Opinion
No. 10-18-00273-CR
08-10-2020
Daniel Benito GUAJARDO, Appellant v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee
Daniel Guajardo appeals from a conviction for possession of a controlled substance with the intent to deliver of four grams or more but less than 200 grams, a first degree felony. TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 481.112(d). Based on two prior convictions, Guajardo was sentenced to 99 years in prison as a habitual offender. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 12.42(d). Guajardo complains that the evidence was insufficient for the jury to have found that the first conviction was final prior to the commission of the second offense and that the judgment erroneously states that he pled true to the enhancement allegations. Because we find that the evidence as to the finality of the first enhancement paragraph prior to the commission of the second offense is insufficient, we reverse the judgment and remand for a new trial on punishment only.
In his first issue, Guajardo complains that the evidence was insufficient for the jury to have found that his first conviction was final prior to the commission of the second offense. Guajardo was put on probation in 2003 for a felony offense in California, which was either revoked or ended on December 14, 2004. The indictment in the second offense in California shows that the second offense was committed on or about December 30, 2003.
In order to enhance punishment as a habitual offender, the first conviction must be final at the time of the commission of the second offense. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 12.42(d). "[A] conviction is not final for enhancement purposes where the imposition of sentence has been suspended and probation granted." Ex Parte Pue , 552 S.W.3d 226, 230 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018) (internal citations omitted). In this proceeding, the evidence showed that Guajardo was placed on probation for the first offense which was not completed at the time that the second offense was committed. Because of this, we find that the evidence was insufficient for Guajardo to have been sentenced as a habitual offender pursuant to Section 12.42(d).
There are no other convictions upon which the enhancements would be proper shown in the record.
The State concedes that the evidence did not show that the first conviction was final prior to the commission of the second offense. However, the State argues that even though Guajardo raised this issue as a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, we should not consider it as argued but reform his issue as a complaint regarding the jury charge. It is possible to frame this issue as a challenge to the jury charge that submits an erroneous instruction regarding the range of punishment; however, this is not the complaint made by Guajardo and we will not address this issue in a manner that the appellant has not raised.
The State had the burden to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the second offense was committed after the first conviction became final. Jordan v. State , 256 S.W.3d 286, 291 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008). Where the State fails to meet this burden, "[a] harmless error analysis should not be undertaken" and the case should be remanded for a new punishment hearing. Id.
Although the State concedes that the sentence could not properly be enhanced based on two prior sequential convictions pursuant to the evidence, the State contends that we should not follow Jordan , but rather that we should conduct a harm analysis and find that the error was harmless because the error only affected the minimum available punishment range—raising it from fifteen to twenty-five years' imprisonment—and did not impact the maximum punishment at all. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. §§ 12.42(b), (d). Because the jury sentenced Guajardo to ninety-nine years' imprisonment—the same maximum punishment available under his indictment even without the first or second conviction—the State contends any error as to the minimum available punishment had no effect on the jury's deliberations and was harmless. Cf. Jordan , 256 S.W.3d at 295 (Keller, P.J., dissenting) (stating that harmlessness of evidentiary insufficiency as to enhancement allegation seemed apparent because jury assessed ninety-nine years' imprisonment, which was top of punishment range).
The State contends that more recent opinions of the Court of Criminal Appeals cast doubt on the propriety and necessity of a harm analysis. See Lake v. State , 532 S.W.3d 408, 411 (Tex. Crim. App. 2017) (plurality op.) (in the absence of structural error, appellate courts should not automatically foreclose application of the harmless error test); Schmutz v. State , 440 S.W.3d 29, (Tex. Crim. App. 2014) (same). We agree with the State that more recent decisions of the Court of Criminal Appeals might be construed to cast doubt on the holding in Jordan that a harm analysis is not necessary. However, the Court of Criminal Appeals' holding in Jordan is still binding precedent regarding this issue and as an intermediate court, we are required to follow it. See State of Texas ex rel. Vance v. Clawson , 465 S.W.2d 164, 168 (Tex. Crim. App. 1971).
However, even if we were to conclude that this type of error is subject to a harm analysis, the Court of Criminal Appeals also determined in Jordan that the State's failure to meet its burden of proof as to this issue "can never be deemed harmless." Jordan , 256 S.W.3d at 293 (noting that "the jury's unsupported finding of true to the second enhancement allegation could very well have generated an inherent, institutional pressure to impose a greater sentence" and that "the legislative purpose behind the habitual felony-enhancement statute is to punish more harshly persons who repeatedly commit crimes"). Because of this, reversal would also be required.
Having found that the evidence is insufficient to support the finding that the offense in the second enhancement occurred after the first conviction became final for purposes of enhancing Guajardo's punishment as a matter of law, we reverse the punishment portion of the trial court's judgment and remand for a new punishment trial. See TEX. CRIM. PROC. CODE art. 44.29(b) ; Jordan , 256 S.W.3d at 289-93. Guajardo's first issue is sustained. Because we have found that Guajardo is entitled to a new trial on punishment, we do not reach his second issue regarding the error in the judgment, which would ostensibly be corrected in the new judgment after the new trial on punishment.
CONCLUSION
Having found that the evidence was insufficient regarding the two convictions necessary for enhancement of Guajardo's punishment as a habitual offender pursuant to Section 12.42(d), we reverse the judgment and remand this proceeding for a new trial on punishment only.
(Justice Neill concurring with an opinion)
CONCURRING OPINION
JOHN E. NEILL, Justice
At the outset, I recognize that the lead opinion correctly concluded that the evidence in this case does not support the enhancement allegation. The question then is what should be done about it. Simply because Guajardo complains that the evidence is "insufficient" should not, per se, obviate a harm analysis. With respect to the enhancement allegation, we are addressing a punishment issue that impacts the sentencing range, not guilt/innocence. In a similar vein, in her dissent in Jordan , Presiding Judge Keller compared this situation to relief afforded when the evidence is insufficient to support a deadly-weapon finding. See Jordan v. State , 256 S.W.3d 286, 294 (Keller, P.J., dissenting). In that instance, we simply delete the deadly-weapon finding. See id. Or, in other words, "[a] conclusion on appeal that the evidence is legally insufficient to support a particular verdict or finding serves to remove that verdict or finding from the case. Period." Id. Therefore, because the evidence in the record failed to support the enhancement allegation, the enhancement should have never been submitted to the jury. Accordingly, the lower end of the punishment range would have been fifteen years, rather than twenty-five years. Like Presiding Judge Keller, I would conclude that Guajardo's request for relief is really jury-charge error that flows from the evidentiary insufficiency. See id. at 294.
However, regardless of whether one agrees with the preceding conclusion, the next step involves whether or not a harm analysis should be conducted. I recognize that, under similar circumstances, a majority on the Court of Criminal Appeals concluded that the "court of appeals was correct in refusing to conduct a harm analysis in this case" and reversed the trial court's judgment and remanded for a new punishment hearing. See id. at 292-93. The facts in this case are identical to those in Jordan and, thus, provide a second opportunity to review Jordan in light of the law on structural error and more recent decisions from the Court of Criminal Appeals. For the reasons articulated below, I believe that a complete harm analysis should have been done in Jordan and should be done in this case.
A structural error is a " ‘defect affecting the framework within which the trial proceeds, rather than simply an error in the trial process itself.’ " Johnson v. United States , 520 U.S. 461, 468, 117 S. Ct. 1544, 137 L. Ed. 2d 718 (1997) (quoting Arizona v. Fulminante , 499 U.S. 279, 310, 111 S. Ct. 1246, 113 L.Ed.2d 302 (1991) ); see Mendez v. State , 138 S.W.3d 334, 339 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004). Structural errors "give rise to automatic reversal, with no harm analysis whatsoever." Johnson v. State , 169 S.W.3d 223, 232 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005). An appellate court may "not review and analyze a claim of error as structural error unless the United States Supreme Court has defined the error as structural...." Burks v. State , 227 S.W.3d 138, 144 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2006, pet. ref'd) (citing Gray v. State , 159 S.W.3d 95, 97 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005) ). In the following types of cases, the United States Supreme Court has found structural errors: (1) a total deprivation of the right to counsel; (2) lack of an impartial trial judge; (3) unlawful exclusion of grand jurors of a defendant's race; (4) violation of the right to self-representation; (5) violation of the right to a public trial; (6) Ake error; and (7) an erroneous reasonable-doubt instruction to the jury. See Mendez , 138 S.W.3d at 340 (citing Johnson , 520 U.S. at 468-69, 117 S.Ct. 1544 ); see also Rey v. State , 897 S.W.2d 333, 345 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995).
"All structural errors must be founded on a violation of a federal constitutional right, but not all violations of federal constitutional rights amount to structural errors." Schmutz v. State , 440 S.W.3d 29 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014). Indeed, "[m]ost constitutional errors are not ‘structural.’ " Mendez , 138 S.W.3d at 340. "For federal constitutional error that is not structural, the applicable harm analysis requires the appellate court to reverse unless it determines beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did not contribute to the defendant's conviction or punishment." Lake v. State , 532 S.W.3d 408, 411 (Tex. Crim. App. 2017) (plurality op.) (citing TEX. R. APP. P. 44.2(a) ).
The situation in the case at bar is not listed among those deemed structural by the United States Supreme Court. Therefore, the error in this case is not structural and should be subjected to a harmless-error analysis. See Lake , 532 S.W.3d at 411.
It is also noteworthy that the United States Supreme Court has held that the failure to submit an element of the offense to the jury was not structural error and was thus subject to a constitutional harmless-error review. Neder v. United States , 527 U.S. 1, 8, 119 S. Ct. 1827, 144 L.Ed.2d 35 (1999). Neder was charged with mail fraud, wire fraud, and bank fraud. Id. at 6, 119 S. Ct. 1827. At trial, the court failed to include materiality as an element of the offense in its jury instructions, although it is an element of all three crimes. Id. at 4-6, 119 S. Ct. 1827. The Supreme Court held that this was error, but subject to a Chapman harmless-error analysis. Id. at 4, 119 S. Ct. 1827 (citing Chapman v. California , 386 U.S. 18, 24, 87 S. Ct. 824, 17 L. Ed. 2d 705 (1966) ). Surely, if the omission of a necessary element in the charge during the guilt-innocence phase is subject to harmless-error analysis, the trial court's error in submitting the enhancement allegation in this case without sufficient evidence of the proper sequencing should also warrant harmless-error analysis.
Nevertheless, the Jordan majority relied on prior decisions in Russell v. State , 790 S.W.2d 655 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990) and Jones v. State , 711 S.W.2d 634 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986) to support its conclusion that a harm analysis should not be conducted when the State failed to meet its burden of showing finality of the enhancement conviction. See 256 S.W.3d at 291. Both of these cases predate the Court's major pronouncement in Cain v. State regarding the application of harmless-error analysis to all errors not deemed structural by the United States Supreme Court. 947 S.W.2d 262, 264 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997) ("Except for certain federal constitutional errors labeled by the United States Supreme Court as ‘structural,’ no error, whether it relates to jurisdiction, voluntariness of a plea, or any other mandatory requirement, is categorically immune to a harmless error analysis. Of course, where the error involved defies analysis by harmless error standards or the data is insufficient to conduct a meaningful analysis, then the error will not be proven harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.... Hence, it may be true that some kinds of errors (particularly jurisdictional ones) will never be harmless ... and that some other kinds of errors will rarely be harmless. But, appellate courts should not automatically foreclose application of the harmless error test to certain categories of errors.").
Additionally, the Jordan majority later emphasized that the "absence of discrete, objective facts decided by a jury in assessing punishment" prevents a reviewing court from quantifying what impact the unsupported finding had on a jury's normative sentencing function. 256 S.W.3d at 293. Thus, "[u]nder these circumstances, the State's failure to meet its burden of proof, even if subjected to a harm analysis, can never be deemed harmless." Id.
Arguably, the Jordan majority conducted a harm analysis—albeit an abbreviated one. See id. Furthermore, just because a particular error might result in a conclusion of harm in most, if not all, instances should not eliminate the need for a harm analysis altogether. Such analysis is important for consistency in the law, especially considering the analysis in the Jordan majority appears to be inconsistent with the law on structural error, as well as other decisions from the Court of Criminal Appeals. See Lake , 532 S.W.3d at 411 ("Even when an error that is not structural under Cain seems to defy proper analysis or the data seems to be insufficient to assess harm, an appellate court is obligated to conduct a thorough analysis to determine the extent of harm caused by this error before reversing the conviction.... If, after such analysis, the harm of the error cannot be assessed, the error will not be proven harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, but appellate courts should not automatically foreclose application of the harmless error test." (internal quotations & footnotes omitted)).
In her dissent, Presiding Judge Keller emphasized that:
Even if the jury had been correctly instructed, it would have heard exactly the same evidence. The prior convictions would still have been presented as "convictions" rather than simple bad acts. The only differences are that the jury would have been permitted to assess a lower minimum punishment, and the range of punishment would have been expanded by ten years. But the jury gave appellant 99 years—the highest term of years possible. I could readily conclude that the ten-year difference in the lower end of the punishment range might have mattered if the jury had assessed 25 years or 50 years, or even 75 years. But not 99 years.
Jordan , 256 S.W.3d at 295 (Keller, P.J., dissenting).
Similarly, in the instant case, Guajardo was sentenced to 99 years—the highest term of years possible. Furthermore, the prior conviction would still have been presented to and considered by the jury. And like Presiding Judge Keller, I would have conducted a harm analysis on this non-structural error and ultimately concluded that the error was harmless, especially given that Guajardo was sentenced at the very top of the punishment range.
However, I am resigned to the fact that Jordan is still binding precedent regarding this issue, and as an intermediate appellate court, we are required to follow it. See State v. DeLay , 208 S.W.3d 603, 607 (Tex. App.—Austin 2006) ("As an intermediate appellate court, we lack the authority to overrule an opinion of the court of criminal appeals."), aff'd sub nom. State v. Colyandro , 233 S.W.3d 870 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006) ; State v. Stevenson , 993 S.W.2d 857, 867 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1999, no pet.) ("Because a decision of the court of criminal appeals is binding precedent, we are compelled to comply with its dictates."). Further, following Jordan , I believe that the lead opinion appropriately reversed the trial court's judgment and remanded for a new trial on punishment. But, because I believe that the Court of Criminal Appeals should revisit Jordan and, at the very least, require a complete harm analysis for his non-structural error, I respectfully concur in the Court's judgment.