Opinion
No. 1 CA-CV 14-0845
11-24-2015
JASON LEE HARRIS, Plaintiff/Appellant, v. MARICOPA COUNTY SUPERIOR COURT, Defendant/Appellee.
COUNSEL Jason Lee Harris, Phoenix Plaintiff/Appellant Arizona Attorney General's Office, Phoenix By Diana Day Counsel for Defendant/Appellee
NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION. UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE. Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
No. CV2014-013196
The Honorable Douglas Gerlach, Judge
AFFIRMED
COUNSEL Jason Lee Harris, Phoenix
Plaintiff/Appellant
Arizona Attorney General's Office, Phoenix
By Diana Day
Counsel for Defendant/Appellee
MEMORANDUM DECISION
Presiding Judge Donn Kessler delivered the decision of the Court, in which Judge Andrew W. Gould and Judge Patricia K. Norris joined. KESSLER, Judge:
¶1 Appellant Jason Lee Harris appeals the trial court's dismissal of his complaint against the Maricopa County Superior Court ("Superior Court") pursuant to Arizona Rule of Civil Procedure ("Rule") 12(b)(6). For the following reasons, we affirm.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
¶2 Harris filed a complaint against the Superior Court alleging that in separate criminal cases, two court commissioners violated his right to due process by allowing the cases to proceed despite the fact that in an earlier case the court had concluded Harris was incompetent to stand trial and there was no substantial probability he would regain competency.
¶3 The court dismissed Harris' complaint sua sponte pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), concluding that Harris had failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, Harris had failed to comply with the notice of claim requirements in Arizona Revised Statutes ("A.R.S.") section 12-821.01 (Supp. 2015), and the only named defendant, the Superior Court, was a non-jural entity incapable of being sued. After the court filed the final judgment with Rule 54(c) language, Appellees moved to dismiss the complaint. The court declared that the motion was moot.
Unless amended in pertinent part after the underlying events, we cite to the current version of any Arizona statutes.
¶4 Harris timely appealed. We have jurisdiction pursuant to A.R.S. § 12-2101(A)(1) (Supp. 2015).
DISCUSSION
¶5 When reviewing a dismissal pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), we "assume the truth of the well-pled factual allegations [in the complaint] and indulge all reasonable inferences therefrom." Cullen v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co., 218 Ariz. 417, 419, ¶ 7 (2008). Dismissal is appropriate "only if as a matter of law [ ] plaintiffs would not be entitled to relief under any interpretation of the facts susceptible of proof." Coleman v. City of Mesa, 230 Ariz. 352, 356, ¶ 8 (2012) (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). We review an order dismissing a complaint de novo. Id. at 355, ¶ 7.
¶6 A governmental entity may not sue or be sued unless it "legally exists and is legally capable of being sued." Yamamoto v. Santa Cruz Cty. Bd. of Supervisors, 124 Ariz. 538, 539 (App. 1979). A court is not sui juris and is therefore not a proper party defendant, so the complaint against the court should be dismissed. Id.
¶7 Harris asserts dismissal was improper because the Superior Court is a municipality and therefore liable to civil suit. We disagree. The named defendant, the Superior Court, is not a municipality; it is a branch of the State and is a non-jural entity, incapable of being sued. See Ariz. Const. arts. III and VI, §§ 10-14; Yamamoto, 124 Ariz. at 539. Because a court is a non-jural entity and is incapable of suing or being sued, the trial court's dismissal was appropriate.
¶8 Generally, before dismissing a complaint with prejudice for failure to state a claim, a court should give the plaintiff an opportunity to amend the complaint if amendment would cure the complaint's legal defects. Wigglesworth v. Mauldin, 195 Ariz. 432, 439, ¶ 26 (App. 1999); see Walls v. Ariz. Dep't. of Pub. Safety, 170 Ariz. 591, 597 (App. 1991). This is especially true if the only defect is a misnomer of the defendant. Simon v. Maricopa Med. Ctr., 225 Ariz. 55, 59, ¶ 10 (App. 2010). However, if amendment would not cure the complaint's legal defects, the court need not provide an opportunity to amend and dismissal with prejudice is appropriate. See id. at 61, ¶ 19 (explaining that when an action is brought against a court based on actions of court employees which are entitled to judicial immunity, dismissal rather than amendment of the complaint is the proper course).
¶9 Harris never requested leave to amend the complaint. However, an amendment to name the proper party would have been futile because the alleged liability was based on actions of court commissioners performing judicial functions. As such, the commissioners are absolutely immune from liability, absent certain exceptions not present here. See Antoine v. Byers & Anderson, Inc., 508 U.S. 429, 436 (1993); Emerson v. Garcia, 1 CA-CR 14-0854, 2015 WL 5822593, at * 2, ¶¶ 8-9 (Ariz. App. Oct. 6, 2015) (mem. decision) (citing exceptions to judicial immunity). Given that immunity, dismissal rather than permitting Harris to amend was the correct result. See Simon, 225 Ariz. at 61, ¶ 19; Yamamoto, 124 Ariz. at 539-40.
The Defendant/Appellee also argues that dismissal was proper because Harris did not serve the Attorney General pursuant to Rule 4.1(h)(1). Given our holding, we do not need to address this argument. --------
CONCLUSION
¶10 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm.