Opinion
21-55349
09-06-2022
JEFF HARLOW, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CHAFFEY COMMUNITY COLLEGE DISTRICT, CORY SCHWARTZ, ERIC BISHOP, JEFF KLEIN, and SUSAN HARDIE, Defendants-Appellees.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
Submitted August 30, 2022 Pasadena, California
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Central District of California D.C. No. 5:18-cr-01583-DSF-SHK Dale S. Fischer, District Judge, Presiding
Before: M. SMITH and R. NELSON, Circuit Judges, and DRAIN, District Judge.
MEMORANDUM [*]
Jeff Harlow is an instructor at Chaffey Community College, where he served as the college's head baseball coach until 2017. He appeals the district court's decisions: (1) finding he failed to exhaust his administrative remedies under California's Fair Employment and Housing Act ("FEHA"), (2) declining to consider his deposition transcript evidence, (3) granting the Defendants' motion for summary judgment, and (4) denying him leave to amend his complaint. The parties are familiar with the facts, so we do not recount them here. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We affirm the district court for the reasons that follow.
1. We review de novo the district court's determination that Harlow failed to timely exhaust his administrative remedies under the FEHA. Rodriguez v. Airborne Express, 265 F.3d 890, 896 (9th Cir. 2001). The FEHA provides: "Any person claiming to be aggrieved by an alleged unlawful practice may file with the department a verified complaint, in writing, that shall state the name and address of the person, employer, labor organization, or employment agency alleged to have committed the unlawful practice complained of . . . ." Cal. Gov't Code § 12960(c) (emphasis added). California Courts have accepted FEHA administrative remedies as exhausted even if claimants do not identify the alleged wrongdoer expressly in their complaint so long as the complaint puts the party on sufficient notice. See, e.g., Saavedra v. Orange Cnty. Consol. Transp. etc. Agency, 11 Cal.App.4th 824, 827 (1992). Harlow's FEHA complaint lacked sufficient information putting the party he later wished to add on notice of his legal action. We accordingly find that he failed to exhaust his administrative remedies under the FEHA.
2. We review a district court's exclusion of evidence on summary judgment for abuse of discretion. Ambat v. City & Cnty. of San Francisco, 757 F.3d 1017, 1032 (9th Cir. 2017) (citing Allstate Ins. Co. v. Herron, 634 F.3d 1101, 1110 (9th Cir. 2011)). The district court declined to consider Harlow's evidence because in Orr v. Bank of America, NT & SA, we indicated that courts do not consider unauthenticated evidence when resolving a motion for summary judgment. 285 F.3d 764, 774 (9th Cir. 2002). But in 2010, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 changed. Courts must now consider unauthenticated evidence at summary judgment if the evidence can "be presented in a form that would be admissible" at trial. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)(2) (emphasis added); see also id., advisory comm. note to 2010 Amendments (proponent of evidence can either "show that the material is admissible as presented or explain the admissible form that is anticipated" at trial).
The district court abused its discretion in declining to consider Harlow's evidence. "A [district] court abuses its discretion when it fails to apply the correct legal standard or bases its decision on unreasonable findings of fact." Briseño v. Henderson, 998 F.3d 1014, 1022 (9th Cir. 2021) (cleaned up) (quoting Nachshin v. AOL, LLC, 663 F.3d 1034, 1038 (9th Cir. 2011)). The district court's reliance on Orr's interpretation of Rule 56 before the 2010 amendments was an error because the legal standard has since changed. But even though the district court erred, its error was harmless. We apply a harmless error analysis when the district court abuses its discretion by excluding evidence in a summary judgment motion. Las Vegas Sands, LLC v. Nehme, 632 F.3d 526, 534 (9th Cir. 2011). With Harlow's evidence taken into consideration, Defendants remain entitled to summary judgment.
3. We review a district court order granting summary judgment de novo. See Santillan v. USA Waste of Cal., Inc., 853 F.3d 1035, 1042 (9th Cir. 2017). Harlow brings discrimination and related claims under the FEHA, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983, and Section 508 of the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794 et seq. For each claim, his evidence fails to create a material dispute on either the prima facie elements or that Defendants' reasons provided for not rehiring him are pretextual. Harlow abandoned his baseball team at an away game forty miles from Chaffey's main campus. There are also reported instances of Harlow yelling at office staff in the hallways. When Harlow sought disability accommodations, the school engaged in an "interactive meeting" to explore his options. Viewing the record in the light most favorable to Harlow, his evidence cannot entitle him to relief. We affirm the district court's order granting the motion for summary judgment.
4. We review for abuse of discretion a district court's denial of leave to amend. AE ex rel. Hernandez v. Cnty. of Tulare, 666 F.3d 631, 636 (9th Cir. 2012).
Harlow sought leave to amend his complaint after the statute of limitations passed. Rule 15(c) allows parties to amend their pleadings after the statute of limitations expires when the amendment "relates back" to the same transaction or occurrence set forth in the original pleading. See Santana v. Holiday Inns, Inc., 686 F.2d 736, 738 (9th Cir. 1982). When state law is implicated, "Rule 15(c)(1) requires us to consider both federal and state law and employ whichever affords the 'more permissive' relation back standard." Butler v. Nat'l Cmty. Renaissance of Cal., 766 F.3d 1191, 1201 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting Coons v. Indus. Knife Co., 620 F.3d 38, 42 (1st Cir. 2010)).
The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Harlow leave to amend his complaint. Harlow never denoted that he did not know the Doe defendants' names in his complaint, as required under California law. Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 474. Nor did Harlow cite specific facts demonstrating how the party he wished to add had notice of this action, as required under federal law. Butler, 766 F.3d at 1202 . We therefore affirm the district court's denial of leave to amend.
AFFIRMED.
[*] This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
The Honorable Gershwin A. Drain, United States District Judge for the Eastern District of Michigan, sitting by designation.