Bingham Mitchell (with whom was S. B. Page), for the defendants. The plaintiffs are not entitled to recover in this action, for two reasons, viz., — I. First, because they have not indemnified "the owner" of "the property * * injured or destroyed, in an action on the case," as required by the law which they here seek to enforce. The plaintiff's pretended right, which they aim here to enforce, is a creature of the statute. It does not now exist under the common law, nor did it at the time of the enactment of the statute. The statute fixes the mode in which the liability of the town "to indemnify the owner" of the property injured or destroyed is to be established, viz., by an "action on the case." The party whose property was injured or destroyed had no right of recovery against the plaintiff town, which was capable of being enforced, except "in all action on the case." To enable the plaintiffs to recover of the defendants, it must first be established not only that they have paid money to the party whose property was injured or destroyed, but it must appear that the plaintiffs' liability was established in the mode prescribed by the statute. Unless the plaintiffs paid "money, under the provisions of the twelfth section "of chapter thirty-four of the General statutes, and paid it in accordance with the provisions of that section, they have no right capable of being enforced against these defendants under the fifteenth section. It is purely a statutory right, and the plaintiffs must show that they have conformed strictly to the statutory requirements.

Have the plaintiffs "paid money under the provisions of the twelfth section"? The plaintiffs paid money upon the award of arbitrators. The arbitration must have been voluntary on the plaintiffs' part, as there was no statute making it obligatory on the part of the plaintiffs to enter into it. This mode of ascertaining the plaintiffs' liability to Parker, and its extent, is entirely outside of the provisions of section twelve, because that section makes no provision for arbitration to determine the liability and its extent. This mode of trial being unauthorized by section twelve, money paid on the result reached is not paid "under the provisions of section twelve." There is but one way pointed out by the statute for determining this question of liability and its extent, viz., "in an action on the case," and everything done in a different mode is unauthorized, and not binding or conclusive upon any one except those who are parties to it. To this arbitration these defendants were not parties, and by its result they cannot be bound, any more than they call be bound by the result of an arbitration between Jones and Roe to determine the amount of damages Jones, should pay Roe for an assault upon him. If the town can refer their liability to arbitration, and then recover of any person who has had to do with the injury or destruction of the property the amount of the award, why can they not agree with the person whose property was destroyed that his estimate of the loss and his judgment of its liability shall be conclusive and then recover of the other parties the amount thus paid, thus obliging them to take the estimate of loss and judgment of liability of a person to whom they would never submit it, and bind them by an agreement in which they never had any voice? I will readily be seen what incalculable injury a license of this kind would work to the rights of third persons.

The form or mode prescribed by the statute would amount to nothing if the plaintiffs can maintain their action. Debt, trover, assumpsit, or trespass would answer just as well, so long as the town did not object to it. The defendants can only be made liable to pay to the town money which the town was compelled to pay Parker under this statute. The town cannot voluntarily pay money, and then recover it of the defendants. "Where an offence is created by statute, and the same statute prescribes the penalty, or the mode of procedure, or anything else of the sort, only that which the statute prescribes can be followed." Bishop on Statutory Crimes, s. 250; Renwick v. Morris, 7 Hill 575; — see, also, Dudley v. Mayhew, 3 N.Y. 9; Almy v. Harris, 5 Johns. 175; Swift's Digest 585; Smith v. Drew, 5 Mass. 514; Gedney v. Tewksbury, 3 Mass. 307; Chesley v. Smith, 1 N.H. 22; Green v. Bailey, 3 N.H. 34; Brigg's Petition, 29 N.H. 551. When the legislature authorizes an act which in its consequences is injurious to the rights of others, and for such injuries prescribes the mode for recovering damages, the statutory remedy must be strictly followed. Lebanon v. Olcott, 1 N.H. 339; Woods v. Nashua M'f'g Co., 4 N.H. 627; Stevens v. Mid. Canal, 12 Mass. 466; Spring v. Russell, 7 Greenl. 273; Calking v. Baldwin, 4 Wend. 667.

II. The plaintiffs are not entitled to maintain their action, because the declaration is not a declaration in case, as is required by the statute. The declaration is an admixture of some of the elements of a declaration in the actions of case, debt, and assumpsit. Its allegation of "whereby and by reason of all which an action has accrued to said town of Hanover to recover of said defendants said sums and interest," is an allegation in an action of debt. Its conclusion, "and that the defendants have been requested to pay the same, but have refused, "is the conclusion of a declaration in an action of assumpsit.

Duncan, for the. plaintiffs. "In an action on the cases" in s. 12, is merely directory, and is not a condition precedent to enable a town to recover what it has paid. The selectmen, as managers of the prudential affairs of the town (Gen. St., c. 37, s. 2), had authority to submit the question of the town's liability to arbitration, and to perform the award. Sanborn v. Deerfield, 2 N.H. 251; Andover v. Grafton, 7 N.H. 298; Hanover v. Eaton, 3 N.H. 38; Union v. Crawford, 19 Conn. 3-31; Knowlton v. Plantation, 14 Me. 20; Cabot v. Britt, 36 Vt. 349, 351; Hoit v. Cooper, 41 N.H. 111. The allegation "whereby" c., is superfluous, and may be stricken out.

Carpenter, on the same side. These defendants are not bound by the award. As they were not notified to defend a suit, the. question of their liability is open, as it was in East Kingston v. Towle, 48 N.H. 57. The town settled Parker's claim by voluntary arbitration at their peril. But if he had recovered judgment against the town for the damages, after full trial, in an action of debt or assumpsit instead of case, that would not have defeated the town's right of action against these defendants. The town were not bound to waste their money in litigation with Parker to get a remedy against the rioters.