Opinion
No. 6-094 / 04-0761
Filed March 15, 2006
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Washington County, Dan F. Morrison, Judge.
Kent Harrison appeals from the dismissal of his application for postconviction relief. AFFIRMED.
Phillip B. Mears of Mears Law Office, Iowa City, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Jean D. Pettinger, Assistant Attorney General, and Barbara A. Edmondson, County Attorney, for appellee.
Considered by Zimmer, P.J., and Miller and Hecht, JJ.
Kent Harrison appeals from the dismissal of his application for postconviction relief. We affirm the district court.
In October 2000 the district court found Harrison guilty of operating while intoxicated (OWI), third offense, in violation of Iowa Code section 321J.2 (1999). The court found Harrison had "operated a motorcycle while amphetamines and marijuana were present in his body as measured by his urine." See Iowa Code § 321J.2(1)(c) (including in the offense of OWI operating a motor vehicle "[w]hile any amount of a controlled substance is present in the person, as measured in the person's blood or urine"). Harrison appealed, and this court affirmed his conviction. State v. Harrison, No. 00-1951 (Iowa Ct.App. Dec. 12, 2001).
In March 2003 Harrison filed a pro se application for postconviction relief. Following appointment of counsel, the application was amended to allege the ineffectiveness of trial counsel for failing to move to suppress the urine test results on the basis that law enforcement did not have reasonable grounds to invoke implied consent, and the ineffectiveness of appellate counsel for failing raise the issue in Harrison's direct appeal. The State sought and obtained dismissal of this claim by summary disposition. The district court concluded a motion to suppress would have been denied as "[t]he record is replete with evidence giving the Trooper grounds to invoke the implied consent statute."
The district court also considered and dismissed the original allegations in Harrison's pro se application. However, these claims are not at issue on appeal.
The court's summary disposition of this matter was appropriate if no genuine issue of material fact exists, and the State is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Iowa Code § 822.6 (2003); Summage v. State, 579 N.W.2d 821, 822 (Iowa 1998). Because this matter involves a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, the court could dismiss Harrison's claim if the undisputed facts established either that his attorney's performance met "an objective standard of reasonableness," or that Harrison did not suffer prejudice as a result of any deficiency in counsel's performance. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2064, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674, 693 (1984) (setting forth two-prong test); State v. Cook, 565 N.W.2d 611, 614 (Iowa 1997) (providing an ineffective assistance claim will fail if a defendant is unable to prove either prong). We agree with the district court that, based upon the undisputed facts in the record, Harrison's claim should be dismissed.
In order to invoke implied consent in this particular case, law enforcement was required to have reasonable grounds to believe Harrison had been operating his motorcycle under the influence of a controlled substance or a drug other than alcohol. Reasonable grounds existed if all the facts and circumstances known to the troopers at the time of invocation, including both direct and circumstantial evidence, would have warranted a reasonable person's belief that Harrison had been operating his motorcycle while under the influence of a drug. See Missman v. Iowa Dep't of Transp., 653 N.W.2d 363, 366 (Iowa 2002); Munson v. Iowa Dep't of Transp., 513 N.W.2d 722, 725 (Iowa 1994).
Section 321J.6 provides, in relevant part:
1. A person who operates a motor vehicle in this state under circumstances which give reasonable grounds to believe that the person has been operating a motor vehicle in violation of section 321J.2 . . . is deemed to have given consent to the withdrawal of specimens of the person's . . . urine and to a chemical test or tests of the specimens for the purpose of determining the . . . presence of a controlled substance or other drugs, subject to this section. The withdrawal of the body substances and the test or tests shall be administered at the written request of a peace officer having reasonable grounds to believe that the person was operating a motor vehicle in violation of section 321J.2 . . . and if any of the following conditions exist:
. . . .
f. The preliminary breath screening test was administered and it indicated an alcohol concentration less than the level prohibited by section 321J.2, and the peace officer has reasonable grounds to believe that the person was under the influence of a controlled substance, a drug other than alcohol, or a combination of alcohol and another drug.
Here, the preliminary breath screening test returned a result of .00.
Drug, as that term is used in section 321J.2, "include[s] any substance that affects the body so as to impair an individual's ability to operate a motor vehicle." State v. Bond, 493 N.W.2d 826, 828-29 (Iowa 1992). It encompasses both legal and illegal substances. Id. "Under the influence" is also broadly defined, and occurs when drug consumption affects reason or mental ability, impairs judgment, causes emotions to be "visibly excited," or results in, "to any extent, lost control of bodily actions or motions." State v. Dominguez, 482 N.W.2d 390, 392 (Iowa 1992) (citing Iowa Crim. Jury Instruction 2500.5 (1988)).
Applying these standards, it is readily apparent the circumstances surrounding Harrison's stop provided reasonable grounds for invoking implied consent. As found by the district court in the underlying criminal proceeding, Trooper Curt Seddon observed Harrison
driving his motorcycle erratically[,] . . . tilting the motorcycle and weaving within his own lane. His arms were moving up and down in a jerky manner, . . . his head was moving from side to side[, and] . . . [his] legs were moving in and out.
[After] the defendant got off the motorcycle [h]e waved his arms and could not stand still. The defendant told Trooper Seddon that he had been taking "white crosses" and "black beauties," over-the-counter drugs [cold medication and caffeine pills].
Harrison also failed a field sobriety test conducted at the scene of the stop.
Harrison failed the walk-and-turn test, but passed the horizontal gaze nystagmus test. However, the latter test only indicates the presence of depressants, such as alcohol.
Harrison contends, however, that any reasonable belief created by these circumstances was negated by the results of a multi-step drug evaluation conducted after Harrison was transported to the law enforcement station but prior to the invocation of implied consent. The evaluation was conducted by Trooper Tom Law, a certified drug recognition expert who had also observed Harrison at the scene of the stop. According to Trooper Law, Harrison appeared to be impaired at the scene, but did not exhibit signs of impairment during the evaluation. Harrison asserts that, in light of this fact, law enforcement could no longer hold a reasonable belief he had been operating his motorcycle under the influence of a drug.
The evaluation results provide no evidence that Harrison was under the influence of drugs when he was operating his motorcycle. They do not, however, negate all the other information the troopers possessed at the time implied consent was invoked. We must look to all the circumstances, which include Harrison's behavior at the scene; the evaluation results; and Trooper Law's opinion, based upon his drug recognition training, as to why Harrison exhibited signs of impairment at the stop but not during the evaluation — that the drug or drugs had time to "wear off."
When we consider all the circumstances known to the troopers at the time implied consent was invoked, we agree with the State that they are sufficient to warrant a reasonable belief Harrison was operating his motorcycle under the influence of a drug. Accordingly, the district court did not err in dismissing Harrison's claim.