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holding municipality immune from claims of negligence per se that arose out of, and flowed from, tortious acts of false arrest and excessive force
Summary of this case from Warren v. Metro. Gov't of NashvilleOpinion
No. 1:02-cv-334
January 30, 2004
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
This case arises out of an incident where police officers employed by the Police Department of the City of Chattanooga, Tennessee, arrested plaintiff Lucas Nathan Hale ("Hale") for disorderly conduct at the scene of a fight involving multiple persons and combatants. Hale brings federal and state claims against defendant City of Chattanooga ("City"), and defendants Clarence Randolph ("Randolph") and John Bradford ("Bradford"), both personally and in their official capacities as police officers employed by the City. Hale seeks to recover compensatory and punitive damages, and attorney's fees.
Hale asserts federal civil rights claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 1985 invoking the Court's subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and 1343. Hale never specifies which particular subsection of 42 U.S.C. § 1985 that he contends is applicable to this suit. Hale claims he was falsely arrested without probable cause, falsely imprisoned in jail, and the police used excessive force in making the arrest thereby depriving Hale of rights secured to him by the Fourth, Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. It is further alleged that the City is liable for the actions of its police officers, Randolph and Bradford, under § 1983 on the theory that the City failed to properly train and supervise them. Hale also makes a claim for attorney's fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988.
With regard to related tort claims brought under Tennessee law, Hale asserts a claim for negligence per se. The basis for the negligence per se claim is Hale's contention that the defendants violated four Tennessee statutes: (1) TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-101, assault; (2) TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-102, aggravated assault; (3) TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-302, false imprisonment; and (4) TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-16-403, official oppression. Furthermore, Hale brings tort claims under Tennessee common law for assault and battery, false arrest, and false imprisonment. The Court has supplemental jurisdiction over these state law claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367.
The matter presently before the Court is the defendants' motion for summary judgment pursuant to FED. R. CIV. P. 56. [Court File No. 16]. After reviewing the record, the Court concludes that the summary judgment motion is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART.
The claim brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1985 is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE as to all defendants. The claim brought against the City under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and all claims brought against the City under Tennessee law are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. All federal and state law claims against the City, including those claims made against Randolph and Bradford in their official capacities, are being dismissed.
The remainder of the defendants' summary judgment motion is DENIED because there are genuine issues of material fact in dispute which will have to determined at trial. The only defendants remaining in this case are Randolph and Bradford in their individual capacities. Plaintiff Hale may proceed to trial on his claims brought against Randolph and Bradford in their individual capacities under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Tennessee law.
I. Standard of Review
Summary judgment is appropriate where no genuine issue of material fact exists and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. FED.R. CIV. P. 56(c). The Court views the facts in the record and all reasonable inferences that can be drawn from those facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, plaintiff Hale. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986); National Satellite Sports, Inc. v. Eliadis Inc., 253 F.3d 900, 907 (6th Cir. 2001). The Court cannot weigh the evidence or determine the truth of any matter in dispute. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986).
Defendants bear the initial burden of demonstrating that no genuine issue of material fact exists. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). To refute such a showing, Hale must present some probative evidence indicating the necessity of a trial for resolving a material factual dispute. Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 322. A mere scintilla of evidence is not enough to preclude summary judgment. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252; McLean v. Ontario, Ltd., 224 F.3d 797, 800 (6th Cir. 2000). The Court's role is limited to determining whether the record contains sufficient proof, that would be admissible at trial under the FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE, from which an objective, rational jury could find for Hale. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, 249; National Satellite Sports, 253 F.3d at 907. While the Court draws all reasonable factual inferences in the light most favorable to Hale, it may grant summary judgment if the record taken as a whole could not lead an objective, rational jury to find for Hale. Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587; McKinnie v. Roadway Express, Inc., 341 F.3d 554, 557 (6th Cir. 2003).
II. Facts
The Court has reviewed the record in the light most favorable to Hale and makes the following findings of fact. At the outset, the Court notes that Hale signed his complaint under oath before a notary public. The complaint constitutes his sworn statement for purposes of considering the summary judgment motion under Rule 56. A verified complaint may serve as an affidavit in opposition to a summary judgment motion if the verified complaint is properly supported and based on personal knowledge. Hamilton v. Roberts, 165 F.3d 27 (Table, text at 1998 WL 639158, * 5 (6th Cir. Sept. 10, 1998); Hartsfield v. Isom, 51 F.3d 272 (Table, text at 1995 WL 150333 (6th Cir. April 5, 1995); Lavado v. Keohane, 992 F.2d 601, 605 (6th Cir. 1993); Williams v. Browman, 981 F.2d 901, 903-05 (6th Cir. 1992); Hooks v. Hooks, 771 F.2d 935, 945-46 (6th Cir. 1985) (To the extent a plaintiff's sworn complaint contains factual allegations based on personal knowledge, it satisfies the requirements of FED.R.CIV.P.56(e) as an opposing affidavit). Hearsay statements which are inadmissible under the FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE and mere conclusory allegations made in a verified complaint are insufficient to withstand a summary judgment motion. Hamilton, 1998 WL 639158 at * 5.
Randolph and Bradford are police officers employed by the City Police Department. On the morning of December 25, 2001, at approximately 2:00 — 2:30 a.m., Hale's cousin, Thomas Derek Miller, and Miller's girlfriend, Sara Jones, got into a physical confrontation and fight with Joshua Carpenter and Jason Carpenter in a parking lot behind a restaurant in the Hixson area in Chattanooga, Tennessee. Various members of the Miller family and Hale family went to the scene of the fight. When Hale arrived at the parking lot, Hale saw his aunt and he began having a conversation with the aunt to inquire what was happening. Hale did not participate in the fight.
In the meantime, one or more telephone calls were made to the City Police Department concerning the fight. Officer Randolph was dispatched to investigate and was already present at the parking lot when Hale arrived. There were as many as 10-12 persons present at the scene of the fight and some of the combatants were armed with weapons (baseball bats and golf clubs). Randolph endeavored to take control of the confusing, hostile situation by ordering all persons to immediately get down on the ground.
Hale alleges that, without any prior warning, Randolph walked up to Hale and intentionally kicked Hale in the groin. The kick caused Hale to collapse and fall to the ground on the parking lot. Randolph had his police pistol drawn from its holster and the pistol was in his hand. Randolph shouted for Hale to get onto the ground after Randolph had already kicked Hale and after Hale was already down on the ground. At the time Hale was kicked, he was engaged in a conversation with family members and he was not actively involved in any fighting. Hale did not hear Randolph order him to lie down on the ground before Randolph kicked Hale.
Randolph placed his pistol against Hale's head. Randolph told Hale to stay down on the ground or Randolph threatened that he would "blow your f-ing head off." When Hale's family tried to intercede and tell Randolph that Hale was simply a bystander who was not involved in the fight, Randolph told them to "shut the f-up." Hale's sister bent down to check on Hale but Randolph put his pistol up to the sister's head and Randolph told her to leave or Randolph would blow her head off.
With Hale still laying on the ground, some of Hale's family told Randolph that he should not kick Hale for no reason. Randolph responded by shouting that he could do "anything that he f-ing wanted," that he was the "one with the f-ing badge," and that he could blow Hale's "f-ing brains out and that there is not a f-ing thing you could do about it." Another unidentified police officer with red hair and a moustache used his foot to stomp the back of Hale's head one time as Hale lay prone on the ground.
Hale states that Bradford was present on the scene as the supervising officer in charge. According to Hale, Bradford witnessed the behavior of Randolph and the other unidentified officer with red hair. It is alleged that Bradford failed or refused to take action to help Hale and to stop the other officers from using excessive force and assaulting Hale. Instead, Bradford threatened to arrest Hale's family if they did not leave and quit complaining about the way in which Hale was being abused.
Hale was arrested, transported by police to the Hamilton County Jail, and booked on a charge of disorderly conduct. After Hale was released on bond, he went to a hospital for medical treatment. Hale could barely walk and had blood in his urine. A physician examined Hale at the hospital and sent him home. Hale was still passing blood in his urine the next day so he went to his family physician. It took Hale almost one month to recover from his soreness and physical injuries.
The disorderly conduct charge against Hale was ultimately dismissed in the Hamilton County Criminal Court. Hale contends the disorderly conduct charge was brought against him as part of a conspiracy by the defendants to cover up or otherwise justify the police assault on Hale.
Randolph and Bradford have a significantly different version of events. In his affidavit [Court File No. 16], Bradford, a Lieutenant in the City Police Department, denies that he was present in the parking lot behind the Cancun Restaurant on the early morning of December 25, 2001. Bradford states he was not on official police duty on December 25, 2001. Bradford submits a copy of his official time records from the Police Department to show that he was off-duty. Moreover, Bradford says that he was not the officer in charge at the scene of the fight when Hale was arrested and Bradford denies having any conversations with Hale's mother or family.
The Court cannot grant summary judgment in favor of Bradford based on his affidavit. The Court is required under Rule 56 to view the record in the light most favorable to Hale. There are genuine issues of material fact in dispute concerning the circumstances surrounding the arrest of Hale and whether Bradford was present at the scene of the arrest as the supervising officer. Hale states in his sworn complaint that Bradford was present when Hale was assaulted, threatened, abused, and arrested by Randolph. Bradford denies being there. The factual dispute concerning Bradford's conduct will have to be decided at trial. It will be up to the jury at trial to determine the credibility of Hale, Bradford, and their respective witnesses. In reviewing the summary judgment motion, the Court cannot determine the credibility of Hale and Bradford.
Although a copy of Bradford's time records show he was not officially on duty as a police officer on December 25, 2001, this does not conclusively prove that Bradford was not present at the scene of Hale's arrest. Bradford could have gone to the scene of Hale's arrest while off duty. The Court is aware, and it is common knowledge, that off-duty police officers sometimes respond to calls for assistance from fellow officers. In other words, just because Bradford maynot have been officially on duty on December 25, 2001, does not necessarily mean and conclusively prove that Bradford could not possibly have been present at the scene of Hale's arrest.
With regard to the claim that the City is liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for failure to properly train and supervise officers Randolph and Bradford, the City submits the affidavit of Lon Eilders ("Eilders"). [Court File No. 16]. Eilders is employed by the City Police Department as manager in charge of accreditation and standards. Eilders states the following. He is familiar with the policies, customs, and practices of the City Police Department as they existed on December 25, 2001. In December of 2001, the City did not have any policy, custom, or practice of allowing its police officers to falsely arrest and prosecute persons without probable cause. The City did not have a policy, custom, or practice of allowing its police officers to excessive force when making an arrest or taking a person into custody. Nor did the City have a policy, custom or practice of allowing its police officers to abuse their power or misuse their official positions (official oppression). Eilders submits copies of the relevant official written policies adopted by the City Police Department which were in effect in December 2001.
Eilders further states that the City does not have a policy, custom, or practice of employing police officers who are not properly trained or supervised. In 1998, Randolph successfully completed a sixteen week training academy provided by the City Police Department which exceeds the requirements and standards of the State of Tennessee for police training. After Randolph graduated from the police academy in 1998, he has been required by the City to receive forty hours of annual in-service police training in each year while he is employed as a police officer.
Finally, Eilders states that he has reviewed the Internal Affairs investigation files of the City Police Department concerning Randolph prior to December 25, 2001. Prior to Hale's arrest on December 25, 2001, there were no complaints or allegations filed with Internal Affairs by any individual accusing Randolph of false arrest or excessive force. No disciplinary action has ever been taken against Randolph since he has been employed as a police officer by the City.
Hale has not presented any proof (depositions, affidavits, authenticated records) under Rule 56 to dispute or rebut Eilders' affidavit concerning the policies, customs, and practices that existed in the City Police Department when Hale was arrested on December 25, 2001. Hale has had ample time to take discovery on this issue. In his memorandum of law [Court File No. 22, pp. 3-4], Hale argues that the instant case is an example of the City failing to properly train and supervise Randolph and Bradford, and an example of a continual practice by the City police of making unsubstantiated criminal charges against victims of police brutality for the purpose of covering up police misconduct. Hale goes on to make the vague, conclusory argument that there have been numerous previous cases in this United States District Court in Chattanooga showing that the City has inadequately supervised its police officers concerning the proper treatment of persons under arrest and placing spurious criminal charges against arrested individuals in an attempt to coverup police misconduct.
Hale appears to be inviting this Court to take judicial notice of other similar lawsuits brought against the City and its police officers but Hale does not bother to identify and specify which prior federal lawsuits he is referring to. In the absence of specific information and records from Hale clearly identifying and explaining the relevance of any similar federal civil rights lawsuits against the City and/or its police officers that were litigated and decided prior to Hale's arrest on December 25, 2001, the Court cannot and will not jump to the unwarranted inference that the City had a custom, policy, or practice of failing to adequately train and supervise police officers.
Hale also argues: "While the City may produce written warnings that the officers should not use excessive force, the actual practice in this area has been that there is no follow-up, supervision or additional training provided to officers who are aggressive without cause." [Court File No. 22, p. 3]. The Court finds that Hale has absolutely no proof to support this argument. Hale offers no probative evidence to show that the City Police Department has a custom or actual practice of failing to properly train and supervise police officers who are the subject of complaints or internal investigations for assaulting persons and using excessive force in making arrests. There is a complete lack of proof in the record to substantiate Hale's contention or to even raise a genuine issue of material fact in dispute on this point. In the absence of any proof from Hale, the Court can only find that Hale is unable and unprepared to present evidence at trial to prove his position.
Moreover, as Eilders states in his affidavit which stands unchallenged by any proof from Hale, the records of the Internal Affairs Division in the City Police Department show that prior to December 25, 2001, there were no allegations/complaints against Randolph or internal investigations of Randolph concerning excessive force and false arrests. At the time Hale was arrested, the City Police Department had no information indicating that Randolph was using excessive force in making arrests and making false arrests without probable cause. Hale simply has no proof that when he was arrested by Randolph on December 25, 2001, the City Police Department had established a custom or actual practice for purposes of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 by failing to adequately train and supervise Randolph.
III. Analysis A. 42 U.S.C. § 1985
Hale does not specify the particular subsection of 42 U.S.C. § 1985 that he contends is applicable to his case. Hale does not clarify and discuss this deficiency in his memorandum of law. [Court File No. 22]. The Court and the defendants should not be placed in the position of having to hazard a guess as to which subsection of § 1985 is the basis for Hale's cause of action.
In the absence of an explanation and clarification from Hale, the Court infers that Hale seeks to rely solely on § 1985(3) which provides in pertinent part: "If two or more persons in any State . . . conspire . . . for the purpose of depriving, either directly or indirectly, any person or class or persons of the equal protection of the laws, or of equal privileges and immunities under the laws . . . the party so injured or deprived may have an action for the recovery of damages occasioned by such injury or deprivation, against any one or more of the conspirators."
The Court concludes that the § 1985(3) claim must be dismissed as to all defendants. Hale does not allege, and offers no proof showing, that he has been subjected to class-based invidious discrimination that is actionable under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3).
To prevail under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3), Hale is required to plead and be able to prove five essential elements: (1) a conspiracy between at least two persons; (2) the purpose or object of the conspiracy was to deprive Hale of the equal protection of the laws, or of equal privileges and immunities under the laws; (3) an overt act was committed by at least one of the conspirators in furtherance of the conspiracy; (4) the defendant's conduct caused Hale to suffer personal injury, property damage, or a deprivation of any right or privilege of a citizen of the United States; and (5) the conspiracy was motivated by racial or other class-based discriminatory animus. Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 102-103 (1971); Vakilian v. Shaw, 335 F.3d 509, 518 (6th Cir. 2003); Bass v. Robinson, 167 F.3d 1041, 1050 (6th Cir. 1999); Collyer v. Darling, 98 F.3d 211, 233 (6th Cir. 1996); Maki v. Laako, 88 F.3d 361, 367 (6th Cir. 1996); Johnson v. Hills Dales Gen. Hosp., 40 F.3d 837, 839 (6th Cir. 1994); Haverstick Enterprises v. Financial Federal Credit, 32 F.3d 989, 993 (6th Cir. 1994).
Although § 1985(3) applies to private conspiracies, it does not apply to all tortious interference with the rights of others. Griffin, 403 U.S. at 101. To make out a viable claim under § 1985(3), Hale is required to prove there was some racial, or otherwise class-based, invidiously discriminatory animus behind the conspirators' action. Bray v. Alexandria Clinic, 506 U.S. 263, 267-68 (1993); United States v. Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners v. Scott, 463 U.S. 825 (1983); Griffin, 403 U.S. at 101; Vakilian, 335 F.3d at 519; Bartell v. Lohiser, 215 F.3d 550, 559-60 (6th Cir. 2000); Collyer, 98 F.3d at 233; Maki, 88 F.3d at 367; Haverstick, 32 F.3d at 994; Newell v. Brown, 981 F.2d 880, 886 (6th Cir. 1992); Rice v. Ohio Dept. of Transp., 887 F.2d 716, 722 (6th Cir. 1989); Averitt v. Cloon, 796 F.2d 195, 198 (6th Cir. 1986). Hale must have proof that the alleged conspiracy was motivated by an intent to invidiously discriminate against Hale because he is a member of a protected class. Studen v. Beebe, 588 F.2d 560, 564 (6th Cir. 1978); Ohio Inns, Inc. v. Nye, 542 F.2d 673, 679 (6th Cir. 1976); Cameron v. Brock, 473 F.2d 608, 610 (6th Cir. 1973); Miller v. City of Columbus, 920 F. Supp. 807, 821-22 (S.D. Ohio). There is no such proof presented by Hale. The record shows that Hale is a white (Caucasian) male. [Court File No. 16, Randolph's Affidavit, p. 2, ¶ 6].
The distinction between classes of persons protected pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) and those classes which are unprotected is rooted in traditional equal protection analysis under the Equal Protection Clause in the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution. The classes of persons protected by § 1985(3) are the discrete and insular minorities that receive heightened constitutional protection under the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause because of their inherently personal characteristics. The class-based, invidiously discriminatory animus required by § 1985(3) must be based on race, ethnic origin, sex, religion, or political loyalty. Haverstick, 32 F.3d at 994; Rice, 887 F.2d at 722; Averitt, 796 F.2d at 198; National Communication v. Michigan Public Service, 789 F.2d 370, 374 (6th Cir. 1986); Browder v. Tipton, 630 F.2d 1149-50 (6th Cir. 1980); Clonlara, Inc. v. Runkel, 722 F. Supp. 1442, 1461 (E.D. Mich. 1989); see also Bartell, 215 F.3d at 560.
Hale does not contend that he is a member of any of these discrete, insular classes of persons entitled to special protection under the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause and § 1985(3). In sum, Hale does not allege and offers no proof showing that the defendants were motivated to conspire against him in violation of § 1985(3) based on his race, ethnic origin, sex, religion, or political loyalty.
Accordingly, Hale's § 1985(3) claim will be DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE as to all defendants. Bass, 167 F.3d at 1050.
B. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 1. In What Capacity Are Randolph and Bradford Being Sued?
Defendants argue that the complaint does not state whether Randolph and Bradford are being sued in their individual capacities or official capacities. [Court File No. 17, p. 9]. Defendants are incorrect. In the style of his complaint, Hale clearly indicates that he is suing Randolph and Bradford individually and as members of the City of Chattanooga Police Department. This is sufficient to put the defendants on fair notice that Randolph and Bradford are being sued in both their individual and official capacities.
A § 1983 claim may be maintained against a defendant in his official capacity, or in his personal (individual) capacity, or in both capacities. A personal-capacity suit seeks to impose personal liability upon a government official, employee, or agent for actions taken under color of state law. Official-capacity suits are merely another way of pleading an action against the governmental entity of which the defendant is an official, employee, or agent. Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165 (1985); Hardin v. Straub, 954 F.2d 1193, 1198 (6th Cir. 1992); Leach v. Shelby County Sheriff, 891 F.2d 1241, 1245-46 (6th Cir. 1989).
To properly plead a § 1983 claim against Randolph and Bradford personally, Hale is required to give fair notice that there is the potential Randolph and Bradford might be individually liable for payment of monetary damages. Shepherd v. Wellman, 313 F.3d 963, 967-69 (6th Cir. 2002); Lovelace v. O'Hara, 985 F.2d 847, 850 (6th Cir. 1993); Whittington v. Milby, 928 F.2d 188, 193 (6th Cir. 1991); Wells v. Brown, 891 F.2d 591 (6th Cir. 1989). Where no explicit statement or allegation of personal liability appears in a complaint, the Court applies a "course of the proceedings" test to determine whether a defendant has received fair notice of the plaintiff's intent to hold the defendant personally liable. Shepherd, 313 F.3d at 967-68; Moore v. City of Harriman, 272 F.3d 769, 772-73 (6th Cir. 2001).
The style of Hale's complaint indicates that Randolph and Bradford are being sued in both their individual and official capacities. Moreover, the course of the proceedings gives fair notice to Randolph and Bradford that Hale seeks to hold them personally liable in damages on the § 1983 claim. In their answer to the complaint [Court File No. 3], Randolph and Bradford state they are answering both in their individual and official capacities. Moreover, Randolph raises the affirmative defense of qualified immunity [Court File No. 3, Defendants' Answer p. 6, Seventh Defense; Court File No. 17, Defendants' Brief in Support of Summary Judgment Motion, pp. 12-14] which indicates that Randolph considers himself as being sued individually for monetary damages.
By bringing suit against Randolph and Bradford in their official capacities, Hale is in effect suing the governmental entity that employs them, namely the City. Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 23-25 (1991); Will v. Michigan Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 68 (1989); Graham, 473 U.S. at 165; Fox v. Van Oosterum, 176 F.3d 342, 347-48 (6th Cir. 1999); Pusey v. City of Youngstown, 11 F.3d 652, 657 (6th Cir. 1993); Leach, 891 F.2d at 1245-46.
2. Section 1983 Claims Against Randolph and Bradford Individually
To prevail on a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Hale is required to plead and prove two essential elements: (1) the defendant deprived Hale of a right, privilege, or immunity secured to him by the United States Constitution, federal statute, or other federal law; and (2) the defendant caused the deprivation while acting under color of state law. Gregory v. Shelby County, Tenn., 220 F.3d 433, 441 (6th Cir. 2000). In this case, there is no dispute that the defendants acted under color of the laws of the State of Tennessee.
Hale has made out viable, prima facie claims against Randolph and Bradford in their individual capacities under § 1983 which cannot be dismissed on summary judgment. There are genuine issues of material fact in dispute whether Randolph and Bradford deprived Hale of rights secured by the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution: the right to be free from excessive force during an arrest and the right to be arrested only upon probable cause. The Fourth Amendment is made applicable to the States by the Equal Protection Clause in the Fourteenth Amendment.
Although Hale also refers to the Fifth and Eighth Amendments to the United States Constitution, he does not explain and clarify how or why the Fifth and Eighth Amendments provide a basis for Hale to assert a cause of action against any of the defendants. As far as the Court can determine from the record, Hale does not have a viable 42 U.S.C. § 1983 cause of action against the defendants based on the Fifth and Eighth Amendments.
In the defendants' brief [Court File No. 17, p. 15], Randolph concedes that the § 1983 claim that he used excessive force in arresting Hale should proceed to trial since there are issues of material fact in dispute. However, Randolph argues that the § 1983 claim that Randolph arrested Hale for disorderly conduct without probable cause should be dismissed. Randolph takes the position that he had probable cause to arrest Hale for disorderly conduct.
Randolph's argument fails. In the context of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the issue of whether probable cause existed is one for the jury to decide at trial, unless there is only one reasonable determination possible. Crockett v. Cumberland College, 316 F.3d 571, 581 (6th Cir. 2003); Pyles v. Raisor, 60 F.3d 1211, 1215 (6th Cir. 1995). Viewing the record in the light most favorable to Hale, the Court concludes there is a genuine issue of material fact in dispute whether Randolph had probable cause to arrest Hale. Based on Hale's version of the facts, a rational jury might be able to reasonably find there was a lack of probable cause to arrest him.
Bradford contends that the § 1983 claims brought against him individually should be dismissed because Bradford denies that he participated in or supervised Hale's arrest. Bradford's motion for summary judgment to dismiss the § 1983 claims brought against him individually must be denied. As discussed supra, there are genuine issues of material fact in dispute whether Bradford was present at the scene of Hale's arrest and whether Bradford supervised the police officers who are alleged to have violated Hale's Fourth Amendment rights.
The Court expresses no opinion whether Hale might ultimately prevail at trial on his § 1983 clams against Randolph and Bradford individually. The Court merely determines there is sufficient proof and material issues of fact in dispute making it necessary for these particular claims to proceed to trial.
3. Section 1983 Claim Against City of Chattanooga
The § 1983 cause of action brought against the City will be dismissed. The City cannot be held vicariously liable pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for constitutional torts committed by its employees based on the doctrine of respondeat superior. There is no respondent superior liability under § 1983 for governmental entities. Board of County Comm'rs of Bryan County v. Brown, 520 U.S. 387, 403 (1997); Collins v. Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 121 (1992); Monell v. New York Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978); Gregory, 220 F.3d at 441; Fox, 176 F.3d at 348; Stemler v. City of Florence, 126 F.3d 856, 865 (6th Cir. 1997); Doe v. Claiborne County, Tenn., 103 F.3d 495, 507 (6th Cir. 1996). The City may not be sued by Hale under § 1983 solely on the basis that an injury has been inflicted on him by a City police officer.
"Instead, it is when the execution of a government's policy or custom, whether made by its lawmakers or those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent official policy, inflicts the injury that the government as an entity is responsible under § 1983." Monell, 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978); see also Brown, 520 U.S. at 403-04; Gregory, 220 F.3d at 441; Fox, 176 F.3d at 348; Sova v. City of Mt. Pleasant, 142 F.3d 898, 904 (6th Cir. 1998); Stemler, 126 F.3d at 865; Meyers v. City of Cincinnati, 14 F.3d 1115, 1117(6th Cir. 1994). For the City to have liability under § 1983, Hale is required to demonstrate that the City, through its deliberate conduct, was the "moving force" behind the alleged deprivation of his federal constitutional rights. Brown, 520 U.S. at 405; City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 389 (1989); Gregory, 220 F.3d at 442.
Hale must also show there is a direct causal link between the City's policy or custom and the deprivation of his federal constitutional rights. The "first inquiry in any case alleging municipal liability under § 1983 is the question of whether there is a direct causal link between a municipal policy or custom and the alleged constitutional deprivation." City of Canton, 489 U.S. at 385-86. Hale is required to prove that his federal constitutional rights were violated as a direct result of the execution of a City policy or custom. Brown, 520 U.S. at 405; Gregory, 220 F.3d at 442; Claiborne County, 103 F.3d at 508; Gazette v. City of Pontiac, 41 F.3d 1061, 1066 (6th Cir. 1994); Garner v. Memphis Police Dep't, 8 F.3d 358, 364 (6th Cir. 1993); Jones v. City of Carlisle, Ky., 3 F.3d 945, 950 (6th Cir. 1993). This is necessary to avoid de facto respondeat superior liability which is prohibited by Monell and its progeny. Claiborne County, 103 F.3d at 508.
A governmental custom must "be so permanent and well settled as to constitute a custom or usage with the force of law." Monell, 436 U.S. at 691; see also Claiborne County, 103 F.3d at 507. It must reflect a course of action deliberately chosen from among various alternatives. Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 823 (1985); Claiborne County, 103 F.3d at 508.
In his complaint, Hale avers that the City is liable for the actions of its police officers due to the City's failure to train and supervise them. Hale asserts that the City failed to implement proper counseling, training, or review to prevent and eliminate abusive police conduct such as what occurred to Hale in this case. Hale also makes a conclusory allegation that this case is not the first incident of "unwarranted abuse of power and misuse of official position by officers" of the City Police Department, and the City has had either "actual or constructive knowledge of the inklings of these problems" but the City failed or refused to prevent further harm or abuse by its police officers. [Court File No. 1, Complaint p. 3, ¶ IV].
A governmental entity can be held liable under § 1983 for its failure to properly train and supervise its employees. But liability will exist for the City only if Hale can prove that the City's failure to train or supervise evidences deliberate indifference to the rights of its inhabitants such that it in effect constitutes a governmental custom or policy within the Monell framework. City of Canton, 489 U.S. 378; Stemler, 126 F.3d at 865; Berry v. City of Detroit, 25 F.3d 1342, 1345 (6th Cir. 1994); Leach, 891 F.2d at 1247-48. A showing of simple or even heightened negligence will not suffice. Deliberate indifference is a stringent standard of fault, greater than negligence, requiring proof that the City government disregarded a known or obvious consequence of its actions. Brown, 520 U.S. at 407, 410; Stemler, 126 F.3d at 865.
A plaintiff ordinarily cannot demonstrate that a governmental entity acted with deliberate indifference without showing it was aware of prior unconstitutional actions of its employees and failed to respond. Brown, 520 U.S. at 407-08; City of Canton, 489 U.S. at 390-91; Stemler, 126 F.3d at 865. It is not enough for a plaintiff in a § 1983 case to merely show that his specific injury could have been prevented or avoided with more or better training. City of Canton, 489 U.S. at 390-91; Mayo v. Macomb County, 183 F.3d 554, 558 (6th Cir. 1999); Sova, 142 F.3d at 904; Lewis v. City of Irvine, Kentucky, 899 F.2d 451, 455 (6th Cir. 1990).
A policy of deliberate indifference may be found if there is proof that the City or its Police Department failed to investigate this incident involving Hale and failed or refused to punish any police officers responsible for violating Hale's constitutional rights. The Sixth Circuit has held that a governmental entity can be liable under § 1983 if it is deemed to have ratified unconstitutional acts committed by its employees by failing to meaningfully investigate those acts. Leach, 891 F.2d at 1248; Marchese v. Lucas, 758 F.2d 181, 188 (6th Cir. 1985).
This Court has reviewed the entire record, including and Male's response in opposition to the summary judgment motion. [Court File No. 22]. As discussed supra, Hale's problem is that he has not presented any proof to support his conclusory allegations that the City is liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for failure to train and supervise its police officers, Randolph and Bradford. Hale cannot defeat the City's motion for summary judgment by resting on the vague, conclusory statements in his complaint. Hale is required under FED. R. CIV. P. 56 to come forward with some probative evidence showing that, at the very least, there is a genuine issue of material fact in dispute which needs to be decided at trial but he has failed to do so.
In sum, there is no proof that: (1) the City had a custom or policy on December 25, 2001, which could support Hale's § 1983 claim against the City; (2) the City was deliberately indifferent by failing to adequately train and supervise its police officers; and (3) there is direct causal link between a City custom or policy and the alleged deprivation of Hale's rights under the United States Constitution. Accordingly, Hale's cause of action brought against the City under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 will be dismissed with prejudice because Hale cannot prove the City is liable for the actions of Randolph and Bradford pursuant to § 1983.
C. Tort Claims Against Randolph and Bradford Individually Under Tennessee Law
Hale may proceed to trial on his tort claims of assault and battery, false arrest, false imprisonment, and negligence per se brought against Randolph and Bradford in their individual capacities under Tennessee law. There are genuine issues of material fact in dispute which preclude summary judgment.
D. Qualified Immunity
Randolph raises the affirmative defense of qualified immunity. Randolph argues that he is entitled to qualified immunity from suit on all of Male's federal and state law claims except for two causes of action: (1) the claim brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 that Randolph used excessive force when arresting Hale in violation of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution; and (2) the Tennessee common law tort claim of assault and battery. Randolph concedes there are genuine issues of material fact in dispute concerning these two particular claims which will have to be decided at trial and preclude qualified immunity. [Court File No. 17, pp. 12-15]. In analyzing qualified immunity, the Court primarily focuses its attention on Hale's claim that he was falsely arrested without probable cause.
There is some confusion whether Bradford is likewise asserting the affirmative defense of qualified immunity. In their motion for summary judgment, defendants say that both Randolph and Bradford are entitled to qualified immunity to the extent that they are being sued in their individual capacities. [Court File No. 16]. However, in their brief filed in support of the summary judgment motion, the defendants do not appear to argue that Bradford is entitled to qualified immunity. Instead, Bradford only argues that all claims against him should be dismissed because Bradford contends he was not present and did not participate in or supervise Hale's arrest on December 25, 2001. [Court File No. 17, pp. 14].
In the defendants' answer to the complaint [Court File No. 3], Randolph pleads the affirmative defense of qualified immunity but Bradford does not plead it. Since qualified immunity is an affirmative defense, it must be pleaded by a defendant. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 815(1982); Veney v. Hogan, 70 F.3d 917, 921 (6th Cir. 1995); Poe v. Haydon, 853 F.2d 418, 424 (6th Cir. 1988). Bradford is not in a position to now raise the affirmative defense of qualified immunity for the first time in a summary judgment motion since he did not plead it in his answer.
In any event, the Court concludes that Randolph and Bradford are not entitled to qualified immunity on any of Hale's remaining causes of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Tennessee law. Qualified immunity from civil liability for damages extends to government officials performing discretionary functions insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established constitutional or statutory rights of which a reasonable person would have known. Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818; Thacker v. City of Columbus, 328 F.3d 244, 259 (6th Cir. 2003); Crockett, 316 F.3d at 579; Ewolski v. City of Brunswick, 287 F.3d 492, 501 (6th Cir. 2002); Spurlock v. Satterfield, 167 F.3d 995, 1005 (6th Cir. 1999); Veney, 70 F.3d at 920. Appropriateness of qualified immunity is a threshold legal question for the Court. Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818 (1982); Veney, 70 F.3d at 920; Poe, 853 F.2d at 424. Qualified immunity is an immunity from suit rather than a mere defense to liability. Qualified immunity is "an entitlement not to stand trial or face the other burdens of litigation, conditioned on the resolution of the essentially legal question whether the conduct of which the plaintiff complains violated clearly established law." Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526(1985); see also Crockett, 316 F.3d at 579; Veney, 70 F.3d at 920; Poe, 853 F.2d at 424.
The question whether a government official may be held personally liable in civil damages for an alleged unlawful official action generally turns on the objective legal reasonableness of the action, assessed in light of the legal rules that were "clearly established" at the time the action as taken. Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 639 (1987); Veney, 70 F.3d at 920. For a law to be clearly established in the context of qualified immunity, the contours of the right must be sufficiently clear that an objectively reasonable government official would understand that what he is doing violates that legal right. "This is not to say that an official action is protected by qualified immunity unless the very action in question has previously been held unlawful; but it is to say that in the light of preexisting law the unlawfulness must be apparent." Anderson, 483 U.S. at 640; see also Thacker, 328 F.3d at 259; Crockett, 316 F.3d at 579; Bass, 167 F.3d at 1051; Spurlock, 167 F.3d at 1006; Ewolski, 287 F.3d at 501; Veney, 70 F.3d at 920; Poe, 853 F.2d at 423.
Qualified immunity involves a two-step inquiry. First, the Court must determine, based on the applicable law, whether the facts viewed in the light most favorable to plaintiff Hale show that the defendants committed a violation of constitutional or statutory law. Second, if there is a violation, then the Court must determine whether the violation involved clearly established legal rights of which a reasonable person should have known. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 200-202 (2001); Conn v. Gabbert, 526 U.S. 286, 290 (1999); Thacker, 328 F.3d at 259; Crockett, 316 F.3d at 579; Ewolski, 287 F.3d at 501; Brooks v. Sevier County, 279 F. Supp.2d 954, 958 (E.D. Tenn. 2003).
The Court cannot grant summary judgment in favor of Randolph and Bradford based on qualified immunity. There are genuine issues of material fact in dispute which must be determined at trial concerning whether police officers used excessive force in arresting Hale and whether Hale was falsely arrested without probable cause. Donovan v. Thames, 105 F.3d 291, 297 (6th Cir. 1997) (Factual disputes in 42 U.S.C. § 1983 excessive force case regarding degree of force used by police to subdue and arrest plaintiff precludes summary judgment in favor of police officers on the basis of qualified immunity). Viewing the facts in the light most favorable to Hale, the Court cannot at this stage of the suit find that officer Randolph had probable cause to arrest Hale for disorderly conduct. Consequently, the Court will deny the summary judgment motion because there are factual disputes as to issues on which the question of qualified immunity turns. Doe v. Bowles, 254 F.3d 617, 622 (6th Cir. 2001); Bass, 167 F.3d at 1051; Cameron v. Seitz, 38 F.3d 264, 273 n. 2(6th Cir. 1994); Adams v. Metiva, 31 F.3d 375, 387 (6th Cir. 1994); Poe, 853 F.2d at 426; Glass v. Abbo, 284 F. Supp.2d 700, 710-11 (E.D. Mich. 2003). Although the application of qualified immunity comprises a question of law for the Court to decide, summary judgment is inappropriate when conflicting evidence creates subordinate predicate factual issues that must be resolved at trial by the factfinder. Painter v. Robertson, 185 F.3d 557, 567 (6th Cir. 1999); Brooks, 279 F. Supp.2d at 958.
Furthermore, when Hale was arrested on December 25, 2001, his Fourth Amendment rights to be free from excessive force during his arrest and to be arrested only on probable cause were clearly established in federal constitutional law. Gardenhire v. Schubert, 205 F.3d 303, 315 (6th Cir. 2000); Bass, 167 F.3d at 1051; Spurlock, 167 F.3d at 1005-07; Donovan, 105 F.3d at 297-98 (It is clearly established law that an arrest without probable cause violates the Fourth Amendment); see also Crockett, 316 F.3d at 580-84.
Accordingly, to the extent that Randolph and Bradford move for summary judgment on the ground of qualified immunity, their motion is DENIED.
E. Tort Claims Against The City Under Tennessee Law
The City moves for summary judgment to dismiss all of Hale's tort claims brought against the City under Tennessee law. These claims are false arrest, false imprisonment, assault and battery, and negligence per se. The basis for the negligence per se claim is Hale's contention that the City and its police officers violated four Tennessee statutes: (1) TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-101, assault; (2) TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-102, aggravated assault; (3) TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-302, false imprisonment; and (4) TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-16-403, official oppression.
To prevail on his Tennessee common law claim of false arrest, Hale must prove that he was arrested for disorderly conduct without probable cause. McLaughlin v. Smith, 412 S.W.2d 21, 26-27 (Tenn.Ct.App. 1966). Hale also contends he was falsely imprisoned in the Hamilton County Jail after being arrested. Under Tennessee law, false imprisonment is the intentional restraint or detention of another without just cause. To prevail on his claim of false imprisonment/false arrest, Hale must prove two elements: (1) he was restrained or detained against his will by the defendant; and (2) the restraint or detention was unlawful. Bryant-Bruce v. Vanderbilt University, Inc., 974 F. Supp. 1127, 1145 (M.D. Tenn. 1997); Raines v. Shoney's, Inc., 909 F. Supp. 1070, 1082 (E.D. Tenn. 1995); Coffee v. Peterbuilt of Nashville, Inc., 795 S.W.2d 656, 659 (Tenn. 1990); Roberts v. Essex Microtel Associates, 46 S.W.3d 205, 213 (Tenn.Ct.App. 2000); Newsom v. Thalhimer Brothers, Inc., 901 S.W.2d 365, 367-68 (Tenn.Ct.App. 1995); Brown v. SCOA Industries, Inc., 741 S.W.2d 916, 919-20 (Tenn.Ct.App. 1987). The gravamen of the false imprisonment claim is that Hale is required to prove he was arrested for disorderly conduct without probable cause. Id. at 920.
The City has sovereign immunity from suit on Hale's false arrest claim. The doctrine of sovereign immunity, acknowledged in Tennessee's common law for over a century, provides that suit may not be brought against a governmental entity in Tennessee unless it consents to be sued. Doyle v. Frost, 49 S.W.3d 853, 857 (Tenn. 2001); Hawks v. City of Westmorland, 960 S.W.2d 10, 14 (Tenn. 1997); Fortenberry v. George, 2002 WL 1446675, * 3 (Tenn.Ct.App. July 3, 2002).
The City's liability for torts committed by its employees and agents is governed by the Tennessee Governmental Tort Liabilities Act ("GTLA"), TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 29-20-101 — 29-20-407. GTLA codifies the Tennessee common law rule of sovereign immunity for counties, municipalities, and other governmental entities. TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-20-201; Limbaugh v. Coffee Medical Center, 59 S.W.Sd 73, 79 (Tenn. 2001); Baines v. Wilson County, 86 S.W.3d 575, 578-79 (Tenn.Ct.App. 2002). GTLA affirms that municipalities in Tennessee are immune from suit with certain exceptions or waivers set forth in GTLA. Doyle, 49 S.W.3d at 857-58. The limited waiver of sovereign immunity in GTLA is in derogation of Tennessee common law and must be strictly construed. Limbaugh, 59 S.W.3d at 83-84; Doyle, 49 S.W.3d at 858 ; Ezell v. Cockrell, 902 S.W.2d 394, 399 (Tenn. 1995); Fortenberry, 2002 WL 1446675 at * 3.
Under GTLA, the City of Chattanooga is generally subject to suit for civil claims sounding in negligence with certain enumerated exceptions. Limbaugh, 59 S.W.3d at 79; Doyle, 49 S.W.3d at 858. TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-20-205 provides in pertinent part that immunity from suit of all governmental entities is removed (waived) "for injury proximately caused by a negligent act or omission of any employee within the scope of his employment, except if the injury arises out of: (2) false imprisonment pursuant to a mittimus from a court, false arrest, malicious prosecution, . . . or civil rights." The City has immunity from suit under GTLA for the negligent acts or omissions of its employees if the injury arises out of the torts specified in TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-20-205(2). Limbaugh, 59 S.W.3d at 83-84.
TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-20-310(a) of GLTA provides that before a Tennessee governmental entity may be held liable in civil damages, a court must determine: (1) the acts of the governmental employee were negligent and were the proximate cause of the plaintiff's injury; (2) the employee was acting within the scope of his employment; and (3) none of the exceptions provided in TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-20-205 apply.
This Court concludes that the City has immunity from suit under GTLA on Hale's cause of action for false arrest. Elmore v. Cruz, 2003 WL 239169, * 4 (Tenn.Ct.App. Feb. 4, 2003); Fortenberry, 2002 WL 1446675 at * 6. To the extent that Hale asserts a Tennessee common law claim against the City for false arrest, said claim is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE on the ground that the City is immune from suit under GTLA.
With regard to the Tennessee claims of false imprisonment, and assault and battery, the City does not argues that it has immunity from suit under GTLA. Assault and battery is not listed as an exception to the waiver of immunity in TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-20-205(2). Limbaugh, 59 S.W.3d at 83; see also Davis v. Hardin County, Tennessee, 2002 WL 1397276, * 5 (W.D. Tenn. May 22, 2002). The City recognizes this point in its brief. [Court File No. 17, p. 10].
TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-20-205(2) provides that the City retains immunity from suit for injuries arising out of "false imprisonment pursuant to a mittimus from a court." The City does not retain sovereign immunity under § 29-20-205(2) injuries arising out of any and all false imprisonments. There is only immunity from suit for injuries arising out of false imprisonment pursuant to a mittimus from a court. In the instant case, the proof does not show that Hale was imprisoned in the Hamilton County jail pursuant to a mittimus from a court. Elmore, 2003 WL 239169 at * 4. Consequently, the City does not pursue the argument that it has immunity from suit under GTLA on Hale's false imprisonment claim.
Although the City does not argue that it has immunity from suit pursuant to TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-20-205(2) on the claims of false imprisonment and assault and battery, the City may have immunity from suit on these intentional tort claims under the "civil rights" language in § 29-20-205(2). This is discussed infra as an alternative reason why Hale's claims of false imprisonment and assault and battery against the City should be dismissed.
Instead, the City argues the false imprisonment and the assault and battery claims dismissed on the ground that Hale has no proof of independent negligent acts on behalf of a City employee which would form the basis for municipal liability under TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-20-205. The City contends there is no proof in the record showing there was negligence or a deficiency in the City's training and supervision of officers Randolph and Bradford prior to Hale's arrest on December 25, 2001.
The Court agrees with the City on this point. TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-20-205 removes or waives the City's immunity from suit for injury proximately caused by a negligent act or omission of a City employee committed within the scope of his or her employment with certain exceptions. False imprisonment and assault and battery are intentional torts that do not sound in negligence. Under GTLA, TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-20-205, the City cannot be held liable for negligence based merely on the alleged commission of the intentional torts of false imprisonment and assault and battery by Randolph and Bradford. The City has immunity from suit under GTLA unless Hale can prove that the City committed a negligent act or omission which proximately caused Hale's injuries. For Hale to prevail on his claim seeking to hold the City liable for intentional torts of false imprisonment and assault and battery allegedly committed by Randolph and Bradford, Hale is required to prove that an independent act of negligence by the City or a City employee proximately caused the intentional torts that resulted in Hale's injuries. Baines, 86 S.W.2d at 580-81. On this question of the City's liability for negligence under TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-20-205, there are no genuine issues of material fact in dispute and the City is entitled to have summary judgment entered in its favor.
There is no proof in the record showing that the City was negligent in hiring, training, supervising, and/or retaining Randolph and Bradford as police officers prior to December 25, 2001. There is no proof that the City, or one of its employees or agents, committed an independent negligent act or omission that proximately caused the intentional torts (false imprisonment, assault and battery) that resulted in Hale's injuries. Accordingly, Male's claims against the City for false imprisonment and assault and battery are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. For the same reasons, Hale's negligence per se claim against the City are likewise DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
In the alternative, there is a different reason why Hale's claims against the City for false imprisonment, assault and battery, and negligence per se should be dismissed. These torts are alleged to have been committed solely in the context of Hale being arrested by the police and the violation of Hale's civil rights (arrest without probable cause and excessive force). We cannot lose sight of the fundamental fact that this is in essence a civil rights suit.
TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-20-205(2) under GTLA provides in pertinent part that immunity from suit of all governmental entities is removed or waived for injury proximately caused by a negligent act or omission of any employee within the scope of his employment except if the injury arises out of "civil rights." It is fair and reasonable to interpret the plain language in § 29-20-205(2) as meaning that civil rights claims are a type of intentional tort. Brooks, 279 F. Supp.2d at 960. This Court construes the term "civil rights" in § 29-20-205(2) as meaning and including claims arising under the federal civilrights laws, e.g. 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and the United States Constitution.
Hale's tort claims of false imprisonment, assault and battery, and negligence per se brought against the City under Tennessee law are predicated on the alleged violation of Hale's civil rights by City police officers. The contention that officers Randolph and Bradford committed assault and battery, false imprisonment, and official oppression clearly arise out of and directly flow from the allegations that the police officers deprived Hale of his civil rights by falsely arresting Hale without probable cause and using excessive force during the arrest. Because Hale asserts his false imprisonment, assault and battery, and negligence per se claims against the City in the context of a civil rights case, his alleged injuries arise out of "civil rights" and the City is entitled to immunity from suit on these claims pursuant to the "civil rights" exception in TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-20-205(2).
Although Hale may seek to circumvent or avoid the City's immunity from suit under TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-20-205(2) by couching some of his civil rights claims against the City in the guise of negligence per se, this strategy fails. The underlying acts which Hale alleges to be negligence per se (assault, false imprisonment, official oppression) are by their very nature the type of conduct one usually associates with intentional torts. Cf. Brooks, 279 F. Supp.2d at 959-60; Coffee, 795 S.W.2d at 660 (false imprisonment is an intentional tort). Hale's negligence per se claim is predicated on intentional tortious conduct involving the violation of Hale's civil rights by City police officers. Based on the facts and circumstances in this case, the Court sees no good reason why the City should not have immunity from suit under the "civil rights" exception in TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-20-205(2).
F. Punitive Damages
Finally, the City moves to dismiss Male's claim for punitive damages. The motion is well taken. Hale is not entitled to recover punitive damages from the City under Tennessee law, GTLA, and 42 U.S.C. § 1983. City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247, 271 (1981); Alexander v. Beale Street Blues Co., Inc., 108 F. Supp.2d 934, 950 (W.D. Tenn. 1999); Tipton County Board of Education v. Dennis, 561 S.W.2d 148 (Tenn. 1978); Johnson v. Smith, 621 S.W.2d 5 70, 5 72 (Tenn.Ct.App. 1981). Hale's claim for punitive damages against the City is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
IV. Conclusion
The defendants' motion for summary judgment [Court File No. 16] is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART.
The motion is GRANTED IN PART as follows. The plaintiff's claim brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1985 is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE as to all defendants. The plaintiff's claim brought against the City under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and all claims against the City under Tennessee law are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. All federal and state law claims against the City, including those claims made against Randolph and Bradford in their official capacities, are being dismissed.
The remainder of the summary judgment motion is DENIED because there are genuine issues of material fact in dispute which will have to determined at trial. The only defendants remaining in this case are Randolph and Bradford in their individual capacities. Plaintiff Hale may proceed to trial on his claims against defendants Randolph and Bradford in their individual capacities under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Tennessee law. These are the only claims which remain before the Court for adjudication.
SO ORDERED.