Opinion
1:24-CV-00042-SBP-RAL
03-15-2024
JIHAAD HARRISON, Plaintiff v. SUPERINTENDENT PATRICIA THOMPSON, DEP. SUPT. KURT SUESSER, DEPUTY SUPT. PAUL BROCKLEHURST, CCPM STEVEN SOLIWODA, HEARING EXAMINER RYAN SZELEWSKI, CORR. OFFICER A.C. VASILIK, CORR. OFFICER K. TAYLOR, Defendants
SUSAN PARADISE BAXTER UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION ON PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR A PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION AND MEDIATION HEARING ECF NO. 5
RICHAND A. LANZILLO CHIEF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
I. Recommendation
It is respectfully recommended that Plaintiff Jihaad Harrison's motion for a preliminary injunction be DENIED.
II. Report
A. Background and Plaintiffs Allegations
Plaintiff Jihaad Harrison, an individual currently incarcerated at the State Correctional Institution (“SCI”) at Albion, initiated this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 by filing a motion to proceed in forma pauperis (ECF No. 1) and a Complaint (ECF No. 1 -2) on February 14, 2024. Defendants are seven employees of the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections (“DOC”). The Complaint alleges that Defendants acted with deliberate indifference to Harrison's mental health needs and failed to protect her in violation of her rights under the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution, and carried on a “campaign of harassment and retaliation” and denied her access to grievances in violation of her rights under the First Amendment. See ECF No. 1-2. The Complaint also asserts an intentional infliction of emotional distress claim under Pennsylvania law. These claims arise from the Defendants' allegedly improper search of Harrison's cell, issuance of false misconducts, and an alleged assault. Harrison seeks declaratory, injunctive, and monetary relief from the Defendants.
Harrison's motion to proceed in forma pauperis is pending.
On March 13, 2024, Harrison filed the instant motion for a preliminary injunction and a mediation hearing. ECF No. 5. In her motion, she avers that Defendant Thompson, SCI-Albion's Superintendent, is “denying [her] access to safety and protection” because she has initiated Harrison's transfer to an SCI where Harrison has “enemies.” ECF No. 5. Harrison requests that the Court prevent the DOC from transferring her to any of the sixteen SCIs that currently house any of her twenty-seven “enemies.” See ECF No. 5, p. 2.
B. Standard of Review
As a matter of substance, the party seeking preliminary injunctive relief has the burden of demonstrating: (1) a reasonable probability of success on the merits; (2) irreparable harm if the injunction is denied; (3) that the issuance of an injunction will not result in greater harm to the non-moving party; and (4) that the public interest would best be served by granting the injunction. Council of Alternative Political Parties v. Hooks, 121 F.3d 876, 879 (3d Cir. 1997); Opticians Ass'n of America v. Independent Opticians of America, 920 F.2d 187, 191-92 (3d Cir. 1990).
As the moving party, Plaintiff bears the burden of producing evidence to support the first two factors. See Acierno v. New Castle Cty., 40 F.3d 645, 653 (3d Cir. 1994). Accordingly, the movant must provide facts that clearly support a finding that immediate and irreparable injury will result to the movant if preliminary relief is denied. See United States v. Stazola, 893 F.2d 34, 37 n.3 (3d Cir. 1990); Hohe v. Casey, 868 F.2d 69, 72 (3d Cir. 1989); ECRI v. McGraw-Hill, Inc., 809 F.2d 223, 226 (3d Cir. 1987) (it is not enough to merely show irreparable harm: the plaintiff has the burden of showing immediate irreparable injury, which is more than merely serious or substantial harm and which cannot be redressed with money damages). Absent support for either of the first two factors, a court must deny the request for a preliminary injunction. See Acierno, 40 F.3d at 653 (3d Cir. 1994); Adams v. Freedom Forge Corp., 204 F.3d 475, 484 (3d Cir. 2000).
The purpose of the preliminary injunction is to preserve the status quo until the rights of the parties can be fairly and fully litigated and determined by strictly legal proofs and according to the principles of equity. Wetzel v. Edwards, 635 F.2d 283, 286 (4th Cir. 1980). Thus, the grant of injunctive relief is an “extraordinary remedy which should be granted only in limited circumstances.” American Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. Winback and Conserve Program, Inc., 42 F.3d 1421 (3d Cir. 1994) (quoting Frank's GMC Truck Center, Inc. v. General Motor Corp., 847 F.2d 100, 102 (3d Cir. 1988)). In the prison context, a request for injunctive relief “must always be viewed with great caution because ‘judicial restraint is especially called for in dealing with the complex and intractable problems of prison administration.'” Goff v. Harper, 60 F.3d 518, 520 (8th Cir. 1995) (quoting Rogers v. Scurr, 676 F.2d 1211, 1214 (8th Cir. 1982)). Preliminary injunctive relief is “not a tool for prisoners to use to regulate ‘in every way, every day, the terms and conditions of plaintiff's confinement.. Stiel v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 2017 WL 2656646, at *4 (D.N.J. June 19, 2017) (quoting Muhammad v. Director of Corrections, 2009 WL 161075, at *1 (E.D. Ca. Jan. 22, 2009)). Thus, where a plaintiff requests an injunction that would require the Court to interfere with the administration of a prison, “appropriate consideration must be given to principles of federalism in determining the availability and scope of equitable relief.” Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 379 (1976). The federal courts are not overseers of the day-to-day management of prisons. Prison officials require broad discretionary authority as the “operation of a correctional institution is at best an extraordinarily difficult undertaking.” Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 566 (1974). Accordingly, prison administrators should be accorded wide-ranging deference in the adoption and execution of policies and practices that are needed to preserve internal order and to maintain institutional security. Beard v. Banks, 126 S.Ct. 2572, 2578 (2006); Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 527 (1979).
C. Discussion
Harrison has failed to allege facts to support that she is likely to succeed on the merits of any claim or that she faces immediate irreparable harm absent the granting of her motion. The allegations of her motion are wholly untethered from the claims asserted in her Complaint and, therefore, do not support a likelihood of success on the merits of any of those claims. This disconnect also negates the Court's jurisdiction over the allegations and claims asserted in her motion. See Seldon v. Wetzel, 2020 WL 1495303, at *3 (W.D. Pa. Mar. 6, 2020), report and recommendation adopted, 2020 WL 1493547 (W.D. Pa. Mar. 27, 2020) (quoting Stewart v. Verano, 2015 WL 1636124, at *2 (M.D. Pa. Apr. 8, 2015)) (“the Court completely ‘lacks jurisdiction over claims raised in a motion for injunctive relief where those matters are ‘unrelated to the underlying complaint.'”). See also Pryor v. Harper, 2021 WL 3563372, at *5 (W.D. Pa. Aug. 12, 2021) (quoting Kaimowitz v. Orlando, Fla., 122 F.3d 41, 43 (11th Cir. 1997), amended on reh 'g, 131 F.3d 950 (11th Cir. 1997) (citing De Beers Consol. Mines v. United States, 325 U.S. 212, 220 (1945))) (“A request for injunctive relief must be dismissed if ‘the injunction in question is not of the same character, and deals with a matter lying wholly outside the issues in the suit.'”). Furthermore, even if Harrison's motion related to her Complaint, her assertion that her safety is at risk because she has “enemies” at numerous institutions to which she may be transferred is conclusory and wholly unsupported by factual allegations to support any imminent risk to her safety. Finally, Harrison's motion asks the Court to interject itself directly into matters of routine prison administration, which the Court is loath to do. See Bell, 441 U.S. at 527; Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 566 (1974).
III. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, it is respectfully recommended that Plaintiff Jihaad Harrison's motion for a preliminary injunction and mediation hearing (ECF No. 5) be DENIED.
IV. Notice
In accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Fed.R.Civ.P. 72, the parties may seek review by the district court by filing Objections to the Report and Recommendation within fourteen (14) days of the filing of this Report and Recommendation. Any party opposing the objections shall have fourteen (14) days from the date of service of objections to respond thereto. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b)(2). Failure to file timely objections may waive appellate rights. See Brightwell v. Lehman, 637 F.3d 187, 194 n.7 (3d Cir. 2011); Nara v. Frank, 488 F.3d 187 (3d Cir. 2007).