Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County. No. RIC429166, Phillip J. Argento, Judge. (Retired judge of the Los Angeles Super. Ct., assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to art. VI, § 6 of the Cal. Const.) Affirmed.
Robert Gruntz, in pro. per., for Cross-complainant and Appellant.
Manning & Marder, Kass, Ellrod, Ramirez and Darin L. Wessel for Cross-defendant and Respondent.
MILLER, J.
The trial court granted defendant James Wiley’s anti-SLAPP motion, which resulted in plaintiff Robert Gruntz’s first amended cross-complaint being stricken. (Civ. Proc., § 425.16.) The trial court did not grant Gruntz leave to amend his first amended cross-complaint. Gruntz appeals the trial court’s order granting Wiley’s anti-SLAPP motion. Gruntz contends the trial court erred by granting the anti-SLAPP motion because the court improperly concluded that Wiley’s actions, which were at issue in the first amended cross-complaint, were protected by judicial immunity. We affirm the judgment.
“SLAPP” refers to a strategic lawsuit against public participation. (Code Civ. Proc., § 425.16; McConnell v. Innovative Artists Talent & Literary Agency, Inc. (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 169, 175 (McConnell).)
The motion at issue in this appeal was Wiley’s second anti-SLAPP motion. The trial court previously granted Wiley’s first anti-SLAPP motion; however, Gruntz filed another cross-complaint against Wiley. The first cross-complaint was filed on February 23, 2007, under case No. RIC429166. The second cross-complaint was filed on April 23, 2008, under the same case number. Accordingly, although the second cross-complaint is not entitled “First Amended Cross-Complaint,” we will refer to it as such.
All further statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure, unless otherwise indicated.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Gruntz filed a first amended cross-complaint against Wiley, seeking indemnification for a workers’ compensation action. In the worker’s compensation action, Gruntz was being sued by an alleged employee, Daniel Nelson. In his first amended cross-complaint, Gruntz alleged that Wiley was the special master assigned to handle Gruntz’s pending divorce. Gruntz asserted that Wiley had assumed control and responsibility over several of the assets owned by Gruntz and his wife, and therefore, Wiley had a duty to purchase worker’s compensation insurance for those assets. Gruntz alleged that Wiley failed to purchase the necessary worker’s compensation insurance, which is why Wiley was responsible for indemnifying Gruntz in the suit brought by Nelson.
Wiley filed an anti-SLAPP motion, requesting that the trial court strike Gruntz’s first amended cross-complaint, because (1) the claims against Wiley arose from Wiley’s actions as a court-appointed special master, i.e., he had judicial immunity; and (2) Gruntz did not establish that he was likely to prevail on his first amended cross-complaint, because Gruntz’s claim of negligence was barred, (a) by judicial immunity; (b) by the litigation privilege (Civ. Code, § 47); (c) by the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel; (d) because Gruntz failed to establish that Wiley owed a duty of care to Gruntz; and (e) because the negligence claim arose from Gruntz’s own non-delegable duties.
At the hearing on the anti-SLAPP motion, Gruntz argued that his first amended cross-complaint should not be dismissed because Wiley was acting without judicial immunity when Wiley took responsibility for the assets owned by Gruntz and his wife. Gruntz asserted that Wiley was acting more like a receiver than a special master, and therefore, Gruntz’s negligence claim was not barred by judicial immunity because Wiley was acting beyond his role as a special master. In response, Wiley argued that special masters “should have absolute quasi judicial immunity,” because anything less would have “a chilling effect” on the actions of special masters.
The trial court stated that Gruntz “had a very creative argument”; however, the court “didn’t accept it.” The court granted Wiley’s anti-SLAPP motion, and denied Gruntz leave to amend.
DISCUSSION
Gruntz contends that Wiley was acting as a receiver, not a special master, when he took responsibility for the assets owned by Gruntz and his wife. Gruntz asserts that Wiley was acting without the protection of judicial immunity in relation to the Gruntzs’s assets because Wiley was not performing a judicial function; rather, he was performing the function of a receiver. Therefore, Gruntz contends that the trial court erred by granting Wiley’s anti-SLAPP motion because Gruntz’s negligence claim is not barred by judicial immunity. We disagree.
We independently review the trial court’s ruling on Wiley’s anti-SLAPP motion. (McConnell, supra, 175 Cal.App.4th at p. 175.)
“‘[S]ection 425.16 requires that a court engage in a two-step process when determining whether a defendant’s anti-SLAPP motion should be granted. First, the court decides whether the defendant has made a threshold showing that the challenged cause of action is one “arising from” protected activity. [Citation.] If the court finds such a showing has been made, it then must consider whether the plaintiff has demonstrated a probability of prevailing on the claim.’ [Citation.]” (In re Episcopal Church Cases (2009) 45 Cal.4th 467, 477.)
In this case, there is no dispute as to the first prong of the anti-SLAPP analysis. Accordingly, we focus on the second prong—the probability that Gruntz will prevail on his claim of negligence against Wiley. In order to satisfy this second prong, Gruntz “must show the complaint is legally sufficient and ‘“‘supported by a sufficient prima facie showing of facts to sustain a favorable judgment if the evidence submitted by the plaintiff is credited.’”’ [Citation.]” (McConnell, supra, 175 Cal.App.4th at p. 176.)
“Under the concept of ‘quasi-judicial immunity,’ California courts have extended absolute judicial immunity to persons other than judges if those persons act in a judicial or quasi-judicial capacity.” (Howard v. Drapkin (1990) 222 Cal.App.3d843, 852-853 (Howard).) “[Q]uasi-judicial immunity from civil suits for acts performed in the exercise of their duties has been given to grand jurors [citation]; administrative law hearing officers [citation]; arbitrators [citations]; organizations sponsoring an arbitrator [citation]; and prosecutors [citation]. Additionally, the State Bar and the Committee of Bar Examiners, as arms of the Supreme Court, and their officials, as officers of the Supreme Court, have been afforded quasi-judicial immunity from civil suits for acts performed in the exercise of their duties. [Citation.] As with the reason for granting judicial immunity, quasi-judicial immunity is given to promote uninhibited and independent decision making. [Citation.]” (Id. at p. 853, fn. omitted.)
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeal, as well as other federal circuit courts, have uniformly held that receivers appointed by a state court to manage the business assets of a marital estate during a dissolution proceeding “‘are court officers who share the immunity awarded to judges.’ [Citations.]” (New Alaska Development Corp. v. Guetschow (9th Cir. 1989) 869 F.2d 1298, 1303 (New Alaska).) In Howard, supra, the appellate court held that a court-appointed psychologist should be afforded quasi-judicial immunity after determining that the rationale underlying the federal extension of immunity to mediators, guardians ad litem, therapists, receivers, bankruptcy trustees, and other persons appointed by the court for their expertise applied with equal force to California courts. (Howard, supra, 222 Cal.App.3dat pp. 856-860.)
“In Hardy v. Vial [(1957)] 48 Cal.2d 577, our Supreme Court recognized that California courts line up with federal decisions in other types of situations, such as immunity for executive public officers when they are performing nonministerial acts, i.e., when they use their judgment or discretion in performing their jobs. [Citation.] Also,... many California decisions which address the issue of immunity cite with frequency to federal decisions. [Citations.]” (Howard, supra, 222 Cal.App.3dat p. 856-857, fn. omitted.)
We conclude receivers have judicial immunity because (1) multiple federal circuit courts have concluded the same; (2) California courts often rely on federal courts when examining immunity issues; and (3) in accord with the Howard court, “[w]e are persuaded that the approach of the federal courts is consistent with the relevant policy considerations of attracting to an overburdened judicial system the independent and impartial services and expertise upon which that system necessarily depends.” (Howard, supra, 222 Cal.App.3dat p. 857). Accordingly, if Wiley were acting within the role of a receiver, as Gruntz alleges, then he would still be immune from Gruntz’s claim for damages, which means it was proper to grant the anti-SLAPP motion.
We note that a receiver may not be immune from allegations of theft and slander. (New Alaska, supra,869 F.2d at p. 1304); however, in this case, Gruntz is not alleging that Wiley slandered him or stole from him, rather, Gruntz is claiming that Wiley was negligent.
In sum, assuming that Gruntz is correct that Wiley was acting as a receiver, Gruntz’s negligence claim fails because Wiley is protected by quasi-judicial immunity. Therefore, Gruntz has failed to show that his first amended cross-complaint is legally sufficient and supported by a sufficient prima facie showing of facts to sustain a favorable judgment if the evidence submitted by Gruntz is credited. Accordingly, we conclude the trial court did not err by granting Wiley’s anti-SLAPP motion, because Gruntz failed to meet the second prong of the analysis.
Gruntz asserts that he has shown he could prevail on his negligence claim. Gruntz contends that Wiley was appointed to be a special master, and therefore, when Wiley began acting as a receiver, he was no longer performing his appointed role and “was acting in the clear absence of all jurisdiction,” which means that Wiley was not protected by quasi-judicial immunity. Judicial immunity protects judges who have acted in excess of authority, but does not protect judges who have “acted in the ‘clear absence of all jurisdiction.’ [Citations.]” (New Alaska, supra, 869 F.2d at pp. 1301-1302.)
We note that Gruntz appears to be contradicting himself by arguing that Wiley was acting beyond his jurisdictional authority when he took responsibility for Gruntz’s businesses, but at the same time arguing that Wiley was negligent for allegedly failing to purchase worker’s compensation insurance for Gruntz’s business. Nevertheless, we infer from Gruntz’s contradiction that he is taking the position that Wiley did not have authority to take control of Gruntz’s businesses; however, since Wiley did take responsibility for the businesses, he was required to purchase insurance for the businesses.
We begin by examining whether Wiley acted beyond his authority by taking responsibility for Gruntz’s businesses. On May 27, 2004, the trial court appointed Wiley to be special master for the limited purposes of determining the Gruntzs’s business and land ownership interests. On August 2, 2004, Wiley requested that the trial court grant him additional authority, so that he could properly discharge his duties. Two weeks later, Gruntz and his wife stipulated that the court could grant Wiley “all the powers under the code as a special master,” and the trial court did so. After another two week period, the trial court ordered Gruntz and his wife to deposit nearly all of their monies into a trust account with Wiley. The court ordered that all payments related to the Gruntzs’ properties and household bills would be made at Wiley’s discretion.
We infer that the trial court was referring to sections 638 and 639, when granting Wiley “all the powers under the code as special master.”
On October 25, 2004, Wiley filed a declaration with the trial court, which explained that the Gruntzs had deposited approximately $65,000 into the trust account. Wiley declared that he used some of the money to pay various bills, but explained that the $65,000 would likely be used within five months. Wiley moved the trial court to authorize Gruntz’s wife to sell a 36-acre property, valued at nearly $1,000,000, and place the proceeds of the sale in an account for distribution to the Gruntzs’s creditors. The trial court granted Wiley’s motion. On April 18, 2005, the trial court granted a second motion, by Wiley, allowing a 19-acre property, owned by the Gruntzs, to be sold; however, the trial court denied the motion to transfer all of the Gruntzs’s titles to Wiley.
Gruntz contends Wiley acted without jurisdiction because Wiley “took over and managed the businesses and properties of the [Gruntzs].” It is unclear what exactly Gruntz means by Wiley “taking over and managing” the properties and businesses; however, we infer that Gruntz is referring to Wiley paying the bills associated with the properties and businesses. We note that the trial court explicitly ordered that all payments related to the Gruntzs’s properties and family support be made at Wiley’s discretion. Accordingly, when Wiley took charge of the bills related to the businesses and properties, he was not acting without jurisdiction, rather he was responding to a direct order from the trial court.
Next, we examine whether Gruntz is correct that Wiley was negligent for not purchasing worker’s compensation insurance for Gruntz’s business. On May 26, 2005, the trial court ordered that “Gruntz shall either have no employees or provide the appropriate workman’s compensation insurance if he does have employees.” Gruntz filed his first amended cross-complaint seeking indemnification for Wiley’s alleged failure to purchase worker’s compensation insurance on April 23, 2008. Based upon the trial court’s order, it was Gruntz’s, not Wiley’s, duty to ensure that the appropriate worker’s compensation insurance was in place.
In light of the trial court’s orders, we are not convinced (1) that Wiley acted without jurisdiction when he took responsibility for paying the Gruntzs’s bills, or (2) that it was Wiley’s duty to ensure that Gruntz’s business had the appropriate worker’s compensation insurance. Further, as concluded ante, to the extent Gruntz is correct that Wiley was acting as a receiver, Wiley’s actions were protected by quasi-judicial immunity.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. Respondent is awarded his costs on appeal.
We concur: HOLLENHORST Acting P. J., GAUT, J.