Opinion
AANCV116008312S
01-19-2016
Stephen Harris, Zoning Enforcement Officer for the City of Milford v. Eileen R. Arisian
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION
Barry K. Stevens, J.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This action was instituted by Kathleen Kuchta, the zoning enforcement officer for the city of Milford (city). The complaint was filed on November 16, 2011, and an amended complaint was filed on December 2, 2011. On February 17, 2015, Stephen Harris, the city's present zoning enforcement officer, was substituted as the plaintiff. The defendant, Eileen Arisian, is the record owner of property located at 2 Orland Street in Milford, Connecticut. The property is located on the corner of Bayshore Drive and Orland Street.
The amended complaint asserts two counts. The first count alleges the following. In 2011, the defendant erected three signs on the front and side of her property. On or about July 7, 2011, the plaintiff issued an order notifying the defendant that the signs violated Milford Zoning Regulations and ordered their removal. The defendant failed to comply with the order and failed to contest it by filing an administrative appeal to the city's Zoning Board of Appeals.
Count two of the amended complaint alleges the following. On or about October 26, 2011, the plaintiff issued an order notifying the defendant that she had not acquired a certificate of zoning compliance and a certificate of occupancy after authorized work had been completed on her property. The order directed the defendant to acquire these certificates within ten days or vacate the premises. The defendant did not file an administrative appeal of this order. She did not vacate the premises and she did not acquire either a certificate of zoning compliance or a certificate of occupancy.
Pursuant to General Statutes § 8-2, the plaintiff seeks the following relief. The plaintiff seeks orders requiring the defendant to remove the signs and enjoining her from using or occupying the premises until the defendant has acquired certificates of zoning compliance and occupancy. The complaint also demands a $2,500 civil penalty, plus attorney fees and costs. The complaint further demands an order permitting periodic inspection of the property by the plaintiff to ensure compliance with the orders.
On January 31, 2012, the defendant filed an answer and special defenses. The answer denies the substantive claims of the amended complaint. The first three special defenses are directed to the first count of this complaint. The first defense alleges that under General Statutes § 8-2, the city lacks the authority to regulate the type of signs posted on the defendant's private residence and that the plaintiff's effort to enforce such regulations is an " ultra vires" act. The second and third defenses allege that the city's enactment and enforcement of zoning regulations that regulate signs on private residences violates the defendant's rights under the first amendment to the United States constitution and article first, § § 4 and 5, of the Connecticut constitution. The last special defense is directed to the second count of the amended complaint and alleges that the plaintiff's claim regarding the defendant's failure to obtain a certificate of occupancy is barred by the statute of limitations set forth in General Statute § 29-265. On February 14, 2012, the plaintiff filed a reply denying these special defenses.
A bench trial was held on June 4, 2015. The plaintiff and the defendant both testified at the trial. After the trial's completion, the parties filed post-trial briefs. The last brief, the plaintiff's reply brief, was filed on September 23, 2015. For the following reasons, judgment enters in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant for a civil penalty of $1,000. The other demands for relief made by the plaintiff are denied.
DISCUSSION
I
As noted above, the defendant has asserted special defenses to the plaintiff's claims. As to the first count of the amended complaint concerning the defendant's signs, the defendant asserts three defenses--that the city " lacks the authority under . . . § 8-2 to regulate the type of signs posted on the defendant's property" and that this regulation violates her constitutional right to freedom of speech under both the federal and state constitutions. As to the second count of the complaint seeking relief based on the defendant's failure to acquire certificates of zoning compliance and occupancy, the defendant asserts one special defense--that the plaintiff's claim is barred by the time limitation of General Statutes § 29-265. In response, the plaintiff argues that the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to entertain any of these defenses because the defendant failed to exhaust her administrative remedies.
There is no dispute that the defendant could have contested the plaintiff's orders by filing appeals with the Zoning Board of Appeals. See General Statutes § § 8-6(a)(1) and 8-7. There is also no dispute that the defendant did not file any such appeals, and therefore, failed to exhaust her administrative remedies. The court concludes that her failure to exhaust her administrative remedies deprives the court of subject matter jurisdiction over her special defense to the second count of the amended complaint. Greenwich v. Kristoff, 180 Conn. 575, 578-79, 430 A.2d 1294 (1980).
The court rejects the plaintiff's argument that the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the defenses to the first count of the amended complaint because in these defenses the defendant contests the validity of the zoning regulations being applied to her conduct. Our Supreme Court has articulated an exception to the administrative exhaustion rule when the defendant in an enforcement action contests the very validity or constitutionality of the regulation she has been charged with violating. " [W]here the plaintiff city has haled the defendant into court, the defendant may defend on the ground of the general invalidity of the ordinance, without exhausting available administrative remedies." Norwich v. Norwalk Wilbert Vault Co., 208 Conn. 1, 7, 544 A.2d 152 (1988).
II
The evidence establishes that the plaintiff maintains three signs on her property that are at issue. Two signs front Bayshore Drive and one sign fronts Orland Street. One sign states " I Do Not Recommend BAYBROOK REMODELERS." The two other signs state " BAYBROOK REMODELERS' TOTAL LAWSUITS" and provides a bar graph identifying the number of these suits. See exhibits 4 through 7. The evidence indicates that the defendant contracted with Baybrook Remodelers to do construction work on her home. She was dissatisfied with this work and the signs were posted to express her dissatisfaction.
Signs are regulated by § 5.3.4 of the Milford Zoning Regulations. The regulation states, inter alia, that one sign may be posted for each separate street line and that a sign's height must not exceed its distance from the lot line.
Section 5.3.4.1 of the Milford Zoning Regulations provides that the following signs are allowed on residential property: " One non-illuminated or indirectly illuminated identification sign for each separate street line not to exceed 9 square feet in area nor 8 feet in height; and further limited as follows: said sign shall be located not less than 10 feet from the front property line; the height of such sign shall not be greater than the distance it is located from any lot line. Noncommercial speech may be placed on any sign permitted by this portion of the Regulations."
Pictures of the three signs as they are presently situated on the building were marked as full exhibits. See exhibits 4 through 7. On the basis of these pictures and the plaintiff's testimony, the court finds that the defendant's signs are posted in violation of the Milford Zoning Regulations. None of the signs are at ground level. All the signs are posted on the first or second floor decks of the house. Consequently, all of the signs violate the height requirement set forth in the regulations because they are higher than the distance between their locations and their respective lot lines. Additionally, there are two signs facing Bayshore Drive in violation of the requirement that there be no more than one sign for each separate street line.
The defendant contends that the plaintiff has exceeded its authority in its effort to regulate the signs she has erected. The substance of the defendant's argument is that the city's regulatory authority is not so broad as to allow the zoning regulation of all signs that may appear on private residences, especially when such regulations impact what is expressed or communicated by the signs. In response, the plaintiff contends that signs, such as the defendant's, are subject to reasonable regulation and that the zoning regulations at issue place restrictions on the location, number, and size of the signs, but do not regulate or interfere with the content of the signs.
The Milford Zoning Regulations broadly define the term " sign." There is little question or dispute that the defendant's signs fall within this definition. For example, this definition includes any writing or pictorial representation that " by reason of its form . . . is designed to attract attention to the subject thereof . . . or is used as a means of . . . announcement or political or artistic expression." Milford Zoning Regs., art. V, § 5.3.3.2(7)(b) and (c); see exhibit 3.
Section 5.3.3.2(7) of the Milford Zoning Regulations provides the following definition: " SIGN means any writing, pictorial representation, illustration, decoration (including any material used to differentiate sign copy from its background), landscaping form, emblem, symbol, design, trademark, banner, flag, pennant, captive balloon, streamer, spinner, ribbon, sculpture, statute, or any other figure or character that: (a) is a structure or any part thereof (including the roof or wall of a building); or (b) is written, printed, projected, painted, constructed, or otherwise placed or displayed upon or designed into landscaping or a structure or a board, canopy, awning, marquee, or vehicle, or upon any material object or device whatsoever; and (c) by reason of its form, color working, symbol, design, illumination, or motion attracts or is designed to attract attention to the subject thereof or is used as a means of identification, advertisement, or announcement or political or artistic expression or decoration; but (d) landscaping constitutes a sign only to the extent that it is planted, trimmed, graded, arranged or installed in such a manner as to convey an explicit commercial message." See exhibit 3.
The law is well established, however, that the city's definition of a sign must be governed and circumscribed by § 8-2, the municipal zoning enabling statute. " [I]n connection with municipal zoning ordinances, it is a cardinal principle of construction that provisions and amendments must be enacted pursuant to the zoning enabling statute." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Capalbo v. Planning & Zoning Board of Appeals, 208 Conn. 480, 490, 547 A.2d 528 (1988). " The zoning commission has some discretion in defining what is a 'sign' for purposes of the zoning regulations, but will be held to strict construction of the definition, considered in the context of the enabling statute, § 8-2, which refers to 'advertising signs.'" R. Fuller, 9 Connecticut Practice Series: Land Use Law and Practice (3d.Ed. 2007), p. 163. More specifically, § 8-2 authorizes city zoning commissions to regulate " the height, size and location of advertising signs and billboards." General Statutes § 8-2(a). There is no dispute that what the defendant placed on her residence were signs. Thus, the precise issue presented by the parties' positions is whether the defendant's signs are " advertising signs" within the meaning of § 8-2(a). The statute itself does not provide a definition of " advertising signs, " and, consequently, the court is presented with an issue of statutory construction.
" We begin by noting that zoning regulations and ordinances, being in derogation of common law, must be strictly construed and not extended by implication . . . These regulations must be interpreted in accordance with the ordinary rule of statutory construction that, where the language of the statute is clear and unambiguous, courts cannot by construction read into the statutes provisions which are not clearly stated . . . In addition, words employed in zoning ordinances are to be interpreted in accord with their natural and usual meaning." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Schwartz v. Planning & Zoning Commission, 208 Conn. 146, 153, 543 A.2d 1339 (1988).
" Generally, it is the function of a zoning board or commission to decide within prescribed limits and consistent with the exercise of its legal discretion, whether a particular section of the zoning regulations applies to a given situation and the manner in which it does apply . . . In applying the law to the facts of a particular case, the [zoning] board is endowed with a liberal discretion, and its action is subject to review by the courts only to determine whether it was unreasonable, arbitrary or illegal." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 152.
In Schwartz, our Supreme Court was presented with the occasion to define " advertising signs" as used in § 8-2: " The most relevant definitions of 'advertise' in Webster's Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary are 'to announce publicly esp[ecially] by a printed notice or a broadcast; [and] to call public attention to esp[ecially] by emphasizing desirable qualities so as to arouse a desire to buy or patronize.'" Schwarz v. Planning & Zoning Commission, supra, 208 Conn. 155. In Schwartz, the court found that a proposed thirty-two-foot-sculpture at the entrance of a shopping plaza was not an " advertising sign" because the evidence did not support the conclusion that it would " arouse the desire of passersby to patronize the merchants and services available there." Id.
See also Amsel v. Brooks, 141 Conn. 288, 299, 106 A.2d 152 (" [t]he verb 'advertise' means, generally, '[t]o give notice to; to inform'; in the sense here employed, the definition '[t]o give public notice of, to announce publicly, esp[ecially] by a printed notice; as, to advertise a sale; hence, to call public attention to, esp[ecially] by emphasizing desirable qualities, in order to arouse a desire to purchase, invest, patronize, or the like, ' is probably the meaning best suited to the word as used in the statute" [emphasis omitted]), appeal dismissed, 348 U.S. 880, 75 S.Ct. 125, 99 L.Ed. 693 (1954).
Relying on Schwartz, the defendant argues that her signs are not " advertising signs" within the meaning of § 8-2 because " she plainly was not trying to promote Baybrook Remodelers. While they may be considered an announcement, the content of the signs constitute an expression of fact and opinion. There is no evidence that [the defendant] had any intent to call public attention to [Baybrook Remodelers] by emphasizing desirable qualities so as to arouse a desire to buy or patronize that business." Defendant's Post-trial Brief, p. 12. On the other hand, the plaintiff contends that the evidence indicates that the defendant posted the signs to call public attention to the defendant's message or viewpoint. Consistent with the definition provided by the zoning regulations, the plaintiff emphasizes that the defendant's signs were designed to attract attention as a means of announcement or expression. According to the plaintiff, " it is ludicrous to conclude that a display 'arousing' the desire of passersby to patronize certain merchants or services would be considered an advertising sign, and thus subject to regulation, but that a display discouraging such patronage would not be deemed an advertising sign and thus free from regulation." (Emphasis in original.) Plaintiff's Reply Brief, p. 3. For the following reasons, the court finds the defendant's argument more persuasive. On the facts of this particular case, a distinction must be drawn between an " advertising sign, " which is within the purview of § 8-2, and a " protest sign, " which is not, especially when the protest sign does not directly or expressly seek to solicit anyone to do anything. This distinction is narrow, but is nevertheless legally significant in this case.
The court appreciates that the city's zoning officials are entitled to broad discretion in construing their authority and in applying zoning regulations. The court also finds particular guidance in the rules of construction holding that zoning regulations must be strictly construed because they are in derogation of common law and that zoning regulations must be given their ordinary meaning in order for people to determine the regulations' applicability to their lives and affairs. See Schwartz v. Planning & Zoning Commission, supra, 208 Conn. 153. When read fairly in the context of the statutory language and structure, the phrase " advertising signs" connotes signs that promote or emphasize qualities or attributes that are used in order to solicit or encourage participation or patronage. This construction of the statute is more specific and narrow than the interpretation advanced by the plaintiff, and therefore, is more consistent with the rule that zoning regulations should be strictly construed and not expanded by implication.
To explain further, the fallacy of the plaintiff's argument is that he interprets the word " advertising" so broadly that it has no substantive or meaningful significance in the context of the statutory language. The word " advertising" is certainly amenable to broad definitions, including, for example, to publicize, inform, or announce. In this regard, the plaintiff appears correct that the purpose of the defendant's signs is to call attention to the defendant's views or opinions about Baybrook. To varying degrees, however, all signs are designed to call attention to a message. Indeed, it is difficult, if not impossible, to conceive of a true sign that is not designed to convey a message. In interpreting statutory language, the words actually used by the legislature should be given effect and meaning, and should not be construed in a way that renders the language superfluous or irrelevant. By qualifying zoning commissions' authority over " signs" by using the phrase " advertising signs, " the legislature clearly contemplated some actual, definitional limitation to the term. The plaintiff's broad interpretation of this phrase based on the city's zoning regulations would allow zoning regulation over not just " advertising signs" but over all signs, which contravenes the legislature's intent.
As explained above, in construing zoning laws, the court must be mindful that the reason language of zoning laws must be strictly construed and limited to its ordinary meaning, is to enable people to determine whether the regulations apply to their lives so that they may appropriately manage their affairs. In this regard, Judge Corradino explained in a similar case that " the state and federal constitutions are not the only guarantors of speech and expression. Throughout the common law there is a sensitivity to the right of people in their private lives or business lives to express themselves without fear of common law suits being filed against them or the state taking action against them." Guilford Planning & Zoning Commission v. Guilford Zoning Board of Appeals, Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven, Docket No. CV-03-0473311-S, (April 21, 2004, Corradino, J.) (37 Conn. L. Rptr. 35, 36). Furthermore, the application of any definition of the phrase " advertising signs" cannot be divorced from the content or nature of the sign at issue or the circumstances surrounding its creation because it is impossible to determine whether a sign is an " advertising sign" without considering the substance and purpose of the sign. See Schwartz v. Planning & Zoning Commission, supra, 208 Conn. 146 (evaluating nature of sculpture in order to determine whether sculpture met definition of " advertising sign"); Guilford Planning & Zoning Commission v. Guilford Zoning Board of Appeals, supra, 40 (considering circumstances of displaying Irish flag in order to determine whether display constituted advertising sign). On the particular facts presented here, the court concludes that the nature of the defendant's signs and the circumstances of their creation fail to support the plaintiff's position that these signs are " advertising signs" within the meaning of § 8-2(a). Accordingly, the signs are not subject to the requirements set forth in the city's zoning regulations.
The court rejects the plaintiff's argument that Kroll v. Steere, 60 Conn.App. 376, 759 A.2d 541, cert. denied, 255 Conn. 909, 763 A.2d 1035 (2000), governs this case. The property owner in Kroll placed a piece of plywood board against her garage. Apparently to express disapproval of the municipality's decision to shoot deer, she painted two deers on the plywood and the words " Who Asked the Deer." In evaluating the municipality's order directing the plywood to be removed, the only issue considered by the Appellate Court in Kroll was whether the plywood " mural" was a " sign" within the meaning of the municipality's zoning regulations. Id., 381-82. The court found that the board was a sign within the meaning of these regulations. Id., 382. The court did not address the meaning of " advertising signs" under § 8-2(a). Thus, Kroll is distinguishable from the present case because the parties here do not dispute that the defendant erected signs. The issue in this case, rather, is whether the defendant's signs are " advertising signs" within the meaning of § 8-2(a).
In summary, the court rejects the plaintiff's argument that the city has the authority to regulate " all" signs as defined by the Milford Zoning Regulations because under § 8-2(a), the zoning commission has the authority only to regulate " advertising signs." Because the defendant's signs are not " advertising signs, " they are not subject to the Milford Zoning Regulations pursuant to § 8-2(a).
On the basis of the court's finding that the signs at issue are not advertising signs subject to regulation by the Milford Zoning Regulations, the court declines to address the defendant's argument that there is no statutory authority for these regulations to restrict the number of signs on her property because § 8-2(a) only authorizes the regulation of the " height, size and location of advertising signs." See Capalbo v. Planning & Zoning Board of Appeals, supra, 208 Conn. 480 (§ 8-2 does not authorize zoning regulation of color of sign). The court also declines to address the defendant's argument that the regulation of her signs violates her constitutional rights to freedom of speech and expression. See Kroll v. Steere, supra, 60 Conn.App. 376 (property owner's constitutional right to freedom of speech was not violated by zoning rules that limited size of sign but did not regulate sign's content).
III
In September 2003 and October 2004, the defendant sought and acquired zoning permits for work to be done on her property. See exhibits 11 and 12. These permits included work to elevate the house, enlarge the kitchen and to build a deck that wrapped around three sides of the building. The permits, as well as the zoning regulations, indicate that an " as-built" survey from an engineer was required after the completion of the work. See Milford Zoning Regs., art. VIII, § 8.8; exhibit 3. The plaintiff testified that the as-built survey was required to verify that the work was done in accordance with the permits and the zoning regulations. He also testified that this survey is necessary for the certificate of zoning compliance, which, in turn, is necessary for the certificate of occupancy. See Milford Zoning Regs., art. VIII, § 8.8. The defendant contracted with Baybrook Remodelers to do the work. The defendant testified that she relied on Baybrook Remodelers to do what was necessary to acquire the certificate of occupancy.
On or about October 26, 2011, the plaintiff issued an order notifying the defendant that she was occupying the property without a certificate of zoning compliance and a certificate of occupancy in violation of § 8.8 and § 8.9 of the Milford Zoning Regulations. Section 8.9 of the Milford Zoning Regulations provides that a structure shall not be " occupied or used unless a Certificate of Zoning Compliance shall have been issued by the Zoning enforcement officer and until a Certificate of Occupancy shall have been issued by the Building Inspector." See exhibit 3. The evidence establishes that in October 2011, the defendant did not have these certificates. Although the parties address a variety of issues and communications that took place regarding these certificates, the dispute ultimately focuses on the requirement for an as-built survey. Harris testified that an as-built survey was not provided by the defendant until July 2014, almost three years after the commencement of this action. When submitted, the survey contained errors in identifying the extent of the building coverage of the lot. A revised survey was presented in August 2014, but this survey also presented questions about its depiction of pavers and a concrete patio covering the lot.
In January 2015, almost four years after the institution of this action, the defendant submitted another revised or corrected survey. According to the plaintiff, this survey indicated a lot coverage of 83.9 percent. The plaintiff testified that under the zoning regulations, the allowable lot coverage for the zone is 65 percent. The plaintiff further explained that because the completed construction, including the pavers, exceeded the lot coverage allowable under the zoning regulations, he, as the zoning enforcement officer, could not issue a certificate of zoning compliance. As indicated above, without a certificate of zoning compliance, a certificate of occupancy cannot be issued. Consequently, at the present time, the defendant still does not have a certificate of zoning compliance or a certificate of occupancy.
During the trial proceedings, the defendant objected to the plaintiff's use of the lot coverage problem as a basis for a finding of a zoning code violation because no such claim was asserted in the amended complaint. The court sustained the objection, noting that although the issue may have become apparent after this action was instituted, the complaint had not been amended to assert this claim. In his post-trial brief, the plaintiff explains that to properly amend the complaint in order to assert this claim, the plaintiff would first be required to serve the defendant with a notice of violation and a cease and desist order, which in turn, would have allowed the defendant to exercise her administrative remedies. These remedies would have included her right to appeal the order to the Zoning Board of Appeals pursuant to § 8-6. The plaintiff has not provided a clear or adequate explanation why this administrative procedure was not initiated after becoming aware of the apparent lot coverage violation. Additionally, the defendant indicates that to the extent the pavers are related to this problem, the pavers were installed in 2005 and the zoning enforcement officer became aware of them well before the present cease and desist orders were issued in 2011. The defendant argues that the plaintiff cannot now institute an action for any lot coverage violation because under General Statutes § 8-13a(a)(1), any such action must be instituted within three years of the violation.
In his post-trial brief, the plaintiff provided the following explanation regarding the objection to evidence of a lot size violation: " Respectfully, however, the issue was raised [as part of the evidence] not as an additional violation of the regulations itself, or as an additional count of the complaint, but rather to impress upon the court that what the defendant has been cited with--a failure to have a certificate of zoning compliance--may not be cured given the current status of the property." Plaintiff's Post-trial Brief, p. 13. On the other hand, the defendant submitted the survey years after the filing of the complaint. The defendant cannot now ask the court to receive the evidence about this submission without also receiving evidence about the adequacy of the submission.
In any event, there is no claim before the court requesting the court to order the issuance of a certificate of occupancy. Just like the complaint did not allege a lot size problem to support a code violation, the defendant has not asserted a counterclaim seeking any affirmative relief. Since this issue has not been sufficiently joined in the pleadings or presented in the evidence, the court cannot determine whether a certificate of occupancy should or should not issue in light of this lot size problem, and both parties recognize that this is an issue that should first be addressed through the administrative process.
The court will only entertain the disposition of claims joined by the pleadings. Stated conversely, the court will not grant relief beyond the claims and requests asserted in the pleadings. The amended complaint seeks an order enjoining the defendant from using or occupying her residence. Injunctive relief is an extraordinary equitable remedy, and even when authorized by statute, such relief is governed by the existing factual circumstances. Based on the totality of the evidence, the court concludes that the plaintiff has not met his burden of proving that the court should issue the requested injunctive relief when the alleged zoning violation is now substantially based on an alleged lot size violation that has not been asserted in the amended complaint and has not been subject to the applicable administrative enforcement procedures.
The plaintiff also seeks the imposition of a civil penalty for the defendant's failure to comply with the October 26, 2011 cease and desist. As previously stated, this order directed the defendant either to acquire the certificates of zoning compliance and occupancy regarding the additions to her residence or to vacate the premises within ten days. General Statutes Section 8-12 provides that " Any person who . . . fails to comply with [a cease and desist order] immediately, or continues to violate any provision of the regulations . . . specified in such order shall be subject to a civil penalty not to exceed two thousand five hundred dollars, payable to the treasurer of the municipality."
There is no dispute that the defendant failed to comply immediately with the order issued on October 26, 2011 and that this failure continued. Under their construction contract, the defendant may have relied on Baybrook to acquire these certificates, but there is no dispute that the plaintiff as the property owner bears ultimate responsibility for complying with the zoning regulations and acquiring the necessary certificates. The evidence also indicates that the defendant did not submit the required as-built survey until July 2014, almost three years after the issuance of the cease and desist order, and this survey had problems that necessitated re-submission. Although the court does not find wilfulness necessary to support an award of attorney fees and costs, the court does find that this very delayed, dilatory response to the cease and desist order warrants the imposition of a civil penalty. Therefore, the court awards a civil penalty of $1,000.
As to the plaintiff's demand for attorney fees and costs against the defendant, the court does not find the requisite wilfulness on the defendant's part necessary for an award of these fees and costs under General Statutes § 8-12. (" If the court renders judgment for such municipality and finds that the violation was wilful, the court shall allow such municipality its costs, together with reasonable attorneys fees to be taxed by the court.") The court notes that the defendant relied on Baybrook to do the construction and to comply with the zoning regulations. The court also notes that she did ultimately submit the as-built survey despite its untimeliness. The defendant still does not have the required certificates, but this deficiency is now based on a purported lot size problem for which there have been no administrative proceedings. Furthermore, the plaintiff has not provided any evidence regarding attorney fees and costs authorized under § 8-12 to allow the court to make an award for such fees.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, judgment enters in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant for a civil penalty of $1,000.
So ordered.