Opinion
No. 78-261
Decided March 22, 1979. Rehearing denied May 17, 1979. Certiorari denied August 20, 1979.
Former assistant professor at the Colorado School of Mines appealed from a summary judgment granted defendant school officials on his contract action.
Affirmed
1. COLLEGES AND UNIVERSITIES — Employment — Authority to Hire Faculty — Nondelegable Duty — Authority — Bind School — Limited to Trustees. A nondelegable duty to hire faculty is implicitly granted the Colorado School of Mines Board of Trustees, and any offers of permanent employment or tenure made by other officials is without legal effect.
2. Duty to Hire Faculty — Nondelegable Duty — Trustees — School of Mines — Representations — Other Officials — Not Binding — Agency Theory. Inasmuch as authority of School of Mines trustees to hire faculty is a nondelegable duty, the representations of other officials of the school relative to that duty could not on any agency theory bind the trustees to honor those representations.
3. Applicant for Hire — State College — Charged With Knowledge — Exercise — Hiring Power — Representations — Officials — Not Estop — Board of Trustees. An applicant for hire at state college is charged with the knowledge, whether actual or not, of the correct exercise of the hiring power; thus, representations of certain officials at School of Mines as to proposed employment of applicant did not estop the Board of Trustees from refusing to honor those representations.
Appeal from the District Court of the County of Jefferson, Honorable Ronald J. Hardesty, Judge.
George W. Boland, for plaintiff-appellant.
J. D. MacFarlane, Attorney General, David W. Robbins, Deputy Attorney General, Edward G. Donovan, Assistant Attorney General, Joseph N. deRaismes, First Assistant Attorney General, Jo Ann Soker, Assistant Attorney General, for defendants-appellees.
Plaintiff Hansen filed a contract action claiming that in reliance upon representations made to him by defendants, he obtained a Ph.D. believing that the degree would give him permanent employment at the School of Mines. From summary judgment granted defendants, Hansen now appeals. We affirm.
Hansen and defendant School of Mines entered into a one year employment contract whereby Hansen was hired as an assistant professor of English. Hansen was thereafter successively given five more one year contracts, the last ending in June 1973. Prior to signing the first contract, Hansen asserts that defendant Fisher, then head of the Department of Humanities and Social Sciences with the School of Mines, informed him that if he obtained a doctorate, he would be promoted to associate professor, thereby gaining de facto tenure. Hansen asserts that this same representation was made to him during his employment by the Vice President of Academic Affairs and subsequently by Fisher's successor, defendant Vandiver.
Hansen received a letter on June 1, 1972, from Vandiver notifying him that when his contract expired at the end of the 1972-1973 school year it would not be renewed. Hansen completed his doctoral degree in December of 1972. When his contract expired without renewal in June of 1973, he filed this action. Hansen asserted that he obtained his Ph.D. in reliance upon the representations made to him, and that nonrenewal of his employment was a breach of the School of Mines' obligation to retain him which arose when the purported condition to gaining permanent employment was fulfilled.
Hansen argues that summary judgment was improperly granted because there existed genuine issues of disputed material fact. We disagree. Relying upon University of Colorado v. Silverman, 192 Colo. 75, 555 P.2d 1155 (1976), the trial court determined that, even assuming the truth of Hansen's allegations, defendants were entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law.
[1] Silverman held that a letter from an associate dean of the University of Colorado to an assistant professor did not create an employment contract which bound the Board of Regents even though Silverman satisfied the conditions set forth in the letter. The court found that under the applicable statute governing the powers of the University's Board of Regents, the power to hire or retain faculty was vested exclusively in the Regents, and could not be delegated. Hansen asserts that Silverman is not applicable here since the legislation governing the School of Mines differs from the statutes construed in Silverman. We find no merit in this argument.
[2] C.R.S. 1963, § 24-9-4(1) (substantially reenacted as § 23-41-104(1), C.R.S. 1973) provided:
"The board of trustees shall have the control and management of the Colorado School of Mines, and of the property belonging thereto, subject to the laws of this state, and may make all needful by-laws and regulations for the government of said board, and for the management and government of the Colorado School of Mines, not inconsistent with the laws of this state."
In Van Pelt v. State Board for Community Colleges Occupational Education, 195 Colo. 316, 577 P.2d 765 (1978), under facts similar to those presented here, the court held that the duty to hire faculty was implicitly included within the State Board's enabling statute, and that the duty to hire could not be delegated without specific legislative provision. We find that reasoning persuasive here even though that case involved a different statute. Thus, the general management power of the School of Mines' Trustees under its statute, which is similar to the statute at issue in Van Pelt, must necessarily include the power to hire faculty, and such power cannot be delegated unless expressly otherwise authorized by the legislature. Van Pelt, supra; Big Sandy School District v. Carroll, 164 Colo. 173, 433 P.2d 325 (1967). No statutory exception to this rule exists here, and the trial court thus correctly applied the rule of Silverman.
[3] Hansen further relies on the law of agency, and argues that the Vice President for Academic Affairs and the Head of the Department of Humanities and Social Sciences had implicit or apparent authority to bind the principal School of Mines. This reliance is misplaced since the rule of nondelegable powers established in Silverman, Van Pelt, and Big Sandy prohibits assumption of authority on an agency theory by declaring that any representation made in derogation of this rule is not binding upon the body exclusively vested with the power in question. Persons dealing with public corporations do so at their peril, and are deemed to have notice of the proper exercise of the powers vested in the corporation. Big Sandy, supra; Englewood v. Ripple Howe, Inc., 150 Colo. 434, 374 P.2d 360 (1962).
Hansen's argument that the School of Mines is estopped to deny its conditional representation of employment must also fail. As the court held in Silverman, an applicant for employment is charged with the knowledge, whether actual or not, of the correct exercise of the hiring power. In light of this principle, and under the facts here presented and pled, we discover no manifest justification for invoking the doctrine of estoppel.
Judgment affirmed.
JUDGE RULAND and JUDGE STERNBERG concur.