Opinion
Civ. A. No. 1497-67.
June 22, 1967.
Laurens H. Silver, Peter S. Smith, Rhoda Lakritz, and David Marlin, Washington, D.C., for plaintiffs.
John Suda, Asst. Corp. Counsel, Washington, D.C., for defendants.
Drew J.T. O'Keefe, U.S. Atty., Harold S. O'Brian, Asst. U.S. Atty., for plaintiff.
Herman Bloom, Philadelphia, Pa., for defendant.
OPINION
The Court has before it an application for the convening of a Three-Judge Court on the ground that this action is brought to enjoin the enforcement of an Act of Congress, it being claimed that the statutory provision in question is unconstitutional.
Such an application should be granted if the constitutional question raised is substantial, that is, reasonably debatable. This limitation is strictly enforced, because otherwise numerous Federal Judges would be immobilized in Three-Judge Courts in actions that may be entirely lacking in merit.
The plaintiff in this action is an applicant for public assistance for herself and three minor children. She made this application to the welfare authorities of the District of Columbia. The application was denied on the ground that she and her children had not resided in the District of Columbia for one year immediately preceding the date of the filing of the application. The residence requirement is contained in the District of Columbia Code, Title 3, Section 203.
It is claimed in this action: first, that this statute, construed as the District of Columbia authorities have construed it, is unconstitutional; and, second, that as a matter of statutory interpretation, this statute has been misconstrued by the District of Columbia authorities. Only the first aspect of this matter is before the Court on this application.
The Court is of the opinion that no substantial constitutional question is involved. Public assistance is a grant. It is not the fulfillment of a contractual obligation. The Congress may surround grants with reasonable requirements and prescribe the categories of persons to whom grants shall be given. To impose a residence requirement is perfectly reasonable. Such provisions have been in existence in similar statutes throughout the country for many years.
If such a requirement did not exist, the District of Columbia might receive a migration of indigent persons and might become a Mecca for persons applying for relief, especially because of the liberal payments made in the District. It is a matter of the protection of the taxpayers, and clearly it is within the discretion of the Congress.
In this connection, the opinion of the Supreme Court in Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 80 S.Ct. 1367, 4 L.Ed.2d 1435, is illuminating. In that case the provisions of the Social Security Act denying payments under the statute to aliens who have been deported were held to be constitutional.
To be sure, the Court can conceive of a purely arbitrary and unreasonable distinction which perhaps might raise a substantial question as to constitutionality. This, however, is not such a case. In the Flemming case, page 611, the Court indicated that Congress has the power to prescribe classifications and requirements of the type there involved. The Court remarked that due process of law can be thought to interpose a bar only if the statute manifests a patently arbitrary classification utterly lacking in rational justification.
It should be noted that the Congress, in the Social Security Act, in making provision for grants to States for aid to needy families with children, expressly authorized the States to employ a residence requirement not exceeding one year, 42 U.S.C. § 602(b).
The suggestion that such a residence requirement interferes with the freedom of travel guaranteed by due process of law is too far-fetched and remote to justify extended discussion.
Accordingly, the application for the convening of a Three-Judge Court is denied, and this action will proceed as an action before a single Judge.
Counsel for the defendants may submit a proposed order.
MEMORANDUM SUR DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR JUDGMENT OF ACQUITTAL
On February 26, 1966, shortly after nine o'clock P.M., in the United States Mint, 16th and Spring Garden Streets, Philadelphia, there was a loud noise which sounded like an explosion. Upon investigation, Sergeant Galati of the Mint security guards found evidence that a firecracker or other explosive had been exploded (N.T. 34). He reported this to his superior, Captain Carr, who then himself examined the evidence (N.T. 12). Captain Carr determined to search all Mint employee lockers in order to find any additional fireworks or explosives which might be hidden in them (N.T. 12). During the course of this search, he opened defendant Donato's locker and found, under defendant's hat, a cloth bag which appeared to contain quarters (N.T. 10, 35). He replaced the bag in the locker, upon which he placed a padlock, and had the defendant summoned to the Mint security guard office (N.T. 10, 22). Defendant was held in the guard office until Secret Service Agent Wagner arrived to question him. After carefully warning him of his right to remain silent and his right to counsel, Agent Wagner asked the defendant some questions and then accompanied him to the employee locker room (N.T. 45, 47-48). When the padlock on his locker was removed, defendant opened the locker, lifted up his hat, and handed Agent Wagner the cloth bag which was subsequently found to contain 192 quarters (N.T. 48, 49). Defendant then informed the agent that he had some quarters in his jacket pockets (N.T. 48). The jacket was found to contain 90 quarters, which were also given to Agent Wagner (N.T. 54). On returning to the guard office, defendant gave Agent Wagner a statement which was suppressed as evidence at the trial out of an abundance of caution (N.T. 49, 73).
After a trial before the undersigned, sitting without a jury, the defendant was found guilty of embezzlement under 18 U.S.C. § 332 (Document 6, p. 125). Defendant has filed a motion for judgment of acquittal, alleging, first, that the evidence is insufficient to make out the crime of embezzlement and, second, that the court erred in refusing to suppress the coins found in his locker.
1. The evidence is sufficient to show the crime of embezzlement.
Defendant argues that the Government's evidence fails to show the crime of embezzlement in that there is no evidence that the coins found in defendant's locker were owned by the Government or that such coins were ever committed to the defendant's possession (brief for defendant, pp. 1, 3). The record shows that defendant was employed at the Mint as a trainee pressman and that, in the normal course of his work, he would handle completed coins as they came off the pressing machines (N.T. 91, 94-95). After inspecting the coins and finding them to be without defects, the pressman opens a trap through which the coins drop into a container at the foot of the press (N.T. 94). Pressmen have