Summary
permitting equity to assume jurisdiction when the constitutional jury trial at law provides incomplete relief
Summary of this case from Gilman v. Lake Sunapee PropsOpinion
No. 4302.
Argued June 2, 1954.
Decided July 1, 1954.
Equity jurisdiction was properly invoked where the controversy over title to land involved accounting, injunctive relief and a multiplicity of suits all involving substantially identical issues.
The fact that the defendants may be deprived of a trial by jury if equity jurisdiction is exercised and that the several suits may be consolidated and tried together to avoid a multiplicity of suits does not as a matter of law deprive equity of assuming jurisdiction where the nature of the case and the relief sought warrants such assumption.
BILL IN EQUITY, filed April 10, 1952, to establish and quiet title as against fourteen defendants to land known as the "fish house area" situated in the town of Hampton. The plaintiff, by its bill, alleges (1) that it is seized and possessed of said tract of land known as the "fish house area," title to which was derived from the Massachusetts Bay Company, so-called, and (2) that there are thirteen buildings on said tract of land as shown on the plan annexed to the bill in equity which the defendants occupied under license or consent of the plaintiff until on or about March 14, 1950, when they were severally notified to vacate the "fish house area" pursuant to a vote of the town to close this land to all persons not engaged in fishing as a principal means of livelihood. The plaintiff alleges that the defendants are in possession of certain buildings and that none of the defendants are now engaged in fishing as a livelihood. The plaintiff further alleges that this bill in equity is necessary to prevent a needless multiplicity of suits and useless litigation at great inconvenience and expense to the parties thereto, and that the adverse claims of the defendants make necessary a decree to quiet the plaintiff's title and to remove any cloud thereon resulting from the continued use and occupation of the buildings by the defendants.
The plaintiff prays for a decree or order (a) adjudging it the lawful owner of said land; (b) enjoining defendants from maintaining the buildings on said land, and (c) for an accounting of the rents and profits derived by defendants from the use and occupation of the land since they were notified to vacate.
The defendants, except Arthur L. Doggett, Jr., by their answers, deny that the plaintiff has, or ever had, title to the "fish house area" and allege title in themselves either by adverse possession or conveyances from third parties.
The plaintiff, before filing said bill in equity, brought writs of entry against the several defendants, seeking to recover possession of the premises claimed by the defendants. These actions were pending when this bill in equity was filed and had been marked for trial by jury on the docket.
The defendants, except Arthur L. Doggett, Jr., by their answers, May 17, 1952, filed motions to dismiss the bill in equity because of the pendency of these actions at law, and the Court, after hearing the parties, denied these motions by orders entered on July 24, 1952.
The defendants, except Arthur L. Doggett, Jr., on June 10, 1953, moved to dismiss the plaintiff's bill because the legal remedy was adequate and because there were pending suits at law for the same cause of action which had not been dismissed. After hearing on that motion on the same day it was denied subject to the defendants' exception. The plaintiff at this hearing took a voluntary nonsuit in each of the writs of entry. The same defendants also at the hearing on June 10 moved for trial by jury of the contested issues presented by the bill in equity for the reasons: "1. That the above named defendants have a constitutional right to trial by jury of the said contested issues of fact because of the nature of the case and of the relief sought. 2. That in the alternative the Court should under its statutory powers refer the said contested issues of fact to a jury for trial." The Court, after hearing the parties, denied this motion subject to defendants' exception. Defendants' exceptions were reserved and transferred by Griffith, J.
Upton, Sanders Upton, Frank A. Batchelder and Perkins Holland (Mr. Richard F. Upton orally), for the plaintiff.
Sleeper Mullavey for the defendant Mace, furnished no brief.
Burns, Calderwood Bryant (Mr. Bryant orally), for the other defendants.
The plaintiff claims that its remedy at law is inadequate and this action falls within recognized equity jurisdiction. The defendants claim that the plaintiff has an adequate legal remedy and to allow this bill in equity to be maintained would deprive them of their constitutional right to trial by jury. N.H. Const., Pt. I, Art. 20. Both agree that the "nature of the case and of the relief sought must be looked to for the settlement of the constitutional question" (Daley v. Kennett, 75 N.H. 536, 540), and that the form of action employed or the procedural tag used to describe it are not necessarily determinative. Murphy Sons Inc. v. Peters, 95 N.H. 275, 276. As is so often the case the formula is easy to locate, simple to state and is generally undisputed but its application to specific facts provides no sure guide, is difficult to employ and is generally controverted. The decisions in other jurisdictions are in conflict. See anno. 117 A.L.R. 9.
The mere fact that title to real estate is involved does not establish the right to a jury trial which deprives equity of all jurisdiction. Hatch v. Hillsgrove, 83 N.H. 91; R. L., c. 371, s. 3; Nixon v. Bonenfant, 97 N.H. 230; Cf. Adams v. Mellian, 99 N.H. 140. On the other hand the mere fact that there may be several actions against several defendants does not establish that the remedy at law is inadequate. Allbee v. Elms, 93 N.H. 202. The pleadings in this case indicate that it will involve much documentary material and ancient documents and records, some of which date from colonial times. With the exception of the defendant Doggett there is an identity of issues and a community of interests sufficient to invoke equity jurisdiction. Complete relief could not be obtained in the law actions originally brought. There is precedent for this basis of equity jurisdiction in Smith v. Bank, 69 N.H. 254. See Page v. Whidden, 59 N.H. 507. "Avoidance of a multiplicity of actions in equity makes for economy in trial procedure and for greater consistency in discretionary findings." Allbee v. Elms, supra, 203; 1 Pomeroy Eq. Jur. (5th ed.) ss. 181, 269; 45 Harv. L. Rev. 1297. While the decisions in this state indicate a strong tendency to uphold the right of trial by jury whenever possible (Murphy Sons Inc. v. Peters, 95 N.H. 275; Employers Assurance Co. v. Tibbetts, 96 N.H. 296), we have not hesitated to permit equity jurisdiction where it involves accounting, injunction and relief from multiplicity of suits involving substantially identical issues. Nixon v. Bonenfant, supra; Berry v. Whidden, 62 N.H. 473.
The difficulties resulting from a multiplicity of suits may be avoided to a certain extent if the suits are consolidated and tried together. Salganik v. Company, 80 N.H. 450, 452; Dartmouth College v. Cameron, 77 N.H. 66, 67. However, this does not deprive equity of jurisdiction in this case where multiple suits at law would involve a community of interests and might require the recognized equitable aids of accounting and injunction. It is true that an amendment from an action at law to a bill in equity may have the effect of depriving the defendants of a jury trial. That matter was considered in Dondero v. Ferranti, 90 N.H. 554, where an action of tort was amended to a bill in equity for accounting. It was stated therein that the "court's finding that justice required the allowance of the amendment is not to be set aside merely because the defendant thereby lost her right to a jury trial of the action at law." The nature of the case and the relief sought in this proceeding warrants equity taking jurisdiction. There was no error in the denial of the defendants' motion to dismiss the bill in equity or the discretionary denial of their motion for a jury trial. Evans v. Evans, 78 N.H. 352. See Gauthier v. Gosselin, 94 N.H. 496.
Exceptions overruled.
All concurred.