Summary
recognizing that the Confrontation Clause protects a criminal defendant's right to physically confront those who testify against him
Summary of this case from Cathey v. StateOpinion
NO. PD-0635-19
12-09-2020
James Ray HAGGARD, Appellant v. The STATE of Texas
OPINION
Hervey, J., delivered the opinion of the Court in which Keasler, Richardson, Newell, and Walker, JJ., joined.
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees a criminal defendant the right to confront adverse witnesses. The issue here is whether the Confrontation Clause was violated when the trial judge allowed Suzanne DeVore, a Sexual Assault Nurse Examiner (SANE), to testify against James Ray Haggard (Appellant) from Montana using a two-way video system.
Because we conclude that admitting DeVore's remote testimony violated the Confrontation Clause, we will reverse the judgment of the court of appeals holding otherwise and remand the cause to the court of appeals to conduct a new harm analysis.
FACTS
On October 5, 2013, the victim's mother, Traci, took her two children, M.W. and A.W., to Haggard's house to play with his stepson and daughter and spend the night, something that happened often. Traci was life-long friends with Haggard, and her daughters referred to him as "uncle." At the time of the alleged assault, M.W. (the victim) was fifteen years old and A.W. was ten years old. M.W. testified that there were only two bedrooms in the house and that A.W. slept in the living room with Haggard's daughter, that Haggard's stepson slept in the second bedroom, and that she slept in Haggard's room. M.W. told the DeVore that Haggard "pulled [her] back to his bedroom." But at trial, she said that she slept in Haggard's bed because she did not want to sleep on the floor and did not think that Haggard would do anything "perverted."
M.W. told DeVore in a dictated statement (which we reproduce here without alteration) that,
He's my uncle & I didn't think he'd do anything perverted. He told me to take my shirt off. I told him I felt uncomfortable. He wasn't forcing me but he took my bottoms off & started playing with my boobs with his fingers & started licking them. On my right boob, I have a hickey. He went down on me, his mouth inside & outside my vagina, & then started doing the ‘dirty deed’, his penis in my vagina. He heard someone walking down the hall & said, ‘Hurry up & put on your clothes’. He kept saying I better not tell because he'd lose his baby & if anyone found out he'd go to jail, & it would tear apart the whole family. "He said, ‘You'd better not tell your mom’. I had an hour of sleep. I woke up, called my mom, & told her to come get me. She asked if he tried to touch me & I said yes he did. My mom asked me because my sister who is 6 doesn't want to go over there anymore & my mom thinks my uncle's boy who is 10 touched her."
Later in the report, DeVore noted that M.W. also told her that "[h]e cleaned himself off with my shirt."
M.W. told DeVore that, shortly after they got in bed, Haggard asked her to take off her clothes, which she did, then he sexually assaulted her. M.W. said that Haggard digitally manipulated her breasts and put his mouth on them, that he put his mouth on her sexual organ, and that he penetrated her vagina with his penis. The assault ended, M.W. told DeVore, when Haggard told her to get dressed and leave because he thought he heard someone walking down the hallway towards his room. M.W. also told DeVore that Haggard "cleaned himself off with my shirt." M.W. testified that, after she left Haggard's room, she made Haggard's stepson sleep in the living room with the girls and that she slept in the second bedroom bed by herself. She also testified that, after the assault, she texted her friend Brittany and called her friend Austin.
M.W. later testified that Haggard showed her pornography before he asked her to take off her clothes. She did not mention that to DeVore.
M.W. was wearing black shorts, a gray shirt, and two bras—a "regular bra" and a sports bra. She told DeVore that she was wearing two bras because she had been playing softball that day.
M.W. waited until the following morning to call her mother to pick her and her sister up. When she called, she was crying and upset, but did not tell Traci what happened. Traci testified that M.W. sounded distressed. M.W. called Traci multiple times, asking her to "hurry up," so Traci called Linda Brackin-Barton (Barton), M.W.’s aunt, to pick the kids up since she lived closer to Haggard. When Barton and the kids returned to Traci's house, Barton said that M.W. told her and Traci what happened. Barton said that M.W. went through the story several times with her and Traci and that "[M.W.] was just talking. She seemed to want to talk about what had happened and I think we were just kind of letting her talk...." M.W. testified that Traci was in the room the entire time, but she also said that she never told her mother the complete story. At trial, Traci testified that she was only in and out of the room and only heard "bits and pieces."
Barton testified that Traci asked her to pick up the children because Traci was too upset.
No one called the police, but Traci put M.W.’s clothes in a Ziploc bag because she saw "stuff on them." Later that day, Traci took M.W. to a friend's birthday party. The next day, Traci went to work and sent M.W. to school even though she did not want to go. M.W. testified that she was going to call her father and ask him to pick her up from school because she did not feel well, but Barton unexpectedly showed up and took her to the hospital for a SANE examination. Barton testified that she read that victims of sexual assaults should be physically examined. Barton said that she called Traci on the way to the school and that Traci did not go to the hospital until later in the day because she was at work.
DeVore performed the SANE examination and wrote down M.W.’s account of what happened. According to DeVore's notes, M.W. was calm and cooperative and made good eye-contact. M.W. told DeVore that Haggard penetrated her vagina, but not her mouth or anus. She also said that she was not sure if Haggard ejaculated on her. DeVore physically examined M.W. and found no trauma to M.W.’s labia majora, labia minora, hymen, vagina, cervix, perineum, or anus. She did, however, find a red and blue bruise approximately 1.5 centimeters by 1 centimeter on M.W.’s right breast.
See supra , note 1.
Later that evening, M.W. was examined by a forensic examiner at Bridgehaven Child's Advocacy Center. M.W. told the examiner that Haggard asked her to play with his penis before they had sex and that, after a while, "semen went everywhere." She also said that she "felt wetness on my hand and on my face. So, I wiped it off with my shirt." Sergeant Stephen Clappart, who was present for the interview, noted that M.W. was "jovial" when he spoke to her. He also noted that M.W. gave the examiner a slightly different account of events.
Jessica Lake, a serologist at the Department of Public Safety crime laboratory in Houston, examined the contents of the SANE kit. The kit contained vaginal swabs, labia majora swabs, labia minor swabs, anal swabs, swabs taken from M.W.’s breasts, headhair combings, a pair of underwear, a bra, a sports bra, and a shirt. Lake did not find the semen on the vaginal swabs, labia swabs, or anal swabs. Lake found areas of interest on the underwear and shirt to test, but both tests were negative for the presence of semen. Andrea Smith, Lake's supervisor, was DNA forensic examiner. She issued her first report in September 2014. Smith found a single DNA profile consistent with M.W. on the vaginal, labia majora, labia minor, and anal swabs. Testing of the left-breast swabs was inconclusive, but a partial DNA profile was extracted from the right-breast swabs using a MiniFiler™ amplification kit. The partial profile was consistent with a two-person mixture, from which neither M.W. nor Haggard could be excluded as contributors. Smith said that the probability of selecting an unrelated person at random who could have contributed to the partial profile was 1 in 6 for Caucasians, 1 in 5 for Blacks, and 1 in 4 for Hispanics. The approximate world population at the time of testing was 7 billion people.
When genetic samples are degraded or low-level, scientists sometimes use a MiniFiler™ chemistry kit to amplify the genetic material, which might yield a partial DNA profile where traditional methods fail.
In 2017, Smith reinterpreted the DNA data using new testing guidelines and software. Her results were significantly more inculpatory. She found that it was 339 billion times more likely that M.W. and Haggard contributed to the mixed DNA on the right-breast swab than M.W. and some other unknown and unrelated individual. Smith was able to develop a partial DNA profile consistent with a two-person mixture from the left-breast swab data, but testing was inconclusive as to whether Haggard was a contributor. Smith was also able to develop a partial DNA profile from the right-breast swab data (without using a MiniFiler™ kit), which she was previously unable to do, and concluded that it is 219 quadrillion times more likely that M.W. and Haggard contributed to the mixture than M.W. and some other unrelated and unknown individual.
In the past, DPS technicians issued a single report even when different chemistry kits were used (e.g., a traditional kit and a MiniFiler™ kit) so long as both kits were used to analyze the same area of interest (e.g., a stain on a shirt). The updated guidelines require technicians to issue a separate report for each kit used.
Before DPS began using the new software, the results of DNA analyses were expressed in the form of a "combined probability of inclusion" statistic (e.g., 1 in 4 Caucasians). The new software, however, issues results in terms of the "likelihood ratio" (LR) that a particular person contributed to a particular DNA mixture.
One reason for the starkly different results is that the MiniFiler™ kit relies on only nine loci to develop a DNA profile, but a traditional chemistry kit relies on 16 loci, which is almost 60% more genetic information.
CONFRONTATION CLAUSE
a. Background
By the time of trial, DeVore had moved to Montana, but she told the State that she would voluntarily travel to Texas to appear in court and testify. The State agreed to reimburse her expenses, but did not subpoena her. The Friday afternoon before trial began, however, DeVore notified prosecutors that she would not voluntarily appear and testify.
The following Monday, the State asked the trial court to allow DeVore to testify from Montana via FaceTime. According to the State, DeVore's testimony was essential because only she could prove-up the chain of custody of the SANE kit and its contents. If she did not testify, the State alleged, the DNA reports would be inadmissible. The trial court granted the State's motion, and DeVore testified the next day after the court overruled another defense objection. DeVore testified that even though she initially agreed to appear in court and that reimbursement of her expenses would be sufficient for her to voluntarily appear and testify, she changed her mind at the last minute for economic and personal reasons. She said that, although the State would reimburse her expenses, it was not going to pay her to testify and neither would her employer. (DeVore testified that she was a self-employed consultant.) DeVore, however, never said that she was incapable of traveling to Texas due to financial constraints, or even if she could, traveling to Texas would cause an undue financial burden. DeVore testified that it was inconvenient timing for her because she flew to Houston the week before to testify at a different trial, and she had to fly to Houston again the weekend after the instant trial to be with an ill family member.
The State brought up that it did not subpoena DeVore and that DeVore's husband was a lawyer and told her that she did not have to voluntarily appear and testify unless she was subpoenaed. But the State focused on how it had insufficient time to subpoena DeVore due to her late notification, even though it had ample time to subpoena her before trial but never did. We also note that the State never sought a continuance before asking the trial court to allow DeVore to testify remotely.
b. Applicable Law
The Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause provides that "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right ... to be confronted with the witnesses against him[.]" U.S. CONST. amend. VI. The Supreme Court long held that the Confrontation Clause protected a criminal defendant's right to physically confront those who testify against him. Coy v. Iowa , 487 U.S. 1012, 1017, 108 S.Ct. 2798, 101 L.Ed.2d 857 (1988) (quoting Pennsylvania v. Ritchie , 480 U.S. 39, 51, 107 S.Ct. 989, 94 L.Ed.2d 40 (1987) (plurality op.)).
For example, in Coy , the issue was whether allowing two child victims of sexual abuse to testify with a screen placed between the victims and Coy violated the Confrontation Clause. Id. at 1014, 108 S.Ct. 2798. The victims could not see Coy, but he could hear them and see their faint outlines. Id. at 1014–15, 108 S.Ct. 2798. The State argued that "the confrontation interest at stake ... was outweighed by the necessity of protecting victims of sexual abuse," but the Supreme Court held that the arrangement violated the Confrontation Clause. Id. at 1020, 108 S.Ct. 2798. The majority agreed that physical, face-to-face confrontation might be properly dispensed with if doing so furthered an important public policy. Id. But it explained that it did not need to decide the issue because, even if such an exception existed, there were no individualized findings that the witnesses "needed special protection...." Id. at 1021, 108 S.Ct. 2798. Two years later, the Supreme Court was squarely presented with the exception question.
An Iowa statute provided for child-witness testimony via closed-circuit television or behind a screen. That statute read in relevant part,
The court may require a party be confined to an adjacent room or behind a screen or mirror that permits the party to see and hear the child during the child's testimony, but does not allow the child to see or hear the party. However, if a party is so confined, the court shall take measures to insure (sic) that the party and counsel can confer during the testimony and shall inform the child that the party can see and hear the child during testimony.
Iowa Code § 910A.14 (1987).
In Maryland v. Craig , 497 U.S. 836, 110 S.Ct. 3157, 111 L.Ed.2d 666 (1990), the trial court allowed a child victim of sexual abuse to testify via a one-way, closed-circuit television system pursuant to a Maryland statute. Unlike the Iowa statute in Coy , the Maryland statute required the trial court to make a finding that the " ‘testimony by the child victim in the courtroom will result in the child suffering serious emotional distress such that the child cannot reasonably communicate.’ " Id. at 840 n.1, 110 S.Ct. 3157. The Supreme Court held that face-to-face confrontation was properly dispensed with because (1) it was to further the "important public policy" of protecting the "physical and psychological well-being of child abuse victims," which outweighed Craig's right to face his accuser in court, and (2) "the reliability of the testimony [was] otherwise assured" because the child victim testified under oath, was fully cross-examined, and the judge, jury, and Craig could see the victim while she testified. Id. at 850, 110 S.Ct. 3157.
Craig , however, was not without limits. The court emphasized that a trial court must make a "finding of necessity" that is "case-specific" and that the trial court must hear evidence,
[I]f the State makes an adequate showing of necessity, the state interest in protecting child witnesses from the trauma of testifying in a child abuse case is sufficiently important to justify the use of a special procedure that permits a child witness in such cases to testify at trial against a defendant in the absence of face-to-face confrontation with the defendant.
The requisite finding of necessity must of course be a case-specific one: The trial court must hear evidence and determine whether use of the one-way closed circuit television procedure is necessary to protect the welfare of the particular child witness who seeks to testify.
Id. at 855, 110 S.Ct. 3157. In recognizing the need for a necessity finding, as the above quote shows, the Court acknowledged that the physical and psychological well-being of the child might not always be sufficient to outweigh a defendant's right to physical, face-to-face confrontation. Id. at 852, 110 S.Ct. 3157.
Since Craig was decided, this Court has required a necessity finding in every case in which we have considered a Confrontation Clause challenge to the cross-examination of a witness via two-way video system. Marx v. State , 987 S.W.2d 577, 580–81 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999) (applying Craig to the use of a two-way video system and requiring a necessity finding); Gonzales v. State , 818 S.W.2d 756, 764 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991) (same). And we are not alone in doing so. Many federal circuit courts of appeals and state supreme courts have reached the same conclusion. See, e.g. , United States v. Cotto-Flores , 970 F.3d 17, 25 (1st Cir. 2020) (applying Craig to two-way video and requiring a necessity finding); United States v. Carter , 907 F.3d 1199, 1206 (9th Cir. 2018) (same); United States v. Abu Ali , 528 F.3d 210, 240 (4th Cir. 2008) (same); United States v. Yates , 438 F.3d 1307, 1313 (11th Cir. 2006) (same); United States v. Bordeaux , 400 F.3d 548, 554 (8th Cir. 2005) (same); Lipsitz v. State , 135 Nev. 131, 442 P.3d 138, 140 (2019) (same); State v. Thomas , 2016-NMSC-024, ¶ 28, 376 P.3d 184, 194 (same); State v. Rogerson , 855 N.W.2d 495, 504 (Iowa 2014) (same); State v. Stock , 2011 MT 131, ¶¶ 25, 30, 361 Mont. 1, 256 P.3d 899, 904 (same); Bush v. State , 2008 WY 108, ¶ 52, 193 P.3d 203, 215 (same); Harrell v. State , 709 So. 2d 1364, 1369 (Fla. 1998) (same).
In an unpublished opinion, the Eleventh Circuit held that it was a reasonable application of federal law to not apply Craig to two-way video. Fuster-Escalona v. Fla. Dep't of Corr. , 170 F. App'x 627, 629–30 (11th Cir. 2006). Even if we were to regard this unpublished opinion as authority, however, it is clearly an outlier. Later that same year, the Eleventh Circuit applied Craig in a published opinion. Yates , 438 F.3d at 1313. And while we acknowledge that the Second Circuit Court of Appeals uses different language, it still requires a necessity finding albeit one that demonstrates "exceptional circumstances." United States v. Gigante , 166 F.3d 75, 81 (2d Cir. 1999).
Forced to concede that this Court has applied the Craig test to two-way video, the dissent contends that those cases are outdated and that we should "focus on the realities of the world we live in today...." Dissenting Op. at 337 n.11. Given that Gonzales , Marx , and this case all utilize live two-way video, apparently, the dissent means that the reality of the world we live in today is that there are more televisions and their screens are bigger. Id. at 336 (stating that the witness's image was projected onto video screens at both counsel's tables, on the judge's video screen, and on a 60-inch television for the jury); see id. at 335 (stating that Haggard "made no objections to the positioning of the camera or to the number and size of screens utilized."). We are not aware of a reported decision, and the dissent does not cite one, in which the number of televisions projecting the witness's visage or the size of the televisions control a Confrontation Clause inquiry. Writing about two-way video and the Confrontation Clause, however, we note that Justice Scalia said,
I cannot comprehend how one-way transmission (which Craig says does not ordinarily satisfy confrontation requirements) becomes transformed into full-fledged confrontation when reciprocal transmission is added. As we made clear in Craig , ... a purpose of the Confrontation Clause is ordinarily to compel accusers to make their accusations in the defendant's presence —which is not equivalent to making them in a room that contains a television set beaming electrons that portray the defendant's image. Virtual confrontation might be sufficient to protect virtual constitutional rights; I doubt whether it is sufficient to protect real ones.
Order of the Supreme Court, 207 F.R.D. 89, 91 (2002) (statement of Scalia, J.) (emphasis added).
Later, the Supreme Court decided Crawford v. Washington , 541 U.S. 36, 61–65, 124 S.Ct. 1354, 158 L.Ed.2d 177 (2004), in which it abandoned its previous reliability-based approach (the second prong of the Craig test) and "adopted a fundamentally new interpretation of the confrontation right...." It said that the Confrontation Clause is "a procedural rather than a substantive guarantee [that] commands, not that evidence be reliable, but that reliability be assessed in a particular manner: by testing in the crucible of cross-examination." Id. at 61, 124 S.Ct. 1354. Although Crawford was about the admission of out-of-court statements, not the dispensation of face-to-face confrontation, some have argued that Crawford implicitly overruled Craig , or at least the reliability prong. See Coronado v. State , 351 S.W.3d 315, 321 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011) (discussing how post- Crawford cases have changed the Confrontation Clause landscape).
See, e.g. , Horn v. Quarterman , 508 F.3d 306, 318–19 (5th Cir. 2007) ; State v. Arroyo , 284 Conn. 597, 935 A.2d 975, 992 n. 18 (2007) ; State v. Henriod , 2006 UT 11, ¶ 17, 131 P.3d 232, 237–38 ; Stock , 256 P.3d at 904 (stating that no court has "concluded Crawford overruled Craig ."); Roadcap v. Commonwealth , 50 Va.App. 732, 653 S.E.2d 620, 625 (2007) ("As nearly all courts and commentators have agreed, Crawford did not overrule Craig .").
c. Analysis
There is no doubt that the role of reliability in a Confrontation Clause analysis has been called into question. But we need not resolve that issue here because our holding is not based on the reliability of DeVore's testimony, but rather whether allowing her to testify remotely "furthered an important public policy." We conclude that it did not.
See Gonzales , 818 S.W.2d at 764 (requiring a necessity finding before authorizing the dispensation of physical, face-to-face confrontation in favor of a two-way video system).
First, however, we must address the lack of a case-specific finding and the requirement that the court hear evidence. There was a discussion between the judge and attorneys and arguments were made, but the judge heard no evidence and made no case-specific finding. The closest thing to a necessity finding in the record is when the judge suggested that DeVore should be allowed to testify because the State did not have time to subpoena her given her late notice. The judge told defense counsel that Craig was inapplicable and that it was allowing DeVore to testify remotely because she was only testifying as an expert and because the procedures ensured the reliability of her testimony. But the fact that DeVore was testifying "only" as an expert does not demonstrate a necessity for the State to procure her testimony remotely. Further, we do not think it is an important public policy to allow the State to procure a witness's testimony remotely when the State had sufficient time and ability to subpoena the witness, and the witness was available to appear and testify, but the State chose not to. Not only is that scenario far afield from Craig , such an exception could be easily abused. Craig , 497 U.S. at 852–53, 855–58, 110 S.Ct. 3157.
The dissent appears to argue that virtual confrontation is superior to physical confrontation. Dissenting Op. at 337 ("[I]t is hard to argue against the fact that current technology allows for the opportunity to see and hear a witness better through two-way video than if that witness was testifying in the courtroom.") (emphasis added). But the facts of this case belie the dissent's assertion. There were numerous technical issues with DeVore's testimony. At one point, DeVore could not hear questioning from the prosecutor, and a short time later the signal was interrupted and no one in the courtroom could see DeVore. Later, defense counsel objected and reminded the trial judge that the judge said he would revisit his ruling if there were any "hiccups." The trial court overruled that objection. There were more problems later, but the trial court never revisited its ruling.
We also note that the dissent appears to take contrary positions. On the one hand, it seems to claim that two-video is better than physical confrontation, but on the other hand, the author also says that she and defendants should prefer physical confrontation. Id. at 336–37. Why a defendant would prefer a physical confrontation when two-way video is supposedly better is not clear.
Neither the judge nor the State cited any authority for the proposition, but our research has revealed one case, Kansas City v. McCoy , 525 S.W.2d 336 (Mo. 1975), in which a court held that allowing an expert witness to testify via closed-circuit television did not violate the Confrontation Clause. Id. at 339. But the court emphasized that the case was about a municipal-ordinance violation, which was civil in nature, and that the procedures ensured the reliability of the testimony. This case is distinguishable because it involves a felony, not a municipal-ordinance violation, and it was decided before Craig , so the Court did not have the opportunity to address the necessity-finding requirement.
We understand that parties sometimes do not subpoena "friendly" witnesses as a courtesy, but that practice comes with drawbacks, as this case illustrates. The dissent would adopt the extraordinary rule that, if a defendant wants to confront adverse witnesses in person, he must subpoena all of the State's witnesses. We are unaware of any courts in this jurisdiction or any other that follows such a rule, and we observe that the dissent cites no authority to support its proposition.
The next question is whether the reasons given by DeVore were sufficient to dispense with physical, face-to-face confrontation. We conclude that they are not. Traveling to appear in court and testify can be frustrating and difficult for various reasons: finances, hectic schedules, health issues, sheer distance, etc. But the right to physical, face-to-face confrontation lies at the core of the Confrontation Clause, and it cannot be so readily dispensed with based on the mere inconvenience to a witness.
The State cites numerous cases that it argues justify allowing DeVore to testify remotely, but those cases deal with child victims and child witnesses, witnesses who are too sick to travel and appear in court, witnesses who are overseas on active duty, or witnesses who are outside the subpoena power of the State.
See, e.g. , Marx , 987 S.W.2d at 577 (upholding trial court's ruling permitting a child sexual-assault victim and child witness to testify via a two-way video system because doing so furthered the important public policy of protecting children who testify in sexual-abuse cases from significant emotional trauma caused by the defendant's presence); Gonzales , 818 S.W.2d at 756 (permitting a 10-year-old murder witness to testify via a two-way closed-circuit system); Bush , 193 P.3d at 203 (permitting a witness who was hospitalized with congestive heart failure one week before trial to testify remotely from Colorado); Harrell , 709 So. 2d at 1364 (permitting two adult victims from Argentina to testify remotely using a two-way video system because they lived in Argentina, beyond the subpoena power of the Court, and because the husband had health problems that prevented him from traveling to the United States); Stevens v. State , 234 S.W.3d 748, 781 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Aug. 23, 2007, no pet.) (permitting a 75-year-old witness who had been hospitalized several times for "decompensated congestive heart failure, gastrointestinal bleeding, atrial fibrillation, and vascular disease" in the year before the trial to testify remotely from Colorado); Rivera v. State , 381 S.W.3d 710, 711 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2012, pet. ref'd) (permitting crime-scene investigator to testify remotely because he was on active duty in Iraq at the time of trial); Lara v. State , No. 05-17-00467-CR, 2018 WL 3434547, at *4 (Tex. App.—Dallas July 17, 2018, pet. ref'd) (mem. op, not designated for publication) (permitting a witness to testify remotely because he had a heart attack the night before trial and was in the hospital).
HARM
Having decided that the trial court committed constitutional error when it allowed DeVore to testify remotely, the next question is whether the court of appeals properly addressed harm and whether it was correct that any error was harmless.
a. The Law
A denial of physical, face-to-face confrontation is reviewed for harmless error. Coy , 487 U.S. at 1021, 108 S.Ct. 2798 ; see Chapman v. California , 386 U.S. 18, 23, 87 S.Ct. 824, 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967). Constitutional error is harmful unless a reviewing court determines beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did not contribute to the conviction. TEX. R. APP. P. 44.2(a). The State has the burden, as beneficiary of the error, to prove that the error is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. See Deck v. Missouri , 544 U.S. 622, 635, 125 S.Ct. 2007, 161 L.Ed.2d 953 (2005) (quoting Chapman , 386 U.S. at 24, 87 S.Ct. 824 ); Wall v. State , 184 S.W.3d 730, 746 n.53 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). In the context of the denial of physical confrontation, the harm analysis "cannot include consideration of whether the witness’ testimony would have been unchanged, or the jury's assessment unaltered, had there been confrontation" because "such an inquiry would obviously involve pure speculation." Coy , 487 U.S. at 1021–22, 108 S.Ct. 2798. Instead, harm must be determined based on "the remaining evidence." b. Analysis
While a reviewing court cannot speculate as to what would have happened had there been a face-to-face confrontation, it should examine the testimony that the witness actually gave when determining whether there is a reasonable likelihood that the error affected the judgment of the jury.
According to the court of appeals, the Van Arsdall harmless-error test applies. Haggard , 2019 WL 2273869, at *7 (citing Shelby v. State , 819 S.W.2d 544, 546 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991) (relying on Delaware v. Van Arsdall , 475 U.S. 673, 684, 106 S.Ct. 1431, 89 L.Ed.2d 674 (1986) )). In Van Arsdall , the Supreme Court held that improper limitations on cross-examination that violate the Confrontation Clause are reviewed for constitutional harm and that the analysis begins with the presumption that the damaging potential of the cross-examination was fully realized. The Court then listed several factors to consider,
[ (1) ] importance of the witness’ testimony in the prosecution's case, [ (2) ] whether the testimony was cumulative, [ (3) ] the presence or absence of evidence corroborating or contradicting the testimony of the witness on material points, [ (4) ] the extent of cross-examination otherwise permitted, and, of course, [ (5) ] the overall strength of the prosecution's case.
Van Arsdall , 475 U.S. at 684, 106 S.Ct. 1431.
The Van Arsdall presumption is inappropriate here where cross-examination is not at issue. But we think the factors set out by the Supreme Court are helpful in determining harm (except for the fourth one asking to what extent cross-examination was otherwise permitted). Ultimately, however, any circumstance apparent in the record that logically informs the harm issue should be considered. Snowden v. State , 353 S.W.3d 815, 822 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011).
Some courts seem to have taken the Court's citation to Van Arsdall in Coy to mean that Van Arsdall controls the harm analysis for the denial of face-to-face confrontation. That is not how we read Coy . We understand the Court to have cited Van Arsdall to show that the denial of face-to-face confrontation, like impermissible limits on cross-examination, is susceptible to a harmless-error analysis. In other words, neither the denial of cross-examination nor the denial of face-to-face confrontation under the Confrontation Clause are structural errors.
Haggard argues that the court of appeals also erred because it undertook a legal-sufficiency analysis, not a denial-of-face-to-face-confrontation harm analysis. Haggard , 2019 WL 2273869, at *7. In particular, he points to the court of appeals's comment that the inculpatory evidence minus DeVore's testimony was "overwhelming."
It is true that we have used the word "overwhelming" when referring to the sufficiency of the evidence, but also when determining whether a defendant was harmed by a constitutional violation. When we use "overwhelming" in a legal-sufficiency analysis, we mean that the issue is not a close call, i.e., the record evidence is more than sufficient for a rational jury to reasonably find each essential element of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. But when we use the word "overwhelming" in a constitutional harmless-error analysis, we are referring to the diminished probability that a constitutional error materially affected the deliberations of the jury. "Overwhelming" evidence of guilt will always be legally sufficient to support a conviction, but constitutional error could be harmful even though the evidence of guilt is "overwhelming." The distinction is important.
There is another issue that the court of appeals should have addressed in its analysis but did not: whether evidence admitted through the complained-of witness must also be excluded from the analysis? The issue is important here because, without DeVore to prove-up the chain of custody of the SANE kit and its contents, the highly incriminating DNA evidence would have been inadmissible. We think it must be excluded under Coy . If it is improper to speculate about how a witness might have testified had there been physical, face-to-face confrontation, it is also improper to speculate about whether evidence admitted through the witness would have been admitted at a hypothetical trial at which the witness did not testify. Engaging in such speculation could lead to the exact problems that the Supreme Court sought to avoid in Coy .
Haggard made this argument to the court of appeals, but it appears to have overlooked it.
For instance, even if we speculate that the State might have known another possible way to get the SANE kit, its contents, and the DNA evidence admitted, that changes the analysis from analyzing harm in the trial that actually happened to assessing harm at a theoretical trial. We would also have to speculate about whether the witness would have given the necessary testimony to admit the evidence—often an attorney believes that a witness will say one thing, but he says another—and whether the judge would have made the proper ruling at the hypothetical trial.
We note that the prosecutor told the judge that the only way he knew to get the SANE kit and its contents admitted was through DeVore's testimony.
CONCLUSION
Having clarified the harm analysis for the denial of face-to-face confrontation, we reverse the judgment of the court of appeals and remand the cause to that court to reassess whether Haggard was harmed.
Yeary, J., filed a concurring opinion.
Slaughter, J., filed a dissenting opinion.
Keller, P.J., and Keel, J., concurred.
CONCURRING OPINION
Yeary, J., filed a concurring opinion.
We have observed many times that this Court's discretionary review capacity is typically limited to reviewing "decisions" of the courts of appeals, subject to very limited exceptions. E.g. , Davison v. State , 405 S.W.3d 682, 691 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013). In the instant case, the court of appeals "assumed without deciding" that the Confrontation Clause was violated in this case, without engaging in any analysis of that question. Haggard v. State , Nos. 09-17-00319-DR & 09-17-00320-CR, 2019 WL 2273869, at *7 (Tex. App.—Beaumont May 29, 2019) (mem. op., not designated for publication). It then determined that any error that may have occurred was harmless. Id. It rendered no "decision" at all regarding whether the Confrontation Clause was violated.
The Court today reaches and extensively discusses the merits of the Confrontation Clause issue, although the court of appeals never decided that question. (That may explain why the Court's opinion does not even mention the court of appeals’ opinion until it comes to address that court's harm analysis; and why the Court never seems to articulate a definite holding with respect to Confrontation Clause error.) The Court never explains why it is appropriate to do so. And I do not agree that the Court's opinion should address the merits of whether Confrontation Clause error occurred.
I concur in the Court's judgment to send the case back for further proceedings with respect to the court of appeals’ harm analysis. Should the court of appeals determine on remand that error, if any, was not harmless after all, it will be obliged to address the merits of the Confrontation Clause issue at that time. We can then review that determination, if that seems appropriate, in due course. Having said that, I am compelled to make one observation about the Court's competing opinions in this case touching on whether Confrontation Clause error occurred, superfluous though I regard my observation to be. The dissenting opinion takes the position that two-way video testimony is in all things consistent with core Confrontation Clause principles requiring the appearance of the accuser face-to-face; that literal, physical presence in the courtroom is not an indispensable feature of true confrontation. See Dissenting Opinion, at 336 ("Two-way video allows this face-to-face meeting and, with today's technology, usually allows each party to see and hear the other better than if they were across the courtroom from each other."). But I agree with the Court that binding United States Supreme Court precedent seems squarely to the contrary. Majority Opinion at 323–25 & 325–26.
I would only add to this debate that the founders of our country could not have thought that some then-undreamed-of technological advancement, such as testimony by two-way video, could take the place of literal face-to-face confrontation, no matter how faithfully it might mimic the perceived truth-finding advantages of physical presence in the courtroom. Such technology did not exist when the Sixth Amendment was adopted, and thus it could not have resided within the people's common understanding of the language: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right ... to be confronted with the witnesses against him." U.S. CONST. , amend. VI. Literal, physical, face-to-face confrontation, live in the courtroom, is the procedure the Sixth Amendment mandates—not some other procedure that might be thought by us today to secure the objectives of confrontation at least as efficaciously, if not more so. See Crawford v. Washington , 541 U.S. 36, 61, 124 S.Ct. 1354, 158 L.Ed.2d 177 (2004) ("To be sure, the [Confrontation] Clause's ultimate goal is to ensure reliability of evidence, but it is a procedural rather than a substantive guarantee. It commands, not that evidence be reliable, but that reliability be assessed in a particular manner[.] * * * The Clause thus reflects a judgment ... about how reliability can best be determined."). We are not at liberty to accept some alternative procedure just because, in our belated judgment, we think it might work as well as, or better than, the constitutionally required one.
Judge Yeary's concurring opinion correctly notes that the court of appeals conducted no error analysis in this case. Instead, it simply assumed without deciding that the Confrontation Clause was violated and proceeded with a harm analysis. Thus, this Court should not conduct an error analysis on the Confrontation Clause issue and should address only the court of appeals’ harm analysis. But because the Court nevertheless chooses to address the Confrontation Clause issue, and because I disagree with the Court's analysis, I feel compelled to write this opinion.
Slaughter, J., filed a dissenting opinion.
The Confrontation Clause of the United States Constitution's Sixth Amendment "comes to us on faded parchment. History seems to give us very little insight into [its] intended scope." California v. Green , 399 U.S. 149, 173–74, 90 S.Ct. 1930, 26 L.Ed.2d 489 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring). The United States Supreme Court, likewise, gives us little clarity. Instead, over the years, the Supreme Court has given us inconsistent (and several plurality) decisions leaving the scope and application of the Confrontation Clause in flux. See, e.g., Ramos v. Louisiana , ––– U.S. ––––, 140 S. Ct. 1390, 1406, 206 L.Ed.2d 583 (2020) (noting that " Crawford v. Washington [, 541 U.S. 36, 124 S.Ct. 1354, 158 L.Ed.2d 177 (2004) ] overturned prior interpretations of the Confrontation Clause"); Johnson v. United States , 576 U.S. 591, 628, 135 S.Ct. 2551, 192 L.Ed.2d 569 (2015) (Alito, J., dissenting) ("[W]e have been unable to come to an agreement on many recurring legal questions. The Confrontation Clause is one example that comes readily to mind."); Ohio v. Clark , 576 U.S. 237, 252, 135 S.Ct. 2173, 192 L.Ed.2d 306 (2015) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (calling the Crawford decision "a categorical overruling, the thorough repudiation, of an earlier line of cases," while the majority suggested that the pre- Crawford approach to the Confrontation Clause may still be available).
The Court's opinion acknowledges that the Supreme Court's 2004 decision in Crawford adopted a new approach to confrontation issues that likely changes how we should analyze questions relating to video testimony. Maj. Op. at 325–26. Yet, without conducting much analysis regarding the correct approach after Crawford and in light of the Confrontation Clause's objectives, the Court concludes that we must still apply the pre- Crawford approach used for remote testimony that asks us, in part, to determine whether such testimony "further[s] an important public policy" and also requires a case-specific finding of necessity based on evidence. Id. The Court bases these requirements on the Supreme Court's prior decisions in Maryland v. Craig , 497 U.S. 836, 110 S.Ct. 3157, 111 L.Ed.2d 666 (1990) (addressing confrontation issue involving one-way video testimony), and Coy v. Iowa , 487 U.S. 1012, 108 S.Ct. 2798, 101 L.Ed.2d 857 (1988) (addressing confrontation issue involving use of screen between defendant and witness at trial). Neither of these cases, however, involved live, two-way video testimony, as is the case here. These cases also do not take into account the advances in modern technology that have vastly improved the quality of video conferencing technology over the past thirty years. In any event, after Crawford , we do not know whether either Craig or Coy are still valid precedents. If they are, we do not know how they would apply to the factually distinct scenario of live, two-way video testimony.
Marc C. McAllister, Two-Way Video Trial Testimony and The Confrontation Clause: Fashioning a Better Craig Test in Light of Crawford, 34 Fla. St. L. Rev. 835, 835 (2007) (noting, after Crawford , that "[t]he use of videoconference technology to capture the testimony of remote trial witnesses raises complex legal issues for which the United States Supreme Court has provided little guidance.... Whether and under what circumstances two-way video transmission of remote witness testimony violates the Sixth Amendment's guarantee of confrontation are issues in need of clearer guidelines."); see also id. at 868 (opining that the analysis in Crawford "suggests that an overwhelming majority of the current Supreme Court Justices would find the Craig test constitutionally suspect, in that it ratifies testimonial statements under a ... subjective determination of reliability without necessarily requiring an opportunity for cross-examination").
Craig emphasized that the right to literal face-to-face confrontation might give way to important policy considerations in some situations, so long as the reliability of the testimony was otherwise assured. Crawford , however, adopted a view of the Confrontation Clause that suggested such subjective considerations were improper; rather, the proper inquiry was based on the firm requirement of an opportunity to cross-examine the witness (and, in the case of out-of-court testimonial statements, the witness must be unavailable to testify). Compare Craig, 497 U.S. at 844, 850, 110 S.Ct. 3157 (stating that the Supreme Court has "never held ... that the Confrontation Clause guarantees criminal defendants the absolute right to a face-to-face meeting with witnesses against them at trial," and permitting one-way video testimony where "necessary to further an important public policy and only where the reliability of the testimony is otherwise assured"), with Crawford, 541 U.S. at 53–54, 124 S.Ct. 1354 (stating in context of admissibility of out-of-court statements, "the Framers would not have allowed admission of testimonial statements of a witness who did not appear at trial unless he was unavailable to testify, and the defendant had had a prior opportunity for cross-examination. The text of the Sixth Amendment does not suggest any open-ended exceptions from the confrontation requirement to be developed by the courts.").
Given the inherent tension between Craig ’s policy/reliability-based approach and Crawford ’s more rigid interpretation of the Sixth Amendment that focuses on the right of cross-examination, lower courts have adopted a variety of tests for determining whether remote witness testimony via two-way video is allowed. Whether a necessity finding is required is likewise up in the air. Absent express guidance from the Supreme Court on the proper test governing two-way video testimony, courts should answer this question by looking to the underlying purposes served by the Confrontation Clause, rather than reflexively applying precedent that addresses factually distinct scenarios. In my view, when all the Confrontation Clause components are satisfied through a two-way video procedure that adequately serves the purposes for which the Clause was adopted, then there is no constitutional violation. When there is no violation, a necessity finding seems quite ... unnecessary.
See, e.g., United States v. Abu Ali , 528 F.3d 210, 240 (4th Cir. 2008) (applying Craig to situation involving two-way video and requiring that, absent face-to-face confrontation, the denial of confrontation was "necessary to further an important public policy" and that "the reliability of the testimony is otherwise assured") (quoting Craig , 497 U.S. at 850, 110 S.Ct. 3157 ); Horn v. Quarterman , 508 F.3d 306, 317–18 & n.17 (5th Cir. 2007) (noting that Supreme Court "has not specifically addressed the use of two-way closed-circuit television" and that, since Craig , "circuits have disagreed on the issue of whether Craig ’s requirement of a specific finding of necessity applies to testimony by two-way closed circuit television as well as to testimony by one-way closed circuit television;" the court went on to apply Craig and conclude that testimony via two-way video was not an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law); Fuster-Escalona v. Florida Dept. of Corrections , 170 F. App'x. 627, 629-30 (11th Cir. 2006) (per curiam, not designated for publication) (holding that it is "not contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, established federal law to hold that no case-specific findings were required prior to [ ] four children testifying via two-way closed television" in child-abuse case, and finding Craig distinguishable because it involved one-way video); United States v. Donziger , Nos. 19-CR-561 & 11-CV-691, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 157797 at *5, 2020 WL 5152162, at *2 (order of Aug. 31, 2020) (allowing the use of live two-way video testimony for sick witness located out of state "[u]pon a finding of exceptional circumstances" and when it "furthers the interests of justice") (quoting United States v. Gigante , 166 F.3d 75, 81 (2d Cir. 1999) ); People v. Jemison , 505 Mich. 352, 363–66, ––– N.W.2d –––– (Mich. June 22, 2020) (holding Craig is limited to its facts and instead applying Crawford test to remote two-way video testimony by DNA analyst); see also McAllister, supra note 2, at 845 (discussing various decisions on the question of what test governs confrontation challenge to two-way video testimony). Of course, I cite the foregoing authorities not for the purpose of suggesting that they all support my position, but rather to show that courts have adopted a variety of approaches to this problem. Given these various approaches, it is apparent that whether Craig ’s necessity requirement strictly governs this situation is an open question subject to debate, rather than firmly settled law as has been suggested.
See Gigante , 166 F.3d at 80 (holding two-way video testimony did not violate Confrontation Clause where the remote witness "was sworn; he was subject to full cross-examination; he testified in full view of the jury, court, and defense counsel; and [the witness] gave this testimony under the eye of [the defendant] himself. [The defendant] forfeited none of the constitutional protections of confrontation"). I recognize that the Court in Gigante additionally required a showing of "exceptional circumstances" to permit remote witness testimony (in that case, the witness was too ill to appear and was in a witness protection program). Id. at 81–82. However, the Gigante court held that there was no constitutional violation. Thus, where the defendant's confrontation rights are otherwise fully protected and there is no constitutional violation, it makes no sense to require anything further.
After Crawford , we seem to be left with two certainties about the Confrontation Clause. First, the main reason the Founders included the Confrontation Clause in the Sixth Amendment was to prevent trial by depositions or ex parte written affidavits. Mattox v. United States , 156 U.S. 237, 242–43, 15 S.Ct. 337, 39 L.Ed. 409 (1895) ; Crawford , 541 U.S. at 50, 124 S.Ct. 1354 ("[T]he principal evil at which the Confrontation Clause was directed was the civil-law mode of criminal procedure, and particularly its use of ex parte communications as evidence against the accused."). Second, the four key components of the Confrontation Clause, when it applies, are that it: (1) requires the witness to take an oath to testify truthfully; (2) allows for face-to-face examination of the witness (but exceptions are allowed); (3) provides the opportunity for cross-examination; and (4) allows the fact-finder to observe the witness's demeanor. See, e.g., Craig, 497 U.S. at 845–46, 110 S.Ct. 3157 ; Green , 399 U.S. at 158, 90 S.Ct. 1930 (noting that the Confrontation Clause "insures that the witness will give his statements under oath[,] ... forces the witness to submit to cross-examination, ... [and] permits the jury ... to observe the demeanor of the witness.);" see also, Brooks, Note, Two-Way Video Testimony and the Confrontation Clause: Protecting Vulnerable Victims After Crawford , 8 STAN . J.C.R. & C.L. 183, 191–96 (April 2012) (discussing various Supreme Court cases). Assuming arguendo that the Confrontation Clause applies to Devore's statements, allowing Devore to testify live by two-way video satisfies each of these four components such that no constitutional violation occurred.
The Supreme Court has long recognized that out-of-court statements that would have been admissible at the time of the Constitution's adoption are admissible notwithstanding the Confrontation Clause—namely, the traditional hearsay exceptions. See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51–56, 124 S.Ct. 1354. Further, the Supreme Court applies the Confrontation Clause only to testimonial statements; it does not apply to nontestimonial statements. Michigan v. Bryant , 562 U.S. 344, 353–54, 131 S.Ct. 1143, 179 L.Ed.2d 93 (2011) (noting that Crawford "limited the Confrontation Clause's reach to testimonial statements" and that "testimonial" statements include "at a minimum ... prior testimony at a preliminary hearing, before a grand jury, or at a former trial; and ... police interrogations") (quoting Crawford , 541 U.S. at 68, 124 S.Ct. 1354 ).
The Supreme Court has noted that only testimonial statements are subject to the Confrontation Clause. Crawford , 541 U.S. at 51, 124 S.Ct. 1354 (stating that the Confrontation Clause applies only to " ‘witnesses’ against the accused ... those who ‘bear testimony.’ "). Non-testimonial statements are generally outside the scope of the Confrontation Clause. Michigan v. Bryant , 562 U.S. 344, 354, 131 S.Ct. 1143, 179 L.Ed.2d 93 (2011). But the Supreme Court has not given us an exhaustive list of what type of statements it considers "testimonial." Ohio v. Clark , 576 U.S. 237, 243–44, 135 S.Ct. 2173, 192 L.Ed.2d 306 (2015). The general rule in determining if a statement is testimonial or nontestimonial, however, "is whether, in light of all the circumstances, viewed objectively, the ‘primary purpose’ of the conversation was to ‘creat[e] an out-of-court substitute for trial testimony.’ " Id. at 245, 135 S.Ct. 2173 (quoting Bryant , 562 U.S. at 358, 131 S.Ct. 1143 ). "And in determining whether a statement is testimonial, ‘standard rules of hearsay, designed to identify some statements as reliable, will be relevant.’ " Id. (quoting Bryant , 562 U.S. at 358–59, 131 S.Ct. 1143 ). Further, Confrontation Clause exceptions which were established at the time of this Country's founding are still recognized today. Clark , 576 U.S. at 246, 135 S.Ct. 2173 ("We have recognized that the Confrontation Clause does not prohibit the introduction of out-of-court statements that would have been admissible in a criminal case at the time of the founding.") (citing Giles v. California , 554 U.S. 353, 358–359, 128 S.Ct. 2678, 171 L.Ed.2d 488 (2008) ; Crawford , 541 U.S. at 56, n. 6, 62, 124 S.Ct. 1354 ); see also Crawford , 541 U.S. at 54, 124 S.Ct. 1354 (citing Mattox , 156 U.S. at 243, 15 S.Ct. 337 ). Statements made for medical treatment are among those "firmly-rooted" exceptions bringing such statements outside the purview of the Confrontation Clause. See White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 357, 112 S.Ct. 736, 116 L.Ed.2d 848 (1992). The declarant does not have to "either be produced at trial or be found unavailable before his out-of-court statement may be admitted into evidence." Id. at 353, 112 S.Ct. 736. Because Devore is a SANE who conducted a medical examination of the victim and testified as an expert regarding what is set forth in her report, her statements may be nontestimonial or otherwise fall within the medical treatment exception. But because this issue is not addressed in the Court's opinion, I will not discuss it further here.
The oath component was satisfied by Devore being sworn by a Montana notary public on her end in front of the camera in full view of everyone in the courtroom.
Devore could have also been administered the oath over two-way video by the trial judge. Two-way video may be used to administer oaths for probable cause affidavits and other matters. See Tex. Code. Crim. Proc. Art. 18.01 (allowing for oaths to be administered and probable-cause affidavits to be transmitted by reliable electronic means). Oaths can even be administered over the phone without video. Clay v. State , 391 S.W.3d 94, 103 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013) (finding that officer's oath sworn over the phone to a magistrate was sufficient and holding, "We see no compelling reason to construe the ‘sworn affidavit’ contemplated by Article 18.01(b) necessarily to require that the oath always be administered in the corporal presence of the magistrate, so long as sufficient care is taken in the individual case to preserve the same or an equivalent solemnizing function to that which corporal presence accomplishes.").
Regarding the personal examination component, Devore testified by two-way video with her live image "projected on the video screens located at counsel table in front of both the prosecutor and defense counsel on the video screen located on the trial court's bench, and projected on a 60-inch TV screen for the jury." State's Brief at 52. The questioner was in full view of Devore. Id. While Appellant objected to allowing Devore to testify by two-way video, he made no objections to the positioning of the camera or to the number and size of screens utilized.
The "face-to-face" component was satisfied because the two-way video allowed for each person to see and hear the other so that Appellant and his counsel had the ability to be "face-to-face" with Devore. "Face-to-face" confrontation does not always have to be within the physical presence of the defendant. Craig , 497 U.S. at 850, 110 S.Ct. 3157 (finding that confrontation rights "may be satisfied absent a physical, face-to-face confrontation"). Two-way video allows this face-to-face meeting and, with today's technology, usually allows each party the ability to see and hear the other better than if they were across the courtroom from each other.
Appellant, in his brief, claims that Devore could not see him during her testimony. Appellant's Brief at 5. But Appellant did not complain about camera position at trial. If he had, arrangements could have been made to ensure that Devore could see Appellant.
The Supreme Court in Craig did state that denial of physical, face-to-face confrontation should be allowed only when "necessary to further an important public policy and only where the reliability of the testimony is otherwise assured." Craig , 497 U.S. at 850, 110 S.Ct. 3157. But first of all, as discussed above, I do not believe Craig applies and may no longer be good precedent. And second, in Craig , the Court was addressing one-way video. There is no valid argument or reason why faceto-face confrontation through two-way video does not satisfy this component. See Jessica Brooks, Note, Two-Way Video Testimony and the Confrontation Clause: Protecting Vulnerable Victims After Crawford , 8 Stan. J.C.R. & C.L. 183, 204–07 (April 2012). Moreover, the Supreme Court and other federal circuit courts have determined on many occasions that using two-way video testimony does not violate the Confrontation Clause. Coy , 487 U.S. at 1023, 108 S.Ct. 2798 (1988) (O'Connor, J., concurring, noting favorably that many states and lower court cases allowed the use of two-way video testimony in child abuse cases); Gigante , 166 F.3d 75 ; Horn , 508 F.3d 306 ; Fuster-Escalona , 170 Fed App'x 627. If there is no Confrontation Clause violation, then why must there be a specific finding by the trial court as long as reliability is assured?
The two-way video also allowed for defense counsel to fully cross-examine Devore. Appellant was able to look upon Devore while being tried, fully cross-examine her, and if needed, was able to impeach her "in every mode authorized by the established rules governing the trial or conduct of criminal cases." Coy , 487 U.S. at 1017, 108 S.Ct. 2798.
It is notable that the Supreme Court allows admission of testimonial witness statements as long as the "declarant is unavailable, and only where the defendant has had a prior opportunity to cross-examine" the witness. Crawford , 541 U.S. at 38, 124 S.Ct. 1354. In cases such as these, the defendant is not allowed face-to-face confrontation in front of the fact-finder, nor can the fact-finder observe the witness's demeanor. This suggests that the number one, most important aspect of the Confrontation Clause is the right to cross-examination.
Finally, everyone in the courtroom was able to observe Devore's demeanor. Devore's two-way video testimony was projected on other screens across the courtroom and on a 60" television screen for the jury. Devore was required to remain in front of the device she was using as a camera at all times so that she stayed in the view of the prosecutor, defense counsel, defendant, judge, and jury. The person questioning Devore stood in view of the camera so that she could see her questioner face-to-face. Defense counsel argued that this was still a Confrontation Clause violation because "it did not reveal Devore's entire body while testifying." Thus, "the jury could not see if she was wringing her hands, bouncing her legs, or engaging in other body language that indicates deception." First, Appellant never raised this concern during the proceedings to allow for adjustment of the camera angle if he was concerned about this. Second, had Devore testified from the witness stand in the courtroom, the jury still could have only seen, at most, the top half of her and would not have been able to see the possible actions about which Appellant raises concern. Having Devore projected on a large screen likely allowed the jury a closer and clearer view of Devore's demeanor and facial expressions than what they would have been able to see had she been physically present in the courtroom.
There is no Confrontation Clause violation using two-way video as long as the four components are otherwise satisfied. Thus, to reiterate, when there is no Confrontation Clause violation, why does the trial court need to make a necessity finding? A necessity finding seems to be appropriate when making an exception to the Confrontation Clause components, but not when there is no violation. Simply put, there was no Confrontation Clause violation here. In examining the history and purpose of the Confrontation Clause, all of Appellant's confrontation rights were fully protected. While I personally prefer having witnesses physically in the courtroom and do not believe that defendants should prefer two-way video testimony, the lack of a physical presence alone when all four components are adequately protected does not amount to a Confrontation Clause violation. Contrary to the Court's hyperbole regarding my position, I have never said that "virtual confrontation is superior to physical confrontation." Maj. Op. at 327, n. 14. In fact, I think that everyone's preference (including mine) is probably live witnesses testifying in person from the witness stand inside the courtroom. But it is hard to argue against the fact that current technology allows for the opportunity to see and hear a witness better through two-way video than if that witness was testifying in the courtroom. Further, while we can all agree that in-person testimony is overall preferred, my position is that two-way video testimony simply does not violate the Confrontation Clause.
I recognize that this Court's prior decisions involving the use of two-way video testimony have applied Craig and required a necessity finding. I do not address these opinions because they are outdated in light of more recent Supreme Court cases cited herein. See Crawford, 541 U.S. 36, 124 S.Ct. 1354. Instead of criticizing me for not following cases of questionable substance given the changes in Supreme Court opinions, advances in technology since 1999, and inconsistent opinions among the federal circuit courts, the Court should, instead, focus on the realities of the world we live in today and conduct a more up-to-date analysis of how these various matters impact application of the Confrontation Clause.
The Court suggests that the minor, brief technical glitches experienced with Devore's testimony proves that testimony by two-way video is inferior. But such minor glitches are no different than glitches that can be experienced with a live witness in a courtroom – coughing fits, microphone malfunction, a soft-spoken witness that the jurors cannot hear well, a witness with a heavy accent, etc.
Moreover, a defendant can take steps to ensure that witnesses testify from the courtroom. Both the State and defense have the right to subpoena witnesses. Thus, going forward, if either side wants to ensure a witness testifies while physically in the courtroom rather than by two-way video, they each have the ability to secure any such witnesses through that subpoena power. I am not saying that a defendant must do that, and there is certainly no requirement for him to do so, but he has that option. Ultimately, however, the decision on whether to allow a witness to testify by two-way video and the method used is within the sound discretion of the trial court. Flannery v. State , 153 Tex.Crim. 36, 216 S.W.2d 980, 982 (1948) ("Some latitude must, of necessity, be given the trial court as to the manner in which a trial is conducted. Orderly procedure in the court room so requires. This latitude extends to and includes the manner and method of the presentation of the testimony and the examination of the witnesses. To be reversible, errors claimed in such matters must be such as to be openly prejudicial to the rights of the accused, and must constitute an abuse of discretion by the trial court."). It would be an abuse of discretion if the method chosen by the trial court violated the Confrontation Clause, but there was no abuse of discretion in this case. Additionally, if as a matter of policy, the Legislature were to create rules for when two-way video testimony may be allowed, that would be appropriate. What is not appropriate (as recognized in Crawford ) is where, like here (and in Craig ), courts are weighing policy decisions involving constitutional rights. See Crawford , 541 U.S. at 67-68, 124 S.Ct. 1354 ("[The Framers] knew that judges, like other government officers, could not always be trusted to safeguard the rights of the people.... They were loath to leave too much discretion in judicial hands ... By replacing categorical constitutional guarantees with open-ended balancing tests, we do violence to [the Framers’] design.").
For the aforementioned reasons, I would affirm the judgment of the court of appeals upholding Appellant's conviction. As such, I dissent.