Opinion
No. 27017-3-III.
March 17, 2009.
Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court for Spokane County, No. 08-2-00413-3, Salvatore F. Cozza, J., entered April 7, 2008.
Affirmed by unpublished opinion per Korsmo, J., concurred in by Sweeney and Brown, JJ.
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
The trial court granted a writ of restitution and judgment for the value of unpaid rent of a mobile home space at a resort. The trial court's findings are amply supported by the record. Accordingly, we affirm.
BACKGROUND
Respondent Groom, Inc. (Groom) owned Picnic Pines Resort on Silver Lake. Prior to November 2006, Groom charged $300 per month for mobile homes to rent space at the resort. In July 2006, Groom served notice on all occupants that the rent would increase on all spaces to $350 per month on November 1, 2006. On August 31, 2006, title to the mobile home in space 26 was transferred from Joey Hegel to appellants Barbara Kabrick and Shelly Gacusana. Mr. Hegel had a written lease with Groom covering the period from August 1, 2005, through July 31, 2006. The lease called for $300 monthly rental payments for space 26.
The resort closed in the summer of 2008.
Paul Kabrick moved into the mobile home in September and his family began paying $300 rent at that time. When they paid $300 for the November rent, the resort sent a letter stating that the rent was $350. The letter also noted that the Kabricks did not have a lease and should report to the resort office to negotiate one. The family never did meet with Groom. Ms. Gacusana had obtained a blank copy of a lease form from the resort manager in August and returned it in November 2006. Various terms were written into the form, including rent of $300 per month, and acknowledgement that 11 people would live in the two bedroom trailer. Groom did not sign the form. Appellants continued to pay $300 rent and Groom wrote again in January 2007, pointing out that insufficient rent had been paid since September and that the lease form that had been returned was not acceptable.
The situation remained the same throughout 2007 with the Kabrick family paying only $300 per month and Groom occasionally writing to tell the family that the rent was short and that no lease existed. Groom eventually threatened to impose late fees and daily fees for use of the resort by nontenants. In early January 2008, Groom gave a five day notice to pay or vacate, and later that month filed an action for unlawful detainer and damages when the deficiency remained unpaid. The appellants filed a response that included requests that the court issue a declaratory judgment that there was an annual lease and that the monthly payments were $300.
The matter proceeded to hearing on March 4, 2008. The trial court found the facts as recited above. The court ruled that there was no contractual landlord-tenant relationship as there had been no meeting of the minds on critical terms, including the rent. The court found that Ms. Gacusana had filled in the lease form, but that Groom had not agreed to the terms. The fact that the family avoided meeting with the landlord was also a strong sign that no contract existed. The court granted the writ of restitution. The court also applied the doctrine of quantum meruit and awarded damages based on the fair market rental value of $350 per month. With costs, the total award was $2,270.27. The Kabrick family (family) timely appealed to this court.
ANALYSIS
The family contends that they were denied their right to a jury trial and that the trial court erred in finding that no lease existed and in awarding damages on a quantum meruit theory. However, they never requested a jury trial and the hearing on the writ was properly held before a judge. The record also supports the determination that no written lease agreement was ever entered into. It was proper for the trial court to award damages under the quantum meruit principle. For all of those reasons, we affirm.
Jury Trial. Initially, the family argues for the first time on appeal that they were denied the right to a jury trial. They were not. First, there is nothing in the record presented to this court that suggests appellants ever sought a jury trial. Accordingly, they have waived any right to a jury hearing. CR 38(d). Secondly, no jury trial is provided in a show cause hearing in an unlawful detainer action. Instead, the trial court is to determine the right to possession of the property and, if material issues of fact exist, can direct that disputed issues be tried at a later time. RCW 59.18.380; Carlstrom v. Hanline, 98 Wn. App. 780, 788, 990 P.2d 986 (2000). Here, the trial court found no material issues of fact existed with respect to the landlord's right to relief and resolved the case without setting it for trial. That was proper under RCW 59.18.380. Hartson P'ship v. Goodwin, 99 Wn. App. 227, 231, 991 P.2d 1211 (2000).
The unlawful detainer provisions of the Residential-Landlord Tenant Act also apply to proceedings under the Manufactured/Mobile Home Landlord-Tenant Act. RCW 59.20.040; Hartson P'ship v. Goodwin, 99 Wn. App. 227, 230, 991 P.2d 1211 (2000).
The family simply has not shown that they made a demand for jury trial or that they were entitled to one. The trial court had the authority to resolve the right to possession of the property under the unlawful detainer statute. There was no error.
Existence of Lease. The family vigorously contends that they had a lease and that the trial court's factual finding to the contrary is in error. The trial court's determination on the credibility of the evidence is an issue that cannot be retried here. In any respect, the evidence certainly supports the trial court's view of the evidence and its conclusion concerning whether a lease existed.
It is the job of the trial court to resolve questions of fact. The function of the appellate courts is to review the action of the trial courts. Appellate courts do not hear or weigh evidence, find facts, or substitute their opinions for those of the trier of fact. See, e.g., Thorndike v. Hesperian Orchards, Inc., 54 Wn.2d 570, 572, 575, 343 P.2d 183 (1959). Because of this division of labor, it is the burden of the party bringing an appeal to establish that prejudicial error occurred in the lower court proceedings. Housing Auth. v. Saylors, 87 Wn.2d 732, 742, 557 P.2d 321 (1976).
Various principles have developed from the relationship between trial and appellate courts. One of those principles involves the fact-finding function of the trial court. It is the responsibility of the party challenging a finding to establish that it was not supported by sufficient evidence to convince a reviewing court of the truth of the fact. State v. Halstien, 122 Wn.2d 109, 128-129, 857 P.2d 270 (1993). Here, the Kabrick family contends that because two of them testified that there was a lease, the evidence does not support the trial court's finding to the contrary. That, however, is not the standard. As trier of fact, the trial judge was free to disregard that testimony altogether, which appears to be what happened here. Instead, the court apparently accepted the testimony of the Groom representatives that no lease existed. We review that finding for evidentiary sufficiency.
The record amply supports that finding. First, both the resort manager and Mr. Groom denied that there was a lease. Second, the only lease form produced in evidence was not signed by Mr. Groom or anyone in management. Third, Groom consistently challenged the amount of payments being made, and whether a lease even existed, from the very moment the Kabrick family paid less than was expected. Fourth, as the trial judge reasoned, it is very difficult to believe that after going to great lengths (and even holding a public hearing for all tenants) to raise the rent and give proper notice, that Groom would accept a lesser rent from newcomers, especially when they were a much larger group of tenants than had previously occupied the trailer.
The evidence amply supported the determination that there was no meeting of the minds and that no contract was signed by both parties. Accordingly, the court's conclusion that no lease existed was correct. There simply was no error in determining that the parties did not have a lease agreement. Quantum Meruit. The family also argues that the trial court erred in awarding damages under the principle of quantum meruit. Granting equitable relief was a proper exercise of the trial judge's discretion. Again, there was no error.
The absence of a lease agreement takes this case outside the Manufactured/Mobile Home Landlord-Tenant Act and therefore renders most of the appellants' arguments concerning alleged breach of the Act irrelevant. However, we do note that RCW 59.20.050(1) does not bear the construction claimed by appellants. When an existing lease expires, the tenant has the right to demand that another written agreement for a one-year tenancy be entered. Further, when a mobile home is moved into a park, the tenant can demand a lease of one year or more. Nothing in that statute, however, suggests that a person who (as here) takes over a space where the lease has already expired is entitled to a one-year lease or suggests the new occupant can retroactively impose a lease on behalf of the former tenant who did not do so.
The doctrine of quantum meruit is one of "quasi contract" that "arises from an implied duty of the parties not based on a contract, or on any consent or agreement." Heaton v. Imus, 93 Wn.2d 249, 252, 608 P.2d 631 (1980). The purpose of the doctrine is to avoid unjust enrichment to one party when, under the circumstances, he is not entitled to it. Id. It is a remedy that provides for a reasonable compensation for work done. Id. at 252-253.
The elements of recovery under quantum meruit are: (1) valuable services rendered; (2) to persons from whom payment was sought; (3) which were accepted and enjoyed by the persons; and (4) under circumstances that reasonably notified them that the plaintiff expected to be paid. Bailie Commc'ns, Ltd. v. Trend Bus. Sys., Inc., 61 Wn. App. 151, 159, 810 P.2d 12, 814 P.2d 699, review denied, 117 Wn.2d 1029 (1991).
Long before Washington became a state, the Territorial Legislature enacted a provision that governs this situation. Called a "tenancy by sufferance," the statute provides in part:
Whenever any person obtains possession of premises without the consent of the owner or other person having the right to give said possession, he shall be deemed a tenant by sufferance merely, and shall be liable to pay reasonable rent for the actual time he occupied the premises.
The policy of this state thus supports the ruling of the trial judge. The other tenants were paying $350 per month and the trial judge determined that to be a reasonable sum for the mobile home spaces. The appellants paid only $300 and it was proper for the trial judge to award the difference in payment in order to make the respondent whole and prevent the appellants from unduly benefiting.
The family raises two primary arguments against the quantum meruit ruling. First, they allege that respondent Groom did not act with "clean hands" and was therefore not in a position to raise an equitable claim. This argument, in turn, is based on various contentions that Groom did not comply with the Manufactured/Mobile Home Landlord-Tenant Act (MHLTA), chapter 59.20 RCW. As noted previously, there never was any lease between the parties and the MHLTA never had any part in this case. Instead, the family, without notice to the respondent, took over a space that had at one time been leased under the Act. That neither invokes the MHLTA nor required Groom to act under it with respect to the new occupants.
The family also argues that there is no evidence that any of the four named in the judgment actually lived on the premises. They construe the doctrine too narrowly. Ms. Kabrick and Ms. Gacusana are the titled owners of the mobile home, while Ms. Gacusana was the one who asserted a leasehold interest in the space. Ms. Holten was the person who actually wrote the checks for payment. It was not unreasonable to believe that these people, along with the husband of Ms. Gacusana, were actually connected to the mobile home that was occupying the space. They received the benefit of the lowered rent paid for the space. The trial court did not err in entering judgment against them.
The record reflects that even though only one family member (and his attendant) actually lived in the mobile home, many others used the resort's facilities and the reason the mobile home was purchased was for family use as a vacation home.
Quantum meruit was fairly applied to this situation. The measure of damages was also reasonable. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment entered by the trial judge.
Attorney Fees. Respondent requests reasonable attorney fees, claiming entitlement under the MHLTA, particularly RCW 59.20.110. As we have already held, there was no lease and the MHLTA was not applicable to this case. Accordingly, we deny the request for reasonable attorney fees since there was no basis in law for them. RAP 18.1.
Respondent is the prevailing party and is entitled to its costs in this action. RAP 14.2.
The judgment is affirmed.
A majority of the panel has determined this opinion will not be printed in the Washington Appellate Reports, but it will be filed for public record pursuant to RCW 2.06.040.
SWEENEY, J. and BROWN, J., concur.