Opinion
Civ. No. 97 C 4783.
February 28, 2000.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
This matter is before the Court on Defendants' Motion to Dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1). For the reasons set forth below, the motion is granted.
BACKGROUND
On January 11, 2000, the United States Supreme Court issued its decision in Kimel v. Florida Board of Regents, ___ U.S. ___, 120 S.Ct. 631, 637 (2000), ruling that by expanding the coverage of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq., ("the ADEA") to the States and State employees, Congress violated Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. Based on the Court's ruling, Federal Courts have determined that they no longer have subject matter jurisdiction over ADEA claims brought by current or former State employees against States in their roles as employer. See generally Lowery v. University of Houston-Clear Lake, ___ F. Supp.2d ___, 2000 WL 148948 (S.D. Tex. Feb. 8, 2000); Bailey v. Canan, ___ F. Supp.2d ___, 2000 WL 11001 (S.D. Ind. Jan. 25, 2000); Dunn v. Baltimore Cty. Brd. of Education, ___ F. Supp.2d ___, 2000 WL 150774 (D.Md. Feb. 9, 2000); McGinty v. New York, ___ F. Supp.2d ___, 2000 WL 132720 (N.D.N.Y. Jan. 10, 2000). In the wake of Kimel, other courts have analyzed the applicability of other employee-protective statutes against state entities. See e.g. Kilcullen v. N.Y. State Dept. of Trans., 2000 WL 64909 (N.D.N.Y. Jan. 12, 2000) (Americans With Disabilities Act); Henrietta v. Guiliani, ___ F. Supp.2d ___, 2000 WL 122152 (E.D. N.Y. Jan. 24, 2000) (Americans With Disabilities Act); Cohen v. Nebraska, ___ F. Supp.2d ___, 2000 WL 149634 (D. Neb. Feb. 8, 2000) (Family Medical Leave Act of 1993).
In the case before this Court, Loretta Harris ("Harris"), Judith Knorst ("Knorst") and Sarah Seaton ("Seaton"), all former employees of the University of Illinois at Chicago ("University"), filed suit on July 3, 1997, against the University alleging discrimination on the basis of sex and age (Count I), harassment (Count II), and retaliation (Count III), pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. ("Title VII"), and the ADEA. Following our opinion on the motion for summary judgment of the University, see Harris v. University of Illinois at Chicago, 1999 WL 281346 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 31, 1999), the remaining claims in this case are Harris' age discrimination claim, Seaton's age discrimination, age discrimination-based harassment and retaliation claims. See Harris, 1999 WL 281346 at *14. Following the issuance ofKimel, the University filed a motion to dismiss Plaintiffs' remaining counts pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1), claiming that because it is an agency of the State of Illinois this Court no longer has jurisdiction to adjudicate these matters.
Knorst's complaint was dismissed in its entirety; thus she is out of the case.
LEGAL STANDARD
Rule 12(b)(1) provides for dismissal of claims over which a federal court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. Jurisdiction is the "power to decide" and must be conferred upon a federal court.See In re Chicago, Rock Island Pac. R.R. Co., 794 F.2d 1182, 1188 (7th Cir. 1986). In reviewing a 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss, the court may look beyond the complaint and view any extraneous evidence submitted by the parties to determine whether subject matter jurisdiction exists. See United Transp. Union v. Gateway Western Ry. Co., 78 F.3d 1208, 1210 (7th Cir. 1996) (citingBowyer v. United States Dept. of Air Force, 875 F.2d 632, 635 (7th Cir. 1989). The plaintiff bears the burden of establishing that the jurisdictional requirements have been met. See Kontos v. United States Dept. of Labor, 826 F.2d 573, 576 (7th Cir. 1987). When a party moves for dismissal pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1), the nonmoving party must support its allegations with competent proof of jurisdictional facts. See Thomson v. Gaskill, 315 U.S. 442, 446, 62 S.Ct. 673 (1942). With these principles in mind, we turn to the motion before us.
DISCUSSION
In Kimel, the Court ruled that by extending the coverage of the ADEA to State governments, Congress effectively abrogated the Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity of the States. See Kimel, 120 S.Ct. at 637. However, the Court also ruled that "the ADEA was not a valid exercise of Congress' power under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. The ADEA's purported abrogation of the State's sovereign immunity is accordingly invalid." Id. at 650.
We believe that the effect of Kimel is to eliminate Plaintiffs' actions for age discrimination. Kimel established the Eleventh Amendment immunity of States against age discrimination suits under the ADEA. See Dunn, ___ F. Supp.2d ___, 2000 WL 150774 at *1. This immunity deprives Federal Courts of jurisdiction over such claims against State entities. The University is an agency of the State of Illinois, and for Eleventh Amendment purposes is treated the same as the State. See Kroll v. Board of Trustees of the University of Illinois, 934 F.2d 904, 907 (7th Cir. 1991). Thus, the University is immune under the Eleventh Amendment from any claims by Plaintiffs that are grounded in the ADEA.
Plaintiffs argue that the University waived its ability to plead as an affirmative defense the Court's lack of subject matter jurisdiction over their claims. Unlike a defense based on a lack of personal jurisdiction, a subject matter jurisdiction defense may be raised at any stage of the litigation. See Sadat v. Mertes, 615 F.2d 1176, 1188 (7th Cir. 1980). The Court may also raise the issue sua sponte. See id. Moreover, the defense could not validly have been raised sooner, because the state of the law was that Federal Courts possessed subject matter jurisdiction over ADEA claims against state entities. Thus, prior to the issuance of Kimel in January of 2000, the University could not plead such an affirmative defense, and is not barred from doing so at this juncture.
Plaintiffs next argue that this matter should not be adjudicated by this Court, but should be left to a jury to resolve. In support Plaintiffs cite Pratt Central Park Ltd. Partnership v. Dames Moore. Inc., 60 F.3d 350 (7th Cir. 1995), wherein the Court stated "[w]hen facts needed to oppose jurisdiction are intertwined with the merits of the case, the establishing of these facts should be left to the jury at trial and not resolved in a Rule 12(b)(1) motion."
Pratt, however, involved diversity jurisdiction, and the dispute centered around whether the amount in controversy was sufficient to support the court having jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). See Pratt, 60 F.3d at 351-52. In contrast, the University claims the Court has no subject matter jurisdiction over Plaintiffs' ADEA claims because under Kimel the act may no longer be applied to State entities. Our determination of this issue is not dependent on any factual questions as to the sufficiency of damages or otherwise. Rather, our task involves the straightforward application of Kimel to Plaintiffs' ADEA claims; purely a legal question. Accordingly, we find Plaintiffs' argument unpersuasive.
Next, Plaintiffs argue that their sex discrimination claims are still part of the case because our March 31st minute order did not explicitly dispose of them, even though our written opinion stated otherwise. While it is true that judgments create obligations, not judicial opinions, see Eakin v. Contl. Ill. Natl. Bank, 875 F.2d 114, 118 (7th Cir. 1989), Plaintiffs confuse final judgment orders, which must be set forth in meticulous detail, with minute orders, which are brief summaries of opinions. Indeed, Eakin pertained to whether the final judgment obligated the defendant to pay a sum of money to plaintiff; not whether a minute order attached to an opinion partially granting summary judgment must set forth in painstaking detail the sufficiency, or lack thereof, of every count. For opinions granting partial summary judgment, the opinion itself is the order. Thus, we find Plaintiffs' argument unsustainable, and we shall not dwell on it further.
Finally, Plaintiffs argue that the Supreme Court's decision inKimel does not preclude the Court from granting injunctive relief. This argument flies in the face of well-settled Supreme Court case law, which for more than 65 years has applied the jurisdictional bar of the Eleventh Amendment to cases against the States notwithstanding the type of relief sought. See Penhurst State Sch. Hospital v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 100, 104 S.Ct. 900 (1984); Missouri v. Fiske, 290 U.S. 18, 27, 54 S.Ct. 18 (1933)("Expressly applying to suits in equity as well as at law, the [Eleventh] Amendment necessarily embraces demands for the enforcement of equitable rights and the prosecution of equitable remedies when these are asserted and prosecuted by an individual against a State."). Accordingly, we hold that Kimel has eliminated jurisdiction against the University for this suit, compelling this Court to dismiss Plaintiffs' ADEA claims, their sole remaining claims in this lawsuit.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Defendants' motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction is granted and Plaintiffs' complaint is dismissed in its entirety.