Summary
recognizing that judicial construction of a statute becomes part of the legislation from the time of its enactment
Summary of this case from Mosley v. W.C.A.BOpinion
June 15, 1965.
September 16, 1965.
Appeals — Arbitration — Payment of record costs accrued to date — Appeals taken prior to Budde decision — Judicial construction of statute as part of legislation.
1. Budde v. Sandler, 204 Pa. Super. 36, Fleisher v. Kaufman, 206 Pa. Super. 378, and Madrid Motor Corporation v. Cashan, 206 Pa. Super. 383, Held controlling.
2. Judicial construction of a statute becomes part of the legislation from the time of its enactment.
3. In this case, it was Held that defendants' contention, that it was unconstitutional and unfair to apply the rule of Budde and Fleisher retroactively to cases in which appeals were taken prior to the Budde decision, was Held to be without merit.
Before ERVIN, P.J., WRIGHT, WATKINS, MONTGOMERY, FLOOD, JACOBS, and HOFFMAN, JJ.
Appeals, Nos. 7, 8, 9, and 10, Oct. T., 1965, from order and judgment of County Court of Philadelphia, March T., 1960, No. 2707-B, in case of Harry C. Erb, Inc. et al. v. Shell Construction Co., Inc. et al. Order and judgment affirmed.
Proceeding upon motion of plaintiffs to quash appeal by defendants from award by arbitrators for plaintiffs in action of trespass for personal injuries and property damage.
Order entered quashing appeal, opinion by O'DONNELL, J. Defendants appealed.
Joseph G. Manta, with him James M. Marsh, and LaBrum and Doak, for appellants.
Stephen M. Feldman, with him Joseph G. Feldman, and Feldman Feldman, for appellees.
WRIGHT, J., dissented for the reasons set forth in his dissenting opinion in the case of Fleisher v. Kaufman, 206 Pa. Super. 378
Argued June 15, 1965.
This appeal is controlled by our decisions in Budde v. Sandler, 204 Pa. Super. 36, 201 A.2d 247 (1964), Fleisher v. Kaufman, 206 Pa. Super. 378, 212 A.2d 846 (1965), and Madrid Motor Corporation v. Cashan, 206 Pa. Super. 383, 213 A.2d 284 (1965).
However, the instant case presents an additional issue which we deem advisable to consider here. It has been argued that it is unconstitutional and unfair to apply the rule of Budde and Fleisher retroactively to cases in which appeals were taken prior to the Budde decision. This argument fails because it erroneously equates retroactive application of a judicial decision interpreting an existing statute with retroactive legislation. Judicial construction of a statute becomes part of the legislation from the time of its enactment. Philadelphia v. Schaller, 148 Pa. Super. 276, 280, 25 A.2d 406, 409 (1942).
With regard to the payment of costs the language of the Arbitration Act is clear and unambiguous. Certainly judicial construction of this statute is not necessary to constitute fair notice to appellants of the requirements of appealing.
Order and judgment affirmed.
WRIGHT, J., dissents for the reasons set forth in his dissenting opinion in the case of Fleisher v. Kaufman, 206 Pa. Super. 378, 212 A.2d 846 (1965).