Opinion
No. 2007-CA-001291-MR.
January 9, 2009.
Appeal from Pike Circuit Court, Honorable Eddy Coleman, Judge, Action No. 99-CI-01361.
James L. Hamilton, Pikeville, Kentucky, Briefs for Appellant.
James E. Cleveland, III, Alexander C. Ward, Ashland, Kentucky, Donald H. Combs, Pikeville, Kentucky, Brief for Appellee.
Before: FORMTEXT KELLER and TAYLOR, Judges; GUIDUGLI, Senior Judge.
OPINION
James H. Hamilton brings this appeal from a June 12, 2007, Order of the Pike Circuit Court amending and enforcing a Settlement and Final Release of All Claims. We reverse and remand.
Hamilton had been an employee of CSX Transportation, Inc. since 1973. He filed a complaint against CSX under the Federal Employers' Liability Act (FELA) codified in 45 U.S.C. § 51 et seq. Hamilton claimed to have suffered various injuries as a result of repeated exposure to poorly designed locomotives and certain loading situations. A jury trial was held, and the jury returned a verdict in favor of CSX. Judgment was entered accordingly.
Hamilton pursued a direct appeal to the Court of Appeals. In Hamilton v. CSX Transportation, Inc., 208 S.W.3d 272 (Ky.App. 2006), our Court reversed and remanded for a new trial on the basis of erroneous jury instructions. Upon remand, Hamilton and CSX engaged in mediation and ostensibly reached a settlement. Thereafter, CSX prepared and transmitted to Hamilton a document styled "Settlement and Final Release of All Claims" (Release). Hamilton refused to execute the Release and claimed that the Release did not reflect the agreement the parties reached at mediation. Both Hamilton and CSX filed motions to enforce the agreement reached through mediation. Eventually, by order entered June 12, 2007, the circuit court ordered the Release to be enforced with slight modifications. This appeal follows.
Hamilton contends that the circuit court erred by enforcing the Release. Hamilton maintains that the Release was too broad and did not reflect the agreement of the parties as reached at mediation. In particular, Hamilton argues that the Release improperly included claims for potential future injuries and claims for injuries not arising from this litigation.
At the conclusion of mediation, the parties signed a document styled "Mediation Agreement." Relevant to this appeal is the following language of that agreement:
IT IS HEREBY AGREED by and between the parties hereto that all claims contained therein between the parties to this Agreement are fully and finally settled with [Hamilton] receiving a settlement of $__________ from [CSX] in exchange for which [Hamilton] agrees to execute a full and final Release of all claims against [CSX] arising out of this litigation, and an entry of dismissal with prejudice, with each party to this litigation paying that party's respective court costs and attorney fees.
In the document styled "Mediation Agreement" entered into the circuit court record, the amount of settlement was obscured to prevent public disclosure.
It is the law in this Commonwealth that a settlement agreement is a contract and is governed by contract law. Ford v. Ratliff, 183 S.W.3d 199 (Ky.App. 2006). When reviewing a settlement agreement, the court:
[M]ust first determine whether the settlement agreement is ambiguous, or "capable of more than one different, reasonable interpretation." If so, then extrinsic evidence may be resorted to in an effort to determine the intention of the parties; if not, then extrinsic evidence may not be resorted to. The criterion in determining the intention of the parties is not what did the parties mean to say, but rather the criterion is what did the parties mean by what they said.
Additionally, if the language of a contract "is unambiguous, the meaning of the language is a question of law, and the intent of the parties must be discerned from the words used in the instrument."
Id. at 202 — 203 (footnotes omitted).
In the case at hand, the controversy is controlled by the terms of the Mediation Agreement. Under the Mediation Agreement, it is unambiguous that the parties agreed to settle and release "all claims . . . arising out of this litigation." Therefore, only claims for injuries asserted by Hamilton in this litigation may properly be included in a release. In sum, we conclude that the parties only agreed to settle and release claims for injuries asserted by Hamilton in this litigation per the Mediation Agreement; as such, a release may only properly include such claims within its ambit.
The Settlement and Final Release of All Claims proposed by CSX was not specifically drafted for this case; rather, according to CSX's attorney, "[t]he release is what we use in every one of these cases. This release came out of the claims department. I didn't alter it."
It appears to this Court that there existed only four separate claims for injury as set forth in Hamilton's complaint, as amended: (1) injuries to elbow and knee, (2) noise-induced hearing loss, (3) bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome and (4) injury to shoulder. However, we are cognizant that the final determination of what claims Hamilton asserted is dependent upon the record and particular facts of this case. Consequently, we remand to the circuit court for a determination of the precise claims for injuries asserted by Hamilton in this litigation. As hereinbefore stated, it is only these claims that may properly be included in the Release.
Hamilton also argues that he is entitled to prejudgment interest and attorney fees due to the actions of CSX as pertains to the Release. Given that we have determined that the circuit court erred in enforcing the Release since it did not reflect the agreement reached by the parties at mediation, on remand we believe the circuit court should also reconsider the issue of prejudgment interest and attorney fees. We otherwise express no opinion regarding the same.
For the foregoing reasons, the Order of the Pike Circuit Court is reversed and this cause is remanded for proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
GUIDUGLI, SENIOR JUDGE, CONCURS.
KELLER, JUDGE, DISSENTS BY SEPARATE OPINION.
Respectfully, I dissent. It is this writer's opinion that the Settlement and Final Release of All Claims which is the subject of this appeal, is inartfully drafted. However, the Release cannot be reviewed as standing alone. The trial court's order entered June 12, 2007, which refers specifically to, and amends, certain language in the Release renders a document that is limited to injuries and/or damages arising out of or connected with the injuries received by the appellant in the underlying action. This writer agrees with the majority in that the Mediation Agreement is unambiguous and that the parties agreed to settle and release all claims arising out of the underlying litigation. The trial court's order of June 12, 2007, clarifies any confusion or concern that claims other than those entertained within the Mediation Agreement are being released by the Settlement and Final Release of All Claims.
In addition, I write separately on the issues of interest and attorney fees raised by the appellant. Attorney fees are within the discretion of the trial court to award and this writer sees no abuse of that discretion. Ford v. Beasley, 148 S.W.3d 808, (Ky.App. 2004). Secondly, "an award of interest is a matter entrusted to the sound discretion of the trial court." Reliable Mechanical, Inc. v. Naylor Indus. Services, Inc., 125 S.W.3d 856 (Ky.App. 2003). Upon remand of this case as instructed by the majority for a determination of the precise claims of injuries, it is this writer's opinion that the trial court's ruling regarding interest and attorney fees for alleged intentional delay by CSX should remain intact.
Therefore, for the reasons noted above, I would affirm the Pike Circuit Court's denial of attorney fees and interest which were sought by appellant. Additionally, I dissent from the majority's opinion that the Release in question goes beyond the scope of the agreed to settlement.