Opinion
Civil No. 3:17-CV-2399
09-12-2019
REGINA GROVE, Plaintiff, v. ARAMARK CORP., et al., Defendants.
(Judge Mariani)
( ) REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
I. Introduction
This case arises out of an allegation of employment discrimination brought by the plaintiff against the defendants. Regina Grove filed the instant suit against her employer, Aramark Corporation ("Aramark"), and several of her supervisors, alleging racial discrimination, retaliation, and constructive discharge in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Grove claims that she was forced to leave her job due to the discrimination and retaliation she suffered at work, which she alleges was solely based upon her race.
The defendants have challenged the plaintiff's naming of Aramark Corporation as a defendant and contend that Aramark Corporation is not an existing entity. They further claim that Aramark Campus, LLC, is the entity that employed the plaintiff. (See Doc. 14-3, at 2). Because we have concluded that the plaintiff's claims fail on the merits, we do not find it necessary to address this contention. --------
The defendants filed a motion to dismiss the complaint (Doc. 14), and after review, we gave the parties notice of our intention to treat the motion as a motion for summary judgment pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure since the motion invited consideration of some matters outside the pleadings. The defendants filed a supplemental brief in support of their motion, and the plaintiff has not filed any objections or supplemental brief. Relying upon a body of what are now undisputed facts that Grove has not chosen to challenge, the defendants contend that Grove's claims fail on their merits because she has not sufficiently alleged or shown any facts that support a claim of racial discrimination or retaliation and the uncontested facts defat her claims as a matter of law.
We agree, and for the reasons set forth below, we will recommend that the defendants' motion be granted.
II. Background
Regina Grove was employed by Aramark as a food service employee in the Scranton School District in Scranton, Pennsylvania beginning in 2011. (Doc. 1, ¶ 15). Her complaint alleges that she began experiencing racial discrimination and retaliation at work in January 2017, when she held a food-prep position at Kennedy Elementary School. (Id., ¶¶ 16-17). This position was a part-time position, in which Grove worked about twenty hours per week and was paid at a rate of $11.25 per hour. (Id., ¶ 17). Grove contends that on January 30, 2019, she was informed by the Human Resources Director, Elaine Evans, and the General Manager, Precious Gillard, that she was being promoted to a supervisor position at Tripp Elementary School. (Id., ¶ 19). This position was a full-time position and offered health insurance refund and a pay raise. (Id.) She arrived at Tripp on January 31, 2017 and was introduced as the Kitchen Lead. (Id., ¶ 20). However, on February 2, James Castaldi informed her that she would no longer be working as the Kitchen Lead, but she continued working at Tripp until February 6. (Id., ¶¶ 21-23). It is alleged that on February 3, Grove, who is an African-American female, reported for work at Tripp to find that the Kitchen Lead was now a Caucasian female. (Id., ¶ 22). Ultimately, Grove was informed by Gillard that she was to report back to her food-prep position at Kennedy on or about February 7. (Id., ¶ 23). Grove then contacted the Aramark Employee Complaint Hotline concerning the job transfer. (Id., ¶ 24).
The uncontested facts tendered by the defendants, however, present a useful and compelling factual context and rebuttal to these allegations. It seems that Grove's transfer to this position was understood by all to be a temporary, fill-in, measure pending the return of the incumbent Kitchen Lead, who was a Caucasian woman. Thus, Grove filled in at the position for several days, until the incumbent returned to work, a fact that was understood by all at the time of this temporary assignment.
The complaint then alleges that on February 13, 2017, while Grove was working at Kennedy, she asked her supervisor, Jan Krushinski, if she could leave early. (Id., ¶ 26). Krushinski allegedly responded that Grove could "stand in the corner until her shift end[ed]." (Id.) Krushinski also allegedly told other employees to file grievances against Grove if Grove caused any problems. (Id., ¶ 27). Then, on February 14, Grove attended a meeting with other Aramark employees, including Gillard and Evans, during which she was reprimanded for her absenteeism in November 2016. (Id., ¶ 29). Grove alleges that she believed that her complaints concerning her alleged demotion and Krushinski's behavior were going to be addressed at this meeting but were not. (Id.) Thus, she reported Krushinski's behavior via the Complaint Hotline on February 15. (Id., ¶ 28). Grove then contacted the Aramark Building Manager at Kennedy on February 16 when she did not receive a response from the hotline. (Id., ¶ 30).
Grove attended another meeting with Aramark employees, including Gillard, Castaldi, and Evans, on February 27, 2017 to address a complaint filed against her by Nathan Barrett, Principal of the Scranton School District. (Id., ¶ 31). Grove contends that Barrett filed a complaint alleging that there was a conflict of interest for Grove working at Kennedy because her son attended school there. (Id.) For their part, the defendants do not dispute that Barrett filed a complaint against Grove, but rather they elaborate on the complaint, stating that the complaint was filed because Grove was inappropriately addressing the staff at Kennedy concerning some behavioral issues that her son was having at school after she was explicitly told not to address the staff. (Doc. 15, at 8). Thus, at the conclusion of this meeting, Grove alleges that although other Caucasian employees were permitted to work in schools where their children attended, she was told that she could not return to the school while there was an investigation pending. (Id., ¶ 32).
After a meeting on March 1, 2017 between Castaldi, Barrett, and the Union president, Grove was told that Aramark had to pay her for four weeks. (Doc. 1, ¶¶ 34-35). Additionally, rather than terminating her employment completely, Grove was told she could not return to Kennedy and was offered other positions at other schools, including a school where her other son attended. (Id., ¶ 37). At first, Grove accepted a position at Scranton High School, a six-hour position, but thereafter changed her mind and accepted a position at Williard Elementary School as a monitor, a three-hour position. (Doc. 14-23, at 2). Grove was employed in this position at the time she alleges she was constructively discharged in August 2017, as she was set to return to work but could not return due to the discrimination and retaliation she allegedly suffered. (Doc. 1, ¶¶ 38-39).
Grove filed her complaint against the defendants on December 28, 2017. (Doc. 1). In this complaint she brought her claims against Aramark, as well as Evans, Gillard, Castaldi and Krushinski, alleging racial discrimination and retaliation, as well as constructive discharge as a result of a hostile work environment in violation of Title VII. Grove also brought a state law claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress, which she has since abandoned. (See Doc. 18, at 10). The defendants filed a motion to dismiss the complaint (Doc. 14), to which we gave notice of our intention to convert to a summary judgment motion. The defendants then filed a brief in support, analyzing the plaintiff's claims through the perspective of a summary judgment motion. (Doc. 31). The plaintiff did not file a response, and the deadline for filing any objections or supplemental briefs has passed.
The defendants contend that the plaintiff's Title VII claims fail for several reasons. First, they argue that there is no individual liability under Title VII, and thus the claims against the individual defendants must fail. Additionally, they assert that the plaintiff has not sufficiently alleged facts to support her racial discrimination, retaliation, and hostile work environment claims. After a review of the record, we agree, and we will recommend that the defendants' motion be granted.
III. Standard of Review
The defendants originally moved to dismiss the plaintiff's complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. (Doc. 14). Upon review of the motion, we provided notice to the parties of our intention to treat the motion as a motion for summary judgment. The plaintiff has not filed a response, and the defendants filed a supplemental brief in support of their motion on August 26, 2019. (Doc. 31).
Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that the court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). Through summary adjudication, a court is empowered to dispose of those claims that do not present a "genuine dispute as to any material fact," Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a), and for which a trial would be "an empty and unnecessary formality." Univac Dental Co. v. Dentsply Int'l, Inc., No. 07-0493, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 31615, at *4 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 31, 2010). The substantive law identifies which facts are material, and "[o]nly disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A dispute about a material fact is genuine only if there is a sufficient evidentiary basis that would allow a reasonable fact finder to return a verdict for the non-moving party. Id., at 248-49.
The moving party has the initial burden of identifying evidence that it believes shows an absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Conoshenti v. Pub. Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 364 F.3d 135, 145-46 (3d Cir. 2004). Once the moving party has shown that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's claims, "the non-moving party must rebut the motion with facts in the record and cannot rest solely on assertions made in the pleadings, legal memoranda, or oral argument." Berckeley Inv. Group. Ltd. v. Colkitt, 455 F.3d 195, 201 (3d Cir. 2006); accord Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324 (1986). If the nonmoving party "fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden at trial," summary judgment is appropriate. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322. Summary judgment is also appropriate if the non-moving party provides merely colorable, conclusory, or speculative evidence. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249. There must be more than a scintilla of evidence supporting the nonmoving party and more than some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts. Id., at 252; see also, Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). In making this determination, the Court must "consider all evidence in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion." A.W. v. Jersey City Pub. Schs., 486 F.3d 791, 794 (3d Cir. 2007).
Moreover, a party who seeks to resist a summary judgment motion by citing to disputed material issues of fact must show by competent evidence that such factual disputes exist. Further, "only evidence which is admissible at trial may be considered in ruling on a motion for summary judgment." Countryside Oil Co., Inc. v. Travelers Ins. Co., 928 F.Supp. 474, 482 (D.N.J. 1995). Similarly, it is well-settled that: "[o]ne cannot create an issue of fact merely by . . . denying averments . . . without producing any supporting evidence of the denials." Thimons v. PNC Bank, NA, 254 F. App'x 896, 899 (3d Cir. 2007) (citation omitted). Thus, "[w]hen a motion for summary judgment is made and supported . . ., an adverse party may not rest upon mere allegations or denial." Fireman's Ins. Co. of Newark NJ v. DuFresne, 676 F.2d 965, 968 (3d Cir. 1982); see Sunshine Books, Ltd. v. Temple University, 697 F.2d 90, 96 (3d Cir. 1982). "[A] mere denial is insufficient to raise a disputed issue of fact, and an unsubstantiated doubt as to the veracity of the opposing affidavit is also not sufficient." Lockhart v. Hoenstine, 411 F.2d 455, 458 (3d Cir. 1969). Furthermore, "a party resisting a [Rule 56] motion cannot expect to rely merely upon bare assertions, conclusory allegations or suspicions." Gans v. Mundy, 762 F.2d 338, 341 (3d Cir. 1985) (citing Ness v. Marshall, 660 F.2d 517, 519 (3d Cir. 1981)).
Finally, it is emphatically not the province of the court to weigh evidence, or assess credibility, when passing upon a motion for summary judgment. Rather, in adjudicating the motion, the court must view the evidence presented in the light most favorable to the opposing party, Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255, and draw all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, Big Apple BMW, Inc. v. BMW of North America, Inc., 974 F.2d 1358, 1363 (3d Cir. 1992). Where the non-moving party's evidence contradicts the movant's, then the non-movant's must be taken as true. Id. Additionally, the court is not to decide whether the evidence unquestionably favors one side or the other, or to make credibility determinations, but instead must decide whether a fair-minded jury could return a verdict for the plaintiff on the evidence presented. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252; see also Big Apple BMW, 974 F.2d at 1363. In reaching this determination, the Third Circuit has instructed that:
To raise a genuine issue of material fact . . . the opponent need not match, item for item, each piece of evidence proffered by the movant. In practical terms, if the opponent has exceeded the "mere scintilla" threshold and has offered a genuine issue of material fact, then the court cannot credit the movant's version of events against the opponent, even if the quantity of the movant's evidence far outweighs that of its opponent. It thus remains the province of the fact finder to ascertain the believability and weight of the evidence.Id. In contrast, "[w]here the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party, there is no genuine issue for trial." Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986) (internal quotation marks omitted); NAACP v. North Hudson Reg'l Fire & Rescue, 665 F.3d 464, 476 (3d Cir. 2011).
It is against these legal benchmarks that we assess the defendants' motion.
IV. DISCUSSION
A. The Individual Defendants Should Be Dismissed.
As we have explained, the plaintiff brings Title VII claims against her employer, Aramark, and her individual supervisors. On this score, the defendants argue that the individual defendants should be dismissed from this suit, as Title VII does not allow for individual liability. We agree.
The Third Circuit Court of Appeals held in Sheridan v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours and Co., 100 F.3d 1061 (3d Cir. 1996) (en banc) that individuals are not liable for Title VII violations. Id. at 1077-78. Since deciding Sheridan the Third Circuit has since reiterated that "claims against individual supervisors are not permitted under Title VII." See Cardenas v. Massey, 269 F.3d 251, 268 (3d Cir. 2001); see also Emerson v. Thiel College, 296 F.3d 184, 190 (3d Cir. 2002) ("[I]ndividual employees are not liable under Title VII."). The law in this area is clear, and has been for some time, and the plaintiff's Title VII claims against the individual defendants should be dismissed.
B. The Plaintiff's Claims Against Aramark Fail on the Merits.
Grove's complaint asserts claims of racial discrimination, retaliation, hostile work environment, and constructive discharge, all in violation of Title VII. She contends that she was promoted and subsequently demoted because of her race, that she was transferred from one position to another because she reported the discrimination, and that she was forced to resign her position at the school due to the hostile work environment created by the defendants. However, as discussed below, on the current undisputed facts, which the plaintiff has not chosen to address or contest, Grove's claims fail for multiple reasons. Therefore, the defendants are entitled to summary judgment on these claims.
1. Racial Discrimination and Grove's Alleged Demotion
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits an employer from discriminating against any individual on the basis of race, color, religion, sex or national origin:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer ... to discharge any individual, or otherwise discriminate against any individual with respect to his [or her] compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, sex, or national origin.42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a). Discrimination claims under Title VII are analyzed under the burden-shifting framework set forth in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S. Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973).
Under McDonnell Douglas, a plaintiff has the initial burden of establishing a prima facie case of discrimination by showing: (1) that he is a member of a protected class; (2) he is qualified for the employment position in question; (3) he suffered an adverse employment action; and (4) such action occurred under circumstances that give rise to an inference of unlawful discrimination. Jones v. School Dist., 198 F.3d 403, 411 (3d Cir.1999); see also McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802, 93 S. Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973). For purposes of discrimination claims under Title VII, an adverse employment action may include something less than discharge, such as a demotion or job transfer, even without a loss of pay or benefits. Jones, 198 F.3d at 411-12.
Once an employee establishes a prima facie case, the employer must articulate a permissible reason for taking the adverse employment action. See, e.g., Krouse v. Am. Sterilizer Co., 126 F.3d 494, 500 (3d Cir.1997). At this stage, the employer's burden is "relatively light; it is satisfied if the [employer] articulates any legitimate reason for the [adverse employment action]; the [employer] need not prove that the articulated reason actually motivated the [action]." Id. (quoting Woodson v. Scott Paper, 109 F.3d 913, 920 n. 2 (3d Cir.1997)). If the employer carries its burden of articulating a legitimate basis for taking the adverse action, the burden returns to the employee to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the employer's purportedly legitimate reason is, in fact, pretextual. Id.
In order to show that an employer's proffered non-discriminatory reason is pretextual, a plaintiff "must point to some evidence, direct or circumstantial, from which a factfinder could reasonably either (1) disbelieve the employer's articulated legitimate reasons; or (2) believe that an invidious discriminatory reason was more likely than not a motivating or determinative cause of the employer's action." Fuentes v. Perskie, 32 F.3d 759, 764 (3d Cir. 1994). Notably, this is a "difficult burden on the plaintiff." Kautz v. Met-Pro Corp., 412 F.3d 463, 467 (3d Cir. 2005) (internal quotation marks omitted). The Third Circuit has explained that in order to satisfy this burden of proving pretext, a plaintiff "must demonstrate such weaknesses, implausibilities, inconsistencies, incoherencies, or contradictions in the employer's proffered legitimate reasons for its actions that a reasonable factfinder could rationally find them unworthy of credence." Jones, 198 F.3d at 413. In considering the parties' competing arguments and evidentiary support, we also must remain mindful that "[t]he question is not whether the employer made the best, or even a sound, business decision; it is whether the real reason is [discrimination]." Keller v. Orix Credit Alliance, 130 F.3d 1101, 1109 (3d Cir. 1997).
Accordingly, "the plaintiff cannot simply show that the employer's decision was wrong or mistaken, since the factual dispute at issue is whether discriminatory animus motivated the employer, not whether the employer is wise, shrewd, prudent or competent." Id. at 1108-09. In this regard, the plaintiff always bears the burden of demonstrating that discrimination was more than likely the reason for the employer's adverse employment action. See Simpson v. Kay Jewelers, 142 F.3d 639, 644-45 (3d Cir. 1998) ("To show that discrimination was more likely than not a cause for the employer's action, the plaintiff must point to evidence with sufficient probative force that a factfinder could conclude by a preponderance of the evidence that [race or national origin] was a motivating or determinative factor in the employment decision."); see also Wilson v. Blockbuster, Inc., 571 F.Supp.2d 641, 652 (E.D. Pa. 2008) (same).
Here, we conclude that Grove's allegations are not sufficient to set forth a prima facie case of racial discrimination. The basis for Grove's discrimination claim is her alleged demotion from Kitchen Lead at Tripp to her former position at Kennedy. On this score, given the current undisputed facts, Grove cannot establish three of the four elements of a prima facie case. First, she cannot establish that she was qualified for the position of Kitchen Lead. In fact, it appears that Grove would not qualify for this position under the collective bargaining agreement. Indeed, the Complaint Hotline investigation states that, "[p]er the CBA, [Grove] is not eligible to move to a permanent position until she is in the current bided [sic] position for 6 months." (Doc. 14-20, at 4; see Doc. 14-4, at 13 ("Section 4 - It is agreed that a successful bidder will not be entitled to bid on any other vacant positions for a period of six (6) months from the day the employee assumes the new position")). Thus, Grove cannot establish that she was qualified for the position of Kitchen Lead.
Moreover, Grove has not shown that she suffered an adverse employment action. While she alleges that her transfer back to her food-prep job was a "demotion," it is clear from the record that Grove's assignment to Tripp as the Kitchen Lead was a temporary fill-in position for someone who would be returning to work. The Complaint Hotline investigation revealed that Grove had been asked to fill in as a lead for an emergency basis, and that Grove understood the placement was temporary until the Kitchen Lead returned. (Doc. 14-20, at 4-5). Additionally, while Grove alleges that she was "promoted" to this position, there is no indication that she received the higher rate of pay for the three days she worked in this position. Simply put, the evidence reveals a commonplace and non-discriminatory workplace event: that Grove was asked to fill-in for another employee for a few days and was returned to her position after that employee returned to work.
Finally, Grove has not alleged any facts to support even an inference of racial discrimination. Indeed, the only allegation that Grove asserts is that the employee who "replaced her" as the Kitchen Lead was a Caucasian female. However, in addition to the fact that Grove was not "replaced," as she had been filling in briefly and temporarily for this individual who already held the position, it is well-settled that "[w]hile the fact that one's replacement is of another national origin may help to raise an inference of discrimination, it is neither a sufficient nor a necessary condition." Pivirotto v. Innovative Systems, Inc., 191 F.3d 344, 354 n. 6 (3d Cir. 1999) (quoting Nieto v. L & H Packing Co., 108 F.3d 621, 624 & n. 7 (5th Cir. 1997) (internal quotations omitted)); see also Hillard v. Morton Buildings, Inc., 195 F.Supp.2d 582, 589 (D. Del. 2002) ("When considered separately, the fact that Plaintiff was replaced by a white employee would not create an inference of discrimination"). Thus, because this single allegation is the only fact that Grove sets forth in an attempt to show an inference of discrimination, and the spare allegation standing alone is legally insufficient to state a claim, we conclude that Grove has failed to set forth a prima facie case of discrimination.
Further, to the extent Grove is alleging that her transfer from Kennedy to Williard was discriminatory, this claim also fails on the uncontested facts before us. At the outset, Grove again fails to raise an inference of racial discrimination, simply alleging in a bare, conclusory manner that "Caucasian employees . . . were permitted to work at the school where their children attended." (Doc. 1, ¶ 32). In addition, Grove's own assertion that she was offered a position at another school that her other son attended further undermines her allegation that her transfer was based on racial discrimination. Additionally, Grove cannot establish that she suffered an adverse employment action, as she was offered a position with similar hours and similar pay but opted for a different job with fewer hours. (Docs. 14-11; 14-23, at 2); see Rosati v. Colello, 94 F.Supp.3d 704, 714 (E.D. Pa. 2015) ("An adverse employment action is one that is serious and tangible enough to alter an employee's compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment").
Moreover, even if Grove could establish a prima facie case of discrimination, Aramark has set forth a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for her transfer, which she has failed to rebut with any evidence of pretext. On this score, the entirely undisputed record indicates that Principal Barrett requested Grove's removal from Kennedy after Grove continued to speak to staff about her son's behavioral issues when she was told not to do so. (Docs. 14-12, 14-13). Indeed, an email from Barrett to Angelina Sickora on February 23, 2017 reads as follows:
I am expressing an extreme conflict of interest with Regina [] having the inability to utilize the appropriate channels to address her child's behavioral issues. During a recent meeting a member of the School-based Behavioral Health team, the teacher & myself, I had asked she not directly address my staff & funnel the issues she is experiencing with me... I would handle. We convened the meeting on a positive note & all agreed upon the plan. During the next school day, her husband came to the school to address my plan of action of which he did not agree. Finally, today I witnessed her addressing staff members again & I would prefer she not work within the building her child is educated. I thank you for your prompt attention to this matter.(Doc. 14-12, at 2). Additionally, Elaine Evans informed Grove that the investigation into Barrett's complaint confirmed the allegations, which is why Grove was offered other positions within the Scranton School District. (Doc. 14-13).
On this score, given that the plaintiff has not presented any evidence from which we could find that this legitimate reason for Grove's transfer was actually discriminatory, this claim of discrimination also fails. Thus, Grove's Title VII discrimination claim should be dismissed.
2. Retaliation for Reporting Discrimination
Title VII also prohibits an employer from retaliating against any employee who makes a report of activity that is unlawful under Title VII. In this case, Grove alleges that she was retaliated against after she made reports to the Complaint Hotline regarding her alleged demotion and regarding Krushinski's behavior toward her. Although it is unclear from the complaint which actions she is alleging were retaliatory, it would seem that Grove is referring to her transfer from her position at Kennedy to her monitor position at Williard. (See Doc. 1, ¶ 45 ("Plaintiff reported workplace discrimination and, as a result, Defendants took adverse employment action against her in the form of harassment and a cut in hours")).
To make out a prima facie case of retaliation under Title VII, a plaintiff must show (1) that he engaged in protected activity; (2) that he suffered an adverse employment action; and (3) there was a causal connection between the protected activity and the adverse action. Carvalho-Grevious v. Delaware State Univ., 851 F.3d 249, 257 (3d Cir. 2017). Ultimately, a plaintiff bringing a Title VII retaliation claim must be able to show that his participation in protected activity was the but-for cause of any alleged adverse employment action that he suffered. Univ. of Texas v. Sw. Med. Center v. Nassar, 570 U.S. 338, 133 S. Ct. 2517, 186 L.Ed.2d 503 (2013) ("Title VII retaliation claims must be proved according to traditional principles of but-for causation, not the lessened causation test stated in § 2000e-2(m). This requires proof that the unlawful retaliation would not have occurred in the absence of the alleged wrongful action or actions of the employer."); see also Grevious, 851 F.3d at 257 (noting that a plaintiff alleging Title VII retaliation "has a higher causal burden than a plaintiff asserting a claim of direct status-based discrimination under Title VII.").
Here, we find that Grove has not set forth sufficient facts to establish a prima facie case of Title VII retaliation. Grove alleges that she reported discrimination through the Complaint Hotline. Indeed, in order to engage in "protected activity," an employee must have either participated in Title VII proceedings or "oppose[d] discrimination made unlawful by Title VII." Moore v. City of Phila., 461 F.3d 331, 341 (3d Cir. 2006). However, neither of the reports from the Complaint Hotline make any reference to any kind of discrimination by Aramark or its employees. To the contrary, the complaint Grove made concerning her "demotion" is not cast in terms which directly implicate Title VII. Rather, the complaint simply states that "[t]he caller does [n]ot know what he/she did to be demoted." (Doc. 14-20, at 4). The report also states that "[Grove] understands that this placement was temporary." (Id.) The second complaint alleged that Krushinski told other employees to file grievances against Grove if Grove had any incidents, given that Grove had an incident with her son in the lunchroom just prior to Krushinski's statement. (Doc. 14-21, at 3). Thus, neither of these reports references any unlawful behavior under Title VII, and Grove did not engage in any protected activity for the purposes of a Title VII retaliation claim.
Moreover, even if Grove could establish a prima facie case of retaliation, Aramark has set forth a non-retaliatory reason for her transfer—her own misconduct relating to her communications about her son. Indeed, as we have explained, Principal Barrett requested that Grove be removed from Kennedy due to Grove's failure to comply with his directive to stop speaking with Kennedy staff concerning her son's behavioral issues. (Docs. 14-12, 14-13). Grove offers no facts to rebut this legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for her transfer, and does not even deny the allegations that she was ignoring Barrett's directive to resolve her son's issues with Barrett rather than speaking to other staff about it. Accordingly, we conclude that Grove's Title VII retaliation claim fails on its merits and should be dismissed.
3. Hostile Work Environment and Constructive Discharge
Finally, Grove alleges that she was constructively discharged due to the defendants' harassment and creation of a hostile work environment. She claims that she was demoted because of her race, told to "stand in the corner" after she complained about the demotion, was told she could not work in the school where her son attended, and was disciplined without cause. Grove alleges that these actions constituted a hostile work environment, and that she was forced to resign her position due to the harassment she suffered.
In order to make a prima facie claim of race-based discrimination on the basis of a hostile work environment, a plaintiff must show that (1) he suffered intentional harassment based on his race; (2) the harassment was severe or pervasive; (3) the harassment detrimentally affected him; (4) the harassment would have detrimentally affected a reasonable person in similar circumstances; and (5) a basis for employer liability. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a); Huston v. Procter & Gamble Paper Prods. Corp., 568 F.3d 100, 104 (3d Cir. 2009); Lawrence v. F.C. Kerbeck & Sons, 134 F. App'x 570, 571 (3d Cir. 2005) (citing Aman v. Cort Furniture Rental Corp., 85 F.3d 1074, 1081 (3d Cir. 1996) ); Taylor v. JFC Staffing Assocs., 690 F. Supp. 357 (M.D. Pa. 2009). The last factor requires that the plaintiff point to facts showing that the employer was aware of the discrimination and yet failed to take prompt and appropriate corrective action. Syed, 906 F.Supp.2d 345, 358 (M.D. Pa. 2012).
Workplace misconduct is not measured in isolation, and accordingly the court's hostile work environment analysis "'must concentrate not on individual incidents, but on the overall scenario' because it is often difficult to determine the motivation behind allegedly discriminatory actions." Syed, 906 F.Supp.2d at 355 (quoting Beaubrun v. Inter Cultural Family, 2007 WL 172385, *4 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 17, 2007). To evaluate a plaintiff's allegations or proof, a court must evaluate the frequency of the alleged conduct, its severity, whether it was physically threatening or humiliating, and whether it unreasonably interfered with the employee's work performance. Lawrence, 134 F. App'x at 571-72; see also Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 23, 114 S. Ct. 367, 126 L.Ed.2d 295 (1993).
Title VII is not violated by "[m]ere utterance of an ... epithet which engenders offensive feelings in an employee" or by mere "discourtesy or rudeness," unless it is so severe or pervasive as to cause an objective change in the terms or conditions of employment. Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 787, 118 S. Ct. 2275, 141 L.Ed.2d 662 (1998) (citations omitted). These considerations also inform an assessment of whether the conduct was "objectively" offensive, since "[c]onduct that is not severe or pervasive enough to create an objectively hostile or abusive work environment ... is beyond Title VII's purview." Harris, 510 U.S. at 21, 114 S. Ct. 367.
Further, Grove has alleged a constructive discharge due to the alleged hostile work environment, as she claims that the harassment was so severe and pervasive that she could not return to work in August 2017. On this score, the Supreme Court of the United States has held that "[a] plaintiff who advances such a compound claim must show working conditions so intolerable that a reasonable person would have felt compelled to resign." Pennsylvania State Police v. Suders, 542 U.S. 129, 147 (2004). However, a court cannot conclude that a plaintiff was constructively discharged based on a hostile work environment if a plaintiff cannot set forth a sufficient claim of a hostile work environment. See Spencer v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 469 F.3d 311, 316 n. 4 (3d Cir. 2006) (quoting Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 968 F.2d 427, 430 (5th Cir. 1992), aff'd, 511 U.S. 244) ("To prove constructive discharge, the plaintiff must demonstrate a greater severity or pervasiveness of harassment than the minimum required to prove a hostile working environment")).
In this case, Grove's hostile work environment claim fails for the same reason that her intentional discrimination claim fails—she cannot establish that any of the alleged harassment or other actions taken were taken because of her race. As we have explained with respect to Grove's demotion allegation, the fact that Grove temporarily fill-in for, and then was replaced by, a Caucasian female does not, alone, raise an inference of race-based discrimination. Similarly, Grove has not shown that her transfer from Kennedy to Williard was based on her race, given that she was transferred for her failure to comply with the Principal's instructions, and that she was offered an opportunity to work at a different school where her other son attended. Further, there is no indication whatsoever that the single comment allegedly made to Grove to "stand in the corner" was made because of Grove's race. See Davis v. City of Newark, 285 F. App'x 899, 902 (3d Cir. 2008) ("[C]omments that cannot be reasonably construed as invoking any racial feeling do not support Title VII liability"). Furthermore, this isolated comment allegedly took place in January or February of 2017 months prior to Grove leaving her employment at Aramark and the plaintiff cites no other intervening events which "show working conditions so intolerable that a reasonable person would have felt compelled to resign." Pennsylvania State Police v. Suders, 542 U.S. 129, 147 (2004). It is also clear from the record that the actions taken against Grove—removing her from a temporary, emergency position and removing her from Kennedy for disciplinary reasons—were taken for legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons. Accordingly, we cannot conclude that any of these actions constituted racial harassment.
Moreover, because Grove has not alleged any evidence of a race-based hostile work environment, we cannot conclude that these actions taken by the defendant resulted in a constructive discharge. See Spencer, 469 F.3d at 316 n. 4 (quoting Landgraf, 968 F.2d at 430 ("To prove constructive discharge, the plaintiff must demonstrate a greater severity or pervasiveness of harassment than the minimum required to prove a hostile working environment")); Owens v. Allegheny Cnty. School, 869 F.Supp.2d 653, 660 (W.D. Pa. 2012) ("A constructive discharge claim requires the establishment of a hostile work environment followed by proof that the conditions created by the hostile work environment were so intolerable a reasonable person subject to them would resign"); Ilori v. Carnegie Mellon Univ., 742 F.Supp.2d 734, 765 (W.D. Pa. 2010) (dismissing the plaintiff's constructive discharge claim where the court found no evidence of a race-based hostile work environment). Accordingly, we recommend that the plaintiff's Title VII claim alleging constructive discharge due to a hostile work environment be dismissed.
In sum. presented with a factual record which thoroughly rebutted Grove's claims in the defendants' motion to dismiss, we converted that motion to a motion for summary judgment and afforded Grove ample opportunity to address these otherwise undisputed facts. Presented with this opportunity, Grove elected not to contest the facts which wholly undermined her claims. Therefore, on the basis of these uncontested facts, the defendants are now entitled to judgment in their favor and this case should be dismissed.
IV. Recommendation
Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, IT IS RECOMMENDED THAT the defendants' motion, which we have converted to a motion for summary judgment, (Doc. 14) be GRANTED.
The parties are further placed on notice that pursuant to Local Rule 72.3:
Any party may object to a magistrate judge's proposed findings, recommendations or report addressing a motion or matter described in 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(B) or making a recommendation for the disposition of a prisoner case or a habeas corpus petition within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy thereof. Such party shall file with the clerk of court, and serve on the magistrate judge and all parties, written objections which shall specifically identify the portions of the proposed findings, recommendations or report to which objection is made and the basis for such objections. The briefing requirements set forth in Local Rule 72.2 shall apply. A judge shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made and may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge. The judge, however, need conduct a new hearing only in his or her discretion or where required by law, and may consider the record developed before the magistrate judge, making his or her own determination on the basis of that record. The judge may also receive further evidence, recall witnesses or recommit the matter to the magistrate judge with instructions.
Submitted this 12th day of September 2019.
/s/ Martin C . Carlson
Martin C. Carlson
United States Magistrate Judge