Opinion
1:19-CV-8747 (CM)
10-11-2019
PHILIP HAHN, Plaintiff, v. THE STATE OF NEW YORK; THE SUPREME COURT OF N.Y.; JUDGE WOOTEN, Defendants.
ORDER OF DISMISSAL :
Plaintiff Philip Hahn, of Paramus, New Jersey, brings this pro se action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. He sues the State of New York, the Supreme Court of New York, and Justice Paul Wooten of the New York Supreme Court, Kings County. For the reasons discussed below, the Court dismisses this action as frivolous.
Plaintiff has paid the relevant fees to bring this action, and the Clerk of Court has issued summonses. After Plaintiff filed his complaint, he filed a letter, which the Court construes as a supplement to the complaint. (ECF 2.) The letter includes a copy of a check Plaintiff issued and, therefore, reveals Plaintiff's complete checking account number. Under 5.2(a)(4) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a court submission may refer to a financial account number only by listing its last four digits. And a person who reveals his own protected information in a court submission waives the protection of Rule 5.2. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 5.2(h). In light of Plaintiff's pro se status, however, I have directed the Clerk of Court to limit electronic access to Plaintiff's letter to a "case participant-only" basis.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The Court has the authority to dismiss a complaint, even when the plaintiff has paid the relevant fees, if it determines that the action is frivolous, see Fitzgerald v. First E. Seventh Tenants Corp., 221 F.3d 362, 363-64 (2d Cir. 2000), or that the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3); Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574, 583 (1999). The Court is obliged, however, to construe pro se pleadings liberally, Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009), and interpret them to raise the "strongest [claims] that they suggest," Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted, emphasis in original).
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff alleges that Justice Wooten denied him a trial by jury in at least two civil actions that Plaintiff brought in the New York Supreme Court, Kings County. Plaintiff asks this Court "to either conduct or order a jury trial and assess damages versus Judge Wooten." (ECF 1, p. 7.)
DISCUSSION
A. The Eleventh Amendment
Plaintiff's claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the State of New York and the Supreme Court of New York are barred by the doctrine of Eleventh Amendment immunity. "[A]s a general rule, state governments may not be sued in federal court unless they have waived their Eleventh Amendment immunity or unless Congress has abrogate[d] the states' Eleventh Amendment immunity . . . ." Gollomp v. Spitzer, 568 F.3d 355, 366 (2d Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted, second alteration in original). This immunity shields States from claims for money damages, injunctive relief, and retrospective declaratory relief. See Green v. Mansour, 474 U.S. 64, 72-74 (1985); Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 101-02 (1984). "[T]he immunity recognized by the Eleventh Amendment extends beyond the states themselves to state agents and state instrumentalities that are, effectively, arms of a state." Gollomp, 568 F.3d at 366 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
Congress has not abrogated the States' immunity for claims under § 1983. See Dube v. State Univ. of N.Y., 900 F.2d 587, 594 (2d Cir. 1990). And the State of New York has not waived its immunity to suit in federal court. See Trotman v. Palisades Interstate Park Comm'n, 557 F.2d 35, 40 (2d Cir. 1977). Moreover, "the New York State Unified Court System is unquestionably an 'arm of the State,' and is entitled to Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity." Gollomp, 568 F.3d at 368 (citation omitted); see Brown v. Astoria Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 444 F. App'x 504 n.1 (2d Cir. 2011) (summary order) (claims against New York Supreme Court barred by the Eleventh Amendment) (citing Gollomp, 568 F.3d at 368).
Plaintiff sues the State of New York and the Supreme Court of New York, a New York State court. The Court therefore dismisses Plaintiff's § 1983 claims against those defendants under the doctrine of Eleventh Amendment immunity and because those claims are frivolous. See Montero v. Travis, 171 F.3d 757, 760 (2d Cir. 1999) ("A complaint will be dismissed as 'frivolous' when 'it is clear that the defendants are immune from suit.'" (quoting Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327 (1989))).
See also Zuckerman v. Appellate Div., Second Dep't, Supreme Court, 421 F.2d 625, 626 (2d Cir. 1970) (holding that a state court is not a "person" for the purpose of § 1983 liability); see generally Will v. Mich. Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58 (1989) (holding that a state agency is not a "person" for the purpose of § 1983 liability).
B. Judicial immunity
Plaintiff's claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Justice Wooten are barred under the doctrine of judicial immunity. Under this doctrine, judges are absolutely immune from suit for claims for damages for any actions taken within the scope of their judicial responsibilities. See Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 11-12 (1991). Generally, "acts arising out of, or related to, individual cases before [a] judge are considered judicial in nature." Bliven v. Hunt, 579 F.3d 204, 210 (2d Cir. 2009). "[E]ven allegations of bad faith or malice cannot overcome judicial immunity." Id. at 209. This is because "[w]ithout insulation from liability, judges would be subject to harassment and intimidation . . . ." Young v. Selsky, 41 F.3d 47, 51 (2d Cir. 1994). And as amended in 1996, § 1983 provides that "in any action brought against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such officer's judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable." 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
Judicial immunity does not apply when a judge takes action outside his or her judicial capacity, or when a judge takes action that, although judicial in nature, is taken "in the complete absence of all jurisdiction." Mireles 502 U.S. at 11-12; see also Bliven, 579 F.3d at 209-10 (describing actions that are judicial in nature). But "the scope of [a] judge's jurisdiction must be construed broadly where the issue is the immunity of the judge." Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 356 (1978).
Plaintiff asserts claims against Justice Wooten arising from his decisions to prevent at least two of Plaintiff's state-court civil actions from proceeding to a trial by jury. This conduct is well within the scope of a judge's duties. Justice Wooten is therefore immune from suit under the doctrine of judicial immunity. Accordingly, the Court dismisses Plaintiff's §1983 claims against Justice Wooten under the doctrine of judicial immunity and because these claims are frivolous. See Montero, 171 F.3d at 760.
The amendment to § 1983, allowing for injunctive relief against a judge only if a state-court declaratory decree was violated or state-court declaratory relief is unavailable, precludes Plaintiff from seeking injunctive against Justice Wooten. This is so because Plaintiff can appeal Justice Wooten's decisions in the state appellate courts. See generally Berlin v. Meijia, No. 15-CV-5308, 2017 WL 4402457, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2017) ("Here, no declaratory decree was violated and declaratory relief is available to plaintiffs through an appeal of the state court judges' decisions in state court."), appeal dismissed, No. 17-3589 (2d Cir. Apr. 18, 2018) (effective May 18, 2018). Federal district courts do not supervise the state courts. --------
C. Leave to amend
District courts generally grant a pro se plaintiff an opportunity to amend a complaint to cure its defects, but leave to amend is not required where it would be futile. See Hill v. Curcione, 657 F.3d 116, 123-24 (2d Cir. 2011); Salahuddin v. Cuomo, 861 F.2d 40, 42 (2d Cir. 1988). Because the defects in Plaintiff's complaint and supplement cannot be cured with an amendment, the Court declines to grant Plaintiff leave to amend.
CONCLUSION
The Court directs the Clerk of Court to assign this matter to my docket, mail a copy of this order to Plaintiff, and note service on the docket. The Court dismisses this action as frivolous.
The Court certifies under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) that any appeal from this order would not be taken in good faith, and therefore in forma pauperis status is denied for the purpose of an appeal. See Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 444-45 (1962).
The Court also directs the Clerk of Court to docket this order as a "written opinion" within the meaning of Section 205(a)(5) of the E-Government Act of 2002. SO ORDERED. Dated: October 11, 2019
New York, New York
/s/_________
COLLEEN McMAHON
Chief United States District Judge