Opinion
Cause No. IP00-0140-C-H/G
August 14, 2001
ENTRY ON DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Plaintiff Nikki Harris has sued MoorMan's, Inc., her former employer, and its parent company, Archer Daniels Midland Company, for violating Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Harris alleges that Charlie Patrick, her immediate supervisor, told several "blonde jokes" over the course of several months. Harris contends that these remarks created a hostile work environment because of her gender. Harris also alleges that she was terminated in retaliation for complaining about the "blonde jokes." Defendants have moved for summary judgment on both counts. Even when the evidence is viewed in the light reasonably most favorable to Harris, she has failed to show that the alleged harassment in this case was sufficiently severe or pervasive to survive summary judgment. Harris has also failed to support her retaliation claim. Defendants' motion for summary judgment is granted as to both the hostile environment harassment claim and the retaliation claim.
Summary Judgment Standard
The standard for summary judgment is well established. If the pleadings, discovery responses, depositions, and any affidavits show there is no genuine issue of any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, the court shall grant a motion for summary judgment. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the court must consider the evidence in the record in the light reasonably most favorable to the non-moving party, giving that party the benefit of all genuine disputes of fact and the benefit of all reasonable inferences from the evidence. The court must ask, in essence, "If the evidence at trial were the evidence submitted on paper with the motion for summary judgment, would the court have to grant a motion for judgment as a matter of law?" See, e.g., Venters v. City of Delphi, 123 F.3d 956, 962 (7th Cir. 1997); Fuka v. Thomson Consumer Electronics, 82 F.3d 1397, 1402 (7th Cir. 1996).
If, after viewing the evidence through this lens, there is no question of material fact remaining in the case, then summary judgment should be granted. However, a motion for summary judgment does not provide a vehicle for resolving issues of credibility or for choosing from among competing reasonable inferences from the evidence, such as the reasons for an employer's decision to fire an employee. See Wallace v. SMC Pneumatics, Inc., 103 F.3d 1394, 1396 (7th Cir. 1997); Pettis v. Alexander Graphics, Ltd., 52 F. Supp.2d 950, 954 (S.D.Ind. 1999).
There is no separate version of Rule 56 that applies only to employment discrimination cases. See Wallace, 103 F.3d at 1396. In an employment discrimination case, as in any case, the court must consider the record carefully and do its best to ensure that it does not substitute its judgment for a jury's resolution of genuinely disputed material issues of fact, but the court must also grant summary judgment to a party entitled to it. Cf. Adusumilli v. City of Chicago, 164 F.3d 353, 360-61 (7th Cir. 1998) (courts should apply summary judgment with "particular care" in employment discrimination cases).
Undisputed Facts I. Harris's Job
MoorMan's sells livestock nutrition products and is a subsidiary of Archer Daniels Midland Company. Porter Shepherd is the National Business Manager of MoorMan's the equine business unit. He also supervised Charlie Patrick, who is the National Sales Manager for the equine team. Patrick hired Nikki Harris in September 1997 as Senior Account Representative and continued to supervise her when she became an Equine Sales Specialist for the equine team in June 1998. Harris reported directly to Patrick.
Harris worked from her home. Initially her assigned territory was central Indiana, but her territory was expanded in June 1998 to include the entire state of Indiana. Consequently, her job required much travel. She spent a limited amount of time with Patrick. Except for two months out of the year, Harris saw Patrick only about twice a month. During April and October, Harris saw Patrick every day for a week. Some of these contacts were continuous, as when doing a "ride along" for a day, but others were sporadic, such as at trade shows.
II. Patrick's Offending Behavior
Harris has offered evidence that, in the ten months between October 1997 and July 1998, Patrick made six "blonde jokes" or remarks in her presence. Harris was the obvious target of some but not all of these remarks.
Defendants deny that Patrick made all the comments attributed to him, but, as defendants also recognize, the court must assume for purposes of summary judgment that he did so.
1. In October 1997, Harris backed Patrick's truck into another vehicle. Patrick stated, "That's what I get for letting a blonde drive my truck."
2. In January 1998, Harris attended a computer-training meeting, during which she experienced difficulty in operating the machine. Patrick responded that they would have "to go a little slower for the blondes."
3. In February 1998, when Harris experienced difficulty with an overhead screen, Patrick commented, "Only a blonde could have this much trouble with something so simple."
4. In April 1998, Harris attended a business dinner with Patrick and two other co-workers at which Patrick told a "dumb blonde" joke. The joke was not explicitly sexual in nature.
5. In June 1998, Patrick told "dumb blonde" jokes of an unspecified nature at a horse show.
6. Then, in July 1998, Patrick introduced his team to an audience of over 200 people, by saying, "I can't seem to remember their names and with them being blondes, they won't be able to either." Shepherd and Patrick both testified that when Shepherd heard the comment, he told Patrick that the comment was inappropriate and would not be tolerated, and he required Patrick to apologize to his team. Harris and Linda Porter, another equine team member who also has blonde hair, testified that Patrick's apology consisted of a statement to the following effect: "Porter [Shepherd] told me I should apologize to the girls since someone could file a lawsuit." That comment was the last inappropriate comment Patrick made, based at least on the record before the court. Harris did not complain to anyone in MoorMan's management about any of the comments until December 1998, as discussed below.
III. Harris's Sales Performance
On April 8, 1998, both Shepherd and Patrick signed a performance report for Nikki Harris which gave her a score of 3.42 for her overall performance (the "Sum of Work Outcomes and Work Behaviors") on a scale of 0-4. A score of 3.42 is described as "meets expectations;" a score of 3.50 is described as "exceeds expectations." Pl. Ex. 9.
In July 1998, Harris exceeded her monthly sales target. From that point on, until December 1998, Harris's sales consistently fell below her monthly targets. Sales targets for all of Shepherd's team were set at 20% higher than sales from the preceding year. For the first quarter of fiscal year 1999 (July 1998 through September 1998), Harris's sales were 5.85% below her target. She had exceeded sales from the previous year, but had still fallen below her goal. For the second quarter of fiscal year 1999 (October 1998 through December 1998), Harris's sales were 38.40% below her target and 26.07% below sales from the previous year. Harris contends that some sales through Central Farm Supply, which was headquartered in Kentucky, should have been included in her figures but were not.
MoorMan's objects to Harris's evidence on this point, but she testified in 2 her deposition that Patrick gave her this information. Patrick's statements to Harris are admissible against MoorMan's as admissions. MoorMan cannot defeat admission of the evidence by offering evidence that Patrick did not have personal knowledge of the information in the reports. The dispute is not material, however, because Harris has not come forward with any evidence as to the amount of the alleged discrepancy or whether it would have had a significant effect on the amounts by which she missed her targets.
Harris was not the only team member to fail to meet her sales goals, but her performance was the poorest of all the team members, at least as a percentage of quarterly sales targets. The table below details the performance of all the team members, including Harris, in terms of their success in meeting their goals for periods 2 through 6 (the periods during which Harris' performance declined). The table below details the success of each team member in achieving their goals for the first and second quarters of fiscal year 1999.
The percentages for Roger Vandermolen, Randy Musolino, Al Fenchel, Carl Segerhammar were calculated by the court using base figures provided by the plaintiff.
1st Qrtr 2nd Qrtr Nikki Harris -5.86% -38.4% Linda Topp +17.49% -12.66% Russ Lange +43.91% -4.10% Linda Porter +12.69% -15.61% Pam Norsworthy -16.45% -9.14% Larry Henry -13.7% -12.52% Roger Vandermolen -3.0% -25.82% Randy Musolino -16.95% -9.3% Al Fenchel +62.22% +138.61% Carl Segerhammar -22.28% -1.47%
Between September 1998 and November 1998, several incidents occurred which defendants argue reflected negatively on Harris' performance. Harris arrived late at a sales training meeting at which she was to give a presentation; she left advertising banners at a horse show; she failed to videotape a presentation as instructed; and she mailed in-store displays to customers rather than setting them up personally. Defendants contend that these actions manifested a lack of focus on the part of Harris. Harris does not dispute that the events described above occurred, although she argues her actions were not erroneous under the circumstances.
IV. Harris's Termination
On December 9, 1998, Patrick, at Shepherd's request, met with Harris to discuss Harris's declining sales. Patrick asked Harris to prepare a 30-60-90 day plan of action for increasing sales, which Harris did. Shepherd testified that he found that Harris's plan lacked specificity.
On December 9, 1998, in the context of another dispute, Harris complained to Patrick, telling him that she did not appreciate the "dumb blonde" jokes and that they were creating a hostile work environment. Harris Dep. 200, 245-46. (The evidence supporting any explicit reference to a "hostile work environment" is very vague, but MoorMan's has accepted it for purposes of summary judgment.) Harris also testified that she suggested to Patrick that she and Shepherd talk about Patrick's comments. Id. The undisputed evidence shows that this meeting in December was five months after Patrick's last "dumb blonde" comment — the one that drew the warning from Shepherd and the requirement that Patrick apologize. After the meeting, Patrick and Harris prepared memoranda with conflicting accounts of the substance of the meeting. Neither memorandum refers to any discussion of the "dumb blonde" comments or any allegation of a hostile work environment.
Harris, Patrick, and Shepherd scheduled a meeting for January 4th, but it was cancelled because Harris was sick. The meeting was rescheduled for January 18th. Shepherd testified that, as of January 18th, he was concerned about Harris's sales but had not gotten to the point of talking to personnel about terminating her. Shepherd Dep. 59. Prior to January 18th, Harris's contact with Shepherd had been limited to a single four or five hour "ride along."
At the meeting, Harris produced a tape recorder. Shepherd informed her that she was not permitted to tape record the meeting. Harris insisted, and no meeting occurred. Harris testified that she intended to discuss her concerns about Patrick at the meeting and for that reason wanted to record the conversation. Harris Dep. 139-40. She also admitted, however, that she never told Shepherd that she wanted to talk about any concerns about Patrick, id., including the "dumb blonde" comments that had last occurred five months earlier.
Shepherd testified that he and John Jones, a Moorman's Human Resources representative, decided to terminate Harris because of her dropping sales, the reports of her inconsistent behavior, and her departure from the January 18th meeting. Shepherd Dep. 64-66. Shepherd and Jones testified that they did not have any knowledge of Harris' concerns about Patrick prior to making the decision to terminate her. After they made the decision, Jones asked Patrick to prepare a memorandum on Harris's performance problems but did not tell Patrick why the memorandum was needed. (The memorandum is Plaintiff's Exhibit 11.) On January 22, 1999, Harris was informed by Patrick and Brent Allen, another Human Resources representative, that her employment was being terminated.
On March 13, 1999, Harris filed her charge of sex discrimination and retaliatory discharge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. Harris alleges that she was terminated because Patrick knew she was going to report his allegedly discriminatory behavior to Shepherd. Defendants respond that Shepherd and Jones, not Patrick, made the decision to fire Harris, and that neither Shepherd nor Jones knew of Harris's unhappiness with Patrick's behavior. Harris also contends that Patrick's comments altered the terms and conditions of her employment by undermining her efforts to build a professional relationship with her clients and by damaging her credibility.
Discussion
Harris brings two distinct claims under Title VII — for hostile environment harassment amounting to sex discrimination during her employment, and for retaliation in firing her because she complained about the harassment.
I. Hostile Environment Harassment Claim
Title VII prohibits employers from discriminating "against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2. Creating a hostile or abusive work environment is one way of altering the conditions of a person's employment. Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 66 (1986). To establish a hostile work environment claim, the facts must show that "the plaintiff was, because of her sex, subjected to such hostile, intimidating, or degrading behavior . . . as to affect adversely the conditions under which she worked." Perry v. Harris Chernin, Inc., 126 F.3d 1010, 1013 (7th Cir. 1997), quoting Carr v. Allison Gas Turbine Div., General Motors Corp., 32 F.3d 1007, 1009 (7th Cir. 1994).
A. Because of Sex?
"Title VII is not a `general civility code' for the workplace . . .; it does not prohibit harassment in general." Spearman v. Ford Motor Co., 231 F.3d 1080, 1086 (7th Cir. 2000), quoting Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 81 (1998). Title VII prohibits discrimination based on a person's sex. Sexual harassment, harassment that has a sexual component, is one form of sex discrimination. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 65. Other forms of harassment are prohibited by Title VII, including harassment which is directed at a person because of her gender. Both sexual harassment and sex-based harassment are actionable under Title VII. See Bilbrey v. Werts Novelty Co., 881 F. Supp. 370, 375-76 (S.D.Ind. 1994) ("The predicate acts which support a hostile-environment sexual-harassment claim need not be explicitly sexual in nature . . . . Rather, the key issue is whether members of one sex are exposed to disadvantages terms or conditions of employment to which members of the other sex are not exposed.") (internal quotations and citation omitted).
The harassment of which Harris complains is better described not as sexual harassment but as sex-based harassment. Defendants argue that Patrick's remarks do not constitute harassment because of sex because the remarks referred to Harris's hair color, not her gender.
While men with blonde hair have occasionally been the targets of "dumb blonde" jokes, any American adult knows the principal targets of such remarks historically have been women. Even occasional jokes about men are ordinarily understood (and good ones treated as funny) only as ironic variations on the cliches about "dumb blonde" women. Also, there is no evidence that Patrick directed any of his "dumb blonde" humor toward any men. A jury could reasonably find that Patrick made the comments because Harris is female. Sex-based discrimination can occur where members of one sex are exposed to negative work conditions to which members of the opposite sex are not. See Bilbrey, 881 F. Supp. at 375-76.
B. Severe or Pervasive?
While a jury could find that Patrick made his comments because of gender, the undisputed facts show that those comments did not violate Title VII. "[N]ot all workplace conduct that may be described as `harassment' affects a `term, condition, or privilege' of employment within the meaning of Title VII." Meritor, 477 U.S. at 67. For "harassment to be actionable, it must be sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim's employment and create an abusive working environment." Id. (internal quotations omitted). Both subjective and objective standards apply. The plaintiff must show both that she believed her work environment was hostile and that her belief was objectively reasonable. Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21-22 (1993).
Viewing the evidence in the light reasonably most favorable to the plaintiff, the court assumes plaintiff believed that her environment was hostile, but her evidence fails to meet the objective standard for hostility. The "occasional vulgar banter, tinged with sexual innuendo, of coarse or boorish workers" does not always create a sexually hostile environment. Baskerville v. Culligan International Co., 50 F.3d 428, 430 (7th Cir. 1995) (reversing judgment for employee). As the Supreme Court has cautioned, "`simple teasing,' . . . offhand comments, and isolated incidents (unless extremely serious) will not amount to discriminatory changes in the `terms and conditions of employment.'" Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 788 (1998).
The Seventh Circuit has held on numerous occasions that certain facts, as a matter of law, did not establish actionable sexual harassment. See, e.g., Galloway v. General Motors Service Parts Operations, 78 F.3d 1164, 1167 (7th Cir. 1996) (affirming summary judgment where co-worker repeatedly called plaintiff a "sick bitch"); Koelsch v. Beltone Electronics Corp., 46 F.3d 705, 706-07 (7th Cir. 1995) (affirming summary judgment where employer rubbed his foot on plaintiff's leg on one occasion and grabbed her buttocks on a separate occasion); Saxton v. American Tel. and Tel. Co., 10 F.3d 526, 528 (7th Cir. 1993) (affirming summary judgment where co-worker touched and kissed plaintiff in a bar, and "lurched" at her while taking a walk in a park); Weiss v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of Chicago, 990 F.2d 333, 337 (7th Cir. 1993) (affirming summary judgment where one co-worker asked plaintiff for dates, called plaintiff a "dumb blonde," put his hand on her shoulder several times, placed "I love you" signs in her work areas, and attempted to kiss her in a bar).
The evidence of harassment in this case consists of a half dozen non-sexual comments over a period of nine months. Harris has offered no evidence that these comments actually affected either her clients' or her co-workers' assessment of her. She has not cited any case from any jurisdiction treating such mild and sporadic comments as actionable under Title VII. From an objective standpoint, these incidents did not approach the level of offensiveness of the behavior in the cases cited above. If instances of crude sexual comments and offensive physical touching, such as those described in the cases above, do not rise to the level of "severe or pervasive," then neither do Patrick's attempted jokes. Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on the hostile environment claim.
II. Retaliation
Harris also claims she was fired for complaining about Patrick's behavior. In addition to prohibiting sex discrimination, Title VII prohibits an employer from retaliating against an employee because the employee "has made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under" Title VII. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a). The purpose of subsection 3(a) is to protect employees' ability to assert their rights.
Under the McDonnell Douglas burden shifting method of proving discrimination, and in the absence of explicit evidence of retaliatory motive, the plaintiff must first establish a prima facie case of retaliation. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973). To establish a prima facie case of retaliation, Harris must show that (1) she engaged in statutorily protected activity; (2) she suffered an adverse employment action, and (3) there is a causal link between the protected activity and the adverse action. See Mathur v. Board of Trustees of Southern Illinois University, 207 F.3d 938, 941-42 (7th Cir. 2000). If the plaintiff can establish a prima facie case, the burden shifts to the employer to state a "legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason" for the adverse action. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802. If the employer states such a reason, the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to show that the "proffered reasons are pretextual and that [the] actual reason was discriminatory." Adusumilli v. City of Chicago, 164 F.3d 353, 362 (7th Cir. 1998).
On the first element — statutorily protected activity — the plaintiff need not prove that the underlying conduct about which she complains actually violated Title VII. It is sufficient if she honestly and reasonably believed there was such a violation. E.g., Dey v. Colt Const. Dev. Co., 28 F.3d 1446, 1457-58 (7th Cir. 1994). The undisputed evidence here shows that Harris never complained about Patrick's comments to anyone other than Patrick himself. Reading Harris's deposition testimony perhaps too generously, she told Patrick in December 1998 that his comments had created a hostile work environment. The undisputed evidence also shows that Patrick's last offensive comment had been made five months earlier, and that the comment had drawn a warning from Shepherd, as well as a demand by Shepherd that Patrick apologize.
In light of the Supreme Court's recent decision in Clark County Sch. Dist. v. Breeden, 121 S.Ct. 1508, 1510 (2001), it is doubtful that even an honest belief by Harris that she had been subjected to a violation of Title VII could be deemed reasonable. In Clark County, the Supreme Court summarily reversed a Court of Appeals decision and ordered dismissal of a retaliation claim. The claim had been based on a complaint about one incident in which the plaintiff and others had been reviewing records of a sexually-charged incident between an applicant for employee and another co-worker. The Supreme Court held that no reasonable person could have believed the incident violated Title VII, and that a complaint about the incident therefore could not support a retaliation claim. 121 S.Ct. at 1510. Harris's claim here — based on a complaint to Patrick about six relatively mild comments over a period of ten months, which had ended five months earlier — is only marginally stronger than the claim in Clark County. Ultimately, however, Harris's claim fails on the issue of causation, so the court need not resolve the issue of protected activity.
As for the second element, Harris plainly suffered an adverse employment action when she was fired. The decisive issue is the third element — causation. Harris has not come forward with evidence of causation to survive summary judgment on her retaliation claim. The only protected activity arguably supported by the evidence in this case is Harris's complaint to Patrick about his behavior in the December 1998 meeting (in which her falling sales figures were obviously the main subject). See Pl. Exs. 6 7 (Patrick's and Harris's memoranda on the meeting). That meeting led to the meeting with Shepherd in January 1999, which did not go forward when Harris insisted on tape-recording it. The undisputed evidence shows Shepherd and Jones made the decision to fire Harris, and that neither one knew of any complaint by Harris about Patrick's earlier "blonde" comments.
If the decision-maker is not aware of any arguably protected activity, a plaintiff cannot establish the causation needed to show retaliation. See Miller v. American Family Mutual Ins. Co., 203 F.3d 997, 1007-08 (7th Cir. 2000); Dey v. Colt Const. Dev. Co., 28 F.3d at 1458 ("We agree that there generally can be no causal link between protected activity and an adverse employment action if the employer remained unaware of the protected activity.").
To overcome this problem in her case, Harris argues that Patrick — the target and audience of her only complaint — actually caused her to be fired, so that Shepherd and Jones were merely what the Seventh Circuit has called "cat's paws" for Patrick's retaliation. See, e.g., Willis v. Marion County Auditor's Office, 118 F.3d 542, 547 (7th Cir. 1997); Shager v. Upjohn Co., 913 F.2d 398, 405 (7th Cir. 1990) (holding that if review committee that was unaware of district manager's age-based animus acted "as the conduit of [manager's] prejudice — his cat's paw — the innocence of its members would not spare the company from liability").
The undisputed evidence shows that Shepherd and Jones knew of Harris's falling sales and her refusal to participate in the scheduled meeting with Shepherd unless she could tape-record it. The undisputed evidence also shows that Jones asked Patrick to prepare his memorandum dated January 19, 1999, after Jones and Shepherd had made the decision to fire Harris. This evidence undermines any inference that Shepherd and Jones were merely acting as Patrick's instruments or "cat's paws" to retaliate against Harris for complaining (in December 1998 about conduct that had stopped in July 1998). "[W]hen the causal relationship between the subordinate's illicit motive and the employer's ultimate decision is broken, and the ultimate decision is clearly made on an independent and a legally permissive basis, the bias of the subordinate is not relevant." Willis, 118 F.3d at 547.
Harris also contends she was terminated in retaliation for her supposed attempt to complain to Shepherd on January 18, 1999. However, Harris has no evidence that Shepherd knew she was attempting to complain about Patrick's comments. She did not tell Shepherd her purpose, and she had never complained to Shepherd about Patrick. Shepherd could not have fired Harris to retaliate against her for her uncommunicated intention to complain on January 18th.
Harris has also failed to show that MoorMan's asserted motivation for her termination was pretextual. To show pretext, Harris must demonstrate that MoorMan's justification for her termination was either lacking a factual basis or so insufficient as to call into question the MoorMan's credibility:
Establishing pretext requires more than excusing the employer's stated reason for its decision; the plaintiff must call the employer's honesty into question by rebutting the reason given . . . . In other words, arguing about the accuracy of the employer's assessment is a distraction, . . . because the question is not whether the employer's reasons for a decision are right but whether the employer's description of its reasons is honest.
Sweeney v. West, 149 F.3d 550, 557 (7th Cir. 1998) (internal quotations and citations omitted).
Harris tries to build a pretext argument by showing that MoorMan's was not consistent in its treatment of her and other employees. She points out that other sales representatives also missed their sales targets. The undisputed facts also show, however, that no other sales representative missed her sales targets by nearly as much. In any sales organization, a sales representative who consistently misses sales targets by large margins should expect her job to be vulnerable. An employer need not fire everyone who missed her target in order to fire the person who missed by the widest margin.
Harris also argues that MoorMan's gave inconsistent reasons for firing her. An employee may show pretext by providing evidence tending to prove that the employer's proffered reasons are factually baseless, were not the actual motivation for the discharge in question, or were insufficient to motivate the discharge. Gordon v. United Airlines, Inc., 246 F.3d 878, 888-89 (7th Cir. 2001). Changing reasons for a decision can also support an inference of pretext. See, e.g., Stalter v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 195 F.3d 285, 291 (7th Cir. 1999) (reversing summary judgment; employer's change in explanation for firing was evidence of pretext).
MoorMan's core reason for firing Harris has always been that her sales were falling well below her sales targets. That reason was not factually baseless or insufficient to motivate a discharge. It is supported by undisputed evidence. The fact that MoorMan's has also documented other relatively minor problems (the facts of which also are not disputed) does not call into question the honesty of the given reasons. It is not unusual for an employer to have a principal reason for a decision and to collect other complaints and criticisms in the course of both making and defending the decision. On its official record of the discharge, MoorMan's gave as the reason: "Terminated due to Performance." Pl. Ex. 10. The form instructs that the reason should be "brief and factual."
In short, there is no inconsistency here sufficient to support an inference of pretext. The court "need not abandon good reason and common sense in assessing an employer's actions," and "the more objectively reasonable a belief is, the more likely it will seem that the belief was honestly held." Gordon, 246 F.3d at 889, quoting Flores v. Preferred Technical Group, 182 F.3d 512, 516 (7th Cir. 1999).
Viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, Harris has not presented sufficient evidence to allow a reasonable to jury to infer that her complaint to Patrick (or her intent to complain to Shepherd) caused her termination or that defendants' stated reason for firing her was pretextual. Accordingly, the court grants defendants' motion for summary judgment as to the retaliation claim.
Conclusion
Defendants' motion for summary judgment is granted as to all claims. Plaintiff's motion to strike a portion of defendants' supplemental reply brief and defendants' motion to strike plaintiff's surreply brief are both denied. Final judgment will be entered accordingly.
So ordered.