Opinion
3:23-CV-1640 (MAD/ML)
01-22-2024
STEVEN J. HANYON, Plaintiff, v. EXPRESS AUTO CREDIT CORP.; ANGELO PASQUALE; and HANNAH DOOLITTLE, Defendants.
STEVEN J. HANYON Plaintiff, Pro Se
STEVEN J. HANYON Plaintiff, Pro Se
ORDER AND REPORT-RECOMMENDATION
MIROSLAV LOVRIC, United States Magistrate Judge
I. BACKGROUND
A. Procedural History
Plaintiff Steven J. Hanyon ("Plaintiff") commenced this action pro se on December 27, 2023, against Defendants Express Auto Credit Corp., Angelo Pasquale, and Hannah Doolittle (collectively “Defendants”). (Dkt. No. 1.) Plaintiff did not pay the filing fee for this action and seeks leave to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”). (Dkt. No. 2.)
On January 3, 2024, United States District Judge Mae A. D'Agostino issued a text order directing Plaintiff to comply with the Federal Rules. (Dkt. No. 5.) More specifically, Judge D'Agostino noted that Plaintiff failed to provide the Court with a short and plain statement of his claim. (Id.) Judge D'Agostino directed Plaintiff to file a complaint within fourteen days of her order. (Id.)
On January 8, 2024, Plaintiff filed a letter to Judge D'Agostino enclosing the “Complaints that you asked for.” (Dkt. No. 8.) On January 10, 2024, Plaintiff filed another letter that refers to itself as motion for summary judgment but appears to include additional allegations and thus was construed for purposes of this initial review as a supplemental pleading. (Dkt. No. 10.)
B. Complaint(s)
Construing Plaintiff's letters as liberally as possible, he appears to allege that Defendants violated his rights. (See generally Dkt. Nos. 8, 10.)
The court must interpret pro se complaints to raise the strongest arguments they suggest. Soto v. Walker, 44 F.3d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1995) (quoting Burgos v. Hopkins, 14 F.3d 787, 790 (2d Cir. 1994)).
More specifically, Plaintiff's letter filed with the Court on January 8, 2024, states that it is enclosing “Complaints” that the Court asked for. (Dkt. No. 8 at 1.) Instead, the filing appears to include a series of documents related to Plaintiff's New York State Division of Human Rights complaints that were filed against non-parties the New York State Police and New York State Department of Labor. (Dkt. No. 8 at 4-10.) In addition, Plaintiff's letter includes two documents each titled “Complaint”: (1) one with caption against non-party Universal Instruments Corporation, and (2) one with a caption against Defendants Express Auto Credit Corp and Pasquale. (Dkt. No. 8 at 2-3.) Plaintiff appears to allege that Defendant Express Auto Credit Corp remotely shut off a device in a 2013 Chevy Cruze, which resulted in Plaintiff being “blocked from work” and the termination of an employment contract with non-party Universal Instruments. (Dkt. No. 8 at 3.)
The document that refers to itself as a motion for summary judgment discusses discrimination he believes he has endured “since [he] was a child d[ue] to New York [S]tate [p]olicies” and a learning disability. (Dkt. No. 10 at 1.) Plaintiff outlines his educational experiences and history with an ex-wife. (Id.)
The motion for summary judgment alleges that at some point in time Plaintiff began working for non-party Universal. (Id. at 2.) Plaintiff alleges that his 2011 Chevy HRR was not running well and eventually “died on an exit to Universal.” (Id.) Plaintiff alleges that he “had to find a new car so [he] went to [Defendant] Express Auto Credit Corp” and purchased a 2013 Chevy Cruze. (Id.) Plaintiff alleges that “they put a GPS remote shut-off switch in the 2013 Chevy Cruze and shut it off in front of Universal's mail box when [he] was retrieving their mail.” (Id.) Plaintiff alleges that he returned the vehicle to Defendant Express Auto Credit Corp but was unable to obtain another vehicle because of his credit score. (Id.) Plaintiff alleges that he was “really upset” at Defendant Express Auto Credit Corp “so [he] sent them a[n] email threatening them.” (Id.) Plaintiff alleges that “the State” confiscated his firearm and he granted “them p[er]mission to keep it for one year but [he] also let them know [he is] related to the founding fathers and [he] find[s] it to be an insult to take such a thing away from [him].” (Dkt. No. 10 at 2-3.)
The motion for summary judgment asserts that (1) Plaintiff is in a lot of debt, (2) has been waiting for unemployment benefits but has not received any, (3) filed the “NYS Poor Person affidavit and also A summary judgment in NYS Supreme Court” which have not been ruled on yet, (4) a judge in the Town of Union imposed a fine that Plaintiff cannot afford, and (5) Plaintiff pleaded guilty to the violation of disorderly conduct upon the advice of the public defender. (Dkt. No. 10 at 3.) The motion for summary judgment asserts that Plaintiff is “so tired of being lied to and abused by the public that serves New York and being left behind by my dream company Universal Instruments.” (Id.)
Plaintiff does not appear to assert any causes of action and does not appear to seek any relief. (Dkt. No. 10 at 3 [“I Steven Hanyon write you such a Motion.”].)
Plaintiff seeks leave to proceed IFP. (Dkt. No. 2.)
II. PLAINTIFF'S APPLICATION TO PROCEED IFP
When a civil action is commenced in a federal district court, the statutory filing fee, currently set at $405, must ordinarily be paid. 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a). A court is authorized, however, to grant IFP status if it determines that the plaintiff is unable to pay the required fee. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1). Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915, where a plaintiff seeks leave to proceed IFP, the court must determine whether the plaintiff has demonstrated sufficient economic need to proceed without prepaying the required filing fee. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1).
The language of that section is ambiguous because it suggests an intent to limit availability of IFP status to prison inmates. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1) (authorizing the commencement of an action without prepayment of fees “by a person who submits an affidavit that includes a statement of all assets such prisoner possesses”). The courts have construed that section, however, as making IFP status available to any litigant who can meet the governing financial criteria. Hayes v. United States, 71 Fed.Cl. 366, 367 (Fed. Cl. 2006); see also Fridman v. City of N.Y., 195 F.Supp.2d 534, 536 n.1 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).
The decision of whether to grant an application to proceed IFP rests within the sound discretion of the court. Anderson v. Coughlin, 700 F.2d 37, 42 (2d Cir. 1983). The Court must be satisfied “that the person is unable to pay such fees or give security therefor” prior to granting IFP status. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1). To make this threshold showing, a plaintiff must demonstrate “that paying such fees would constitute a serious hardship on the plaintiff, not that such payment would render plaintiff destitute.” Fiebelkorn v. United States, 77 Fed.Cl. 59, 62 (Fed. Cl. 2007) (citing Adkins v. E.l. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 335 U.S. 331, 339 (1948)); see also Potnick v. E. State Hosp., 701 F.2d 243, 244 (2d Cir. 1983) (“Section 1915[a] does not require a litigant to demonstrate absolute destitution[.]”); accord, Lee v. McDonald's Corp., 231 F.3d 456, 459 (8th Cir. 2000). As the Second Circuit has noted, “no party must be made to choose between abandoning a potential meritorious claim or foregoing the necessities of life.” Potnick, 701 F.2d at 244 (citing Adkins, 335 U.S. at 339).
Here, Plaintiff's submission is incomplete. For example, Plaintiff fails to answer questions 2 and 3 outlining any employment and wages or other income he has received in the last twelve months. (Dkt. No. 2 at ¶¶ 2-3.) In addition, Plaintiff fails to answer question 4, which asks him to identify any money that he has in cash or in a checking or savings account. (Dkt. No. 2 at ¶ 4.)
In this instance, due to Plaintiff's incomplete IFP application, I am unable to conclude that he possesses insufficient funds to pay the $405.00 filing fee to commence an action without “foregoing the necessities of life.” Potnick, 701 F.2d at 244 (citing Adkins, 335 U.S. 339). Accordingly, I deny Plaintiff's motion to proceed in this case IFP. (Dkt. No. 2.) To the extent that Plaintiff may wish to renew his request to proceed IFP, and given the Court's unanswered questions about his financial situation, any request to proceed without the prepayment of fees must include a fully completed long form in forma pauperis application.
III. RELEVANT LEGAL STANDARDS GOVERNING INITIAL REVIEW OF A COMPLAINT
Ordinarily, the finding that Plaintiff does not qualify for IFP status would end the Court's discussion, and Plaintiff, in light of his pro se status, would likely be afforded an opportunity to either prepay the full filing fee, or submit a new, completed, and certified application for IFP. Because, however, as is discussed more completely below, I find that Plaintiff's Complaint is frivolous and fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, 28 U.S.C. § 1915 requires that the court dismiss the action “[notwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion thereof, that may have been paid[.]” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e).
In determining whether an action is frivolous, the court must consider whether the complaint lacks an arguable basis in law or in fact. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). Dismissal of frivolous actions is appropriate to prevent abuses of court process as well as to discourage the waste of judicial resources. Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327; Harkins v. Eldridge, 505 F.2d 802, 804 (8th Cir. 1974); see Fitzgerald v. First East Seventh Street Tenants Corp., 221 F.3d 362, 364 (2d Cir. 2000) (a district court “may dismiss a frivolous complaint sua sponte even when the plaintiff has paid the required filing fee[.]”); see also Pflaum v. Town of Stuyvesant, Columbia Cnty., N.Y., 11-CV-0335, 2016 WL 865296, at *1, n.2 (N.D.N.Y. Mar. 2, 2016) (Suddaby, C.J.) (finding that the Court had the power to address and dismiss additional theories of the plaintiff's retaliation claim sua sponte because those theories were so lacking in arguable merit as to be frivolous).
In order to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, a complaint must contain, inter alia, “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). The requirement that a plaintiff “show” that he or she is entitled to relief means that a complaint “must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (emphasis added) (quoting BellAtl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 [2007]). “Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief . . . requires the . . . court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense. . . . [W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged-but it has not shown-that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679 (internal citation and punctuation omitted).
“In reviewing a complaint . . . the court must accept the material facts alleged in the complaint as true and construe all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff's favor.” Hernandez v. Coughlin, 18 F.3d 133, 136 (2d Cir. 1994) (citation omitted). However, “the tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions. Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
Courts are “obligated to construe a pro se complaint liberally.” Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009); see also Nance v. Kelly, 912 F.2d 605, 606 (2d Cir. 1990) (per curiam) (reading the plaintiff's pro se complaint “broadly, as we must” and holding that the complaint sufficiently raised a cognizable claim). “[E]xtreme caution should be exercised in ordering sua sponte dismissal of a pro se complaint before the adverse party has been served and [the] parties . . . have had an opportunity to respond.” Anderson v. Coughlin, 700 F.2d 37, 41 (2d Cir. 1983).
IV. ANALYSIS
In addressing the sufficiency of a plaintiff's complaint, the court must construe his pleadings liberally. Sealed Plaintiff v. Sealed Defendant, 537 F.3d 185, 191 (2d Cir. 2008). Having reviewed Plaintiff's filings with this principle in mind, I recommend that all causes of action be dismissed for three reasons.
First, Rule 8 of the Fed.R.Civ.P. requires a “short and plain statement” of a claim, showing that “the pleader is entitled to relief.” Whitfield v. Johnson, 763 Fed.Appx. 106, 107 (2d Cir. 2019) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)). Each statement must be “simple, concise, and direct,' and must give ‘fair notice of the claims asserted.” Whitfield, 763 Fed.Appx. at 107 (quoting Simmons v. Abruzzo, 49 F.3d 83, 86 (2d Cir. 1995)). A pleading must also contain “a demand for the relief sought[.]” Id. “A complaint may be dismissed under Rule 8 if it is ‘so confused, ambiguous, or otherwise unintelligible that its true substance, if any, is well disguised.'” Id. Moreover, Rule 10 of the Fed.R.Civ.P. provides that “[a] party must state its claims or defenses in numbered paragraphs, each limited as far as practicable to a single set of circumstances[.]” Fed.R.Civ.P. 10(b). Rule 10's purpose is to “provide an easy mode of identification for referring to a particular paragraph in a prior pleading[.]” Clervrain v. Robbins, 22-CV-1248, 2022 WL 17517312, at *2 (N.D.N.Y. Dec. 8, 2022) (Stewart, M.J.) (citation omitted), report and recommendation adopted, 2023 WL 3170384 (N.D.N.Y. May 1, 2023) (D'Agostino, J.). A complaint that does not comply with these Rules “presents far too heavy a burden in terms of defendants' duty to shape a comprehensive defense and provides no meaningful basis for the Court to assess the sufficiency of [the plaintiff's] claims,” and may properly be dismissed by the court. Gonzales v. Wing, 167 F.R.D. 352, 355 (N.D.N.Y. 1996) (McAvoy, C.J.).
As it currently stands, Plaintiff's filings wholly fail to provide fair notice of the claims he attempts to assert. Given its lack of clarity, the Court recommends dismissal of the action because it is not acceptable under Rules 8 and 10 of the Fed. R. Civ. P.
Second, and in the alternative, I recommend that Plaintiff's action be dismissed because he fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Plaintiff fails to allege any causes of action and it is thus difficult to analyze Plaintiff's claims. However, to the extent that he intended to allege causes of action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, he fails to allege the involvement of a state actor. Whalen v. Cnty. of Fulton, 126 F.3d 400, 405 (2d Cir. 1997) (citing Eagleston v. Guido, 41 F.3d 865, 875-76 (2d Cir. 1994)) (“To state a valid claim under § 1983, the plaintiff must allege that the challenged conduct (1) was attributable to a person acting under color of state law, and (2) deprived the plaintiff of a right, privilege, or immunity secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States.”).
Due to the nature of Plaintiff's filings, it is difficult to precisely determine exactly which doctrine applies, but his claims are also likely barred. “[I]n the event the underlying state court proceedings are concluded, such claims are likely barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.” Walker v. O'Connor, 22-CV-0581, 2022 WL 2341420, at *6 (N.D.N.Y. June 29, 2022) (Dancks, M.J.). In the event that Plaintiff's underlying state court proceeding remains pending, his request for this Court's involvement may also implicate the Younger abstention doctrine. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971). Under the Younger doctrine, “federal courts [must] abstain from taking jurisdiction over federal constitutional claims that involve or call into question ongoing state proceedings.” Diamond “D” Constr. Corp. v. McGowan, 282 F.3d 191, 198 (2d Cir. 2002).
Third and in the alternative, I recommend that Plaintiff's action be dismissed to the extent that it asserts claims against New York State-or any of its arms or agencies-because it is immune from suit pursuant to the Eleventh Amendment. Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 276 (1986); Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 98-100 (1984); see Ognibene v. Niagara Cnty. Sheriffs Dep't, 03-CV-0678E, 2003 WL 24243989, at *3 (W.D.N.Y. Dec. 1, 2003) (“To the extent the plaintiff names various state courts as defendants and seeks either legal or equitable relief against them under § 1983, they are immune from such suit under the Eleventh Amendment.”).
For each of these reasons, I recommend that Plaintiff's action be dismissed.
V. OPPORTUNITY TO AMEND
Generally, a court should not dismiss claims contained in a complaint filed by a pro se litigant without granting leave to amend at least once “when a liberal reading of the complaint gives any indication that a valid claim might be stated.” Branum v. Clark, 927 F.2d 698, 704-05 (2d Cir. 1991); see also Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a)(2) (“The court should freely give leave when justice so requires.”). An opportunity to amend is not required, however, where “the problem with [the plaintiff's] causes of action is substantive” such that “better pleading will not cure it.” Cuoco v. Moritsugu, 222 F.3d 99, 112 (2d Cir. 2000); see also Cortec Indus. Inc. v. Sum Holding L.P., 949 F.2d 42, 48 (2d Cir. 1991) (“Of course, where a plaintiff is unable to allege any fact sufficient to support its claim, a complaint should be dismissed with prejudice.”). Stated differently, “[w]here it appears that granting leave to amend is unlikely to be productive, . . . it is not an abuse of discretion to deny leave to amend.” Ruffolo v. Oppenheimer & Co., 987 F.2d 129, 131 (2d Cir. 1993); accord, Brown v. Peters, 95-CV-1641, 1997 WL 599355, at *1 (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 22, 1997) (Pooler, J.).
See also Carris v. First Student, Inc., 132 F.Supp.3d 321, 340-41 n.1 (N.D.N.Y. 2015) (Suddaby, C.J.) (explaining that the standard set forth in Gomez v. USAA Fed. Sav. Bank, 171 F.3d 794, 796 (2d Cir. 1999)-that the Court should grant leave to amend “unless the court can rule out any possibility, however unlikely it might be, that an amended complaint would be successful in stating a claim”-is likely not an accurate recitation of the governing law after Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007)), rev'd on other grounds, 682 Fed.Appx. 30.
Although this Court has serious doubts, it is not clear whether a better pleading would permit Plaintiff to assert a cognizable cause of action against Defendants. Out of an abundance of caution and in deference to Plaintiff's pro se status, the undersigned recommends the action be dismissed with leave to amend to cure the defects as stated above.
If Plaintiff chooses to avail himself of an opportunity to amend, such amended pleading must set forth a short and plain statement of the facts on which he relies to support any legal claims asserted. Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a). In addition, the amended complaint must include allegations reflecting how the individual(s) named as Defendant(s) are involved in the allegedly unlawful activity. Finally, Plaintiff is informed that any amended complaint will replace the existing Complaint, and must be a wholly integrated and complete pleading that does not rely upon or incorporate by reference any pleading or document previously filed with the Court. See Shields v. Citytrust Bancorp, Inc., 25 F.3d 1124, 1128 (2d Cir. 1994) (“It is well established that an amended complaint ordinarily supersedes the original, and renders it of no legal effect.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
ACCORDINGLY, it is
ORDERED that Plaintiff's IFP application (Dkt. No. 2) is DENIED without prejudice and with leave to renew; and it is further
ORDERED that should Plaintiff wish to proceed with this action, he must either (i) pay the $405.00 filing fee, or (ii) submit a completed, signed, and certified Long Form IFP application in accordance with this Order and Report-Recommendation within thirty (30) days from the date of the filing of this Order and Report-Recommendation. Plaintiff is advised that, if he does not fully comply with this Order and Report-Recommendation within thirty days, the undersigned will issue a report and recommendation to the assigned district judge that the action be dismissed; and it is further respectfully
RECOMMENDED that the Court DISMISS WITH LEAVE TO AMEND Plaintiff's action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1915(e)(2)(B) as frivolous; and it is further respectfully
ORDERED that the Clerk of the Court shall file a copy of this order, report, and recommendation on the docket of this case and serve a copy upon the parties in accordance with the local rules. The Clerk shall also send Plaintiff a blank Long Form IFP application.
The Clerk shall also provide Plaintiff with copies of all unreported decisions cited herein in accordance with Lebron v. Sanders, 557 F.3d 76 (2d Cir. 2009) (per curiam).
NOTICE: Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), the parties have fourteen days within which to file written objections to the foregoing report. Such objections shall be filed with the Clerk of the Court. FAILURE TO OBJECT TO THIS REPORT WITHIN FOURTEEN DAYS WILL PRECLUDE APPELLATE REVIEW . 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) (Supp. 2013); Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a), 6(d), 72; Roldan v. Racette, 984 F.2d 85 (2d Cir. 1993) (citing Small v. Sec'y of Health and Human Servs., 892 F.2d 15 (2d Cir. 1989)).
If you are proceeding pro se and served with this report, recommendation, and order by mail, three additional days will be added to the fourteen-day period, meaning that you have seventeen days from the date that the report, recommendation, and order was mailed to you to serve and file objections. Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(d). If the last day of that prescribed period falls on a Saturday, Sunday, or legal holiday, then the deadline is extended until the end of the next day that is not a Saturday, Sunday, or legal holiday. Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a)(1)(C).