Opinion
1:OOCV28-C
August 26, 2003
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION AND ORDER
THIS MATTER is before the Court on the motion of Defendant Richard Buchanan for summary judgment on the basis of Eleventh Amendment immunity, filed in this matter on December 6, 2001. Consideration of this motion was stayed on January 16, 2002, pending resolution of the appeal in the matter of Henderson Amusement, Inc. v. Good, 172 F. Supp.2d 751 (W.D.N.C. 2001), aff'd, 2003 WL 932463 (4th Cir. March 10, 2003), which decision also addressed the issue now before the Court — whether sheriffs in North Carolina are entitled to immunity from suit under the Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution. The Fourth Circuit has now decided the appeal in Henderson Amusement and declined to rule on the issue. Accordingly, the issue is now ripe for decision; the Court conducted oral argument June 23, 2003. Having considered the pleadings, Defendant Buchanan's motion, the parties' arguments, and the applicable law, the Court will, in deference to binding authority, deny Defendant Buchanan's motion for summary judgment.
PROCEDURAL AND FACTUAL BACKGROUND
This action arises out of Plaintiff's arrest by members of the Avery County Sheriff's Department on December 4, 1999, during which Plaintiff alleges officers used excessive force against him. Plaintiff filed this action on February 11, 2000, alleging, inter alia, that Defendant Richard Buchanan, former Sheriff of Avery County, North Carolina, failed properly to train, supervise, discipline, and control the law enforcement officers with the Avery County Sheriff's Department and established or approved of a policy permitting the use of excessive force against impaired persons, thereby violating Plaintiff's civil rights under the United States Constitution and the laws and Constitution of North Carolina. (Compl. ¶¶ 19, 21-23). Plaintiff also filed suit against Ed Williams, individually and in his official capacity as Deputy of the Avery County Sheriff's Department; Avery County, North Carolina; and a John Doe defendant. Defendants Buchanan, Williams, and Avery County filed their Answer on April 7, 2000, and the parties subsequently engaged in discovery, after which Plaintiff dismissed his claims against Avery County and the John Doe defendant.
Defendants Williams and Buchanan then moved for summary judgment, and on September 21, 2001, the Court entered an order denying Defendants' motion as to Plaintiff's excessive force claim but granting Defendants' motion as to Plaintiff's civil conspiracy and constitutional claims asserted under North Carolina law. Defendant Buchanan filed a second motion for summary judgment on December 6, 2001, this time arguing that this Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over Plaintiff's action against him because, as a sheriff, he was a state official immune from suit in federal court under the Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution. As set forth above, this Court stayed Defendant Buchanan's motion, and the stay has now been lifted, rendering the motion ripe for resolution.
DISCUSSION
Exercising some liberty to begin with the conclusion, the undersigned judge notes, here at the beginning of the analysis, that my analysis of the creation of the office of sheriff and the historical role of the sheriff in North Carolina in the exercise of his duties of governance and the enforcement of state law convinces me that the position of sheriff is more properly considered an office of the State of North Carolina, entitled to all of the privileges and immunities bestowed upon any office of the State. As such, it is my opinion that the sheriff should enjoy immunity from suit in federal court under the Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution. This Court is nevertheless bound to follow the decisions of the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals and the United States Supreme Court. Indeed, notwithstanding the Fourth Circuit's decision in Harter v. Vernon, 101 F.3d 334 (4th Cir. 1996), that North Carolina sheriffs are not state officials entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity, this judge has since held that the sheriff is entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity based on my interpretation of more recent Supreme Court decisions that appeared to dictate a contrary result. Nevertheless, as set forth more fully below, the Fourth Circuit has since reaffirmed the validity of Harter, and this Court is bound to adhere to the result dictated by the Fourth Circuit.
In Harter, the Fourth Circuit held that "the Eleventh Amendment does not bar a suit against a North Carolina sheriff in his official capacity." Harter, 101 F.3d at 343. In so holding, the Fourth Circuit explained that in determining whether an agency or employee constitutes an arm of the state for purposes of the Eleventh Amendment, a court is to consider four factors: (1) whether the state treasury will be responsible for paying any judgment that might be awarded; (2) whether the entity exercises a significant degree of autonomy from the state; (3) whether the entity is involved with local versus statewide concerns; and (4) how the entity is treated as a matter of state law. See id. at 337. The Harter Court made clear that the first factor — whether the state treasury will pay any resulting judgment — is the most important factor, such that if the state treasury will pay the judgment, "the entity is immune from suit," and the remaining factors need not be considered. Id. at 339. On the other hand, if the state treasury will not pay the judgment, it remains the most important consideration but is not determinative and must be considered in light of the other three factors. See id.
Noting that it was undisputed that the State does not have to satisfy judgments against sheriffs in North Carolina and that this factor weighed against the extension of Eleventh Amendment immunity to the sheriffs, the Harter Court then considered the degree of a sheriff's autonomy from the State and found that the State of North Carolina exercises "considerable authority" over the office of sheriff in that the office is created by the North Carolina Constitution and the North Carolina General Statutes set the sheriff's term of office, qualifications, and numerous duties. See id. at 340. The court then found that the county also exercises substantial control of sheriffs. See id. In particular, the court noted that the sheriff is elected by residents of the county, the county sets and pays the salaries of the sheriff and his deputies, the county determines and pays the overall budget, and the Board of County Commissioners determines the number of salaried employees in the sheriff's office, appoints a new sheriff if the sheriff resigns or is removed, and receives a sheriff's resignation. See id. at 340-41. Ultimately, the Harter Court determined that this factor was mixed and that it did not weigh strongly in either direction. See id. at 341. With respect to whether the sheriff was involved with local or statewide concerns, the court found that while sheriffs enforce state laws and perform duties for the State's benefit, he may only perform those duties within a county and is, ultimately, responsible to the county, such that the office of sheriff is generally involved with local, rather than state, concerns. See id. at 342. Finally, in considering how the office of sheriff is treated under North Carolina state law, the Harter Court noted that state court decisions as to whether a particular entity is a state actor are not determinative, though such decisions should be considered. See id. After considering the relevant state statutes, regulations, and constitutional provisions and the lack of analysis in North Carolina decisions holding sheriffs to be state actors, the Harter Court concluded that state law treats sheriffs as local, not state, officials. See id. at 342-43. A strongly divided court decided to deny the defendant sheriff's petition for rehearing en banc. See id. at 343.
Following Harter, the Supreme Court issued opinions in Regents of the Univ. of Calif, v. Doe, 2519 U.S. 425, 117 S.Ct. 990 (1997), and McMillian v. Monroe County, 520 U.S. 781, 117 So. Ct. 1734 (1997), which emphasized the importance of relevant state law in determining whether a particular entity is an arm of the state for Eleventh Amendment immunity purposes and rejected the notion that this determination turns on the issue of financial responsibility alone. See McMillian, 520 U.S. at 786, 117 S.Ct. at 1737; Regents, 519 U.S. at 429-31, 117 S.Ct. at 904-05. In light of Regents and McMillian and yet another decision from the North Carolina Court of Appeals affirming that North Carolina sheriffs function as "state officials" for purposes of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, see Buchanan v. Hight, 133 N.C. App. 299, 305, 515 S.E.2d 225, 229 (1999); see also Messick v. Catawba County, 110 N.C. App. 707, 713-14, 431 S.E.2d 489, 493 (1993); Slade v. Vernon, 110 N.C. App. 422, 429, 429 S.E.2d 744, 748 (1993), the undersigned concluded that the Harter Court's emphasis on the effect of a judgment on the state treasury was misplaced and that, considering all factors but especially the treatment of the office of sheriff under North Carolina law, North Carolina sheriffs are more properly considered state officials, entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity. See, e.g., Henderson Amusement, Inc., 172 F. Supp.2d at 763.
Following Regents and McMillian, however, and in response to arguments that these cases effectively overruled its decision in Harter, the Fourth Circuit reaffirmed the validity of its analysis and judgment in Harter. See Cash v. Granville County Bd. of Educ., 242 F.3d 219, 227 (4th Cir. 2001). The court cited the judgment in Harter with approval, see id. at 226, and stated explicitly: "[W]e continue to follow our jurisprudence, as stated in Harter . . ., and in doing so, we believe that we are faithfully applying the relevant Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence announced by the Supreme Court in Regents . . .," id. at 227. The Cash Court then concluded, "[w]e therefore reject the district court's view that the Supreme Court's recent decisions in Regents and McMillian overruled our decision in Harter." Id. In light of the Fourth Circuit's clear and unequivocal reaffirmation of its Harter decision — both its analysis and its judgment — this Court is bound to adhere to that decision and, therefore, concludes that North Carolina sheriffs are not entitled to immunity under the Eleventh Amendment, but rather, are subject to suit in federal court.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, the Court holds that Defendant Buchanan is not immune from suit under the Eleventh Amendment. IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that Defendant Buchanan's Motion for Summary Judgment on the Basis of Eleventh Amendment Immunity (#56) is DENIED.