Harris v. Beadle

Full title: DOUGLAS E. HARRIS, SR., Plaintiff, vs. BRENDA BEADLE, et al., Defendants

Court: United States District Court, D. Nebraska

Date published: Mar 16, 2004

4:03CV3148 (D. Neb. Mar. 16, 2004)

Opinion

4:03CV3148

March 16, 2004

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

JOSEPH BATAILLON, District Judge

This matter is before the court on filing no. 13, the Motionto Dismiss filed by defendant-Mark E. Weilage; and filing no. 19, the Motionto Dismiss filed by defendants-Brenda Beadle and the Douglas County Attorney. The plaintiff has sued the defendants in their individual and official capacities.

After the plaintiff, Douglas E. Harris, Sr., had served a sentence for sexual assault of a child, the defendants allegedly caused the plaintiff to be involuntarily committed under Nebraska's Mental Health Commitment Act. The plaintiff contends that his commitment was wrongfully procured and violated his right to due process. As alleged in the complaint, Mark E. Weilage, Ph.D., a psychologist, wrote a letter to Brenda Beadle, Deputy County Attorney, representing that the plaintiff had committed six felony sexual assaults, whereas the plaintiff had only two such convictions as an adult. Nevertheless, the plaintiff alleges that because of the misinformation passed on by Weilage and Beadle, an erroneous reference to six sexual assaults occurred in proceedings before the Mental Health Board, resulting in the plaintiff's involuntary commitment for treatment.

The plaintiff's attorney corrected the record in the commitment proceedings by explaining that the plaintiff had two convictions, not six. Nevertheless, the plaintiff seeks $1.5 million in damages for the defendants' "criminal libel."

None of the parties provides the date of the mental health hearing in which the alleged defamation occurred. However, the pleadings suggest that the commitment hearing occurred shortly after the plaintiff had completed his prison sentence in November 2001. The plaintiff did not file this case until April 25, 2003. However, claims of libel and slander arise under state law and are subject to a one-year statute of limitations. Pursuant to Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-208, "[t]he following actions can only be brought within the periods stated in this section: Within one year, an action for libel and slander. . . ." The one-year limitations period for a claim of libel or slander begins to run on the accrual of the cause of action. Prokop v. Hoch, 607 N.W.2d 535, 539 (Neb. 2000). "[A] cause of action for slander or libel accrues on the date of publication of the defamatory matter." Id. In this case, if the alleged publication of defamatory matter occurred before April 24, 2002, the statute of limitations expired before the plaintiff began this litigation on April 25, 2003.

In addition, if the plaintiff is asserting a claim based on 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violation of his civil rights, violations of state law do not state a claim for relief under section 1983. See, e.g., Bagley v. Rogerson, 5 F.3d 325, 328 (8th Cir. 1993): "[A] violation of state law, without more, does not state a claim under the federal Constitution or 42 U.S.C. § 1983." Accord Collins v. Bellinghausen, 153 F.3d 591, 596 (8th Cir. 1998) (violation of state law, without more, does not state § 1983 or federal constitutional claim).

Also, claims, such as defamation, based on injury to reputation do not state a claim for deprivation of liberty or propertyprotected by the Due Process Clause. Siegert v. Gilley, 500 U.S. 226, 229 (1991); Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 712 (1976).

Insofar as the plaintiff may be alleging false imprisonment caused by the defendants' false statements against him, "false imprisonment is a state law tort claim. It is not coextensive with the Fourteenth Amendment, which `protects only against deprivations of liberty accomplished "without due process of law.'"" King v. Beavers. 148 F.3d 1031 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1002 (1998), citing Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 145 (1979).

Finally, if the plaintiff is alleging that the defendants wrongfully caused his involuntary commitment by their false statements, he may not challenge the factual basis for his confinement in anaction for damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Heck v. Humphrey. 512 U.S. 477, 486-87 (1994) (An action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 which would call into question the lawfulness of a plaintiff's confinement is not cognizable until after the judgment has been "reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such determination, or called into question by a federal court's issuance of a writ of habeas corpus.").

Although the plaintiff seeks damages against defendants who allegedly provided false information to procure his involuntary commitment, his success in this action would mean that his commitment is unlawful. As stated, the plaintiff may not, through an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, cast doubton the validity of his confinement unless his judgment of commitment has first been invalidated or overturned in any state proceeding or through a petition for a federal writ of habeas corpus¹ brought after exhaustion of state court remedies. See, e.g., Von Flowers v. Leean, 215 F.3d 1331, 2000 WL 554518 (7th Cir.), cert. denied. 531 U.S. 866 (2000) (unpublished), the plaintiff, serving an indeterminate civil commitment under Wisconsin's sexual predator law, "is not entitled to sue for damages for his allegedly unconstitutional confinement until he shows that the order of commitment has already been invalidated." Id., 2000 WL 554518 at**2. citing Heck v. Humphrey. AccordRogers v. Illinois Dept. of Corrections Special Eval. Unit 160 F. Supp.2d 972, 977-78 (N.D. III. 2001).

1 "A person who is confined in a mental institution as a result of a judgment of notguilty by reason of insanity or as a result of any other judicial or administrative order is `in custody' for purposes of [28 U.S.C.] § 2254." Von Flowers v. Leean, 215 F.3d 1331, 2000 WL 554518 at **1 (7th Cir.), cert. denied. 531 U.S 866 (2000) (unpublished).

The values and objectives implicit in Heck v. Humphrey apply as well to a plaintiff who has been involuntarily committed as to a convicted prisoner serving a sentence. Federalism, avoiding the potential for federal-state tension, and the objectives of preserving consistency and finality are at stake in both contexts. See Heck v. Humphrey. 512 U.S. at 484:

The common-law cause of action formalicious prosecution provides the closest analogy to claims of the type considered here. . . .One element that must be alleged and proved in a malicious prosecution action is termination of the prior criminal proceeding in favor of the accused. . . . This requirement "avoids parallel litigation over the issues of probable cause and guilt . . . and it precludes the possibility of the claimant [sic] succeeding in the tort action after having been convicted in the underlying criminal prosecution, in contravention of a strong judicial policy against the creation of two conflicting resolutions arising out of the same or identical transaction."

(Emphasis added.)

This Court has long expressed similar concerns for finality and consistency and has generally declined to expand opportunities for collateral attack. . . .

Id. at 484-85.

[H]abeas corpus is the exclusive remedy for a state prisoner who challenges the fact or duration of his confinement and seeks immediate or speedier release, even though such a claim may come within the literal terms of § 1983.

Id. at 481.

We do not engraft an exhaustion requirement upon § 1983, but rather deny the existence of a cause of action. Even a prisoner who has fully exhausted available state remedies has no cause of action under § 1983 unless and until the conviction or sentence is reversed, expunged, invalidated, or impugned by the grant of a writ of habeas corpus.

Id. at 489.

Heck v. Humphrey does not bar claims based on § 1983 challenging conditions of confinement, but this is not such a case. In addition, the plaintiff has remedies available to him if he disagrees with the results of his annual reviews under the Mental Health Commitment Act. Accordingly, the plaintiff's complaint will be dismissed without prejudice. He may proceed to challenge his commitment in a state court, or he may bring a petition for writ of habeas corpus in this court after exhausting his state-court remedies. Moreover, this Memorandum and Order shall not be construed to prevent the plaintiff from challenging the result of any annual review under the Mental Health Commitment Act after exhausting his state-court remedies.

THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED:

1. That filing no. 13, the Motion to Dismiss filed by defendant-Mark E. Weilage, is granted;

2. That filing no. 19, the Motion to Dismiss filed by defendants-Brenda Beadle and the Douglas County Attorney, is granted;

3. That the plaintiff's complaint and this action are dismissed without prejudice; and

4. That a separate judgment of dismissal will be entered in accordance with this Memorandum and Order.