Opinion
Cause No. IP 99-1907-C T/F.
January 25, 2002
Lawrence M Reuben, Attorney at Law, Indianapolis, IN.
James P Hanlon, Office of the United States Attorney, Indianapolis, IN.
ENTRY ON DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
This entry is a matter of public record and is being made available to the public on the court's web site, but it is not intended for commercial publication either electronically or in paper form. Although the ruling or rulings in this Entry will govern the case presently before this court, this court does not consider the discussion in this Entry to be sufficiently novel or instructive to justify commercial publication or the subsequent citation of it in other proceedings.
On December 17, 1999, Plaintiff Diana Guynn ("Guynn") brought suit against her former employer John E. Potter, in his official capacity as Postmaster General, United States Postal Service ("Postal Service"). Guynn alleges that Postal Service violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, by engaging in quid pro quo sexual harassment, retaliation, and subjecting her to a hostile work environment. Postal Service moved for summary judgment on all of Guynn's claims. Postal Service argues that the suit is untimely, that Guynn lacks standing, and that she is unable to establish a prima facie case for any remaining claims. As explained below, the Postal Service is correct in most respects, at least sufficiently so that the court GRANTS the Postal Service's motion for summary judgment.
John E. Potter became the new Postmaster General for the United States Postal Service on June 4, 2001, and has been substituted as the new defendant pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 25(d).
A. Motions for Summary Judgment
The purpose of summary judgment is to "pierce the pleadings and to assess the proof in order to see whether there is a genuine need for trial." Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). Summary judgment is appropriate when there are no genuine issues of material fact, leaving the moving party entitled to judgment as a matter of law. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(C). The moving party must show there is no genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). A factual issue is material only if resolving the factual issue might change the suit's outcome under the governing law. Clifton v. Schafer, 969 F.2d 278, 281 (7th Cir. 1992). An issue is genuine if there is sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to return a verdict in favor of the non-moving party on the evidence presented. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986); Baucher v. Eastern Ind. Prod. Credit Ass'n, 906 F.2d 332, 334 (7th Cir. 1990).
Although intent and credibility are critical issues in employment discrimination cases, there is no special rule of civil procedure that applies only to them. See, e.g., Wallace v. SMC Pneumatics, Inc., 103 F.3d 1394, 1396 (7th Cir. 1997). In employment discrimination cases, as in all cases, the court must carefully view the evidence in the record in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, including all reasonable inferences, and determine whether there is a genuine issue of material fact.
B. Undisputed Material Facts
Guynn began working for the Postal Service in 1978. Stanley Miller ("Miller"), also employed by the Postal Service, sexually harassed Guynn "from virtually the outset of her employment." (Complaint at ¶¶ 6-8.) Initially, Guynn and Miller were co-workers at the Downtown Post Office. During that time, Miller engaged in conduct such as wearing a shirt that read "Italian Stallion," and asking Guynn if she thought he was a stallion. Miller would ask Guynn to go out on dates and ask if she would sleep with him. From the beginning of their acquaintance, Miller's conduct toward Guynn was unwelcome. Guynn also knew that Miller's conduct was inappropriate and wrong.
Sometime prior to 1996, Miller was promoted to supervisor and subsequently left the Downtown Post Office to work at the Airport Postal Service facility. Miller became the Plant Manager of the Airport Postal facility. In June of 1996, Guynn transferred to the Airport facility where Miller was the Plant Manager. Initially, Guynn and Miller worked different shifts and did not come into contact. Miller worked the day shift and Guynn worked the late shift. However, Guynn subsequently transferred to the day shift, and the harassment by Miller resumed.
For example, Miller asked Guynn if she had any boyfriends, asked how often they had sex, asked if it was enjoyable enough for her, and stated that he was "a replacement" for her boyfriend. Guynn worked at a table near the staircase that led to Miller's office, and occasionally Miller would "hover within four to five inches" from Guynn's face and ask how she was doing, if she changed her mind, and if she wanted to go out with him. Guynn would tell him to leave her alone. In late 1997, Miller offered to help Guynn secure a transfer to Florida in exchange for sexual favors but she did not respond to that statement. Miller's harassment continued and led up to an alleged assault at an empty warehouse near the airport. Miller, Guynn, and Bill Hill, another Postal Service employee, went to the warehouse to examine it for use in sorting mail in light of the pending United Parcel Service (UPS) strike. Guynn could not recall the exact date of the incident, but it was one to three months before UPS went on strike on August 4, 1997. While in the warehouse, Miller asked Guynn to go upstairs to the second floor with him. Once they entered into the dark hallway, he pushed her against the wall and put his hands on her. Guynn pushed Miller away and ran downstairs. Guynn did not discuss this incident with Bill Hill. Guynn also did not report the incident to her supervisor or the police.
Guynn also believes that "Miller or any of his associates" may have had something to do with a serious fire at her house on March 18, 1998. However, Guynn has no proof that Miller, or anyone associated with him, had anything to do with the fire. Just prior to this fire, Miller told Guynn that she could work all the overtime she wanted if she would have sexual intercourse with him.
Early in June 1998, in a menacing tone Miller told Guynn that she could not leave him. (Guynn Aff. at ¶ 6.) A few weeks later, Guynn received notice of the first of three suspensions. On June 30, 1998, Guynn received notice of a seven-day suspension. The Postal Service suspended Guynn for failure to report two injuries immediately — in violation of the postal safety guidelines. The notice of suspension was not signed by Miller.
On July 10, 1998, Miller came into the garage area where Guynn was taking a break. Miller told Guynn he had heard that she was going to leave the Airport facility. Miller then stated, "[w]ell, you're not going anywhere. You can't leave me." Miller continued: "I have waited long enough. * * * If you (Guynn) do not fuck me (Miller), I will have you (Guynn) fired." (Guynn Dep. at 200; Guynn Aff. at ¶ 9.) Guynn rolled her eyes and walked away.
Less than a month after threatening to have Guynn fired if she did not have sex with Miller, Guynn received notice of a second suspension. The Postal Service suspended Guynn on July 30, 1998, in connection with the failure to maintain the total value of cash and stamps in her drawer. On July 20, 1998, Guynn was working as a window clerk and was responsible for a drawer of cash and stamps. An audit of Guynn's drawer for July 20, 1998, revealed a shortage of $1,083.79. This was not the first time that an audit showed Guynn's drawer to be short cash and/or stamps. Guynn's drawer also was short $656.32 and $324.81 on February 16, 1998 and October 28, 1997 respectively. On August 1, 1997, there was $342.39 in excess of the amount expected in her drawer. Guynn believes that someone got into her drawer and took stamps out of it. However, Guynn does not have any evidence that someone took stamps out of her drawer. Guynn always had to sign for a key to her drawer, but she suspects that management kept a duplicate key in a secure area. As a result of Guynn's failure to keep her shortages within a reasonable limit, Postal Service suspended her for fourteen days. The notice of suspension was not signed by Miller. Guynn filed grievances regarding both of these suspensions, and Guynn had not missed any work or lost pay as a result of these suspensions. Guynn was not required to pay back any shortages either.
On July 31, 1998, Guynn went on sick leave. Guynn claims that the sick leave in August was due to the emotional and psychological stress brought on by Miller's behavior toward her. Guynn was hospitalized at St. Vincent's Stress Center and received psychological therapy. On August 15, 1998, Guynn returned to work and began working in a new position at the Downtown Post Office.
On approximately April 27, 1999, Guynn and others were giving blood at the post office during a blood drive. Miller walked into the doorway of the room, which was about 15 to 20 feet away from Guynn. He did not say anything, but he smirked or sneered at her. The incident lasted about ten seconds.
On the same day, Guynn saw Miller in her work area both before and after giving blood. Before giving blood, Guynn observed Miller in her area about ten or fifteen feet from her smiling and leering, which lasted approximately two minutes. After giving blood, Miller came to Guynn's work area again. This time Miller smiled and laughed, before walking away about ten minutes later.
On July 10, 2000, Guynn was the evening close out clerk. Postal Service alleges that "the evening close out clerk [is] required . . . to ensure that all Postal Service funds were properly placed and secured in the bag before sealing it and sending it to the Registry section." (Pl.'s Ex. J.) It was later discovered that the Speedway Branch official remittance was missing. The remittance deposit ticket total was $13,009.29, which included $8,701.00 in cash and $4,308.29 in checks and money orders. All of the checks and money orders were recovered, except for $249.70. Guynn was the last person who had access to the Postal Service funds, and failed to explain what happened to them.
Greg L. Thurston ("Thurston") held the position of Acting Station Manager at the Indiana Speedway Station. Guynn worked under Thurston's managerial authority at the Speedway Station. On February 12, 2001, while Guynn was working, Gregory Thurston instructed her to leave the facility and informed her that she was being placed on administrative leave (her third suspension) pending termination for the loss of Postal Service funds which occurred on July 10, 2000.
Postal Service sent a Notice of Removal on March 12, 2001, which became effective on April 13, 2001. (Pl. Ex.'s J.) The alleged reason for her termination was the failure to account for Postal Service funds on July 10, 2000.
Guynn filed for bankruptcy on November 3, 1998. Throughout the bankruptcy she was represented by counsel. In connection with her bankruptcy proceeding Guynn signed under oath a "Statement of Financial Affairs." On this statement Guynn stated that she was not a party to any law suits. However, as of August 14, 1998, Guynn already made her initial EEO contact for the purposes of filing her discrimination claim. On February 20, 1999, Guynn's bankruptcy debts were discharged and her bankruptcy case was formally closed on May 20, 1999.
On October 26, 2000, the Trustee of Guynn's bankruptcy case filed a motion to re-open the bankruptcy case with the United States Bankruptcy Court. The motion was granted and an order re-opening the case entered on November 2, 2000.
C. Discussion
1. Standing and Real Party In Interest
Postal Service argues that Guynn lacks standing and/or is not the real party in interest. This issue is a threshold question that must be decided before reaching the merits of the case. The distinction between standing to sue and the real party in interest doctrine is often blurred. The two concepts are similar in that both "are used to designate a plaintiff who possesses a sufficient interest in the action to entitle him to be heard on the merits." Weissman v. Weener, 12 F.3d 84, 86 (7th Cir. 1993). The doctrine of standing requires federal courts to make sure concrete legal issues are presented by a plaintiff with a particularized injury in fact traceable to the conduct of the defendant which is likely to be redressed by the relief sought. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 559 (1992). However, the designation of the real party in interest entails identifying the person who possesses the particular right sought to be enforced. Firestone v. Galbreath, 976 F.2d 279, 283 (6th Cir. 1992). In examining the differences between the real party in interest doctrine and the standing doctrine, the Seventh Circuit stated:
The difficulty we have with approaching standing through the traditional real party in interest tests of Fed. Rule Civ. P. 17(a) is that those tests focus on the source and `ownership' of the legal right asserted. In Association of Data Processing Service Organizations, Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 90 S.Ct. 827, 25 L.Ed.2d 184 (1970), the Supreme Court makes it clear that the `legal interest' test is no longer determinative of standing to raise federal constitutional issues. Id. at 153.
Apter v. Richardson, 510 F.2d 351, 353 (7th Cir. 1975). Postal Service argues that the bankruptcy trustee is the only party with a sufficient interest in the action to be entitled to reaching the merits. Guynn has standing to prosecute her claims because she is the individual who suffered the alleged harassment. However, after the bankruptcy the issue becomes who is entitled to bring the claim — Guynn or the bankruptcy trustee. Thus, the issue is properly characterized as whether Guynn is the real party in interest.
The real party in interest doctrine, as set forth in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 17(a), mandates that every action be prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest. The modern purpose of the rule is to "protect the defendant against a subsequent action by the party actually entitled to recover, and to insure generally that the judgment will have its proper effect as res judicata." FED. R. CIV. P. 17(a), Advisory Committee Notes (1966). Guynn filed a Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition on November 3, 1998. She did not list this suit or any of its claims as assets on the bankruptcy petition. Postal Service argues that the claims raised in this suit were property of the bankruptcy estate, so that Guynn is not the real party in interest.
The filing of a bankruptcy petition creates a bankruptcy estate. The bankruptcy estate includes "all legal or equitable interests of the debtor in property" at the time the bankruptcy petition was filed. 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1). Courts have uniformly held that the phrase "legal or equitable interests" includes causes of action. See, e.g., In re Polis, 217 F.3d 899, 901 (7th Cir. 2000); In re Smith, 640 F.2d 888, 890 (7th Cir. 1981); Midwestern Indemnity Co. v. Laikin, 119 F. Supp.2d 831, 855 (S.D.Ind. 2000). To become property of the bankruptcy estate, causes of action need not be formally filed prior to the bankruptcy filing. In re Polis, 217 F.3d at 902.
If any of Guynn's legal claims arose prior to the filing of the petition, they became the property of the bankruptcy estate. Id.; accord, Cable v. Ivy Tech State College, 200 F.3d 467, 472-73 (7th Cir. 1999); In re Carousel Int'l Corp., 89 F.3d 359, 362 (7th Cir. 1996). Under Chapter 7 of the bankruptcy code: "The trustee has sole authority to dispose of property, including managing litigation related to the estate." Cable, 200 F.3d at 472. Only the trustee can prosecute or defend a claim belonging to a Chapter 7 bankruptcy estate. Id.; accord, In re New Era, Inc., 135 F.3d 1206, 1209 (7th Cir. 1998); In re Perkins, 902 F.2d 1254, 1257-58 (7th Cir. 1990).
Logically, the next question is whether some or all of Guynn's claims accrued before she filed the bankruptcy petition. Clearly, some, if not all, of Guynn's claims had arisen prior to the bankruptcy. Facts which show that Guynn's claims had accrued include the assault in the empty warehouse, the June threat, the July threat to have her fired if she did not sleep with him, the possible arson of her home, and the first two suspensions. Guynn initially spoke with the EEO investigator on August 14, 1998, which was before she filed the bankruptcy petition. By the time she filed her bankruptcy petition, Guynn's claims for sexual harassment and a hostile work environment had accrued. Plus, she had taken the first step of asserting those claims by having the initial meeting with the EEO investigator. Since her claims arose prior to the filing of the bankruptcy petition, Guynn is not the real party in interest on her claims for sexual harassment and hostile work environment or any other cause of action that might have accrued on or before November 3, 1998.
Rule 17(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides: "No action shall be dismissed on the ground that it is not prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest until a reasonable time has been allowed after objection for ratification of commencement of the action by, or joinder or substitution of, the real party in interest. . . ." Postal Service objected to Guynn prosecuting the action when it took Guynn's deposition on July 13, 2000 (Guynn Dep. at 276-281), when it filed its motion for summary judgment on September 1, 2000, and when it filed Defendant's Final Contentions on October 17, 2000. Guynn has taken steps to re-open the bankruptcy estate, but has not joined or substituted the trustee as the plaintiff. Guynn has had more than a reasonable amount of time to join the trustee as a party to the litigation. Those claims arising before November 3, 1998, must be dismissed because Guynn is not the real party in interest. See Weissman v. Weener, 12 F.3d 84, 86 (7th Cir. 1993) (dismissing case after plaintiff failed, within reasonable time, to remedy real party in interest defect raised by court).
Guynn argues that this issue is moot since the Bankruptcy Trustee re-opened the bankruptcy estate. The court disagrees. Simply re-opening the bankruptcy estate is insufficient. Only the trustee has a right to prosecute a claim that belongs to the bankruptcy estate. The trustee was not substituted or joined as a party to the litigation, even though Guynn had more than a reasonable amount of time to join the trustee.
However, since Guynn was not terminated until April 13, 2001, her claim for retaliation had not accrued when she filed the bankruptcy petition. Those claims were not part of the bankruptcy estate, and Guynn is the real party in interest for that claim, which must be addressed on the merits.
2. Timeliness Of Claims
Postal Service also argues that Guynn's claims are untimely and should be dismissed. The regulations implementing Title VII provide in part: "An aggrieved person must initiate contact with a Counselor within 45 days of the date of the matter alleged to be discriminatory or, in the case of personnel action, within 45 days of the effective date of the action." 29 C.F.R. § 1614.105(a)(1). Both parties agree that Guynn did not initiate contact with an EEO investigator until August 14, 1998. Furthermore, both parties agree that the 45-day period began June 30, 1998, and that all of the facts that occurred before that date are untimely and cannot be considered. Thus, the court will only consider facts that occurred after June 30, 1998.
3. Retaliation
Title VII makes it unlawful for an employer to retaliate against any individual "because he has opposed any practice made an unlawful employment practice by this title, or because he has made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under this title." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a). This provision is applicable to the federal government, including the United States Postal Service, under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16. Guynn alleges that Postal Service discharged her because she filed an EEO complaint and pursued a discrimination lawsuit.
In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the court must initially focus on whether the individual who had the authority to discharge Guynn acted in retaliation for Guynn's engaging in the protected activity of filing a discrimination claim. Guynn's first two suspensions occurred before she initiated the discrimination claim by contacting the EEO. Guynn's final suspension and termination were ordered by the Acting Station Manager, Gregg L. Thurston. According to Thurston's affidavit he decided to terminate Guynn's employment effective April 13, 2001. (Def. Ex. 15 at ¶ 2.) Thurston also averred: "Stanley Miller had no involvement whatsoever with the Notice of Removal I issued [to] Ms. Guynn. In fact, I have never had any sort of verbal or written communication with Mr. Miller, and at no point in my Postal Service career have I respo[nded] — directly or indirectly — to him." (Def. Ex. 15 at ¶ 3.)
Guynn has proffered no evidence upon which a reasonable jury could conclude that Thurston, as opposed to Miller, acted in retaliation. No connection has been shown between Thurston's decision to terminate her employment and the charge of discrimination. The only evidence Guynn points to is Miller's comments and threat: "If you do not fuck me, I will have you fired."
However, there can be situations where the motive of another employee can be imputed to the decisionmaker because, "under the circumstances of the case, the employer simply acted as the `cat's paw.'" Willis v. Marion County Auditor's Office, 118 F.3d 542, 547 (7th Cir. 1997); see Shager v. Upjohn Co., 913 F.2d 398, 405 (7th Cir. 1990) (holding that if the review committee was aware of district manager's age-based animus and acted "as the conduit of [manager's] prejudice — his cat's paw — the innocence of its members would not spare the company from liability). The cat's paw theory prevents employers from escaping liability by setting up many layers of pro forma review, which makes the operative decision that of a subordinate with an illicit motive. Willis, 118 F.3d at 547. "However, it is clear that, when the causal relationship between the subordinate's illicit motive and the employer's ultimate decision is broken, and the ultimate decision is clearly made on an independent and legally permissive basis, the bias of the subordinate is not relevant." Id. citing Long v. Eastfield College, 88 F.3d 300, 307 (5th Cir. 1996) (stating that, if decisionmaker based his decision on his own independent investigation, the causal link between the subordinates' allegedly retaliatory intent and the termination would be broken).
In this case, Guynn did not provide evidence upon which a reasonable jury could have concluded that Thurston was Miller's "cat's paw" or that the suspension or termination was in an effort to carry out Miller's threat. Thurston decided to terminate Guynn because of her failure to maintain Postal Service funds on July 12, 2000. On July 12, 2000, when Guynn was the evening close-out clerk responsible for the Postal Service funds the official remittance totaling $13,009.29, including $8,701.00 in cash and $4,308.29 in checks and money orders, disappeared. Guynn was in charge of maintaining and securing the funds, but failed to do so. All of the checks and money orders were recovered except for $249.70, but the cash was not recovered. Guynn was the last person who had access to the Postal Service funds, and once given the opportunity failed to explain what happened to the funds. Guynn also failed to maintain Postal Service funds in the past, and was suspended on July 30, 1998, for failure to maintain funds (August 1, 1997, surplus of $342.39; October 28, 1997, shortage of $324.81; February 16, 1998, shortage of $656.32; July 20, 1998, shortage of $1,083.79). Since there is no evidence that Thurston acted in retaliation or as a conduit for Miller's threats, summary judgment is appropriate.
D. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, Postal Service is entitled to judgment as a matter of law on all of the claims stated in the Complaint. Summary Judgment is GRANTED to Defendant Postal Services, and final judgment shall be entered accordingly.
ALL OF WHICH IS ORDERED.