Opinion
53093.
ARGUED JANUARY 10, 1977.
DECIDED FEBRUARY 23, 1977.
Attorney fees. Fulton Superior Court. Before Judge Tidwell.
Glenville Haldi, for appellant.
Candler, Cox, Andrews Hansen, E. Lewis Hansen, for appellee.
The appellee hired the appellant attorney on a contingent-fee basis to prosecute a securities case against a third party. During the pendency of the securities proceeding, the appellee allegedly discharged the appellant. The appellant then made a motion as part of the securities case to be paid his fee. From a denial of the motion, the appellant presents this interlocutory appeal.
An attorney who is hired under a contingent fee contract and later discharged has a right to payment of a reasonable attorney fee. Bearden v. Lane, 107 Ga. App. 424 (1) ( 130 S.E.2d 619) (1963). As a general rule, a discharged attorney who was employed on a contingent fee basis may not recover that fee by a summary proceeding or order in the cause in which the fee is earned. 7 CJS 1100, Attorney and Client, § 194; see McLaughlin v. McLaughlin, 427 S.W.2d 767 (4) (Mo.App. 1968); In re Lomm, 195 So.2d 416 (1) (La.App. 1967); Shatzkin v. Shahmoon, 19 App. Div. 2d 658 (4) ( 242 NYS2d 72) (1963); Fields v. Potts, 140 Cal.App.2d 697 ( 295 P.2d 965) (1956); Marx v. Marx, 24 N. J. Super. 204 ( 93 A.2d 773) (1953). The attorney may bring an independent action, however. Patterson v. Drake, 126 Ga. 478 (8) ( 55 S.E. 175) (1906). Cases dealing with other than contingent fees are distinguished. White v. Aiken, 197 Ga. 29 (2) ( 28 S.E.2d 263) (1943); Head v. Aycock, 116 Ga. App. 739 ( 158 S.E.2d 685) (1967); Carter v. Wyatt, 113 Ga. App. 235 (8) ( 158 S.E.2d 74) (1966). Therefore, the trial judge properly dismissed the appellant's motion.
Judgment affirmed. Quillian, P. J., and Shulman, J., concur.