Hankins v. City of Tacoma

Full title: MICHAEL T. HANKINS and SINCERE HANKINS, husband and wife, and MICHAEL…

Court: United States District Court, W.D. Washington, at Tacoma

Date published: Feb 26, 2007

Case No. C06-5099 FDB (W.D. Wash. Feb. 26, 2007)

Opinion

Case No. C06-5099 FDB.

February 26, 2007

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON TITLE VI CLAIMS

FRANKLIN BURGESS, District Judge

This civil rights action against the City of Tacoma and individual police officers stems from the alleged conduct of police officers occurring in a traffic stop and the alleged failure of the City of Tacoma to train and supervise the officers or investigate claims of misconduct. Out of this common nucleus of operative facts, Plaintiffs' assert numerous claims for violations of state tort law, federal law and constitutionally protected rights.

Before the Court is Defendants' motion for summary judgment on Plaintiffs' Title VI cause of action. After having reviewed all materials submitted by the parties and relied upon for authority, the Court is fully informed and hereby grants the motion for summary judgment and dismisses Plaintiffs' Title VI claims.

INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND

On May 8, 2003, Tacoma Police Officer Robert Baker initiated a traffic stop on Plaintiff Michael Hankins. Earlier in the day, Tacoma police officers had been advised of an armed robbery that had occurred in Lacy, Washington. The officers were provided with the license number of a green Cadillac that had been involved in the robbery. When Officer Baker first saw Michael Hankins' vehicle, he recognized it as a dark-colored Cadillac. Officer Baker followed the vehicle in an attempt to determine whether it was the green Cadillac involved in the robbery. As Officer Baker caught up with the vehicle in the 2100 block of South J Street, he was able to determine it that it was black, not green and that the license did not match that of the armed robbery vehicle. Although the license number and color did not match the description of the robbery vehicle, Officer Baker ran the license number through his mobile data computer to confirm the plates belonged to the vehicle. Officer Baker continued to follow the vehicle until he received information reflecting that the plates belonged to the vehicle, but were canceled. Officer Baker then initiated the traffic stop on Michael Hankins for driving a vehicle with canceled license plates. This stop occurred in the area where Officer Baker had initially commenced to follow Michael Hankins, who had circled around and come back to his original location, across the street from the residence of his father-in law. Plaintiff and his father-in law, Michael Ward, are African-Americans. Officer Baker knew where Michael Ward resided.

The accounts of what transpired after Officer Baker initiated the stop vary widely among the parties.¹ Plaintiffs' account follows. Upon seeing Officer Baker activate the patrol lights, Michael Hankins parked in front of his in-laws' residence where he knew there would be witnesses to what transpired. Mr. Hankins then got out of his vehicle and Officer Baker got out of his patrol car and swore at Mr. Hankins, telling him to get back in his vehicle. Mr. Hankins wife, Sincere, and a number of others were in Michael Ward's yard observing what was transpiring. Officer Baker then told Mr. Hankins to close the car door or he would shut it on his leg. Officer Baker then reached in with his right arm and grabbed Mr. Hankins by the throat. Mr. Hankins could not breath and was gasping for air. Officer Jason Brooks appeared displaying pepper spray and told Mr. Hankins to comply with Officer Baker's commands. He did not spray Mr. Hankins. Officer Garrison then appeared, placed his taser against Mr. Hankins chest and deployed a taser charge.

1 Defendants concede that the differing accounts of what transpired preclude summary judgment on the causes of action for the use of excessive force and false arrest, either on the merits or the basis of qualified immunity.

Plaintiff Michael Ward was at the scene and provides the following account. Mr. Ward saw Officer Baker choking his son-in-law, Michael Hankins, and pleaded for the officers to stop their assault on his son-in-law. Without warning Mr. Ward was pepper-sprayed by Officer Brooks and then tasered by Officer Garrison.

Michael Hankins was charged with violation of the vehicle code for driving with cancelled license plates and obstructing a police officer. The charges were ultimately dismissed. Michael Ward was charged with assault. A jury trial found him not guilty.

An internal affairs investigation with respect to Officer Baker sustained allegations of unsatisfactory performance and lack of courtesy as to Officer Baker. Allegations of excessive force were not sustained. Allegations in respect to Officer Brooks and Officer Garrison for unsatisfactory performance and lack of courtesy were determined to be unfounded and they were exonerated on allegations of excessive force.

In regard to the conduct of the municipal defendant, Plaintiffs assert that "Officer Baker has had numerous citizen complaints filed against him for excessive force, rudeness, profanity, and the like, most of which have not been sustained and very little, if any discipline meted out to him." Plaintiffs also cite to excerpts from a July, 1 2003 "Racial Profiling Data Collection Study Final Report"(racial profiling study) prepared for the City of Tacoma Police Department as establishing that "Tacoma Police Officers pulled over a disproportionate number of black drivers."

Plaintiffs assert claims for violations of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d on the basis the City of Tacoma Police Department, a recipient of federal funding, is engaged in discriminatory practices in the form of racial profiling through the practice of targeting African-Americans in stops, detentions, interrogations and searches of residents of the Hilltop neighborhood of the City of Tacoma.

SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD

A court must grant summary judgment if the pleadings and supporting documents, viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, "show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); see also, Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986). When considering a summary judgment motion, the evidence of the non-movant is "to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). These inferences are limited, however, "to those upon which a reasonable jury might return a verdict." Triton Energy Corp. v. Square D. Co., 68 F.3d 1216, 1220 (9^th Cir. 1995). Rule 56(c) mandates the entry of summary judgment against a party who, after adequate time for discovery, fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which the party will bear the burden of proof at trial. Celotex, at 322-23. Rule 56(e) compels the nonmoving party to "set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial" and not to "rest upon the mere allegations or denials of [the party's] pleading." The nonmoving party must do more than "simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts." Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586-87 (1986). There is no issue for trial unless there is sufficient evidence favoring the non-moving party. Anderson, at 249. Summary judgment is warranted if the evidence is "merely colorable" or "not significantly probative."Id. at 249-50.

TITLE VI AND RACIAL PROFILING

Title VI of the of the Civil Right Act provides that "[n]o person in the United States shall, on the ground of race, color, or national origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance." 42 U.S.C. § 2000d. Private individuals may sue to enforce Title VI only in instances of intentional discrimination. Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 279-84 (2001). The entity involved must be engaged in intentional discrimination and be the recipient of federal funding. Rodriguez v. California Highway Patrol, 89 F. Supp.2d 1131, 1139 (N.D. Cal. 2000). To maintain a private right of action under Title VI, a plaintiff must prove that he was victimized by a "program or activity" that received federal funds. Buchanan v. City of Bolivar, Tennessee, 99 F.3d 1352, 1356 (6^th Cir. 1996). There must be a nexus between the alleged discriminatory conduct and the specific program to which federal funds were directed. David K. v. Lane, 839 F.2d 1265, 1275-76 (7^th Cir. 1988).

Thus, it must be determined whether Plaintiffs have evidenced intentional discrimination, specifically, that the City of Tacoma's actions were motivated by race and that race was a determining factor in the City's decisions. Plaintiff must also establish a nexus between the alleged discrimination (racial profiling) and the specific program that received federal funding. See, David K., at 1275-76.

Plaintiffs assert that the City of Tacoma supported a custom of racial profiling of African-Americans residing in the Hilltop neighborhood, thereby subjecting them to disparate treatment. Where an officer has reasonable suspicion or probable cause to initiate a stop, a person alleging racial profiling must prove the officer acted in a discriminatory manner and that the discrimination was intentional. Bingham v. City of Manhattan Beach, 341 F.3d 939, 948 (9^th Cir. 2003); Reese v. Jefferson Sch. Dist. No. 14J, 208 F.3d 736, 740 (9^th Cir. 2000). It is undisputed that the license plates on Michael Hankins vehicle were canceled at the time of the traffic stop and thus, Officer Baker had a reasonable basis to initiate the stop.

Allegations of racial profiling may be sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss. See, Rodriguez v. California Highway Patrol, 89 F. Supp.2d 1131 (N.D. Cal. 2000). However, on a motion for summary judgment, bare allegations unsupported by legally competent evidence do not give rise to a genuine dispute of material fact.

After having ample opportunity to conduct discovery, Plaintiffs rely on statements in their own deposition testimony and the results of the "study on racial profiling" to establish a claim of racial profiling. Plaintiffs deposition testimony merely recite legal arguments and Plaintiffs' belief that the incident was the product of racial profiling. There are no facts based upon Plaintiffs' personal knowledge that evidence a pattern or practice of racial profiling by the Defendants.

Plaintiffs' selective references to the racial profiling study are insufficient evidence of disparate treatment. This statistical study shows disparate impact within the City of Tacoma, but does not show disparate treatment among similarly situated motorist of different races. Plaintiffs must show not a disparity of motorists of each race stopped by police, but rather that the police treated the defendants differently than other similarly situated motorists of another race. See, United States v. Bass, 536 U.S. 862, 863-64 (2002); Anderson v. Cornejo, 355 F.3d 1021, 1023-1025 (7^th Cir. 2004) In the context of selective prosecution, the Ninth Circuit has held that data suggesting more African-Americans are prosecuted federally does "not advance a defense of selective prosecution without further consideration of the sociological factors affecting the pattern of crime and without a showing that similarly situated defendants of other races had been left unprosecuted." United States v. Turner, 104 F.3d 1180, 1185 (9^th Cir. 1997). Here the class of similarly situated individuals necessarily would include motorists present in the area where Defendant officers were patrolling and that were subject to the possibility of a traffic stop for similar driving infractions. See, Chavez v. Illinois State Police, 27 F. Supp.2d 1053, 1066-1067 (N.D. Ill. 1998). Plaintiffs' statistical evidence fails this test.

On the issue of federal funding, Plaintiffs state that it is undisputed that the Tacoma Police Department receives federal assistance, for example, through the federal Law Enforcement Terrorism Prevention Program and the Department of Homeland Security grants. Plaintiffs have failed, however, to establish a nexus between a program funded by these federal monies and the alleged racial profiling. There is no evidence of how the Tacoma Police Department used its federal money to target African-Americans residing in the Hilltop neighborhood. The record contains no evidence that City of Tacoma used federal funds to increase the number of officers on patrol in the Hilltop. Moreover, there is no evidence that any federal funds had any residual effect on law enforcement in the Hilltop. Particularly, Plaintiffs have failed to show that the traffic stop of Michael Hankins was made possible, in whole or in part, by federal funding.

In sum, there is insufficient support for the claim of a nexus between the City of Tacoma Police Department's federal funding and any alleged racial profiling. Defendants' motion for summary judgment on the Title VI claims, therefore, shall be granted.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, the Defendant City of Tacoma and its Police Department are entitled to summary judgment of dismissal of Plaintiffs' Title VI claims in their entirety.

ACCORDINGLY,

IT IS ORDERED:

Defendant City of Tacoma's Motion for Summary Judgment on Plaintiffs' Title VI claims [Dkt. #47] is GRANTED, and these claims are dismissed, with prejudice.