Opinion
No. 1329 C.D. 2013
03-06-2014
Sheldon Hannibal, Appellant v. Pa. Department of Corrections, Administrative Staff and PIC Commissary Supervisor, Dir. Jane and John Doe, et al.
BEFORE: HONORABLE BERNARD L. McGINLEY, Judge HONORABLE ROBERT SIMPSON, Judge HONORABLE JAMES GARDNER COLINS, Senior Judge
OPINION NOT REPORTED
MEMORANDUM OPINION BY JUDGE SIMPSON
Sheldon Hannibal (Hannibal), an inmate representing himself, asks whether the Court of Common Pleas of Greene County (trial court) erred in upholding the Office of District Attorney of Greene County's (District Attorney) disapproval of Hannibal's private criminal complaint against various prison personnel regarding the sale of an allegedly defective television set. Hannibal argues the trial court and the District Attorney abused their discretion by refusing to approve his private criminal complaint where he established a prima facie case concerning the crimes alleged. He also asserts the disapproval of his private criminal complaint constitutes bias toward prisoner litigation. Upon review, we affirm.
Hannibal was previously convicted of and sentenced to death for first degree murder. See Commonwealth v. Hannibal, 562 Pa. 132, 753 A.2d 1265 (2000).
In March 2013, Hannibal filed a private criminal complaint with the District Attorney against the State Correctional Institution-Greene (SCI-Greene), Pennsylvania Correctional Industries' (PCI) commissary staff and directors Jane and John Doe as well as SCI-Greene's administrative staff. Through his complaint, Hannibal set forth the following allegations.
In November 2011, Hannibal purchased an RCA flat screen color television set (television) from the commissary at SCI-Greene. The television was defective and only worked for a few months. After Hannibal complained, a replacement television was provided in February 2013; however, the replacement television also proved defective.
Hannibal alleged the PCI commissary and SCI-Greene administrative staff "with full knowledge that they are selling defective product [sic], and still sale [sic] them to prisoners via deception and under the color of state law. Furthermore selling these defective product [sic] at full price. [sic] nevertheless never informing the prisoners that these defective products will barely last to the end of their (90) days warranty." Certified Record, Item #1, "Nature of Criminal Complaint," 3/8/13, at 1. Hannibal alleged this is a "practice, [c]ustom, and pattern very well know [sic] by PCI and Department of Corrections..[sic]" Id.
Hannibal further alleged SCI-Greene's administrative staff informed him that the 90-day warranty issued on the first television applied only to that television and did not apply to the replacement television. Thus, Hannibal alleged the replacement television did not come with a warranty. Hannibal alleged that when the replacement television ceases to operate, he will be forced to purchase a third television. Hannibal alleged this is "a clear case of deception and also extortion/fraudulent practice simply because [he] is a prisoner." Id. at 2.
In addition, Hannibal alleged that after he filed a grievance regarding this matter, Lieutenant Anthony Gumbarevic became upset and denied the grievance. Lieutenant Gumbarevic also informed Hannibal that his only option was to purchase an extended warranty for an additional $90. However, Hannibal alleged, neither the PCI nor administrative staff honored the original warranty. As a result, Hannibal alleged he
was forced via [e]xtortion , [sic] to pay the ($90-Dollars) [sic]. This [e]xtortion practice/[c]ustom and [p]attern by the PCI and the Department of Correction,. [sic] First they sale [sic] you a defective product knowingly than [sic] they neither honor the warranty nor do they stop sailing [sic] defective product [sic] to the prisoners. And they do so under a fraudulent and deceptional [sic] practice,custom , [sic] and pattern. Under the color of state law. [sic]
Id.
Hannibal alleged the actions of the PCI commissary staff and directors Jane and John Doe as well as SCI-Greene administrative staff constituted theft by unlawful taking/extortion, a deceptive fraudulent practice, an unfair trade practice and a violation of the statutory provision regarding corrupt organizations.
In response, the District Attorney's office sent Hannibal a letter in which it indicated that, in the exercise of its discretion, it disapproved Hannibal's private criminal complaint. The District Attorney's office stated that Hannibal may still have a civil claim against the individuals named; however, by law, the District Attorney's office could not counsel Hannibal in non-criminal matters. The District Attorney's office stated that Hannibal could contact private counsel or the local magisterial district judge for further options. Hannibal petitioned the trial court for review of the District Attorney's disapproval.
Based on its review of the information provided, the trial court issued an order in which it determined the District Attorney did not abuse her discretion in disapproving Hannibal's criminal complaint. Hannibal appealed, and the trial court directed him to file a concise statement of the errors complained of on appeal, which he did.
Hannibal appealed to the Superior Court, which transferred the matter to this Court on the ground that Hannibal filed his private criminal complaint against the Department of Corrections. As this case is an appeal from the disapproval of a private criminal complaint, jurisdiction lies with the Superior Court. Commonwealth v. Smith, 4 A.3d 227, 229 n.10 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2010). However, as no party has objected to jurisdiction, we will decide this matter. Id.; see 42 Pa. C.S. §704(a) (waiver of objections to jurisdiction); Pa. R.A.P. 704(a) (same).
Thereafter, the trial court issued an opinion pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 1925(a) in which it explained: (1) it was not required to hold a hearing; (2) the District Attorney properly declined to prosecute as the facts and investigation did not reveal an intent to defraud or steal; (3) Hannibal did not provide any evidence that the District Attorney's decision was based on bad faith, fraud or unconstitutionality; and, (4) absent a showing of intent, Hannibal's remedy was civil in nature. This matter is now before us for disposition.
On appeal, Hannibal presents two issues. He first argues the trial court and the District Attorney abused their discretion by refusing to approve his private criminal complaint where he established a prima facie case regarding the criminal offenses alleged. Hannibal also asserts the disapproval of his complaint constitutes bias toward prisoner litigation.
Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure 506, which governs the approval of private complaints, states:
(A) When the affiant is not a law enforcement officer, the complaint shall be submitted to an attorney for the Commonwealth, who shall approve or disapprove it without unreasonable delay.Pa.R.Crim.P. 506.
(B) If the attorney for the Commonwealth:
(1) approves the complaint, the attorney shall indicate this decision on the complaint form and transmit it to the issuing authority;
(2) disapproves the complaint, the attorney shall state the reasons on the complaint form and return it to the affiant. Thereafter, the affiant may petition the court of common pleas for review of the decision.
Where, as here, a district attorney disapproves a private criminal complaint on the ground that the complaint is civil in nature, such a statement constitutes a "policy-based" reason for disapproval of charges. Commonwealth v. Michaliga, 947 A.2d 786, 791 (Pa. Super. 2008); see Commonwealth v. Cooper, 710 A.2d 76 (Pa. Super. 1998); Hearn v. Myers, 699 A.2d 1265 (Pa. Super. 1997).
Had the District Attorney disapproved the private complaint based on an insufficiency of evidence, the trial court would review the matter de novo. See In re Private Criminal Complaints of Rafferty, 969 A.2d 578 (Pa. Super. 2009). --------
The Superior Court explains that review of a trial court's consideration of the Commonwealth's policy-based reason is as follows:
[W]hen the district attorney disapproves a private criminal complaint on wholly policy considerations, or on a hybrid of legal and policy considerations, the trial court's standard of review of the district attorney's decision is abuse of discretion. This deferential standard recognizes the limitations on judicial power to interfere with the district attorney's discretion in these kinds of decisions.... Thereafter, the appellate court will review the trial court's decision for an abuse of discretion, in keeping with settled principles of appellate review of discretionary matters.... The district attorney's decision not to prosecute a criminal complaint for reasons including policy matters carries a presumption of good faith and soundness.... The complainant must create a record that demonstrates the contrary. Thus, the appropriate scope of review in policy-declination cases is limited to whether the trial court misapprehended or misinterpreted the district attorney's decision and/or, without a legitimate basis in the record, substituted its judgment for that of the district attorney. We will not disturb the trial court's decision unless the record contains no reasonable grounds for the court's decision, or the court relied on rules of law that were palpably wrong or inapplicable. Otherwise, the trial court's decision must stand, even if the appellate court would be inclined to decide the case differently.Michaliga, 947 A.2d at 791-92 (citations omitted).
Speaking through Judge (now Justice) Stevens, the Superior Court further explained:
The private criminal complainant has the burden to prove the district attorney abused his discretion, and that burden is a heavy one. In the Rule 506 petition for review, the private criminal complainant must demonstrate the district attorney's decision amounted to bad faith, fraud or unconstitutionality. The complainant must do more than merely assert the district attorney's decision is flawed in these regards. The complainant must show the facts of the case lead only to the conclusion that the district attorney's decision was patently discriminatory, arbitrary or pretextual, and therefore, not in the public interest. In the absence of such evidence, the trial court cannot presume to supervise the district attorney's exercise of prosecutorial discretion, and should leave the district attorney's decision undisturbed.In re Private Criminal Complaints of Rafferty, 969 A.2d 578, 581-82 (Pa. Super. 2009) (citations and quotations omitted).
A private criminal complainant is not entitled to an evidentiary hearing regarding the trial court's review of the District Attorney's decision. Braman v. Corbett, 19 A.3d 1151, 1159 (Pa. Super. 2011). Rather, Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure 506 merely allows the private criminal complainant the opportunity to have his complaint reviewed in the common pleas court. Id.
In addition, "where the prosecutor believes the private affiant is attempting to utilize the justice system to redress grievances for which there are adequate civil remedies and conveys this rationale with the single phrase '[a]ffiant should file civil action,' the prosecutor sufficiently sets forth a clear statement as to the particular policy that dictates withholding prosecution." Cooper, 710 A.2d at 81 (citation and quotation omitted). Moreover,
[t]he District Attorney's function is to represent the Commonwealth in criminal prosecutions. The District Attorney exercises this responsibility by first evaluating complaints to determine whether criminal charges should be brought against an individual. The private prosecutor, even if he or she was the victim, has no legitimate interest, other than as a member of the general public, in seeing a violator of the laws brought to justice by the Commonwealth and punished for his misdeeds. If a private prosecutor feels individually harmed his remedy is a civil suit for damages.Commonwealth v. Pritchard, 596 A.2d 827, 831 (Pa. Super. 1991) (emphasis added) (citations and quotations omitted). Thus, "[t]he district attorney has the discretion to decline prosecution when adequate civil remedies are available to redress grievances." Hearn, 699 A.2d at 1268.
Here, in its order rejecting Hannibal's challenge to the District Attorney's disapproval of his private criminal complaint, the trial court stated the District Attorney did not abuse her discretion in refusing to approve the complaint. We discern no abuse of discretion in the trial court's determination. As stated above, a district attorney's disapproval of a private criminal complaint on the ground that a civil remedy exists constitutes a valid policy-based reason for disapproval. Michaliga, 947 A.2d at 795 (district attorney is presumed to have acted in good faith, and district attorney's disapproval of a complaint on the ground the complainant has a civil remedy is "clearly based upon 'sound thinking' given the state of the law in Pennsylvania.") (citing Cooper; Hearn). Hannibal asserts the disapproval of his private complaint is based on bias toward prisoner litigation, and the District Attorney never approved a prisoner's private complaint. Beyond these bald assertions, Hannibal offers no explanation as to why a civil remedy is inadequate under these circumstances. Because we discern no abuse of discretion in the trial court's decision here, we affirm.
/s/_________
ROBERT SIMPSON, Judge ORDER
AND NOW, this 6th day of March, 2014, the order of the Court of Common Pleas of Greene County is AFFIRMED.
/s/_________
ROBERT SIMPSON, Judge