Opinion
October 10, 1995
Appeal from the Supreme Court, New York County (Herman Cahn, J.).
Although timely brought, plaintiff's cause of action for breach of an alleged oral contract involving an exchange of her services for a share of defendant's corporate stock is barred by the Statute of Frauds contained in UCC 8-319 ( see, Dillon v Peretti, 176 A.D.2d 497, 498; Goldfinger v. Brown, 169 A.D.2d 702, 703). That plaintiff worked 20 years for defendants without any salary and without even asking what her share of the corporate stock would be or when she would receive it is not unequivocally referable to the alleged oral contract ( see, Anostario v Vicinanzo, 59 N.Y.2d 662, 664). Nor do her allegations that she resigned her position with another company in order to work for defendants support a claim of promissory estoppel ( see, Cunnison v. Richardson Greenshields Sec., 107 A.D.2d 50, 52-54). In any event, even assuming the Statute of Frauds did not apply, the alleged agreement to make plaintiff a "part of the Windjammer family" is too vague to be capable of enforcement ( see, Martin Delicatessen v. Schumacher, 52 N.Y.2d 105, 109), making plaintiff at best an employee at will subject to termination for any reason or no reason ( Murphy v. American Home Prods. Corp., 58 N.Y.2d 293, 300-301). Finally, plaintiff's vague allegations are devoid of the details necessary to support a claim of fraud ( see, Mariani v. Dyer, 193 A.D.2d 456, lv denied 82 N.Y.2d 658), and are also unsupported by proof that defendants never intended to fulfill their alleged promise ( see, Brown v Lockwood, 76 A.D.2d 721, 731-732).
Concur — Sullivan, J.P., Kupferman, Williams and Tom, JJ.