Opinion
No. CV 04 4001189 S
March 15, 2005
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION
Facts:
Highville Mustard Seed Charter School (hereinafter "Highville") is a state public charter school located in Hamden, Connecticut organized and operating pursuant to §§ 10-66aa et seq. of the Connecticut General Statutes. The school's grade levels range from prekindergarten, whose students are three and four years old, through eighth grade. The organization of the school in terms of the ages and grade levels was approved by the State Board of Education pursuant to § 10-66bb(d)(7) of the Connecticut General Statutes. Highville has operated continuously since the 1998-99 school year.
On or about August 1, 2003 Alida D. Begina, Superintendent of Schools for the Town of Hamden (hereinafter "Hamden"), sent a letter to Lyndon Pitter, Highville's Executive Director advising him that Hamden would not provide transportation to preschool students enrolled at Highville during the 2003-04 school year (Record ("R") 1.C.).
It is undisputed that before this date prekindergarten children were using transportation provided for kindergarten and higher grades that was provided for Highville by Hamden.
A number of parents of these preschool students who resided in Hamden pursued an appeal to Hamden (appeal letters R 1.A., 1-27) and via letter dated September 26, 2003 (R 1.A., 1-22). Hamden notified these parents that on October 3, 2002 it would conduct a hearing pursuant to the provisions of § 10-186 of the Connecticut General Statutes.
Hamden held a hearing on the aforementioned date (Transcript marked as R 1.I.). A written decision dated October 13, 2000 was issued, ruling that Hamden is not required pursuant to § 10-66ee(f) of the Connecticut General Statutes to provide transportation to preschool students residing in Hamden and enrolled at Highville (R 1.H.).
Byway of letters dated October 28, 2003 (R 2.B., 1-10) a number of the parents who appealed to Hamden pursued an appeal to the State Board Education (hereinafter the "State Board").
On November 25, 2003 the State Board, acting through a designated impartial hearing officer, conducted a hearing pursuant to the provisions of § 10-186(b)(2) of the Connecticut General Statutes (Transcript marked as R. 2.H). Highville requested and was granted interested party status at the aforementioned hearing.
The State Board rendered its decision via written memorandum dated March 17, 2003 (R 2.E.). Hamden thereafter filed the present appeal in conjunction with which it sought a stay of the State Board's decision ordering it to provide transportation to preschool students residing in Hamden and enrolled at Highville. The application for a stay was the subject of a May 11, 2004 bearing before a coordinate Judge of the Superior Court (Pittman, J.). After receiving testimony and entertaining arguments of counsel, ordered the decision stayed only for the remainder of the 2003-04 school year.
It is this Court's understanding that although the stay has expired Hamden continues to provide the subject children with transportation to Highville.
Standard of Review
The salient underlying facts in this matter are not in dispute. Nor is the nature of the issue before this Court. The matter before this Court is an issue of pure law involving statutory interpretation. The Court reviews such issues of law de novo. Ordinarily, "[c]onclusions of law reached by the administrative agency must stand if the court determines that they resulted from a correct application of the law to the facts found and could reasonably and logically follow from such facts." Cadlerock Props. Joint Venture v. Commissioner of Envtl. Prot., 253 Conn. 661, 668-69 (2000).
However, where, as here, the agency's interpretation of the underlying statutory provisions have not previously been the subject of rigorous judicial scrutiny, the Connecticut courts have found such deference to be inappropriate. "[T]he traditional deference accorded to an agency's interpretation of a statutory term is unwarranted when the construction of a statute . . . has not previously been subjected to judicial scrutiny [or to] a governmental agency's time-tested interpretation." Conn. Light Power Co. v. Dep't of Pub. Util. Control, 830 A.2d 1121, 1126 (Conn. 2003) quoting Schiano v. Bliss Exterminating Co., 260 Conn. 21, 33-34 (2002). See also Bell Atl. Mobile v. Dep't of Pub. Util. Control, 253 Conn. 453, 470 (2000) ("Furthermore, when a state agency's determination of a question of law has not previously been subject to judicial scrutiny the agency is not entitled to special deference."); Conn. State Med Soc'y v. Conn. Bd of Exam'rs in Podiatry, 208 Conn. 709 (1988) ("In our view, this is purely a question of law, requiring that the intent of the legislature be discerned. Such a question invokes a broader standard of review than is ordinarily involved in deciding whether, in light of the evidence, the agency has acted unreasonably, arbitrarily, illegally or in abuse of its discretion.") (Citation omitted).
The central legal issue in this case deals with the interpretation of Connecticut General Statutes §§ 10-66ee(f) and 10-186 and whether those statutes require Hamden to provide transportation services to preschool children attending Highville. The issue of the provision of transportation services to preschool students of state charter schools has not previously been subject to prior State Board interpretation or judicial scrutiny. Thus, the Court must review the State Board's interpretation of these statutes de novo. "The interpretation of statutes presents a question of law . . . Although the factual and discretionary determinations of administrative agencies are to be given considerable weight by the courts . . . it is for the courts, and not for administrative agencies, to expound and apply governing principles of law." Domestic Violence Serv's. of Greater New Haven, Inc. v. Freedom of Info. Comm'n, 47 Conn.App. 466, 470-71 (1998); See also Bridgeport Hosp. v. Comm'n on Human Rights and Opportunities, 232 Conn. 91, 109 (1995); Connecticut State Med Soc'y, 208 Conn. at 719.
Chapter 54 of the Connecticut General Statutes concerns Connecticut's Uniform Administrative Procedure Act (hereinafter the "UAPA"). Subsection 4-183(a) C.G.S. provides that any person who has exhausted all administrative remedies available an administrative agency in this state and who is aggrieved by a final decision of said agency may appeal to the Superior Court. Subsection 4-183(i) provides that the appeal shall be heard by the Court shall be confined to the record. Subsection 4-183(j) provides that:
The court shall not substitute its judgment for that of the agency as to the weight of the evidence on questions of fact. The court shall affirm the decision of the agency unless the court finds that substantial rights of the person appealing have been prejudiced because the administrative findings, inferences, conclusions, or decisions are: (1) In violation of constitutional or statutory provisions; (2) in excess of the statutory authority of the agency; (3) made upon unlawful procedure; (4) affected by other error of law; (5) clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative, and substantial evidence on the whole record; or (6) arbitrary or capricious or characterized by abuse of discretion or clearly unwarranted exercise of discretion.
Discussion
Subsection 10-66ee(f) of the Connecticut General Statutes concerns the transportation requirements of charter schools. It provides in pertinent part:
The local or regional board of education of the school district in which the charter school is located shall provide transportation services for students of the charter school who reside in such school district pursuant to section 10-273a unless the charter school makes other arrangements for such transportation.
Section 10-273a C.G.S. concerns transportation to and from elementary and secondary schools. This statute provides that:
Any town transporting children to and from any public elementary school, including kindergartens, or to and from any public secondary school within said town shall be reimbursed for the cost of such pupil transportation annually in accordance with the provisions of sections 10-97 and 10-266m. (Emphasis added.)
The Court notes that the children that are the subject of the instant action are enrolled prekindergarten.
Hamden argues that because § 10-273 C.G.S. does not explicitly include pre-kindergartens, it is not legally obligated to provide transportation to children attending the pre-kindergarten program at Highville. It further notes that it does not provide such services for Pre-K children who are enrolled in programs in the public school system. "[T]here is no legal obligation to provide transportation to charter school Pre-K students when it does not provide the same services to similarly situation non-charter Pre-K students enrolled in public school programs." See (R. 2.E., 2 of 6).
As was previously stated herein the organization of the subject charter school in terms of the ages and grade levels was approved by the State Board of Education pursuant to § 10-66bb of the Connecticut General Statutes. This section concerns the State Board of Education granting charters for local and state charter schools. It provides in pertinent part that:
(a) On and after July 1, 1997, the State Board of Education may grant, within available appropriations, charters for local and state charter schools in accordance with this section.
(b) Any person, association, corporation, organization or other entity, public or independent institution of higher education, local or regional board of education or two or more boards of education cooperatively, or regional educational service center may apply to the Commissioner of Education, at such time and in such manner as to the commissioner prescribes, to establish a charter school, provided no nonpublic elementary or secondary school may be established as a charter school and no parent or group of parents providing home instruction may establish a charter school for such instruction . . .
(d) Applications pursuant to this section shall include a description of (7) the organization of the school in terms of the ages or grades to be taught and the total estimated enrollment of the school . . . (emphasis added).
It is well-settled law that "statutes should be construed, where possible, so as to create a rational, coherent and consistent body of law." City of Waterbury v. Town of Washington, 260 Conn. 506, 557 (2002), citing, Doe v. Doe, 244 Conn. 403, 428 (1998) ("we read related statutes to form a consistent, rational whole, rather than to create irrational distinctions") and In re Valerie D., 223 Conn. 492, 524 (1992) ("[s]tatutes are to be interpreted with regard to other relevant statutes because the legislature is presumed to have created a consistent body of law"). Alter hearing argument, reviewing the briefs and researching the law, this Court comes to the conclusion that to construe § 10-273a C.G.S. as is argued by Hamden would be to run counter to the long established requirement to read states to form a consistent rational whole. Our legislature enacted legislation that not only created charter schools, but gave the State Board of Education the power to accept applications from charter schools that defined what a "student" was, i.e., the "ages or grades to be taught." This Court is aware that Subsection 10-186(a) C.G.S. provides that:
Each local or regional board of education shall furnish, by transportation or otherwise, school accommodations so that each child five years of age and over and under twenty-one years of age who is not a graduate of a high school or vocational school may attend public school, except as provided in section 10-233c, and subsection (d) of section 10-233d.
Although one could argue that this statute limits a local or regional board of education to transporting children above the age of five, the provisions of this statute applies to public schools in general and Section 10-66ee(f) only pertains to charter schools.
Where statutes contain specific and general references covering the same subject matter, the specific references prevail over the general. Atwood v. Regional School District No. 15, 169 Conn. 613, 622, 363 A.2d 1038 (1975); Meriden v. Board of Tax Review, 161 Conn. 396, 402, 288 A.2d 435 (1971).
Galvin v. Freedom of Information Commission, 201 Conn. 448, 456 (1986).
The plain language of § 10-66ee(f) provides in pertinent part that "the local or regional board of education of the school district in which the charter school is located shall provide transportation services for students who reside in such school district . . ."
Subsection 10-66bb(d)(7) of the Connecticut General Statutes provides that charter schools must submit applications that include a description of the organization of the school in terms of the ages or grades to be taught. The section explicitly provides that local and regional boards of education "shall provide transportation services for students of the charter school." This section does not mention any of the limitations in the ages or grades of students attending charter schools as do other educational statutes that do not address charter schools. "The words of the statute involved are the single most important factors in statutory interpretation." State v. Lawrence, 86 Conn.App. 784, 794 (2005).
The meaning of a statute shall, in the first instance, be ascertained from the text of the statute itself and its relationship to other statutes. If, after examining such text and considering such relationship, the meaning of such text is plain and unambiguous and does not yield absurd or unworkable results, extratextual evidence of the meaning of the statute shall not be considered.
Public Acts No. 03-154 § 1.
To strictly construe the subject statutes as is argued by Hamden would be to frustrate the legislation that gives boards of education the power to approve charter schools that vary in their educational makeup on the bases of age and grades as is provided for in the enabling legislation.
For all of the foregoing reasons the appeal in this matter is dismissed. So ordered.
Richard A. Robinson