Opinion
C/A No. 6:20-cv-00362-HMH-JDA
02-04-2020
Terrance Terrell Hagood, Plaintiff, v. South Carolina, Defendant.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Terrance Terrell Hagood ("Plaintiff"), proceeding pro se, brings this civil action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging violations of his constitutional rights. Plaintiff is a detainee at the Greenville County Detention Center. He files this action in forma pauperis under 28 U.S.C. § 1915 and § 1915A. Pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B), and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2)(d), D.S.C., the undersigned Magistrate Judge is authorized to review the Complaint for relief and submit findings and recommendations to the District Court. Having reviewed the Complaint in accordance with applicable law, the undersigned finds that this action is subject to summary dismissal for the reasons below.
The undersigned takes judicial notice that Plaintiff has the following charges pending against him in the Greenville County Court of General Sessions: driving under suspension, license suspended for DUI, third or subsequent offense at case number 20181090033557; trafficking in methamphetamine or cocaine base at case number 2017A2330202910; resisting arrest at case number 2017A2330202937; resisting arrest at case number 2017A2330202939; assaulting, beating, or wounding police officer serving process or while resisting arrest at case number 2017A2330207784; escape at case number 2017A2330207785; trafficking in methamphetamine or cocaine base at case number 2017A2330207786; driving under the influence at case number 6102P0462366; driving under suspension at case number 6102P0462367; and giving false information to law enforcement at case number 6102P0462368. See Greenville County Thirteenth Judicial Circuit Public Index, available at https://publicindex.sccourts.org/Greenville/PublicIndex/PISearch.aspx (search by case numbers) (last visited Feb. 3, 2020); see also Philips v. Pitt Cty. Mem. Hosp., 572 F.3d 176, 180 (4th Cir. 2009) (explaining that courts "may properly take judicial notice of matters of public record"); Colonial Penn Ins. Co. v. Coil, 887 F.2d 1236, 1239 (4th Cir. 1989) ("We note that 'the most frequent use of judicial notice is in noticing the content of court records.'").
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff makes the following allegations in his Complaint. [Doc. 1.] Plaintiff contends that his rights under the Fourth Amendment were violated because he was subjected to an unlawful search and seizure resulting from false warrants and drug analysis. [Id. at 4.] Plaintiff alleges that, on August 21, 2017, he was arrested by Officer M. A. Taylor of the South Carolina Highway Patrol for trafficking in meth/cocaine base and resisting arrest. [Id. at 5.] Plaintiff alleges that, according to the arresting officer's statement, certain of the drugs in question field tested positive for crack cocaine. [Id.] Plaintiff alleges that he was pulled over for a traffic violation and the officer asked for insurance and identification. [Id.] Plaintiff told the officer he had a license, but he did not have it on his person. [Id.] The officer walked to his patrol car and then returned and said he smelled marijuana. [Id.] Plaintiff contends that the officer did not process the traffic violation and that the marijuana smell had nothing to do with the reason for which he was pulled over. [Id.]
In the injury section of the Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that he told the officer that he had asthma. [Id. at 6.] The officer tried to get blood samples to show that Plaintiff was under the influence of alcohol. [Id.] Plaintiff alleges that the officer also stated that he was under the influence of a "mix drug" but never said what mix of drugs. [Id.] Plaintiff alleges that he has PTSD but the officers "fail[ed] to understand." [Id.] For his relief, Plaintiff seeks $1.5 million in damages. [Id.]
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Plaintiff filed this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915, the in forma pauperis statute. This statute authorizes the District Court to dismiss a case if it is satisfied that the action "fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted," is "frivolous or malicious," or "seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief." 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). Further, Plaintiff is a prisoner under the definition in 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(c), and "seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity." 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). Thus, this Court is charged with screening Plaintiff's lawsuit to identify cognizable claims or to dismiss the Amended Complaint if (1) it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or (2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A.
Because Plaintiff is a pro se litigant, his pleadings are accorded liberal construction and held to a less stringent standard than formal pleadings drafted by attorneys. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam). However, even under this less stringent standard, Plaintiff's Complaint is subject to summary dismissal. The mandated liberal construction afforded to pro se pleadings means that if the court can reasonably read the pleadings to state a valid claim on which Plaintiff could prevail, it should do so, but a district court may not rewrite a petition to include claims that were never presented, Barnett v. Hargett, 174 F.3d 1128, 1133 (10th Cir. 1999), or construct Plaintiff's legal arguments for him, Small v. Endicott, 998 F.2d 411, 417-18 (7th Cir. 1993), or "conjure up questions never squarely presented" to the court, Beaudett v. City of Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274, 1278 (4th Cir. 1985). The requirement of liberal construction does not mean that the court can ignore a clear failure in the pleading to allege facts which set forth a claim cognizable in a federal district court. See Weller v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387, 391 (4th Cir. 1990).
Although the Court must liberally construe the pro se Complaint and Plaintiff is not required to plead facts sufficient to prove his case as an evidentiary matter in the Complaint, the Complaint "must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)); see also Francis v. Giacomelli, 588 F.3d 186, 193 (4th Cir. 2009) (explaining that a plaintiff may proceed into the litigation process only when his complaint is justified by both law and fact). "A claim has 'facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.'" Owens v. Baltimore City State's Attorneys Office, 767 F.3d 379, 388 (4th Cir. 2014).
DISCUSSION
Plaintiff filed this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which "'is not itself a source of substantive rights,' but merely provides 'a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.'" Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994) (quoting Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144 n.3 (1979)). A civil action under § 1983 "creates a private right of action to vindicate violations of 'rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws' of the United States." Rehberg v. Paulk, 566 U.S. 356, 361 (2012). To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential elements: (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under the color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).
Here, Plaintiff appears to assert a claim for violations of his Fourth Amendment rights. However, the Complaint is subject to summary dismissal because Plaintiff has failed to name a proper Defendant and he has failed to state a claim for relief under § 1983. Further, even if Plaintiff had named a proper party and alleged facts to support a Fourth Amendment claim, this action would still be subject to summary dismissal based on the Younger abstention doctrine.
Defendant is entitled to dismissal
As an initial matter, the Court notes that the State of South Carolina is entitled to summary dismissal from this action. First, South Carolina cannot be sued under § 1983 because it is not a person. Brooks v. S.C. Dep't of Corr., No. 6:18-cv-0632-MBS-KFM, 2018 WL 2470746, at *2 (D.S.C. Apr. 20, 2018), Report and Recommendation adopted by 2018 WL 2461897 (D.S.C. June 1, 2018); see also Harden v. Green, 27 F. App'x 173, 178 (4th Cir. 2001) (explaining a defendant in a § 1983 action must qualify as a "person"). It is well settled that the State of South Carolina is not considered a person subject to suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See, e.g., Cobb v. South Carolina, No. 2:13-cv-02370-RMG, 2014 WL 4220423, at *6 (D.S.C. Aug. 25, 2014); Ackbar v. South Carolina, No. 4:17-cv-1019-RMG-TER, 2017 WL 2348460, at *2 (D.S.C. May 17, 2017), Report and Recommendation adopted by 2017 WL 2364302 (D.S.C. May 30, 2017).
Further, the State of South Carolina has Eleventh Amendment immunity from a suit for damages brought in this Court. See Belcher v. S.C. Bd. of Corr., 460 F. Supp. 805, 808-09 (D.S.C. 1978). The Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution divests this Court of jurisdiction to entertain a suit for damages brought against the State of South Carolina or its integral parts. U.S. Const. amend. XI; see also Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999); Harter v. Vernon, 101 F.3d 334, 338-39 (4th Cir. 1996); Bellamy v. Borders, 727 F. Supp. 247, 248-50 (D.S.C.1989).
Under Pennhurst State School & Hospital v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 99 (1984), a state must expressly consent to suit in a federal district court. However, the State of South Carolina has not consented to suit in federal court. See S.C. Code § 15-78-20(e) (1976) (South Carolina statute expressly provides that the State of South Carolina does not waive Eleventh Amendment immunity, consents to suit only in a court of the State of South Carolina, and does not consent to suit in a federal court or in a court of another State); see also McCall v. Batson, 329 S.E.2d 741, 743 (1985) (abolishing sovereign immunity in tort "does not abolish the immunity which applies to all legislative, judicial and executive bodies and to public officials who are vested with discretionary authority, for actions taken in their official capacities"), superseded by statute, S.C. Code Ann. § 15-78-100(b), see Jeter v. S.C. Dep't of Transp., 369 S.C. 433 (S.C. Ct. App. 2006). Since the Eleventh Amendment bars the relief that Plaintiff requests against the State of South Carolina, the Complaint fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted against this Defendant and, as a result, it should be dismissed. See Alkebulanyahh v. S.C. Dep't of Corr., No. 6:10-cv-2976-MBS-KFM, 2010 WL 5625463, at *1-2 (D.S.C. Dec. 2, 2010), Report and Recommendation adopted by 2011 WL 202987 (D.S.C. Jan. 21, 2011).
Plaintiff's claims are subject to dismissal
Further, the Complaint as a whole is subject to summary dismissal as Plaintiff has failed to state a claim for relief that is plausible. As noted, Plaintiff alleges that he was subjected to an unreasonable search and seizure in violation of the Fourth Amendment. The Fourth Amendment guarantees, among other protections, "[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures." U.S. Const. amend. IV. Section 1983 provides a damages remedy for violations of the Fourth Amendment. See, e.g., Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 609 (1999) ("§ 1983 allow[s] a plaintiff to seek money damages from government officials who have violated his Fourth Amendment rights."). Although "[t]he Fourth Amendment prohibits law enforcement officers from making unreasonable seizures, and seizure of an individual effected without probable cause is unreasonable," Brooks v. City of Winston-Salem, N.C., 85 F.3d 178, 183 (4th Cir. 1996), Plaintiff has failed to allege facts to support a claim for relief as explained below.
To establish a Fourth Amendment claim, "Plaintiff must make a showing of a lack of probable cause for the issuance of the warrants for his arrest." Williams v. Sims, No. 3:10-cv-862-CMC, 2012 WL 4322085, at *4 (D.S.C. Sept. 20, 2012). To successfully challenge the probable cause statement in a warrant, the party challenging the warrant must "make a substantial preliminary showing that a false statement knowingly or intentionally, or with reckless disregard of the truth, was included by the affiant in the warrant affidavit," Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 156 (1978), or the party must show that the affiant omitted from the affidavit "material facts with the intent to make, or with reckless disregard of whether they thereby made, the affidavit misleading," Miller v. Prince George's County, Md., 475 F.3d 621, 627 (4th Cir. 2007) (citation and quotation marks omitted). "There must be allegations of deliberate falsehood or of reckless disregard for the truth." Franks, 438 U.S. at 171. "Reckless disregard" can be established by evidence that an officer acted "with a high degree of awareness of [a statement's] probable falsity," that is, "when viewing all the evidence, the affiant must have entertained serious doubts as to the truth of his statements or had obvious reasons to doubt the accuracy of the information he reported." Wilson v. Russo, 212 F.3d 781, 788 (3d Cir. 2000) (internal quotation marks omitted). Further, claims, such as the one asserted by Plaintiff here, are "properly 'founded on a Fourth Amendment seizure that incorporates elements of the analogous common law tort of malicious prosecution.'" Massey v. Ojaniit, 759 F.3d 343, 356 (4th Cir. 2014) (quoting Lambert v. Williams, 223 F.3d 257, 262 (4th Cir. 2000)). "To state such a Fourth Amendment claim, 'we have required that [1] the defendant have seized plaintiff pursuant to legal process that was not supported by probable cause and [2] that the criminal proceedings have terminated in plaintiff's favor.'" Id. (quoting Durham v. Horner, 690 F.3d 183, 188 (4th Cir. 2012)).
Here, other than his bald assertion that he was arrested based on a false warrant, Plaintiff has failed to allege facts showing that he was arrested without probable cause. Plaintiff appears to allege that he was arrested after a traffic stop based on the arresting officer's determination that Plaintiff had drugs and was possibly under the influence of drugs. Plaintiff does not allege that the officer did not find drugs or that the officer's arrest was improper for any reasons other than that the arrest was not related to the officer's reason for the initial stop. Simply put, Plaintiff has not alleged facts showing the arresting officer, who is not named as a defendant in this action, lacked probable cause to arrest him or to seek the issuance of the arrest warrants. Accordingly, Plaintiff has failed to state a claim for relief. Abstention under Younger
Additionally, Plaintiff's Fourth Amendment claim appears related to criminal charges pending against him in the Greenville County Court of General Sessions. Such claims are not properly before this Court based on the Younger abstention doctrine and are also subject to summary dismissal on that basis. See Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971). Granting Plaintiff's requested relief in this case would require this Court to interfere with or enjoin a pending state court criminal proceeding against Plaintiff. Because a federal court may not award relief that would affect pending state proceedings absent extraordinary circumstances, this Court should abstain from interfering with it.
In Younger, the Supreme Court held that a federal court should not equitably interfere with state criminal proceedings "except in the most narrow and extraordinary of circumstances." Gilliam v. Foster, 75 F.3d 881, 903 (4th Cir. 1996) (en banc) (internal quotation marks omitted). The Younger Court noted that courts of equity should not act unless the moving party has no adequate remedy at law and will suffer irreparable injury if denied equitable relief. Younger, 401 U.S. at 43-44; see also Sprint Commc'ns, Inc. v. Jacobs, 571 U.S. 69, 72-73 (2013) (explaining the circumstances when Younger abstention is appropriate).
From Younger and its progeny, the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has culled the following test to determine when abstention is appropriate: "[1] there are ongoing state judicial proceedings; [2] the proceedings implicate important state interests; and [3] there is an adequate opportunity to raise federal claims in the state proceedings." Martin Marietta Corp. v. Md. Comm'n on Human Relations, 38 F.3d 1392, 1396 (4th Cir. 1994) (citing Middlesex Cty. Ethics Comm'n v. Garden State Bar Ass'n, 457 U.S. 423, 432 (1982)). Here, Plaintiff is involved in ongoing state criminal proceedings related to the warrants at issue in this case, and Plaintiff asks this Court to award relief for alleged constitutional violations; thus, the first element is satisfied. The second element is satisfied for reasons the Supreme Court has explained: "[T]he States' interest in administering their criminal justice systems free from federal interference is one of the most powerful of the considerations that should influence a court considering equitable types of relief." Kelly v. Robinson, 479 U.S. 36, 49 (1986). The third element is also satisfied, as the Supreme Court has noted "that ordinarily a pending state prosecution provides the accused a fair and sufficient opportunity for vindication of federal constitutional rights." Gilliam, 75 F.3d at 903 (quoting Kugler v. Helfant, 421 U.S. 117, 124 (1975)).
A ruling in Plaintiff's favor in this case would call into question the validity of the state court criminal proceedings against him and would significantly interfere with those ongoing state proceedings. See Younger, 401 U.S. at 43-45; Cinema Blue of Charlotte, Inc. v. Gilchrist, 887 F.2d 49, 52 (4th Cir. 1989) ("[F]ederal courts should abstain from the decision of constitutional challenges to state action, however meritorious the complaint may be, 'whenever [the] federal claims have been or could be presented in ongoing state judicial proceedings that concern important state interests.'") (citation omitted); Washington v. Tilton, No. 2:10-cv-997-HFF-RSC, 2010 WL 2084383, at *1 (D.S.C. May 19, 2010). This Court finds that Plaintiff can raise his federal constitutional rights in the state court proceedings. Thus, this Court should abstain from hearing this action.
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION
In light of all the foregoing, it is recommended that the District Court DISMISS this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915 and § 1915A without leave to amend and without issuance and service of process.
The undersigned recommends dismissal without leave to amend because any attempt to cure the deficiencies in the Complaint would be futile for the reasons stated herein. See Goode v. Cent. Va. Legal Aid Soc'y, Inc., 807 F.3d 619, 624 (4th Cir. 2015).
IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.
s/ Jacquelyn D. Austin
United States Magistrate Judge February 4, 2020
Greenville, South Carolina