Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Ct. No. BC180583, Carl J. West, Judge.
James G. Lewis for Plaintiff and Appellant.
O’Melveny & Myers, Brian P. Brooks, Elizabeth L. McKeen, and Danielle N. Oakley for Defendant and Respondent.
SUZUKAWA, J.
Plaintiff John La Grou filed a putative class action lawsuit against defendant Ford Motor Company. The trial court dismissed several claims by way of a motion for judgment on the pleadings and granted summary adjudication of the remaining claims. In La Grou’s appeal from the judgment, he argues that several causes of action should be reinstated. Finding no error, we affirm.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff John La Grou filed this putative class action lawsuit against defendant Ford Motor Company in 1997. Ford removed the action to federal court, where it was consolidated with other similar actions. After the consolidated actions were dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the order of dismissal in 2001. (In re Ford Motor Co. (9th Cir. 2001) 264 F.3d 952, 956.) The United States Supreme Court dismissed its writ of certiorari in October 2002 (Ford Motor Co. v. McCauley (2002) 537 U.S. 1), and this action was remanded to superior court in 2003.
In January 2004, La Grou filed the operative second amended complaint (complaint). The complaint alleged claims for breach of contract, promissory estoppel, and violations of the Consumer Legal Remedies Act (CLRA) (Civ. Code, § 1750 et seq.), unfair competition law (UCL) (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 17200 et seq.), and false advertising law (FAL) (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 17500 et seq.), based on the following allegations.
From 1993 to 1997, Ford advertised a Ford Citibank credit card (credit card or card), which had no annual fee but allowed cardmembers to earn a 5 percent rebate (rebate) toward the purchase or lease of a new Ford vehicle. Prior to receiving their credit cards, cardmembers were informed that: (1) they could earn a maximum rebate of $700 during any consecutive 12-month period; (2) they could accrue a maximum rebate of $3,500 during any consecutive five-year period; and (3) any earned but unused rebate would expire after five years.
Upon receiving their credit cards, cardmembers were given the Ford Rebate Program Manual (Program Manual) that set forth the terms and conditions of the rebate program. The Program Manual contained the disclosure that is at the heart of this litigation, which is that the rebate program could be modified or terminated at will.
La Grou concedes that he read the Program Manual, including the disclosure that the rebate program could be modified or terminated at will, upon receiving his credit card in mid-1995. La Grou also concedes that he paid no fees or interest on his credit card account.
In June 1997, La Grou learned that Ford was terminating the rebate program effective January 1, 1998, and that he was eligible for a new Citibank Driver’s Edge credit card that would provide a 2 percent rebate of up to $500 per year.
When the rebate program was terminated, La Grou had accumulated a total rebate of about $1,600. This was less than the maximum rebate of $3,500 that La Grou had intended to accrue. In his complaint, La Grou alleged that “[t]he premature termination of the program” prevented him “from accruing the amount of the rebate that he... had been contemplating.”
Based on Ford’s allegedly unlawful early termination of the rebate program, La Grou filed the putative class action complaint on October 31, 1997.
In 2000, over two years after this litigation was filed, La Grou applied the entire amount of his accumulated rebate toward the purchase of a new Ford automobile.
In March 2009, the parties stipulated that because this putative class action is a provisionally complex case (Cal. Rules of Court, rules 3.400(c)(6), 3.403), the superior court would resolve certain threshold legal issues before addressing the class certification issues. Pursuant to the parties’ stipulation, the superior court treated the following legal issues as a defense motion for judgment on the pleadings: “1. Whether La Grou’s claim under the CLRA must be dismissed in light of the decision in Berry v. American Express Publishing, Inc., 147 Cal.App.4th 224, 233 (2007) [Berry]; and [¶] (2) Whether an express contractual authorization to terminate the Ford Rebate Program bars all of Plaintiffs’ claims.”
In its June 4, 2009 ruling, the superior court granted Ford’s motion for judgment on the pleadings as to the breach of contract, unjust enrichment, and CLRA claims, which were dismissed. It also granted the motion as to the “unlawful” prong of the UCL claim.
Although the trial court treated the threshold legal issues as a motion for judgment on the pleadings, the ruling to some extent resembled that of a motion to strike. The trial court granted the motion for judgment on the pleadings as to part of a claim—the part involving the “unlawful” prong of the UCL—but denied the motion as to the remainder—the part involving the “unfairness” prong of the UCL. Given that a motion for judgment on the pleadings is the equivalent of a general demurrer (Middaugh v. Board of Trustees (1975) 45 Cal.App.3d 776, 780-781), and a demurrer cannot properly be sustained to part of a cause of action (Kong v. City of Hawaiian Gardens Redevelopment Agency (2002) 108 Cal.App.4th 1028, 1047), a motion for judgment on the pleadings should not be granted as to part of a cause of action. To strike the “unlawful” prong of the UCL claim from the complaint would also be unusual because courts are generally reluctant to use a motion to strike as “a procedural ‘line item veto’ for the civil defendant.” (PH II, Inc. v. Superior Court (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 1680, 1683.) However, these procedural issues are not before us. The parties consented to the procedure that was employed and La Grou does not challenge the substantive ruling on the “unlawful” prong of the UCL claim. (See Keenan v. Dean (1955) 134 Cal.App.2d 189, 195 [if it was error to use the motion to strike as a general demurrer, such error would be nonprejudicial].)
As a result of the June 4 ruling, the only remaining claims involved the alleged violations of the FAL and the “unfairness” element of the UCL. Ford moved for summary judgment or summary adjudication of the remaining claims on September 14, 2009. The superior court granted Ford’s motion on February 2, 2010, and entered a final judgment on February 24, 2010. La Grou timely appealed from the judgment.
DISCUSSION
In this appeal from the judgment, La Grou challenges (1) the June 4, 2009 order dismissing the CLRA claim, and (2) the February 2, 2010 order granting summary adjudication of the “unfairness” element of the UCL claim.
I. The Dismissal of the CLRA Claim Was Proper
A. Standard of Review
“A judgment on the pleadings in favor of the defendant is appropriate when the complaint fails to allege facts sufficient to state a cause of action. (Code Civ. Proc., § 438, subd. (c)(3)(B)(ii).) A motion for judgment on the pleadings is equivalent to a demurrer and is governed by the same de novo standard of review. (Gerawan Farming, Inc. v. Lyons (2000) 24 Cal.4th 468, 515; Mack v. State Bar [(2001)] 92 Cal.App.4th 957, 961.) All properly pleaded, material facts are deemed true, but not contentions, deductions, or conclusions of fact or law; judicially noticeable matters may be considered. (Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318; Mack, at p. 961.)” (Kapsimallis v. Allstate Ins. Co. (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 667, 672.)
B. La Grou’s CLRA Claim
The CLRA proscribes specified acts or practices “in a transaction intended to result or which results in the sale or lease of goods or services to any consumer.” (Civ. Code, § 1770, subd. (a).)
The complaint alleged that Ford violated the CLRA by engaging in deceptive advertising of the credit card rebate program. The advertising was allegedly deceptive because it failed to reveal that the rebate program was terminable at will and that Ford had already decided to terminate the program before its customers could accrue the maximum rebate of $3,500 over a five-year period.
The complaint alleged that Ford’s advertising campaign violated section 1770, subdivision (a)(5), which proscribes “[r]epresenting that goods or services have sponsorship, approval, characteristics, ingredients, uses, benefits, or quantities which they do not have or that a person has a sponsorship, approval, status, affiliation, or connection which he or she does not have, ” and subdivision (a)(14), which proscribes “[r]epresenting that a transaction confers or involves rights, remedies, or obligations which it does not have or involve, or which are prohibited by law.”
C. Ford’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings
In its motion for judgment on the pleadings, Ford argued that the CLRA, which covers the lease or sale of goods or services, does not apply to credit card agreements or benefits associated with credit card accounts. (Citing Berry, supra, 147 Cal.App.4th 224 [the issuance of a credit card is not a transaction that is intended to result or which results in the sale or lease of goods or services to any consumer under the CLRA].)
In addition, Ford pointed out that because its right to terminate the rebate program at will was disclosed in the Program Manual, the termination of the program was permissible under the contract and thus was neither unfair nor deceptive under the CLRA. (Citing Augustine v. FIA Card Servs., N.A. (E.D. Cal. 2007) 485 F.Supp.2d 1172, 1174 [because the retroactive increase of credit card interest rates was disclosed in the cardholder’s contractual agreement, it was not a deceptive practice under the CLRA].)
D. The Trial Court’s Ruling
In its June 4, 2009 order, the superior court granted the motion for judgment on the pleadings on the CLRA claim on the ground that the statute does not apply to the issuance of a credit card. The trial court’s order stated in relevant part that under Berry, supra, 147 Cal.App.4th 224, “the issuance of the Ford card cannot be considered a ‘good’ or ‘service’ within the meaning of the CLRA. The Court is not persuaded by LaGrou’s assertion that the ‘good’ or ‘service’ constituted the Rebate Program itself, or that it was an advertisement for the sale of Ford vehicles. The Rebate Program was an integral part of the credit transaction, and as such does not support a CLRA claim. The CLRA does not apply to the credit application and Rebate Program here. The motion to dismiss the CLRA claim in the LaGrou complaint is granted.”
E. Analysis
La Grou seeks to distinguish Berry, supra, 147 Cal.App.4th 224, on the ground that Ford was not supplying the credit card. La Grou argues that Citibank, not Ford, “was supplying the credit. Ford’s program was to sell cars by reason of the program. The co branding of the credit card was its means to develop a consumer base for its product. Following the logic of the Berry case, Ford doesn’t meet the test of a credit supplier.” We are not persuaded.
The appellant in Berry argued that the arbitration clause in the respondent’s credit card agreement was unconscionable, and thus violated the CLRA. (Civ. Code, § 1770, subd. (a)(19 [inserting an unconscionable provision in the contract is a deceptive act or practice under the CLRA].) The respondent in Berry argued that the CLRA did not apply because the issuance of the card to the appellant was not “a transaction intended to result or which results in the sale or lease of goods or services to [a] consumer.” (Civ. Code, § 1770, subd. (a).) The appellate court in Berry agreed with the respondent’s contention that the CLRA did not apply to its issuance of a credit card. (Berry, supra, 147 Cal.App.4th p. 228.) The court stated that “[t]he extension of credit is not a tangible chattle.... [T]he card has no intrinsic value and exists only as indicia of the credit extended to the cardholder. Berry’s AMEX card is thus not a ‘good’ under CLRA.” (Berry, supra, 147 Cal.App.4th at p. 229.) Similarly, the appellate court in Berry agreed with the respondent’s contention that its issuance of credit was not a “service” under the CLRA. The court reasoned that under Civil Code section 1761, subdivision (b), “service” means “work, labor, and services for other than a commercial or business use, including services furnished in connection with the sale or repair of goods.” In rejecting the appellant’s assertion that the credit provided by the respondent constituted a “service” furnished in connection with the sale or repair of goods, the court in Berry concluded that the CLRA’s legislative history failed to “support the notion that credit, separate and apart from a specific purchase or lease of a good or service, is covered under the act.” (Id. at pp. 229-230.)
In this case, Ford furnished a rebate program that allowed cardmembers to accumulate, within prescribed limits, rebates that are subject to the terms and conditions set forth in the 15-page Program Manual. According to the Program Manual, “[r]ebates are good toward the purchase or lease of an eligible new vehicle, ” but have no cash value, are nonnegotiable, are subject to change without notice at any time, cannot be redeemed in whole or in part for cash, are not the property of the cardholder, and may not be redeemed unless the cardholder’s account is open and in good standing. Given the limitations and restrictions imposed by the Program Manual on the redemption of rebates, even though qualifying credit card purchases will earn a 5 percent rebate, the cardmember may or may not be able to satisfy the conditions for redeeming the rebate. Accordingly, the evidence fails to show that this particular rebate program is tied to the specific purchase or lease of a vehicle. We therefore conclude that under these facts, the rebate program is neither a good nor a service that is covered by the CLRA. (See Berry, supra, 147 Cal.App.4th at pp. 229-230.)
In addition, Ford alternatively argued below that because its right to terminate the rebate program was fully disclosed in the Program Manual, its termination of the program was permissible under the contract and thus was neither unfair nor deceptive under the CLRA. (Citing Augustine v. FIA Card Servs., N.A., supra, 485 F.Supp.2d at p. 1174 [because the retroactive increase of credit card interest rates was disclosed in the cardholder’s contractual agreement, it was not a deceptive practice under the CLRA].) Although the trial court did not rely on this alternative ground, we are not bound by the trial court’s rationale in reviewing the grant of a motion for judgment on the pleadings. “‘Because a motion for judgment on the pleadings, like a demurrer, raises only questions of law, we may consider new theories on appeal to challenge or justify the trial court’s ruling. (O’Neil v. General Security Corp. (1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 587, 606; B & P Development Corp. v. City of Saratoga (1986) 185 Cal.App.3d 949, 959.) “[W]e review the trial court’s disposition of the matter, not its reasons for the disposition. [Citation.]” (Ott v. Alfa–Laval Agri, Inc. (1995) 31 Cal.App.4th 1439, 1448.)’ (Burnett v. Chimney Sweep [(2004)] 123 Cal.App.4th [1057, ] 1065.)” (Hood v. Santa Barbara Bank & Trust (2006) 143 Cal.App.4th 526, 535.)
Given that La Grou does not challenge the trial court’s determination that the contract included the Program Manual, which allowed Ford to terminate the program at will, we conclude that the termination of the program was neither unfair nor deceptive under the CLRA. (See Augustine v. FIA Card Servs., N.A., supra, 485 F.Supp.2d at p. 1174.)
II. The Summary Adjudication of the UCL Claim Was Proper
A. Standard of Review
“‘A summary adjudication motion is subject to the same rules and procedures as a summary judgment motion. Both are reviewed de novo. [Citations.]’ (Lunardi v. Great West Life Assurance Co. (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 807, 819.)” (Haney v. Aramark Uniform Services, Inc. (2004) 121 Cal.App.4th 623, 631, fn. 1.)
The standard of review for a summary adjudication motion is well established. The motion “shall be granted if all the papers submitted show that there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (c).) A moving defendant has met his burden of showing that a cause of action has no merit by establishing that one or more elements of a cause of action cannot be established or that there is a complete defense. (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 849-850; Lackner v. North (2006) 135 Cal.App.4th 1188, 1196.)
B. La Grou’s Claim for Violation of the “Unfairness” Element of the UCL
Under the UCL, “unfair competition” is defined to “mean and include any unlawful, unfair or fraudulent business act or practice and unfair, deceptive, untrue or misleading advertising and any act prohibited by Chapter 1 (commencing with Section 17500) of Part 3 of Division 7 of the Business and Professions Code.” (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 17200.) “Because section 17200’s definition is ‘disjunctive, ’ the statute is violated where a defendant’s act or practice is unlawful, unfair, fraudulent or in violation of section 17500. [Citation.]” (South Bay Chevrolet v. General Motors Acceptance Corp. (1999)72 Cal.App.4th 861, 878 (South Bay Chevrolet).)“The statutory language referring to ‘any unlawful, unfair or fraudulent’ practice (italics added) makes clear that a practice may be deemed unfair even if not specifically proscribed by some other law.” (Cel-Tech Communications, Inc. v. Los Angeles Cellular Telephone Co. (1999) 20 Cal.4th 163, 180.)
All further undesignated statutory references are to the Business and Professions Code.
“A violation of the UCL’s fraud prong is also a violation of the false advertising law (§ 17500 et seq.). [Citations.]” (In re Tobacco II Cases (2009) 46 Cal.4th 298, 312, fn. 8.)
Following the June 4, 2009 dismissal of the “unlawful” aspect of the UCL claim, the sole remaining claim for violation of section 17200 involved the “unfairness” element of the UCL. In order to recover under the “unfairness” prong of section 17200, La Grou must establish that Ford “engaged in a business practice ‘likely to deceive’ the reasonable consumer to whom the practice was directed. [Citations.]” (South Bay Chevrolet, supra, 72 Cal.App.4th at p. 878.)
The complaint alleged that Ford’s advertising campaign for the rebate program violated the “unfairness” element of the UCL because the advertisements were likely to deceive the intended customers. Allegedly, the advertisements were likely to deceive the intended customers because they provided no “meaningful disclosure” that the rebate program was modifiable and terminable at will.
C. Ford’s Motion for Summary Adjudication of the UCL Claim
Ford moved for summary adjudication of the “unfairness” element of the UCL claim on two grounds: (1) La Grou lacked standing to maintain the UCL claim because he did not lose any money or property as a result of Ford’s conduct, he did not pay any fees or interest to obtain or maintain his credit card, and he did not have a vested ownership interest in any unearned rebates; and (2) given that Ford had a contractual right to terminate the rebate program at will (which La Grou does not challenge on appeal), the termination of the rebate program did not violate the “unfairness” element of the UCL (citing Walker v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. (2002) 98 Cal.App.4th 1158, 1177 [the unfairness element of the UCL “‘does not give the courts a general license to review the fairness of contracts’”]).
D. The Trial Court’s Ruling
The trial court granted Ford’s summary adjudication motion on both theories. With regard to the issue of La Grou’s standing, the trial court concluded that Ford had met its initial burden of demonstrating that La Grou did not lose any money or property as a result of Ford’s alleged acts of unfair competition and false advertising. The trial court cited the following evidence: (1) La Grou testified that when he received his credit card, he read the accompanying Program Manual, which gave Ford the right to terminate the rebate program at will; (2) La Grou testified that he paid no annual fee or interest on his credit card account; and (3) in 2000, La Grou purchased a Ford Focus using all of the rebate points that he had accumulated under the rebate program.
Based on the above evidence, the trial court stated: “Even assuming that Ford engaged in unfair competition by virtue of the Rebate Program, Plaintiff did not lose money or property as a result of the Program, as he used the points accumulated under the Rebate Program to purchase a Ford vehicle, he did not pay any annual fee in connection with the credit card, and he does not allege there was anything wrong with the Ford vehicle he purchased. This evidence satisfies Ford’s burden. Plaintiff has not, and cannot, raise a triable issue of material fact as to whether he lost any money or property as a result of Ford’s acts in conjunction with the Rebate Program. The notion that Plaintiff is entitled to Ford’s ‘profits’ is unpersuasive; the nature of the remedy sought does not change the fact that Plaintiff did not lose money or property as a result of the Rebate Program. As such, Plaintiff cannot establish (and cannot reasonably be expected to establish) standing, and the motion for summary judgment is well-taken on that ground alone.” (Citing Hall v. Time Inc. (2008) 158 Cal.App.4th 847.)
With regard to La Grou’s substantive claims, the trial court noted that in light of its prior determination that Ford was contractually authorized to terminate the rebate program, the court did not have a general license to review the fairness of the contract. (Citing South Bay Chevrolet, supra, 72 Cal.App.4th at p. 887 [“‘unfairness’ prong of section 17200 ‘does not give the courts a general license to review the fairness of contracts’”].)
Finally, the trial court concluded that any notion of unfairness or fraud in the rebate program was negated by “the disclosure provided with the credit card[, which] stated that the rebate program had a maximum duration of five years (and the fact that Plaintiff acknowledged the language stating that Ford may cancel the program at any time), negates any notion of unfairness or fraud in the Rebate Program. These representations were not likely to deceive the public. As such, there could not have been any causation; in other words, Plaintiff could not have lost any money or property as a result of theprogram (even assuming Plaintiff lost money or property, which he did not).”
E. The Parties’ Contentions on Appeal
As we understand La Grou’s opening brief, he contends that: (1) summary adjudication was improper because there are triable issues of material fact as to whether Ford’s advertisements were misleading due to the omission of any meaningful disclosure that the rebate program was terminable at will; (2) if the advertisements are found to be misleading, then Ford violated the “unfairness” element of the UCL; and (3) if Ford violated the UCL, then La Grou is entitled to various remedies including (a) disgorgement of the profits from the vehicles sold as a result of the misleading advertisements; (b) restitution; and (c) injunctive relief.
Ford responds that the “appeal fails at the outset because La Grou did not appeal the trial court’s determination that he lacked standing to pursue his UCL and FAL claims. Even if he had appealed the determination, the trial court’s ruling was correct and requires dismissal of his UCL and FAL claims. The trial court correctly found that La Grou lacks standing to maintain his UCL and FAL claims because he has lost no money or property as a result of Ford’s conduct. He paid nothing to obtain or maintain his credit card, and he had no vested ownership interest in any unearned rebates to which he now claims he is entitled. Because he cannot obtain restitution under the UCL, La Grou lacks standing to pursue these statutory claims. Moreover, because La Grou was fully aware of Ford’s right to terminate the Program, which was expressly disclosed to him before he used the card to make any purchases, any losses he supposedly incurred were not ‘as a result of’ any prior advertising statements that La Grou now contends were misleading.”
Ford further responds that “La Grou’s UCL and FAL claims independently fail as a substantive matter. La Grou cannot sustain a claim under the ‘unfair’ prong of the UCL because, as the trial court ruled and La Grou does not challenge, La Grou’s contract with Ford reserved to Ford the right to terminate the Program at any time. As [other courts have] held, the mere exercise of a contractual right, without more, cannot be unfair under the UCL. See, e.g., Walker v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 98 Cal.App.4th 1158, 1176-1177 (2002).”
F. Analysis
When La Grou filed this action in 1997, the UCL’s standing requirements for private individuals were much more lenient. Previously, the UCL “authorized ‘any person acting for the interests of itself, its members or the general public’ (former § 17204) to file a civil action for relief. Standing to bring such an action did not depend on a showing of injury or damage.” (Californians for Disability Rights v. Mervyn’s, LLC (2006) 39 Cal.4th 223, 228 (Mervyn’s).)
After this case was filed, the standing requirements for private individuals seeking to file an action for civil relief under UCL were changed. In the November 2, 2004 General Election, the UCL was amended by Proposition 64 to prevent “uninjured private persons from suing for restitution on behalf of others. This is a consequence of section 17203 (as amended by Prop. 64, § 2), which provides that ‘[a]ny person may pursue representative claims or relief on behalf of others only if the claimant meets the standing requirements of Section 17204 and complies with Section 382 of the Code of Civil Procedure....” (Mervyn’s, supra, 39 Cal.4th at p. 232.)
Proposition 64 “changed the standing requirements for a UCL claim to create a two-pronged test: A private person now has standing to assert a UCL claim only if he or she (1) ‘has suffered injury in fact, ’ and (2) ‘has lost money or property as a result of the unfair competition.’ (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 17204; see Mervyn’s, supra, 39 Cal.4th at p. 227.) Proposition 64 accomplished that change by amending Business and Professions Code section 17204, which prescribes who may sue to enforce the UCL, by deleting the language authorizing suits by any person acting on behalf of the general public and by replacing it with the phrase, ‘who has suffered injury in fact and has lost money or property as a result of the unfair competition.’ (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 17204; see Mervyn’s, supra, 39 Cal.4th at p. 228.)” (Hall v. Time Inc., supra, 158 Cal.App.4th at p. 852.)
Applying section 17204 to this case, we conclude that La Grou lacks standing as a matter of law because the evidence is undisputed that he suffered no injury in fact and he lost no money or property as a result of the alleged acts of unfair competition.
Significantly, La Grou has not challenged the trial court’s determination that Ford’s termination of the rebate program was authorized by the parties’ contract. When that determination is coupled with the undisputed evidence that La Grou paid neither fees nor interest on his credit card account and that La Grou redeemed all of his accumulated rebate points when he purchased a new car in 2000, we are compelled to conclude as a matter of law that: (1) because La Grou paid nothing to Ford to obtain the rebate that he fully redeemed, he lost no money or property as a result of Ford’s alleged acts of unfair competition; and (2) because Ford was lawfully entitled to terminate the rebate program, La Grou has no ownership interest or claim to any unearned rebate.
The law is clear that when a private plaintiff lacks standing under section 17204, he or she has no right to restitution, disgorgement of profits, or injunctive relief under the UCL. La Grou’s assertion to the contrary is refuted by the plain language of section 17204 and the Supreme Court’s pronouncement that “[u]nder the UCL, an individual may recover profits unfairly obtained to the extent that these profits represent monies given to the defendant or benefits in which the plaintiff has an ownership interest.” (Korea Supply Co. v. Lockheed Martin Corp. (2003) 29 Cal.4th 1134, 1148.)
We therefore conclude the motion for summary adjudication was properly granted on the ground that La Grou lacked standing to maintain the UCL claim. The remaining substantive issues are therefore moot and require no further discussion.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. Ford is awarded its costs.
We concur: EPSTEIN, P.J., WILLHITE, J.