Opinion
43380.
SUBMITTED JANUARY 15, 1968.
DECIDED FEBRUARY 9, 1968.
Larceny of automobile. Fulton Superior Court. Before Judge Alverson.
William L. Gower, for appellant. Lewis R. Slaton, Solicitor General, J. Walter LeCraw, J. Roger Thompson, Amber W. Anderson, for appellee.
1. Where it appears that the defendant, arrested on another charge, voluntarily surrendered to the police officers who arrested him, an automobile in his possession which was later determined to have been stolen, the seizure of the vehicle was not unlawful.
2. Since the defendant voluntarily surrendered possession of the automobile and also disclaimed ownership thereof, he has no standing to complain that any subsequent search of the vehicle without a warrant was a violation of his rights.
SUBMITTED JANUARY 15, 1968 — DECIDED FEBRUARY 9, 1968.
The defendant was arrested March 6, 1967, on a cheating and swindling warrant. An automobile which he first identified as his was parked on the street adjacent to a business concern. When further questioned, he denied ownership, stating it had been left with him by a named nonresident, and that he had no identifying papers. Concerning the automobile he testified that the detective said: "Give me your keys." "I said, `Here you are.' I gave him the keys and that is all I know about it until . . ." The police officer testified as follows: "Q. Why did you have the automobile impounded? A. Well, I asked him was there anyone that could drive the car and he said there was not. He had the keys to the Cadillac in his pocket and gave them to me. I told him I would have to impound it for safekeeping." The defendant was placed in jail and the automobile in the police garage. The following day the serial plaque was removed from the door frame, it was ascertained that the numbers had been changed, and an inspection of the concealed serial numbers in the car frame indicated that the visible number had been tampered with. Further investigation revealed that the car was a stolen vehicle, the owner was located, the defendant was indicted, tried and convicted of larceny of an automobile. The sole enumeration of error insisted on is the overruling of a motion to suppress evidence on the ground that it was illegally obtained in that the officers, before examining and removing the serial number of the automobile, should have obtained a search warrant.
1. The actual seizure of the automobile took place at the time of the defendant's arrest on the first charge. It is not necessary for us to rule whether under the circumstances the procedure was legal or not; from the testimony of the officer and the statement of the defendant it does not appear that the latter's surrender of the keys was the result of duress, and the defendant did not deny the statement of the officer that before impounding the vehicle he gave the defendant an opportunity to get someone else to drive it away. There was at least a tacit acquiescence on the part of the defendant in relinquishing possession of the vehicle for the announced purpose of getting it off the street.
2. "Objection that an automobile was illegally searched without a warrant is not available to one who makes no claim to the ownership or possession of the automobile or its contents and who was not present at the time of the search." Cain v. State, 113 Ga. App. 477 (3) ( 148 S.E.2d 508). The defendant disclaimed ownership, could not give the police officers information on the whereabouts of the owner, and parted with custody when he gave them the keys for the purpose of having the vehicle removed to the police garage. The Constitution prohibits only searches which are unreasonable, and reasonableness is to be decided on its own facts and circumstances. Cash v. State, 222 Ga. 55, 59 ( 148 S.E.2d 420). The search, in view of the ignorance as to the identity of the true owner, was not unreasonable. Cf. Cotton v. United States, 371 F.2d 385.
Judgment affirmed. Jordan, P. J., and Pannell, J., concur.