Opinion
No. CV 04-4000350
February 25, 2005
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE MOTION TO DISMISS
The plaintiff in this matter seeks damages from the defendant as a result of an incident which occurred in New Jersey on December 5, 2004. The plaintiffs claim that they had hired the defendant to transport their personal property in connection with a move from Maryland to Connecticut and that, while en route to Connecticut, the defendant's moving van struck a parked vehicle along the New Jersey Turnpike, resulting in damage to their personal property within the van. The defendant served an apportionment complaint upon Price Honda, whose vehicle was allegedly struck by the defendant in New Jersey, and Benjamin Dickinson, the alleged driver of that vehicle. Dickinson, who is a resident of Delaware, and Price Honda, which also has its principal place of business in Delaware, were served both by leaving copies of the writ, summons and apportionment complaint with the commissioner of motor vehicles of the State of Connecticut and by certified mail, return receipt requested.
The apportionment defendants have now moved to dismiss the apportionment complaint on the grounds that the court lacks personal jurisdiction. The apportionment defendants contend that none of the requirements of the state's long-arm statutes have been met, and that the court therefore has no personal jurisdiction over them. Although this case came to the undersigned on two motions to dismiss, normally arguable matters, both parties requested the court to take the matter on the papers without oral argument, and it has done so.
The defendant/apportionment plaintiff, H.P. Latham, has filed objections to the motion to dismiss contending that it has satisfied the requirements of the applicable long-arm statute, Gen. Stats. § 52-59b. In particular, it cites Gen. Stats. § 52-59b(a)(3), which refers to one who "commits a tortious act outside the state causing injury to person or property within the state, except as to a cause of action for defamation of character arising from the act, who (A) regularly does or solicits business or engages in any other persistent course of conduct, or derives substantial revenue from goods used or consumed or services rendered in the state, or (B) expects or should reasonably expect the act to have consequences in the state and derives substantial revenue from interstate or international commerce . . ." The court assumes, for purposes of this discussion, that Dickinson, by leaving the Price Honda vehicle in its location along the New Jersey Turnpike, committed "a tortious act outside the state causing injury to . . . property . . ." The alleged tortious act, however, did not cause damage to property "within the state" as is required by the statute. It is clear from the allegations of both the plaintiffs' complaint and the apportionment complaint, however, that the injury to property did not occur within the state of Connecticut, but rather in New Jersey. See Abrams v. Riding High Dude Ranch, Docket No. CV97-0345046, judicial district of Fairfield at Bridgeport (November 21, 1997, Skolnick, J.), 1997 Ct.Sup. 11390, 11397.
Latham filed separate objections to each of the two motions to dismiss, one on behalf of Dickinson and one on behalf of Price Honda. The memorandum of decision in support of both objections, however, focus only on jurisdiction over Dickinson.
Additionally, the defendant/apportionment plaintiff has presented no evidence upon which the court might conclude that Dickinson "regularly does or solicits business, or engages in any other persistent course of conduct, or derives substantial revenue from goods used or consumed for services rendered in the state, or (B) expects or should reasonably expect the act to have consequences in the state and derives substantial revenue from interstate or international commerce . . ." When a challenge to the court's jurisdiction is raised by a non-resident individual, it is the plaintiff, in this case the apportionment plaintiff, who bears the burden of proving the court's jurisdiction. Standard Tallow Corp. v. Jowdy, 190 Conn. 48, 54 (1983).
With respect to the corporate defendant, Price Honda, that entity points out that none of the various subsections of Gen. Stat. § 33-929, which deals with long-arm jurisdiction over corporations, has been fulfilled. Latham, in its objection to both Dickinson's motion to dismiss and Price Honda's, appears not to contest that assertion. (As previously indicated, the objection as to Price Honda discusses only Dickinson's situation.).
The court agrees with the would-be apportionment defendants that the court lacks jurisdiction over them, and the motions to dismiss are therefore granted.
Jonathan E. Silbert, Judge