Opinion
1:23-CV-00303-SPB-RAL
03-15-2024
COREY L. HARRIS SR., Plaintiff v. JULIA ANN WILLIAMS, MARSHALL J. PICCININI, HONORABLE JOHN J. TRUCILLA, CITY OF ERIE POLICE DEPT., AND DEEP STATE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS, Defendants
SUSAN PARADISE BAXTER UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION ON MOTION FOR A TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER ECF NO. 11
RICHARD A. LANZILLO CHIEF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
I. Recommendation
It is respectfully recommended that Plaintiff Corey L. Harris Sr.'s motion for a temporary restraining order (ECF No. 11) be DENIED.
II. Report
Plaintiff Corey L. Harris Sr. brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against “Julia Ann Williams, Marshall J. Piccinni, the Honorable John J. Trucilla, the City of Erie Police Dept., and the Deep State Court of Common Pleas” by filing a motion to proceed in forma paupers (“IFP”) and Complaint on October 30, 2023. See ECF Nos. 1 (IFP), 1-1 (Complaint). Thereafter, the Court denied IFP and administratively closed the action. See ECF No. 7. On March 5, 2024, Harris filed another IFP motion (ECF No. 10), along with a declaration (ECF No. 10-1). In his declaration, Harris alleges that his civil rights were violated during criminal proceedings against him and, as relief, he asks for a new trial. Thereafter, Harris filed the instant motion for a temporary restraining order against Attorney Nicole Sloane and the Erie County Court of Common Pleas “for misrepresentation and for ineffective assistance of counsel.” ECF No. 11. The motion requests that Attorney Sloan be withdrawn as his attorney of record because “petition is herein pro se.” Id.
A. Standard of Review
A temporary restraining order is assessed under the same standards as a preliminary injunction. See, e.g., Alves v. Main, 747 Fed.Appx. Ill. 112 n.3 (3d Cir. 2019) (citing Holland v. Rosen, 895 F.3d 272, 285 (3d Cir. 2018)). As a threshold procedural matter, however,
[t]he court may issue a temporary restraining order without written or oral notice to the adverse party or its attorney only if: (A) specific facts in an affidavit or a verified complaint clearly show that immediate and irreparable injury, loss, or damage will result to the movant before the adverse party can be heard in opposition; and (B) the movant's attorney certifies in writing any efforts made to give notice and the reasons why it should not be required.”Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(b)(1).
The party seeking preliminary injunctive relief has the burden of demonstrating: (1) a reasonable probability of success on the merits; (2) irreparable harm if the injunction is denied; (3) that the issuance of an injunction will not result in greater harm to the non-moving party; and (4) that the public interest would best be served by granting the injunction. Council of Alternative Political Parties v. Hooks, 121 F.3d 876, 879 (3d Cir. 1997); Opticians Ass 'n of America v. Independent Opticians of America, 920 F.2d 187, 191-92 (3d Cir. 1990).
As the moving party, Harris bears the burden of producing evidence to support the first two factors. See Acierno v. New Castle Cty., 40 F.3d 645, 653 (3d Cir. 1994). He must allege facts and produce evidence that clearly support a finding that immediate and irreparable injury will result to the movant if preliminary relief is denied. See United States v. Stazola, 893 F.2d 34, 37 n.3 (3d Cir. 1990); Hohe v. Casey, 868 F.2d 69, 72 (3d Cir. 1989). Absent support for either of the first two factors, a court must deny the request for a preliminary injunction. See Acierno, 40 F.3d at 653 (3d Cir. 1994); Adams v. Freedom Forge Corp., 204 F.3d 475, 484 (3d Cir. 2000).
The purpose of the preliminary injunction is to preserve the status quo until the rights of the parties can be fairly and fully litigated and determined by strictly legal proofs and according to the principles of equity. Wetzel v. Edwards, 635 F.2d 283, 286 (4th Cir. 1980). The grant of injunctive relief is an “extraordinary remedy which should be granted only in limited circumstances.” American Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. Winback and Conserve Program, Inc., 42 F.3d 1421 (3d Cir. 1994) (quoting Frank's GMC Truck Center, Inc. v. General Motor Corp., 847 F.2d 100, 102 (3d Cir. 1988)). In the prison context, a request for injunctive relief “must always be viewed with great caution because ‘judicial restraint is especially called for in dealing with the complex and intractable problems of prison administration.'” Goff v. Harper, 60 F.3d 518, 520 (8th Cir. 1995) (quoting Rogers v. Scurr, 676 F.2d 1211, 1214 (8th Cir. 1982)). Finally, “where an individual seeks ‘immediate or more speedy release,”' as Harris seeks here, he is “asserting a remedy available through a habeas [corpus] petition,” rather than an action pursuant to §1983. Jose M. C. v. Tsoukaris, 467 F.Supp.3d 213, 221 (D.N.J. 2020) (citing Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 494 (1973); Camacho Lopez v. Lowe, 452 F.Supp.3d 150, 158 (M.D. Pa. Apr. 7, 2020)).
B. Discussion
Harris's motion for emergency injunctive relief satisfies none of the requirements for issuance of a temporary restraining order and is facially frivolous. As an initial matter, injunctive relief against Attorney Sloane is unavailable because she is not a party to this case. See Pryor v. Harper, 2021 WL 3563372, at *5 (W.D. Pa. Aug. 12, 2021) (citing McLaughlin v. Zavada, 2019 WL 5697347, at *2 (W.D. Pa. Nov. 4, 2019) (citing Victor v. SCI Smithfield, 2011 WL 6003923, at *4 (M.D. Pa. Nov. 30, 2011) (“pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(d), non-parties to litigation cannot be bound by injunctions unless they have been found to be acting ‘in active concert or participation' with the party against whom injunctive relief is sought”))). Furthermore, the motion is comprised solely of conclusions of law and devoid of factual allegations to support any claim for relief. Harris has alleged nothing to support a likelihood of success on the merits of any conceivable claim against any Defendant or the threat of irreparable harm absent emergency injunctive relief. The motion also seeks relief that may only be pursued in a petition for writ for habeas corpus rather than an action pursuant to § 1983.
III. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, Harris's motion for a temporary restraining order (ECF No. 11) should be DENIED.
IV. Notice
In accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Fed.R.Civ.P. 72, the parties may seek review by the district court by filing Objections to the Report and Recommendation within fourteen (14) days of the filing of this Report and Recommendation. Any party opposing the objections shall have fourteen (14) days from the date of service of objections to respond thereto. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b)(2). Failure to file timely objections may waive appellate rights. See Brightwell v. Lehman, 637 F.3d 187, 194 n.7 (3d Cir. 2011); Nara v. Frank, 488 F.3d 187 (3d Cir. 2007).