Summary
holding that defendants waived their right to file second motion for summary judgment, but allowing second motion on narrow legal issue of whether plaintiff has alleged the violation of a clearly established constitutional right
Summary of this case from HAAS v. WOODSOpinion
NO. 3-99-CV-2734-BD.
June 13, 2003.
MEMORANDUM ORDER
Defendants have filed a motion asking the court to reconsider its ruling that they withdrew their motion for summary judgment filed on June 11, 2001. For the reasons stated herein, the motion for reconsideration is denied. However, the court will allow defendant to file an out-of-time motion for summary judgment limited to the issue of whether the "informal detainer" placed against plaintiff gives rise to a clearly established right under federal law to constructive custody sentence credits.
I.
This is a civil rights action brought by Plaintiff Randolph Vinton Haas, a former inmate in the Texas prison system, against: (1) S.O. Woods, Jr., Chairman of the State Classification Committee of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division ("TDCJ-ID"); (2) Victor Rodriguez, former Chairman of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Parole Division ("TDCJ-PD"); and (3) Bryan Collier, Director of the Review and Release Processing Center for the TDCJ-PD. The gravamen of plaintiff's complaint is that defendants acted with deliberate indifference in miscalculating his sentence credits which delayed his release from prison by 163 days. Plaintiff filed suit in federal district court on December 2, 1999. Defendants, who are all represented by the Texas Attorney General, timely answered and raised the affirmative defense of qualified immunity. On May 23, 2000, defendants filed a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss based, in part, on their immunity defense. This motion was denied on September 21, 2000. The court then entered a scheduling order establishing certain pretrial deadlines, including a July 6, 2001 deadline for the completion of discovery related to qualified immunity and an August 6, 2001 deadline for filing dispositive motions. See ORDER, 3/20/01.
In his original complaint, plaintiff also sued TDCJ-ID Director Gary Johnson, the TDCJ-ID, and the TDCJ-PD. The claims against those defendants were dismissed by order dated September 21, 2000.
In his recommendation denying the motion to dismiss, the magistrate judge noted that he was unable to determine whether the conduct of defendants was objectively unreasonable based on the pleadings alone. Defendants were invited to reurge their qualified immunity defense in a motion for summary judgment "after the parties have had an opportunity to engage in limited discovery." See FINDINGS REC. OF MAG. JUDGE, 8/23/00 at 10, adopted by ORDER, 9/21/00.
On June 11, 2001, defendants sought summary judgment on their immunity defense. One of the arguments made by defendants in their motion was that plaintiff was not entitled to credit on his Texas sentence for time spent in the Massachusetts Department of Corrections because "Texas never lodged a `detainer' against Haas with the Massachusetts prison authorities." (Def. MSJ Br. at 18-19). On July 30, 2001, the same day plaintiff's response to this motion was due, defendants produced a series of teletype communications sent by the Texas Board of Pardons and Paroles to the Boston Police Department in late May and early June of 1988, advising that a pre-violator's warrant had been issued for plaintiff and asking the agency to place a "hold" on him. (Plf. Mot. for Sanc., Exh. 1). These documents were not only produced two weeks after the expiration of the discovery deadline, but more than seven months after a court order requiring defendants to "conduct a diligent search for all responsive documents and fully comply with Plaintiff's Request for Production . . ." See AGR. ORDER ON MOT. TO COMPEL, 1/2/01 at 2, ¶ 3.. As a sanction for failing to timely produce material documents, the court struck defendants' motion for summary judgment and ordered the case to trial. See ORDER, 9/7/01. Defendants appealed this ruling to the Fifth Circuit. In an unpublished per curiam opinion, the appellate court held that this sanction was disproportionate to the discovery abuse and vacated the order striking defendants' motion for summary judgment. The case was remanded for further proceedings, including "the determination of an appropriate sanction, any additional discovery, and consideration of any motion for summary judgment asserting the defense of qualified immunity." Haas v. Woods, No. 01-11401, op. at 3 (5th Cir. Nov. 7, 2002).
The teletype communications were found by Defendant Bryan Collier when he reviewed plaintiff's parole records following his deposition on July 16, 2001. Although defendants apologized to the court for "any inconvenience that this oversight might have caused," no explanation was offered as to why Collier failed to conduct a diligent search for these documents sooner. ( See Def. Reply to MSJ at 3, ¶ 8).
On December 6, 2002, the court held a status conference with the attorneys to discuss the procedures for resolving the issue of qualified immunity raised in defendants' motion for summary judgment. At this conference, which was not recorded, the court allowed plaintiff to redepose several witnesses regarding documents that were not timely produced during discovery and to send depositions on written questions to a records custodian in Massachusetts and the officers involved in the teletype communications. Defendants were then given a choice of either: (1) standing on their pending motion for summary judgment; or (2) withdrawing their summary judgment motion and filing a renewed or amended motion upon the completion of this additional discovery. Defense counsel chose the second option, electing to withdraw the pending motion for summary judgment and file a renewed or amended motion so he could address any new evidence uncovered at the depositions to be taken by plaintiff. This election is memorialized by a written order dated December 16, 2002, which recites, in pertinent part:
The Court grants Defendants leave to withdraw their Motion for Summary Judgment and to refile such motion limiting any revisions to such motion to address the late produced documents. Such Amended Motion for Summary Judgment shall be filed on or before March 29, 2003. Plaintiff's response shall be due on or before April 30, 2003.
ORDER ON STAT. CONF., 12/16/02 at 1.
Defense counsel approved both the form and substance of this order. ( See Def. Mot. for Rec., Exh. 3 at 3).
The March 29, 2003 deadline came and went without defendants filing a renewed or amended summary judgment motion. At a hearing held on May 2, 2003, the court tentatively ruled that defendants were barred from seeking summary judgment in this case. Defendants now take the position that, despite the language of the December 16, 2002 scheduling order, their original motion for summary judgment was never withdrawn and remains pending. Based on their interpretation of the order, together with the absence of any notation on the docket sheet that their original motion was unfiled or withdrawn, defendants seek a reconsideration of the court's prior ruling so they can obtain a resolution of the qualified immunity issues raised in their original motion for summary judgment. Plaintiff has responded to defendants' motion for reconsideration and counsel for both parties have submitted sworn declarations detailing their recollections of the events at the December 6, 2002 scheduling conference. The motion is now ripe for determination.
II.
The court initially observes that neither party argues that the December 16, 2002 scheduling order is ambiguous. Indeed, defendants maintain that "the status of Defendants' MSJ should be based on the record and actual pleadings filed in this case, and not an attempted reconstruction of the events of the status conference December 6, 2002." (Def. Supp. to Mot. to Rec. at 1, ¶ 2).
The court agrees. The plain language of this order "grants Defendants leave to withdraw their Motion for Summary Judgment and to refile such motion limiting any revisions to such motion to address the late produced documents . . ." See ORDER ON STAT. CONF., 12/16/02 at 1. Significantly, the order does not grant defendants leave to file a motion to withdraw their pending summary judgment motion should they decide to seek leave at some point in the future. Rather, the order grants leave to withdraw the summary judgment motion and allows defendants to refile the motion by March 29, 2003. The fact that the district clerk did not make an entry on the docket sheet withdrawing the motion does not alter the effect of this order. Nor does counsel's statement that he "would not have wanted to withdraw the pending MSJ without having something to file in its place protecting Defendants' qualified immunity defense." (Def. Supp. to Mot. to Rec., Exh. 1 at 1). Based on the plain language of the December 16, 2002 order, defendants' original motion for summary judgment was withdrawn and defendants were required to file a renewed or amended motion by March 29, 2003.
It is interesting to note that defense counsel never checked the PACER docket sheet to determine whether his original summary judgment motion had been unfiled or withdrawn until after the deadline for filing a renewed or amended motion had expired. (Def. Mot. for Rec., Exh. 5 at 20).
Even were defendants to successfully argue that the December 16, 2002 order is ambiguous, the events at the status conference and the subsequent conduct of defense counsel is contrary to his suggested interpretation of the order. At the status conference held on December 6, 2002, the court informed the attorneys that it would rule on the issue of qualified immunity after plaintiff redeposed certain witnesses who had submitted affidavits in support of defendants' motion for summary judgment and propounded depositions on written questions to a records custodian in Massachusetts and the officers involved in the teletype communications. These depositions were limited in scope to the issue of qualified immunity and any matters contained in documents that were not timely produced by defendants during discovery. The court then told Robert B. Maddox, lead counsel for defendants, that he could either: (1) stand on his pending summary judgment motion, in which event he would not be permitted to address any evidence uncovered at the depositions regarding the late produced documents; or (2) withdraw his pending motion and file a renewed or amended motion for summary judgment after the depositions were taken, "limiting any revisions to such motion to address the late produced documents." Given these options, the court clearly recalls that Maddox elected to withdraw his pending motion for summary judgment and file a new one. In his sworn declaration, Maddox recalls that he was the one who raised the issue of a new scheduling order with a new deadline for filing an amended motion for summary judgment. ( See id., Exh. 1 at 1). He goes on to state:
I recall that the Court also informed me that if I was going to file an amended MSJ I also needed to withdraw the pending MSJ. I assumed that this was something I would have to do in the future and would require some formal action on my part. It was not my understanding that in order to get a new deadline for an amended MSJ, I would first have to withdraw my pending MSJ.
( Id., Exh. 1 at 1) (emphasis added).
Maddox's "recollections" and "understanding" of what transpired at this conference are inconsistent with the December 16, 2002 order, which he signed, and his conduct after the order was issued. At the May 2, 2003 hearing, Maddox admitted that he had fully intended to file another summary judgment motion in this case by the March 29, 2003 deadline. (Def. Mot. for Rec., Exh. 5 at 11). He even called opposing counsel one week before the deadline expired to request an extension of time. ( Id., Exh. 5 at 19-20). However, Maddox did not file a renewed or amended motion because:
Counsel for plaintiff said that he would give defendants a one-week extension to file a renewed or amended motion for summary judgment, provided defense counsel sent him a written agreement to that effect. No written agreement was ever prepared or transmitted by defense counsel. (Def. Mot., Exh. 5 at 20).
I had a lot of things going on in an unemployment case that I had been working on, and I might say I'm still in the process of trying to get the dispositive motion on file in that case, and I just — while I would have liked to have cleaned up and streamlined the motion in this case somewhat, I just had to get something on file in that case before I could worry about, you know, kind of prettying up the motion in this case, and I apologize to the Court for any confusion I've caused.
( Id., Exh. 5 at 20). This suggests that Maddox knew he was supposed to file an amended or renewed motion for summary judgment but through neglect, inadvertence or otherwise, failed to do so.
For these reasons, the court declines to reconsider its prior ruling that defendants withdrew their motion for summary judgment filed on June 11, 2001 and failed to timely file a renewed or amended summary judgment motion in this case.
III.
Defendants also argue that their qualified immunity defense should be considered on summary judgment "in the interest of justice." According to defendants, "[i]f this case can be decided based on qualified immunity now . . ., it benefits all parties as well as the Court to resolve these purely legal issues now, rather that [sic] proceed with the time and expense of additional discovery and trial, only to have Haas' claim fail as a matter of law on a Rule 50 motion at trial." (Def. Mot. for Rec. at 2-3).
This argument is well-taken, at least in part. As one of their grounds for summary judgment, defendants argue they are entitled to qualified immunity based on the purely legal issue of whether the "informal detainer" placed against him by Texas parole officials, as evidenced by the teletype communications to the Boston Police Department, gives rise to a clearly established right under federal law to the constructive custody sentence credits made the basis of his claim. The court agrees that this narrow legal issue should be determined prior to trial "in the interests of justice."
Accordingly, defendants are granted leave to file a renewed or amended motion for summary judgment out-of-time, limited to the issue of whether the "informal detainer" placed against plaintiff gives rise to a clearly established right under federal law to constructive custody sentence credits. This amended motion shall be filed by June 27, 2003. Plaintiff shall file a written response to the motion by July 28, 2003. The motion and response must be accompanied by briefs not to exceed 15 pages in length. See LR 56.5(b) (as modified). Any affidavits, depositions, written discovery materials, or other summary judgment evidence must be included in a separate appendix. The appendix shall be numbered sequentially from the first page through the last, and include an index of all documents contained therein. An envelope that contains a non-documentary or oversized exhibit must be numbered as if it were a single page. See LR 56.6(b). Defendants may file a reply, but no additional evidence, by August 12, 2003. No supplemental pleadings, briefs, or summary judgment evidence will be allowed without leave of court. See LR 56.7.
SO ORDERED.