Hart v. Forest Oil Corporation

Full title: DOYLE RUSSELL HART v. FOREST OIL CORPORATION, ET AL

Court: United States District Court, E.D. Louisiana

Date published: Apr 25, 2005

Civil Action No. 03-2776 Section "C" (2) (E.D. La. Apr. 25, 2005)

Opinion

Civil Action No. 03-2776 Section "C" (2).

April 25, 2005

ORDER AND REASONS ¹

1 Meghan Holahan, a third year law student at Tulane University Law School, assisted in the research and preparation of this decision.

HELEN BERRIGAN, Chief Judge, District

Before this Court are several motions for summary judgment filed by defendants. Forest Oil Corporation ("Forest Oil") and Coastal Production Services ("Coastal") and have moved for summary judgment based on their assertion that the plaintiff, Doyle Russell Hart ("Hart") does not qualify as a seaman under the Jones Act. Production Management Industries, Inc. ("PMI") moved initially for summary judgment on the issue of seaman status, but has since moved to strike that motion. Universal Compression Inc. ("Universal") has also moved for summary judgment on the basis that Hart cannot show that Universal was negligent or that its negligence caused his injuries. After having considered the motions, the record and the law, the Motions for Summary Judgment filed by filed by Forest Oil Corporation Coastal Production Services are GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART (Rec. Docs. 72 85), the Motion to Strike filed by Production Management Industries, Inc., is GRANTED (Rec. Doc. 86), and the Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Production Management Industries, Inc. is DISMISSED (Rec. Doc. 82).

The undisputed facts indicate that on September 27, 2001, Hart was employed by Coastal as a B Production Operator working for Forest Oil and based at Saturday Island, a stationary oil platform. Hart used PRINCESS, a 27-foot vessel provided by Forest Oil, to travel to well sites, including those in Magnolia Field. During a normal day, Hart would travel to Magnolia Field, take measurements, check gauges and return to Saturday Island. On occasion, he might be required to stay at Magnolia Field all day. Hart was injured while on a production barge owned by Forest Oil. A worker for Universal had been working on that barge prior to the accident.

Standard of Review

Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that summary judgment shall be granted if the discovery performed by the parties to the suit, admissions and any affidavits "show that there is no genuine issues as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." The moving party has the burden of first presenting the court with support for its motion as well as record evidence in support; subsequent to this, the non-moving party must show the court that there are facts which support the need for a trial. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986). Where the nonmoving party bears the burden of proof at trial, it must go beyond the pleadings to show that there is a genuine issue of material fact.Id., If after adequate time for discovery, that party is unable to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to his case, summary judgment is appropriate. Id.; Matsushita Electricity Industry Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986).

I. Seaman status motions

Hart claims seaman status because he was aboard the production barge at the time of the accident. Forest Oil and Coastal argue that Hart did not have any connection with a vessel in navigation because the barge did not move, had never moved and was stationary, facts to which Hart agrees in his own deposition. (Depo. Hart, pp. 56-60). In the alternative, Hart contends he qualifies for seaman status because he spent a significant portion of his time aboard the PRINCESS. Forest Oil and Coastal claim service on the vessel was incidental to Hart's employment, and that he did not contribute to the function or spend thirty percent of his time aboard PRINCESS. There are two issues presented in these motions: whether the barge qualifies as a vessel in navigation for purposes of the Jones Act, and whether Hart's affiliation with PRINCESS was more than incidental.

Seaman Status Law

In 1995, the United States Supreme Court outlined a two-part test to be used in determining seaman status. Chandris Inc. v. Latsis, 515 U.S. 347 (1995). First, the employee's duties must contribute to the function of the vessel or to its mission; second, "a seaman must have a connection to a vessel in navigation (or to an identifiable group of such vessels) that is substantial in terms of both its duration and its nature."Chandris, 515 U.S. at 368.

The Fifth Circuit provided a list of factors to consider when determining if a structure qualifies as a vessel under the Jones Act. These factors are to be used when floating vessels such as a production barge are in question. "[T]hree factors [are] usually present when floating platforms are not vessels: (1) the structures involved were constructed and used primarily as work platforms; (2) they were moored or otherwise secured at the time of the accident; and (3) although they were capable of movement and were sometimes moved across navigable waters in the course of normal operations, any transportation function they performed was merely incidental to their primary purpose." Burchett v. Marine Equipment Mgm. Corp., 48 F.3d 173, 176 (5^th cir. 1995). The vessel is "in navigation" as used in the Jones Act when it is used for commerce and transportation within navigable waters.Garret v. Dean Shank Drilling Co., 799 F.2d 1007 (5^th cir. 1986). If the structure is not a vessel, it fails the first prong of Chandris.

The Supreme Court has provided guidance regarding the second prong, the worker's relationship to the vessel. Contributing to the function of the vessel means that the crewmember performs the "ship's work." The rule for determining "substantial" and "duration," as adopted by the Supreme Court, requires that the worker spend at least 30 percent of his time contributing to the function of the vessel in order to qualify for seaman status.McDermott International, Inc. v. Wilander, 498 U.S. 337 (1991).

The Barge

After careful review of the record and applicable case law, this Court concludes that the production barge owned by Forest Oil does not meet the requirements for a vessel under Chandris and therefore does not qualify Hart for seaman status. Although Hart contends that he is unable to ascertain how long the barge was located in its stationary position and that it qualifies as a "special purpose vessel," the depositions an discovery presented by the movers support the conclusion that the barge was used strictly as a platform for storing and processing oil and gas. Such a barge-platform is not a vessel in navigation in the Fifth Circuit. Burchett, 48 F.3d at 176. The barge in question was, at all times, ballasted to the waterbed, with many cables and pipes. Further, the barge had not been moved during Hart's employment and there was no intention to move the barge. Testimony was provided that the barge was rusted and no longer could function in navigation. (Depo. Labeth, pp. 15-16). Even if the barge had moved, Hart would not prevail because there was no intention to move it on a regular basis. Barrios v. Engine Gas Compressor Services, 669 F.2d 350 (5^th cir. 1982). For all purposes, the barge was a work platform used to process and store oil. As such, Hart cannot qualify as seaman under the Jones Act based on work performed on the barge and summary judgment as to seaman status through this affiliation with the platform-barge is mandated.

PRINCESS

The parties do not dispute the fact that PRINCESS meets the first prong of the Chandris test and qualifies as a vessel in navigation. What is in dispute is whether Hart's affiliation with this vessel was merely incidental to his employment or whether he spent a substantial portion, at least 30 percent, of his time onboard the vessel. The movers contend that Hart was not assigned to PRINCESS, not was he hired to perform the "ship's work;" he slept and ate on the Saturday Island platform, not on the vessel. Further, the movers assert that Hart was only on board PRINCESS incidentally to the main focus of his employment. Hart claims that he was required to pilot, navigate, load, unload maintain, fuel and perform other tasks associated with PRINCESS.

In Barrios, the plaintiff made the same argument as Hart. Barrios claimed he performed a substantial amount of work aboard the vessels he used to travel from platform to platform. The Fifth Circuit held that there was no showing "that Barrios' work aboard them was other than transitory and incidental to his employment as a mechanic on the compressor station." Barrios, 669 F.2d at 353. Barrios was aboard vessels for approximately two hours each day and never slept or ate aboard them. He did not perform any maintenance. The court found that any work performed by Barrios which aided the vessels' navigational purpose was done voluntarily, as he was not assigned to the vessels. Further, Barrios was only a passenger aboard the vessels and never required to pilot or navigate. In conclusion, the court found Barrios' "employment as a mechanic on the compressor stations did not contribute to the function of the crewboats or to the welfare of the vessels during movement." As such, Barrios was denied recover under the Jones Act. Barrios, 669 F.2d at 354.

Hart asserts he spent a substantial portion of his day aboard PRINCESS and/or attending to its needs. Unlike the plaintiff inBarrios, Hart actually acted as skipper of PRINCESS and was not merely a passenger. He contends this function furthered the mission of the vessel. Hart's immediate supervisor stated in deposition that Hart spent a substantial portion of his time piloting, navigating, loading and unloading PRINCESS, up to 40 percent of his day. (Depo. Labeth, pp. 122-125). Further, PRINCESS was essential to the performance of an operator's job duties. Hart's supervisor also explained that in the process of checking the wells, Hart would not get off the vessel. (Depo. Labeth, pp. 39-40; Depo. Aguillard). In light of this evidence supportive of seaman status, summary judgment as to PRINCESS is inappropriate at this time.²

2 Although this Court recognizes Forest Oil's concerns regarding PMI's motivation in striking its own Motion for Summary Judgment, this Court also recognizes a party's right to make strategic decisions. Therefore, PMI's motion to strike will be granted.

II. Universal's Motion for Summary Judgment

On the day before the plaintiff's accident, Universal's employee Jonathan Esteve ("Esteve") was called to repair a compressor problem on Forest Oil's Magnolia production barge. Esteve could not make the repairs until the next day and the Magnolia Field wells 1 and 3 were "shut in." On September 27, 2001, Esteve arrived at the production barge to perform the necessary repairs to the compressor. Hart arrived later in order to bring the wells back online when he was injured on the production barge.

Universal posits that Hart cannot prove it was negligent in any way that is a legal cause of his injuries. Universal argues that it is undisputed that the accident occurred when the No. 2 pressure separator ruptured due to over-pressure, which was caused by the improper opening of a block valve on the gas outlet line leading to the pressure separator and the failure of several check valves and pop-off valves. It is undisputed that the No. 2 well on the Forest Oil production barge had been taken out of service prior to the accident.

Forest Oil argues in opposition that Esteve is at fault because he noticed that a suction gauge on the compressor was not registering and had been removed, and failed to either turn off the compressor or warn Hart.³ PMI argues in opposition that the rupture could have been prevented by Esteve securing the "system" when the normal suction pressure and suction controller were noted lacking. (Rec. Doc. 104, pp. 1-2). PMI also argues in opposition that the cause of the accident remains under investigation, and refers to a Wood Group Production Service Memorandum ("Wood Group"), which it claims states that the unsafe conditions "detected" by Esteve may have been among the contributing causes of the accident. (Rec. Doc. 104, p. 3).

3 Much of Forest Oil's recitation of the relevant deposition of Esteve is mistated, as pointed out by Universal in reply brief. That portion which is mistated is not considered by the Court.

Universal replies that the missing suction controller had no causal relationship to the over-pressure of the No. 2 separator according to the deposition testimony. In any event, Universal establishes that there is no evidence that Esteve failed to warn Hart of any dangerous condition unknown to Hart, or that Esteve heard the "hissing" noise which preceded the accident before Hart heard it. Universal also relies on the Wood Group memo for vindication.

The Court has been presented with no deposition testimony which establishes fault on the part of Universal. The only evidence of fault and causation is the Wood Group memo, which was produced by Coastal and provides in pertinent part:

The cause of the injuries was created by an over-pressured vessel which ruptured. The vessel, a Low Pressure Separator, was out of service and was thought to be isolated by a check valve, dump valve and closed block valves. A compressor mechanic and a production operator were in process of bringing on a well and assumed that the LPS was not in the process loop. A 3" block valve that was upstream of the LPS was left open, allowing a path from the compressor discharge to the check valve, dump valve and block valves, which come to find out, had previously been cut — therefore enabling a path to the LPS. Also, the 1 "PSV on the LPS failed to release the pressure. So, the apparent cause of the vessel to receive hazardous energy was the assumption that it was blocked from service. Overall preliminary cause analysis seems to be directed toward equipment component failure (wear and age), and operational procedure, which could have ensured the LPS was truly isolated from the high pressure.

The Court does not read this memo as implicating fault on the part of Universal. Where, as here, an adequate time had been provided for discovery, summary judgment in favor of Universal is appropriate in light of the lack of proof as to causative fault on its part.

Accordingly,

IT IS ORDERED that the Motions for Summary Judgment filed by Forest Oil Corporation Coastal Production Services are GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART (Rec. Docs. 72 85), the Motion to Strike filed by Production Management Industries, Inc. is GRANTED (Rec. doc. 86), and the Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Production Management Industries, Inc. is DISMISSED (Rec. Doc. 82).

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Universal Compression, Inc. is GRANTED. (Rec. Doc. 91).