Opinion
Case No. 20080486-CA.
Filed August 20, 2009. Not For Official Publication
Appeal from the Fourth District, Provo Department, 040403916 The Honorable James R. Taylor.
Rex I. Eagar, Provo, for Appellant.
Nan T. Bassett and Gary T. Wight, Salt Lake City, for Appellee.
Before Judges Greenwood, Thorne, and McHugh.
MEMORANDUM DECISION
Jonathan Hall appeals from the district court's order granting summary judgment in favor of Jason Steimle and dismissing Hall's negligence claim with prejudice based on Hall's failure to designate an expert witness on causation. We affirm.
In a negligence claim, the plaintiff carries the burden of establishing a prima facie case, including proximate and actual causation of the injury. See Fox v. Brigham Young Univ., 2007 UT App 406, ¶ 21, 176 P.3d 446. "[S]ummary judgment is appropriate only when there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Crestwood Cove Apartments Bus. Trust v. Turner, 2007 UT 48, ¶ 10, 164 P.3d 1247 (internal quotation marks omitted). When reviewing a grant of summary judgment, we review the district court's conclusions of law for correctness and give them no deference. See Grappendorf v. Pleasant Grove City, 2007 UT 84, ¶ 5, 173 P.3d 166; Blackner v. State, Dep't of Transp., 2002 UT 44, ¶ 8, 48 P.3d 949.
Hall asserts that the district court erred in determining that Hall failed to establish a prima facie case of causation by not designating an expert witness. Hall argues that his injuries, unlike those in Fox v. Brigham Young University, 2007 UT App 406, 176 P.3d 446, and Beard v. K-Mart Corp., 2000 UT App 285, 12 P.3d 1015, involve medical damages within the common experience of a layperson such that expert witness testimony is not required to establish causation. Indeed, "`[t]he need for positive expert testimony to establish a causal link between the defendants' negligent act and the plaintiff's injury depends on the nature of the injury.'" Fox, 2007 UT App 406, ¶ 22 (alteration in original) (quotingBeard, 2000 UT App 285, ¶ 16). However, "[i]t is only in `the most obvious cases' that a plaintiff may be excepted from the requirement of using expert testimony to prove causation."Id. (quoting Beard, 2000 UT App 285, ¶ 16).
Hall's negligence suit, while presenting different injuries and causation issues than those in Fox and Beard, is still not an obvious case. Rather, Hall's negligence case is complicated by a previous diving injury in the summer of 1998 or 1999 when Hall suffered whiplash because he dove into a shallow lake. On October 4, 2000, about two months before the motor vehicle accident, Hall presented to Anderson Chiropractic complaining of neck and back pain. In his complaint, Hall alleges that he suffered permanent neck and back injuries as a result of the motor vehicle accident. It is beyond the ordinary knowledge and common experience of a layperson, given the history of Hall's neck and back pain, to determine whether the diving incident or the motor vehicle accident caused Hall's neck and back injuries, permanent or otherwise.
The plaintiff in Fox v. Brigham Young University, 2007 UT App 406, 176 P.3d 446, broke her leg after a slip and fall.See id. ¶ 6. This court affirmed the trial court's ruling that expert testimony was required to determine whether the need for her medical treatment was caused by the allegedly defective stairs or the plaintiff's own arthritic knee. See id. ¶¶ 23-25.
The plaintiff in Beard v. K-Mart Corp., 2000 UT App 285, 12 P.3d 1015, suffered neck and wrist problems after being struck in the head and falling to the floor. See id. ¶ 2. This court determined that without expert medical opinion linking the injury to the necessity of the surgery, a jury would be speculating about a linkage that is beyond its knowledge and experience. See id. ¶ 20.
Although Dr. Anderson, Hall's treating chiropractor, was designated to testify concerning any observable changes to Hall's neck and back condition before and after the motor vehicle accident, a jury would not, without resorting to speculation, be able to determine if Hall's neck and back pain was caused by the motor vehicle accident or the diving incident, or if the motor vehicle accident exacerbated a pre-existing condition. Testimony concerning a chronological relationship between the accident and Hall's neck and back pain is not sufficient, in this case, to establish causation. See Beard, 2000 UT App 285, ¶ 20 (determining that the trial court erred in failing to remove the issue of causation from the jury, stating that "expert medical testimony merely established a chronological relationship between the accident and [the plaintiff's] symptoms. No expert medical testimony was received that the neck and wrist surgeries were necessitated by her accident").
Hall also asserts that a genuine issue of material fact precludes summary judgment. Hall argues that there are factual disputes as to when Hall began experiencing pain following the motor vehicle accident and as to the location, type, and severity of the pain experienced after the accident. Such disputes, however, do not establish causation in this case in the absence of expert testimony.
The district court did not err in dismissing Hall's negligence claim for failure to present expert testimony on the element of causation because the circumstances and nature of Hall's neck and back injuries were sufficiently complex to require such testimony. As a result, we affirm the district court's summary judgment ruling in favor of Steimle.
WE CONCUR: Pamela T. Greenwood, Presiding Judge, Carolyn B. McHugh, Judge.