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finding that Magistrate Judge "properly exercised his discretion" by ending "an already extensive discovery period . . . ."
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99 Civ. 11490 (RCC)(FM)
August 12, 2002
OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff Gucci America, Inc. ("Gucci") filed this action against defendants Exclusive Imports International ("Exclusive"), Imperial Trading, Ltd. ("Imperial"), Innopex, Ltd. ("Innopex"), Cyril Israelson ("Israelson"), Joshua Frankel ("Frankel") and Aaron Wagschal ("Wagschal"). Gucci claims, inter alia that defendants infringed its trademark by engaging in the distribution of counterfeit Gucci watches. Defendants hotly contest Gucci's claims, and discovery has been particularly contentious. Now before the Court are the parties' objections to several rulings of Magistrate Judge Maas, who is currently supervising pre-trial proceedings.
Defendant Teitelbaum was dismissed from the case by stipulation dated April 27, 2001.
This is not the first time that the parties have brought their discovery disputes to this Court. See Gucci America, Inc. v. Exclusive Imports Int'l, No. 99 Civ. 11490 (RCC), 2001 WL 21253 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 9, 2001). Familiarity with the Court's earlier opinion is presumed.
DISCUSSION
The district court may reverse a Magistrate's findings as to non-dispositive matters only if they are clearly erroneous or contrary to law. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(a); 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A). Magistrates have broad discretion in resolving discovery disputes and those decisions are reviewed under an "abuse of discretion" standard. See Moss v. Enlarged City School Dist. of City of Amsterdam, 166 F. Supp.2d 668, 670 (N.D.N.Y. 2001) ("[M]agistrate judges are given broad discretion with respect to pre-trial discovery issues and reversal is warranted only when that discretion is abused.") (citations omitted); see also Thomas E. Hoar, Inc. v. Sara Lee Corp., 900 F.2d 522, 525 (2d Cir. 1990). With respect to dispositive matters, the district court undertakes a de novo review. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b).The Court will address in turn the orders entered by Judge Maas.
I. The January 31, 2001 Orders
On January 31, 2001, Judge Maas held a conference during which he made a number of oral rulings. Gucci objects to two of those orders. First, Judge Maas precluded Gucci from arguing at trial that certain evidence, consisting of several Gucci watches, was tampered with while in the possession of defendants' counsel. Judge Maas concluded that Gucci had waived this argument by moving for defense counsel's disqualification and a hearing and then withdrawing the motion. (Transcript dated January 31, 2001 ("1/31/01 Tr."), at 3.) Second, Judge Maas denied Gucci's request to take discovery regarding the sale of counterfeit Gucci watches by a Canadian retailer, Costco Canada, Inc. ("Costco Canada"). Costco Canada was supplied with the allegedly counterfeit goods by defendant Innopex and its principal, defendant Joshua Frankel. Judge Maas held that, because there was insufficient proof of a nexus with the United States, discovery as to the Canadian transactions would be "tangential and beyond the appropriate scope of discovery in this case." (Id. at 12.) Judge Maas also concluded that the Canadian activity did not constitute a "similar act" for purposes of Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b). (Id. at 11.)
Gucci also objected to a third ruling requiring Gucci to produce its expert for further deposition. That issue is now moot because Gucci's expert did in fact provide the additional testimony. (Letter to the Court from Milton Springut dated March 4, 2002, at 2.)
A. The Tampering Issue
Gucci argues that preclusion of evidence as to the tampering deprives Gucci of its right to a jury trial because it calls its expert's credibility into question. At deposition, Gucci's expert, Jean Michel Guerry, had identified certain genuine watches as counterfeit, and vice versa. Gucci alleged that the reason for the identification difficulty was that the watches were tampered with while in the possession of defense counsel. Defendants denied that any tampering had occurred and offered to provide testimony to that effect.
Judge Maas ordered a hearing on the issue and directed the parties to submit written statements as to their respective positions. However, by letter dated January 16, 2001, plaintiff withdrew its disqualification motion and request for a hearing, but purported to reserve the issue for trial. Judge Maas rejected plaintiff's reservation:
Gucci determined that it was no longer in its interest to pursue the disqualification motion at a hearing. Gucci proffered the following reasons for its reversal: (1) defense counsel already had viewed the most sensitive discovery in the case; (2) a hearing would involve considerable expense and inconvenience; (3) the issue of credibility was one for the jury; and (4) disqualification would delay the case. (Plaintiff's Objections dated February 14, 2001, at 4.)
In my view, Mr. Springut, by withdrawing the request to have this heard pretrial, you are waiving the opportunity to challenge or to present the case that the watches that are in the possession of counsel were tampered with while in the possession of counsel, and will not be able to raise that at trial because you'd be sandbagging the defendant who then would have no way of responding without voucher, so at a minimum in my view that is moved out of the case for trial.
(1/31/01 Tr. at 3.)
Judge Maas' ruling was not clearly erroneous. First, Gucci cites no authority for its proposition that its right to a jury trial has been undermined by Judge Maas' ruling. Rather, it is well settled that courts have the discretion to rule on evidentiary matters pre-trial, particularly those that may involve an abuse of the judicial process. See Gonzalez v. Trinity Marine Grp., 117 F.3d 894, 898 (5th Cir. 1997) (affirming use of pre-trial hearing in order to address allegations of evidence tampering and noting that such a decision is "wholly within the discretion of the district court and does not deprive Plaintiff of his right to a jury trial on his claims"). Indeed, if the Court were to allow plaintiff to accuse opposing counsel during trial of tampering with evidence, without first finding some basis for the accusation, a new trial might be warranted. See, e.g., Draper v. Airco, Inc., 580 F.2d 91, 94-96 (3d Cir. 1978) (reversing jury verdict where plaintiff implied that defense counsel had engaged in misconduct by withholding evidence).
Gucci simply has not provided any grounds for overturning Judge Maas' ruling. Therefore, pursuant to that ruling, Gucci may not argue or present a case during trial that the watches were tampered with while in the possession of defense counsel.
B. The Canadian Discovery
Gucci also appeals Judge Maas' decision to deny discovery regarding the alleged distribution of counterfeit watches to Costco Canada. First, Gucci takes issue with Judge Maas' determination that the Canadian transactions lack a nexus with the United States and therefore are not relevant. Specifically, Gucci claims that an adequate nexus exists because some of the watches were processed through Costco's office in Washington State.
Alternatively, Gucci argues that discovery as to the Canadian sales should be permitted because, contrary to Judge Maas' conclusion, such evidence is admissible on the issue of willfulness under Fed.R.Evid. 404(b). Specifically, Gucci argues that willfulness can be shown because Innopex and Frankel were supplying Costco Canada at the same time they were on notice that the watches they had sold in New York were counterfeit.
Although this issue is a close one, this Court cannot say that Judge Maas' resolution of it was clearly erroneous. First, although Gucci contends that certain Canadian sales were "processed" through Costco's corporate office in Washington State, Gucci submitted no evidentiary support for that allegation and, in contrast, defendants submitted documents to contradict it. Judge Maas specifically found that plaintiffs proof was insufficient to justify discovery. (1/31/01 Tr. at 12.) Nor is it clear in any event that such "processing" would support a Lanham Act claim. See Vanity Fair Mills, Inc. v. T. Eaton Co., 234 F.2d 633 (2d Cir. 1956) (dismissing Lanham Act claims against a Canadian defendant for sales that occurred in Canada). Therefore, the Court cannot conclude that Judge Maas abused his discretion in denying discovery on that basis.
Second, Judge Maas did not clearly err in concluding that, because the Canadian sales were "not a violation of the US trademark laws," they did not constitute a similar act under Fed R. Evid. 404(b). (1/31/01 Tr. at 11-12.) Although evidence regarding contemporaneous infringing conduct in the United States probably would be admissible on the issue of willfulness, see, e.g., International Star Class Yacht Racing Ass'n v. Tommy Hilfiger, U.S.A. Inc, 80 F.3d 749, 754 (2d Cir. 1996), at issue here is conduct occurring outside this country which is subject only to Canadian law.
On this appeal, Gucci has submitted excerpts of Canadian statutes and asks this Court to make a determination that defendants' conduct was unlawful thereunder. As a preliminary matter, it should be noted that those legal authorities were not presented to the Magistrate Judge. Moreover, Gucci is in essence asking this Court to try two cases — in other words, to first determine whether defendants' conduct in Canada violated Canadian law and then to use that finding in assessing liability and damages in the instant case. The Court has found no case law, and Gucci has cited to none, requiring it to undertake such a process. Therefore, Gucci has failed to show that the Magistrate's decision to disallow the requested discovery was clearly erroneous. Consequently, Judge Maas' determination will be upheld.
This is not a situation where defendants have been found guilty by Canadian authorities or had a judgment entered against them by a Canadian court. Indeed, according to the record before the Court, an investigation by the Royal Canadian Mounted Police concluded that "there was no evidence to suggest that [defendants] had the requisite knowledge or intent to traffic in counterfeit watches." (Defendants' Response to Plaintiff's Objections dated March 5, 2001, Ex. 4.)
II. The February 21, 2001, and March 6, 2001 Orders
Gucci next objects to an oral ruling made by Judge Maas on February 21, 2001, which was memorialized in writing on March 6, 2001. At issue is whether Judge Maas correctly ruled that Gucci Group, N.V. ("Gucci Group"), plaintiff's indirect parent corporation, remains in this action as a counterclaim defendant.
Plaintiff Gucci is a wholly owned subsidiary of Gucci North America Holdings, Inc., a Delaware corporation, which is a wholly owned subsidiary of Gucci Group, a Netherlands corporation.
This Court, in its earlier Opinion and Order, struck the Amended Answer and Counterclaims filed on December 11, 2000, by defendants Imperial and Exclusive, which contained, among other things, certain antitrust allegations against Gucci Group. 2001 WL 21253, at *5. This Court so ruled because defendants had failed to obtain the prior permission of the Court to amend their pleadings as required by Rule 15 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. (Id.) This Court also determined that leave to amend would be denied because, inter alia, the antitrust counterclaims would inject delay into the case and were factually remote from the counterfeiting issues. (Id. at *6.) Given its decision to strike the pleadings of those defendants, it was this Court's assumption that no counterclaims against Gucci Group remained in the case and that therefore Gucci Group was no longer a party to the action. The Court based this assumption on the fact that Innopex, the only other defendant asserting counterclaims against Gucci Group, had apparently dropped those claims by not including them in its amended answer. (Id. at *5 n. 5.)
Imperial also had amended its answer and counterclaims once before without permission, on April 3, 2000.
Innopex asserted counterclaims in its initial answer on April 3, 2000, but dropped them in its subsequent amended answer filed on December 11, 2000.
Relying on this Court's decision, Judge Maas ruled in January 2001 that Mr. Tom Ford, a high-level executive of Gucci Group, need not be produced for deposition but instead would have to be subpoenaed under Rule 45. (1/31/01 Tr. at 30.) However, on February 21, 2001, Judge Maas orally reversed that ruling, holding that Gucci Group remained a party to this action based on Innopex's counterclaims. Judge Maas therefore ruled that Mr. Ford could be deposed. Gucci moved for reconsideration, which was denied by Judge Maas in a written Order dated March 6, 2001 (the "March 6, 2001 Order").
In sum, Judge Maas held that, by virtue of Gucci having prevailed on its application to strike the December 11, 2000 Amended Answer and Counterclaims, that pleading was rendered a nullity and therefore the counterclaims raised by Innopex in its initial answer, other than the antitrust counterclaims, were reinstated. (See March 6, 2001 Order at 4.)
Judge Maas' decision is based on an incorrect reading of this Court's Opinion and Order. The December 11, 2000 Amended Answer and Counterclaims constituted a global pleading filed on behalf of defendants Imperial, Innopex, Frankel, Wagschal, Exclusive and Israelson. This Court did not exclude that pleading in its entirety; rather, its decision struck the Amended Answer and Counterclaims only as it pertained to defendants Imperial and Exclusive, because those entities did not have permission, either by the Federal Rules or by order of this Court, to file amended pleadings at such a late date. This accords with the language employed by this Court, holding that "the amended answers and counterclaims filed by defendants Imperial Trading and Exclusive Imports are hereby stricken. . . ." 2001 WL 21253, at *7 (emphasis added).
In contrast, the amended pleading was proper as to defendant Innopex. Because Innopex's initial answer and counterclaims, filed on April 3, 2000, were never answered by counterclaim defendants, Innopex was entitled under the Federal Rules to amend its pleading once before a response was served. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a) ("A party may amend the party's pleading once as a matter of course at any time before a responsive pleading is served. . . ."). Innopex did so by joining the December 11, 2000 pleading but asserting no counterclaims on its behalf. Therefore, Innopex's withdrawal of those counterclaims was proper.
Innopex now argues that it withdrew its counterclaims in reliance on Exclusive and Imperial pursuing those same claims. This statement appears to be nothing more than an after-the-fact rationalization. As Gucci correctly notes, there is no basis in the Federal Rules for a withdrawal of claims conditionally, or in reliance on the pleadings of other parties, nor did Innopex ever indicate at that time that its amendment was so conditioned. Moreover, if Innopex believed that it suffered some actionable injury by virtue of Gucci's conduct, it has an obligation to press the claim on its own behalf, rather than relying on the claims of others.
Therefore, Innopex's counterclaims are no longer in the case, and the Court perceives no basis for reinstating them. Consequently, the only counterclaims remaining in this action are the claims for tortious interference and declaratory judgment asserted by defendant Imperial against Gucci in its pleading of January 26, 2000.
III. The July 6, 2001 Orders
Defendants object to certain discovery rulings of Judge Maas issued on the record on July 6, 2001. Specifically, defendants claim that Judge Maas erred by disallowing certain discovery pertaining primarily to Gucci's watch sources, parts, costs and expert notes thereon. Defendants argue that these items are highly relevant to their defense, which rests on contentions that defendants bought and sold genuine Gucci watches made by Gucci assemblers. According to defendants, this parallel sale of genuine products, while admittedly unauthorized by Gucci, does not violate the Lanham Act under the case of Polymer Tech. Corp. v. Mimram, 37 F.3d 74 (2d Cir. 1994). However, for the reasons set forth below, none of Judge Maas' rulings are clearly erroneous and therefore his orders must be upheld.
A. Defendants' Third Set of Interrogatories
On or about March 2, 2001, Gucci made statements in discovery acknowledging that certain unidentified Gucci watch parts were "uniquely styled" for Gucci, while admitting that other parts were not. In addition, Gucci stated that it was aware of "persons or entities other than Gucci" to whom suppliers have "sold components or parts identical or substantially the same as those sold to Gucci." (Defendants' Objections dated July 20, 2001, at 5-6.)
Defendants, in an attempt to identify these persons and parts, served a Third Set of Interrogatories and a Third Request for Documents on April 4, 2001. Plaintiff refused to respond on the grounds that it had already answered 45 interrogatories, more than the 25 permitted pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 33(a), and that defendants had ample opportunity to obtain that information at deposition. Judge Maas upheld plaintiff's position and did not require plaintiff to answer the interrogatories or to produce the documents.
That decision is not clearly erroneous. Defendants now contend that they are entitled to serve 150 interrogatories because there are six defendants in this action. However, where, as here, the parties are acting in unison and are represented by the same counsel, they may be treated as one party for purposes of the interrogatory limits. See Wright Miller, 8A Fed. Prac. Proc. Civ.2d § 2168.1 (2002). Nor is there anything in the Federal Rules which would entitle defendants to more interrogatories simply because the Magistrate had extended the 25-interrogatory limit once before. In denying the requested discovery, Magistrate Judge Maas properly exercised his discretion to put an end to an already extensive discovery period.
B. Gucci's Watch Costs
During deposition, plaintiff's expert Mr. Guerry refused to answer questions as to Gucci's costs incurred in producing its watches. Defendants moved to compel that information, arguing that evidence as to Gucci's costs is relevant to show that an alleged counterfeiter, who purchased the same parts at the same cost, probably received those parts from a genuine Gucci source. Judge Maas did not find the requested information to be sufficiently relevant:
It seems to me that had your questions during the discovery period been, and where do you buy your cases, where do you buy your backs, where do you buy your own component parts . . . that is relevant to the question of whether or not the watches are counterfeit.
It seems to me costs, if it is conceivably relevant, is relevant only to the motivation or intent of various players in this case, your argument being why would we spend almost as much money to buy a counterfeit watch or perhaps as much money to buy a counterfeit watch as we would spend to buy in the grey market a genuine Gucci watch. . . .
But as to that, Gucci's costs of production as opposed to the price at which a genuine Gucci watch may be available on the chain of distribution strikes me as not really relevant. It may well be that Gucci pays less because Gucci buys in volume.
So as to this request, although I'm certainly not pleased that Mr. Guerry apparently without prompting chose not to answer, I am not going to compel answers at this point.
(Transcript dated July 6, 2001 ("7/6/01 Tr."), at 3.) at 19-20.)
Again, Judge Maas' ruling was not in clear error. Gucci's own costs have no bearing on whether an alleged counterfeiter would find it economical to buy genuine or counterfeit watch components. However, defendants now argue that such costs are relevant to Gucci's motive in bringing this suit, which they allege is to identify rogue Gucci suppliers who sell outside the Gucci chain of distribution in order to cut off discount sales. Whether or not Gucci's aim is to root out such suppliers has little, if any, connection to the cost to Gucci of producing watches. Again, there is simply no basis for overturning Judge Maas' use of his discretion in determining what discovery is appropriate and relevant.
Nor did Gucci "open the door" on this issue by inquiring of defendants' expert Mr. Lewand as to whether it was economical for a counterfeiter to make high quality watches. Gucci was entitled to cross-examine Mr. Lewand about statements he had made on that subject in his expert report.
C. Gucci's Expert Notes
Defendants next take issue with Gucci's claim that it cannot produce the notes taken by its experts, because it has no such notes. According to defendants, this answer is "too pat" and "untrustworthy." (Defendants' Objections dated July 20, 2001, at 11.) Specifically, defendants claim that various evidence and inferences support the conclusion that Jean Martin, Mr. Guerry's assistant, took notes when he aided Mr. Guerry in examining certain watches for Mr. Guerry's expert report. (11 at 12.)
However, Gucci did not represent to Judge Maas that Mr. Martin did not take such notes. Rather, Gucci represented that it undertook a diligent search and that, to the extent the notes ever existed, they were destroyed long ago. (See 7/6/01 Tr. at 26-27.) Judge Maas found this explanation acceptable:
I am satisfied. I am not going to require anything further with respect to the notes of Mr. Guerry or Mr. Martin, despite the fact that those notes may have existed and have now been destroyed or lost. If Mr. Guerry testifies at the trial I would think that would be certainly grist for the mill.
(Id. at 27-28.)
Defendants argue that Judge Maas should have ordered further inquiries, and allowed defendants to question Mr. Martin as to whether he retained such notes in his personal files. However, Judge Maas obviously was satisfied with Gucci's representations that no notes existed and there was no abuse of discretion in accepting counsel's statements on the record.
Defendants suggest that Mr. Martin should be precluded from trial because he was not produced for deposition. This issue is premature. The Court will address it prior to trial after receiving the parties' witness lists.
Defendants also argue that Judge Maas erred by not requiring plaintiff to produce certain documents that Mr. Guerry had reviewed in connection with his supplemental report. Defendants contend that Judge Maas, at the very least, should have evaluated those documents in camera before accepting plaintiff's privilege assertions. However, defendants cite no authority for the proposition that Judge Maas was obligated to conduct a hands-on review. Judge Maas acted within his discretion in directing plaintiff's counsel to described the content of those documents on the record, and so ruling on that basis. Again, defendants have failed to make any showing of clear error here.
D. Interrogatory Verifications
Gucci at various times served five verifications to interrogatory responses signed by Karen Lombardo, the Gucci Vice President of Human Resources. Defendants took Ms. Lombardo's deposition, allegedly because they suspected she was "merely a figurehead `primed' by counsel to sign for plaintiff." (Defendants' Objections dated July 20, 2001, at 14.) At the deposition, Ms. Lombardo testified that she had no knowledge of the substantive truth of the interrogatory responses and had taken no independent verification of the facts asserted, but had instead relied upon information furnished by counsel. Defendants now claim that Ms. Lombardo's lack of personal knowledge runs afoul of Fed.R.Civ.P. 33(b).
Judge Maas declined to impose sanctions, stating first that the purpose of the verification requirement is primarily so that the answering party is bound by its responses. (See 7/6/01 Tr. at 9.) Judge Maas went on to observe that:
[A]s a practical matter here a lot of the information that was requested had to come from different sources, some which [sic] were not even Gucci America because of the internecine relationships among various Gucci corporations such that counsel may well have been the only person who could coordinate the information.
I know that a lot of this is consistent with [defendants'] theory that [plaintiff's counsel], in effect, is the director of copyright enforcement or trademark enforcement for Gucci. But even if that were the case, that certainly is an option that Gucci has available to it, so long as a corporate officer who felt that he or she could reasonably rely on [counsel's] representations did it and the responses are signed in appropriate form. . . .
(Id. at 9-10.)
There was no clear error in Judge Maas' decision to reject defendants' request for sanctions. First and foremost, defendants make no allegation that the substance of the responses was untrue, thus they have not been prejudiced by Ms. Lombardo's lack of personal knowledge. Moreover, defendants could, and did, ask for the identities of those persons who provided the information contained in the interrogatory responses.
Secondly, defendants cite no case law which would preclude a corporate representative from relying on counsel's efforts in gathering information and drafting appropriate interrogatory responses. Indeed, as one Court of Appeals has noted:
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 33 expressly permits a representative of a corporate party to verify the corporation's answers without personal knowledge of every response by furnishing such information as is available to the party. of course, the representative must have a basis for signing the responses and for thereby stating on behalf of the corporation that the responses are accurate. The representative may accomplish this through whatever internal process the corporation has chosen, including discussions with counsel.
Shepherd v. ABC, Inc., 62 F.3d 1469, 1482 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (internal citations omitted). Therefore, it cannot be said that Judge Maas' ruling was clearly erroneous.
E. Gucci's Rule 30(b)(6) Witness
Similar to the above situation, defendants complain that Gucci designated Robert Artelt as its Rule 30(b)(6) witness, despite Mr. Artelt's lack of familiarity with the noticed subjects, in order to avoid producing a witness with actual knowledge, and because Mr. Artelt was already a named deponent. Defendants argue that Mr. Artelt had no personal knowledge of the Rule 30(b)(6) subject matters, but instead based his testimony on information provided by plaintiff's counsel prior to deposition. Defendants therefore contend that Mr. Artelt's testimony was inadequate, especially with respect to (1) the chain of custody of certain alleged counterfeit watches and (2) the sources known to Gucci of those watches and parts.
Mr. Artelt is the Managing Director of Gucci Timepieces America, an affiliate of plaintiff.
Judge Maas rejected defendants' argument, holding that the Rule 30(b)(6) witness need not be the most knowledgeable and finding that "on balance [Mr. Artelt] was marginally adequate." Again, there is no clear error here. Because Rule 30(b)(6) witnesses testify on the corporation's behalf, courts routinely hold that such deponents need not have personal knowledge on a given subject, so long as they are able to convey the information known to the corporation. See Dravo Corp. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 164 F.R.D. 70, 75 (D. Neb. 1995) ("If the persons designated by the corporation do not possess personal knowledge of the matters set out in the deposition notice, the corporation is obligated to prepare the designees so that they may give knowledgeable and binding answers for the corporation.") (citing Marker v. Union Fidelity Life Ins. Co., 125 F.R.D. 121, 126 (M.D.N.C. 1989)); see also Cruz v. Coach Stores, Inc., No. 96 Civ. 8099, 1998 WL 812045, at *4 n. 3 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 18, 1998) ("Rule 30(b)(6) does not require a party to produce someone who is `most knowledgeable' but only someone whose testimony is binding on the party."), aff'd in part, vacated in part on other grounds, 202 F.3d 560, 573 (2d Cir. 2000).
Moreover, plaintiff has represented that the knowledge imparted to Mr. Artelt is the sum of all knowledge known to both Gucci and its affiliates. Thus there is simply no basis for overturning Judge Maas' ruling in this respect.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Magistrate Judge's Orders of January 31, 2001, and July 6, 2001, are upheld in all respects. The Magistrate Judge's Orders of February 21, 2001, and March 6, 2001, are vacated and remanded, in light of this Opinion and Order, for consideration as to what, if any, discovery should be available from Gucci Group and/or other non-parties. Furthermore, the parties are directed to appear before this Court on September 20, 2002, at 9:30 a.m. for the scheduling of their requested summary judgment motions.