Summary
using the Restatement (Third)'s definition of actual authority
Summary of this case from Crawford-Brunt v. KruskallOpinion
C.A. No. 07C-01-003WLW.
Submitted: December 10, 2010.
Decided: December 21, 2010.
Upon Motions in Limine.
Relevance — Denied in part; Granted in part.
Discovery Violations — Denied.
Ronald G. Poliquin, Esquire of Chasanov, Schaeffer Poliquin, Dover, Delaware; attorneys for the Plaintiff.
Laura L. Gerard, Esquire and Marc P. Niedzielski, Esquire of the Department of Justice, Wilmington, Delaware; attorneys for the Defendants.
ORDER
The parties have both submitted motions in limine. The Commission's motion proposes to exclude evidence on the basis of relevance and discovery violations. Harmon's motion proposes to exclude evidence for discovery violations. All of the motions will now be resolved.
ISSUES
A. Relevance
Whether to exclude, as irrelevant: (1) Michael Hall's testimony about the rules of harness racing; (2) argument or evidence that Plaintiff was wrongfully persecuted by Senators Oberle and Cook; (3) John Wayne's testimony about the scope of his authority as an agent of the State; (4) Dr. Minnehan's expert economic testimony concerning Plaintiff's damages.
B. Discovery Violation
Whether to exclude the parties' exhibits because they failed to provide them before a Court ordered deadline.
Similarly, the Commission asks the Court to exclude testimony from Michael Hall because Plaintiff failed to identify him as an expert until after the deadline. The issue is moot because Hall's proposed testimony is irrelevant in this promissory estoppel action.
FACTS
The Delaware Harness Racing Commission ("DHRC" or "the Commission") appointed Donald Harmon ("Harmon") as a seasonal racing judge on August 30, 1999. On July 1, 2000, Harmon was transferred to the merit system position of Presiding Judge. Harmon was an at-will employee, paid per diem, who served at the pleasure of the Commission.In the Spring of 2003, the Commission received a complaint alleging that Harmon had illegally altered the results of an April 3, 2003 qualifying race. During that race, two associate racing judges determined that a horse had violated a racing rule by "breaking stride" before reaching the quarter pole. The complaint alleged that Harmon used his authority to modify that decision to a less serious "interference break," as a favor to the horse's owner.
The Commission and the State Department of Justice investigated the incident. The State indicted Harmon on two criminal charges for his alleged fraud. The Commission suspended Harmon without pay pending the outcome of the criminal case. The Commission also continued to conduct its own investigation, led by John Wayne, DHRC's administer of racing. According to Harmon, Wayne promised him that the Commission would reinstate him as presiding judge if he were acquitted of criminal charges. Harmon was acquitted on October 22, 2004, and he asked to be reinstated pursuant to the promise allegedly made by Wayne. The Commission conducted a hearing on November 16, 2004. Two days later, it issued its decision not to reinstate Harmon.
Procedural History
On January 3, 2007, Harmon sued the State, the Commission and various individual defendants for alleged violations of procedural due process, retaliatory discharge, defamation, breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and intentional interference with contract. Harmon also brought a claim under the Whistleblower's Protection Act. On January 27, 2007, Harmon amended his complaint to include an allegation of malicious prosecution.
After nearly four years of pretrial maneuvering, the case is now ready for trial. Harmon's only remaining claim is for promissory estoppel. The parties' final pretrial motions in limine are now before the Court.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Evidence is relevant when it has any tendency to prove that a fact of consequence to a claim or defense is more or less likely than it would be without the evidence. All relevant evidence is admissible unless it is otherwise excluded.
DISCUSSION
A. Relevance
Evidence is relevant if has any tendency to alter the probabilities of any fact of consequence to a claim or defense. This case raises two issues: (1) whether Wayne could bind the Commission to reinstate Plaintiff (i.e. whether he had the authority), and (2) whether Wayne did bind the Commission by making a promise that justice will enforce. Any evidence that helps resolve these issues will be relevant. Each of the Commission's relevance objections will be considered in turn.1. Michael Hall, Harness Racing Expert
Plaintiff intends to introduce Hall's testimony in order to show that Plaintiff's decision to call an "interference break" at the April 2003 qualifying was appropriate. That purpose is irrelevant because it doesn't matter whether there was good reason to suspend Plaintiff. This is a promissory estoppel action, not a contract dispute. All that matters at this point is whether Wayne made a binding promise that justice will enforce against the Commission. Hall's testimony is completely unrelated to any legal issue in controversy; it is therefore irrelevant and inadmissible.
2. Senators Oberle and Cook, Alleged Wrongdoers
Plaintiff intends to introduce evidence that the two state Senators treated him unfairly or even illegally. That purpose is irrelevant because this is a suit for promissory estoppel, not a tort action. All that matters at this point is whether Wayne made a binding promise that justice will enforce against the Commission. Evidence about the alleged wrongdoing of these individuals is completely unrelated to any legal issue in controversy; it is therefore irrelevant and inadmissible.
3. John Wayne's testimony about his authority
Plaintiff intends to introduce evidence of Wayne's understanding of the scope of his own authority. The evidence is relevant for that purpose because it goes directly to the critical agency issue underlying this lawsuit. That is, Plaintiff can only enforce Wayne's promise against the Commission if Wayne had authority to make the promise on the Commission's behalf. The Commission contends, correctly, that Wayne is not at liberty to define the scope of his own authority. However, as the Restatement of Agency provides, "an agent has [actual] authority to act for a principal to the extent that the agent reasonably believes, in accordance with the principal's manifestations to the agent, that the principal wishes the agent so to act." Clearly, Wayne's understanding of the scope of his authority, although far from determinative, is relevant to this issue.
Restatement (Third) Of Agency § 2.01 (2006); See Billops v. Magness Const. Co., 391 A.2d 196, 197 (Del. 1978) (explaining that actual authority can be either express or implied).
The Commission has expressed concern that Wayne's testimony may mislead the jury into believing that he had whatever authority he thought he possessed. That concern can be adequately addressed by a well-crafted limiting instruction.
4. Dr. Minnehan, Plaintiff's economics expert
Finally, Plaintiff proposes to have Dr. Minnehan give an expert opinion as to the extent of the damages. The evidence is relevant for that purpose because damages (detrimental reliance) are an essential element of promissory estoppel. Generally, courts award reliance damages for promissory estoppel. Expectation damages in promissory estoppel suits are only permitted in very unusual situations. Dr. Minnehan's expert testimony should be helpful to the jury, as it labors to determine what damages Plaintiff may have suffered due to his detrimental reliance on Wayne's promise. Therefore, the testimony is clearly relevant.
The Second Restatement of Contracts provides the seminal formulation of promissory estoppel:
A promise which the promisor should reasonably expect to induce action or forbearance on the part of the promisee or a third person and which does induce such action or forbearance is binding if injustice can be avoided only by enforcement of the promise. The remedy granted for breach may be limited as justice requires.
Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 90 (1981).
B. Discovery Violations
Both parties have filed motions seeking to exclude various pieces of evidence that were submitted by the other party after discovery deadlines expired. It is essential that parties comply with the rules of procedure and orders governing discovery. The Court reserves the right to sanction either party for further tardiness. However, given that the Court finds that neither party has been prejudiced by the late submissions, the motions to exclude evidence for discovery violations are denied. This case has been languishing in pretrial motions and discovery for a very long time. Trial on the one remaining issue is now only weeks away. The time for arguing about discovery is over.
IT IS SO ORDERED.