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Hale v. Wilson

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit
Aug 10, 1966
364 F.2d 906 (9th Cir. 1966)

Summary

In Hale v. Lawrence, 22 N.J.L. 72, the Supreme Court held (at p. 74): "Upon general principles, wherever a demurrer is filed in good faith or for the purpose of settling a question of law involved in the controversy, justice requires that, upon the decision of that point of law, either party should be permitted to amend his pleadings, in such mode as to present for determination the substantial cause of action, or the real ground of defense.

Summary of this case from Lully v. National Surety Co.

Opinion

No. 20755.

August 10, 1966.

Jord O. Hale, in pro. per.

Thomas C. Lynch, Atty. Gen., Robert R. Granucci, Michael R. Marron, Deputy Attys. Gen., San Francisco, Cal., for appellee.

Before MERRILL, BROWNING and ELY, Circuit Judges.


Appellant was convicted and sentenced in 1960 on his plea of guilty to charges of violating sections 209 and 211 of the California Criminal Code. His petition for habeas corpus was based upon the theory that his guilty plea was induced by a confession obtained in violation of the rule of Escobedo v. State of Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 84 S.Ct. 1758, 12 L.Ed.2d 977 (1964). The district court denied the petition without a hearing on the ground that the Escobedo rule is to be applied prospectively only. See Johnson v. State of New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719, 86 S.Ct. 1772, 16 L.Ed.2d 882 (1966).

By allegations appearing for the first time in briefs filed in this court, appellant materially expanded his claim to raise the more general issues of whether his guilty plea was the product of alleged threats and promises and an allegedly coerced confession (see, e.g., Commonwealth of Pennsylvania ex rel. Herman v. Claudy, 350 U.S. 116, 118, 76 S.Ct. 223, 100 L.Ed. 126 (1956); Chambers v. State of Florida, 309 U.S. 227 n. 2, 60 S.Ct. 472, 84 L.Ed. 716 (1945); White v. Pepersack, 352 F.2d 470, 472 (4th Cir. 1965); Wright v. Dickson, 336 F.2d 878, 882 (9th Cir. 1964); Jones v. Cunningham, 297 F.2d 851 (4th Cir. 1962)); and whether he was adequately represented by counsel in the submission of his guilty plea. Wilson v. Reagan, 354 F.2d 45 (9th Cir. 1965); Wright v. Dickson, supra, 336 F.2d at 883; Jones v. Cunningham, 313 F.2d 347 (4th Cir. 1963). As the cited cases indicate, neither of these issues, if adequately alleged and ultimately proven, would be foreclosed by the guilty plea itself.

Because the second issue is wholly new and the first is substantially so, we affirm the judgment, but without prejudice to the right of the appellant to renew his present contentions in the district court in a new petition for habeas corpus. See Flemings v. Wilson, 365 F.2d 267 (9th Cir. 1966).


Summaries of

Hale v. Wilson

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit
Aug 10, 1966
364 F.2d 906 (9th Cir. 1966)

In Hale v. Lawrence, 22 N.J.L. 72, the Supreme Court held (at p. 74): "Upon general principles, wherever a demurrer is filed in good faith or for the purpose of settling a question of law involved in the controversy, justice requires that, upon the decision of that point of law, either party should be permitted to amend his pleadings, in such mode as to present for determination the substantial cause of action, or the real ground of defense.

Summary of this case from Lully v. National Surety Co.
Case details for

Hale v. Wilson

Case Details

Full title:Jord O. HALE, Appellant, v. Lawrence E. WILSON, Warden, etc., Appellee

Court:United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit

Date published: Aug 10, 1966

Citations

364 F.2d 906 (9th Cir. 1966)

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