Summary
granting summary judgment on the ground that Craig is not retroactive
Summary of this case from Deutsch v. Circa Bistro LLCOpinion
No. CV02-0515784S
July 7, 2005
RULING ON MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
1. As to the dram shop allegations of count one and the reckless service allegations of count two, the plaintiff is unable to identify the assailant and thus is unable to provide an evidentiary foundation to demonstrate the existence of a genuine issue of material fact. Appleton v. Board of Education, 254 Conn. 205, 209, 757 A.2d 1059 (2000). He is unable to proffer any evidence that the defendants sold any alcohol to the plaintiff's assailant while the assailant was intoxicated let alone that there was even a sale of alcohol to the assailant or that the assailant was intoxicated. See, as to count one, General Statutes § 30-102; Deedon v. Friend's of Jasper McLevy's, Superior Court, judicial district of Fairfield at Bridgeport, Docket No. CV 00 0372489 (January 8, 2003, Wolven, J.) and count two, Kowal v. Hohfer, 181 Conn. 355, 436 A.2d 1 (1980); Craig v. Driscoll, 262 Conn. 312, 325, 813 A.2d 1003 (2003). His conclusory statements do not "constitute evidence sufficient to establish the existence of disputed material facts." Gutpa v. New Britain General Hospital, 239 Conn. 574, 583, 687 A.2d 111 (1996). The motion is therefore granted.
2. As to the negligent service allegations of count four, the motion is granted; first, for the reason that the ruling of Craig v. Driscoll, supra, is not retroactive; see, for example, Estate of Ridgaway v. Silk, Superior Court, complex litigation docket at Middlesex, Docket No. CV 01 0103518 (April 28, 2004, Quinn, J.) ( 36 Conn. L. Rptr. 872); Stavola v. Costa, Superior Court, judicial district of Danbury, Docket No. CV03-0350462 S (January 18, 2005, Moraghan, J.) ( 38 Conn. L. Rptr. 530); Public Acts 2003, No. 03-91. This court notes that there are other Superior Court judges who have adopted a contrary position; see Shortt v. Senor Ponchos, Inc., Superior Court, judicial district of Waterbury, Docket No. CV 044000928 (May 17, 2005, Gallagher J.) but it not does adopt that reasoning. Second, to the extent a cause of action did exist, the motion would be granted for the reasons set forth above.
3. As to the safe premises allegations of count three, the motion for summary judgment is denied as there are material factual issues extant.
Berger, J.