Opinion
No. 1:15-cv-1259-JDT-egb
08-04-2016
AUDIE GROGG, Plaintiff, v. GRADY PERRY, ET AL., Defendants.
ORDER TO MODIFY THE DOCKET, FOR PARTIAL DISMISSAL, AND DIRECTING THAT PROCESS BE ISSUED AND SERVED ON DEFENDANT DOWIN
On October 27, 2015, Plaintiff Audie Grogg ("Grogg"), who is confined in the Hardeman County Correctional Facility ("HCCF") in Whiteville, Tennessee, filed a pro se complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 accompanied by a motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis. (ECF Nos. 1 & 2.) On October 28, 2015, the Court granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis and assessed the civil filing fee pursuant to the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(a)-(b). (ECF No. 4.) The Clerk shall record the defendants as the Warden Grady Perry, Corrections Corporation of America ("CCA"), Deputy Warden Mrs. First Name Unknown ("FNU") Burns, Sergeant FNU Dowin, and inmate FNU Pierce.
The Clerk is DIRECTED to remove Arion Nation as Defendant as it was meant to describe Defendant Dowin's alleged gang affiliation at HCCF. (Compl. at 2, ECF No. 1.)
I. THE COMPLAINT
Grogg alleges that Defendant Dowin in affiliated with the Aryan Nation gang members. (Compl. 4, ECF No. 1.) On October 5, 2015, Grogg contends that Defendant Dowin crushed his wrist then slammed him face first into a door. (Id.) Grogg alleges that on October 7, 2015, Defendant Dowin took Grogg to the shower where Grogg was threatened by Defendant Piece for filing grievances against Defendant Dowin. (Id.) On October 8, 2015, Defendant Pierce informed Grogg's cellmate, inmate Tim Taylor, that he and Defendant Dowin had a hit on Grogg to kill on sight. (Id.) Grogg alleges that his life is in danger and he has filed and grievance, a Security Threat Group ("STG") report, and an incompatible against Defendant Dowin and has still been ignored. (Id.)
Grogg also appears to be including additional allegations in the part of the forms relegated for details of steps taken to follow the state grievance procedure. (Id. at 2.) Grogg alleges that he has filed grievances and complaints, but nothing has been done. (Id.) He contends that he has been placed in segregation on multiple disciplinary reports and had been found guilty without any hearings, inmate advisors, or any opportunity to defend himself. (Id.) Grogg contends that he was told to serve five weeks "in the hole" for trying to mail his legal mail. (Id.) As a result, Grogg writes that Defendant Perry told him that Mrs. Futrell, who is not a party to this complaint, could do whatever she wants, and that Defendant Burns also ignores and avoids his cell. (Id.at 3.) Grogg continues to be in the hole and has been denied sick call, dental, medical and optical treatment. (Id.)
Grogg seeks to be transferred, to receive monetary restitution, and to have Defendants Dowin and Perry immediately terminated. (Id. at 5.)
On February 3, 2016, Grogg filed additional hand-written complaint in a letter to the court, which is very difficult to decipher. (ECF No. 5.) Grogg alleges that on January 23, 2016, he was put in segregation for failure to clear a metal detector and refusal to pick up his boots by C.O. Pinkle, who Grogg describes as a prejudiced black woman. (Id. at 1.) Grogg further alleges that on January 25, 2016, "another prejudice black woman" placed him in property restriction, stripped him of his clothes, and took all of Grogg's property. (Id.) Grogg continues to allege that on January 26, 2015, Dorothy Roberts, "another prejudice black woman" had his water turned off to his sink and toilet. (Id.) Grogg pleads to not be shipped back the CCA for fear he will be killed. (Id.) On March 3, 2016. Grogg provided the court with notification that he was moved back to HCCF. (ECF No. 6.)
Grogg's letter also provides allegations against Dr. Dietz which are addressed in Grogg's complaint No. 15-1260.
II. ANALYSIS
A. Screening and Standard
The Court is required to screen prisoner complaints and to dismiss any complaint, or any portion thereof, if the complaint
(1) is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted; or28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).
(2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.
In assessing whether the complaint in this case states a claim on which relief may be granted, the court applies the standards under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), as stated in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677-79 (2009), and in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555-57 (2007). Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470-71 (6th Cir. 2010). "Accepting all well-pleaded allegations in the complaint as true, the Court 'consider[s] the factual allegations in [the] complaint to determine if they plausibly suggest an entitlement to relief.'" Williams v. Curtin, 631 F.3d 380, 383 (6th Cir. 2011) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 681) (alteration in original). "[P]leadings that . . . are no more than conclusions . . . are not entitled to the assumption of truth. While legal conclusions can provide the framework of a complaint, they must be supported by factual allegations." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679; see also Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 n.3 ("Rule 8(a)(2) still requires a 'showing,' rather than a blanket assertion, of entitlement to relief. Without some factual allegation in the complaint, it is hard to see how a claimant could satisfy the requirement of providing not only 'fair notice' of the nature of the claim, but also 'grounds' on which the claim rests.").
"A complaint can be frivolous either factually or legally. Any complaint that is legally frivolous would ipso facto fail to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." Hill, 630 F.3d at 470 (citing Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325, 328-29 (1989)).
Whether a complaint is factually frivolous under §§ 1915A(b)(1) and 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) is a separate issue from whether it fails to state a claim for relief. Statutes allowing a complaint to be dismissed as frivolous give "judges not only the authority to dismiss a claim based on an indisputably meritless legal theory, but also the unusual power to pierce the veil of the complaint's factual allegations and dismiss those claims whose factual contentions are clearly baseless." Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327, 109 S. Ct. 1827 (interpreting 28 U.S.C. § 1915). Unlike a dismissal for failure to state a claim, where a judge must accept all factual allegations as true, Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949-50, a judge does not have to accept "fantastic or delusional" factual allegations as true in prisoner complaints that are reviewed for frivolousness. Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327-28, 109 S. Ct. 1827.Id. at 471.
"Pro se complaints are to be held 'to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers,' and should therefore be liberally construed." Williams, 631 F.3d at 383 (quoting Martin v. Overton, 391 F.3d 710, 712 (6th Cir. 2004)). Pro se litigants and prisoners are not exempt from the requirements of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Wells v. Brown, 891 F.2d 591, 594 (6th Cir. 1989); see also Brown v. Matauszak, No. 09-2259, 2011 WL 285251, at *5 (6th Cir. Jan. 31, 2011) (affirming dismissal of pro se complaint for failure to comply with "unique pleading requirements" and stating "a court cannot 'create a claim which [a plaintiff] has not spelled out in his pleading'") (quoting Clark v. Nat'l Travelers Life Ins. Co., 518 F.2d 1167, 1169 (6th Cir. 1975)) (alteration in original); Payne v. Sec'y of Treas., 73 F. App'x 836, 837 (6th Cir. 2003) (affirming sua sponte dismissal of complaint pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2) and stating, "[n]either this court nor the district court is required to create Payne's claim for her"); cf. Pliler v. Ford, 542 U.S. 225, 231 (2004) ("District judges have no obligation to act as counsel or paralegal to pro se litigants."); Young Bok Song v. Gipson, 423 F. App'x 506, 510 (6th Cir. 2011) ("[W]e decline to affirmatively require courts to ferret out the strongest cause of action on behalf of pro se litigants. Not only would that duty be overly burdensome, it would transform the courts from neutral arbiters of disputes into advocates for a particular party. While courts are properly charged with protecting the rights of all who come before it, that responsibility does not encompass advising litigants as to what legal theories they should pursue."). B. § 1983 Claim
Grogg filed his complaint on the court-supplied form for actions under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 which provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress, except that in any action brought against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such officer's judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable. For the purposes of this section, any Act of Congress applicable exclusively to the District of Columbia shall be considered to be a statute of the District of Columbia.To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two elements: (1) a deprivation of rights secured by the "Constitution and laws" of the United States (2) committed by a defendant acting under color of state law. Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 150 (1970).
1. Claims Against CCA
Grogg's complaint does not allege a viable claim against CCA. "A private corporation that performs the traditional state function of operating a prison acts under color of state law for purposes of § 1983." Thomas v. Coble, 55 F. App'x 748, 748 (6th Cir. 2003) (citing Street v. Corr. Corp. of Am., 102 F.3d 810, 814 (6th Cir. 1996)); see also Parsons v. Caruso, 491 F. App'x 597, 609 (6th Cir. 2012) (corporation that provides medical care to prisoners can be sued under § 1983). The Sixth Circuit has applied the standards for assessing municipal liability to claims against private corporations that operate prisons or provide medical care to prisoners. Thomas, 55 F. App'x at 748-49; Street, 102 F.3d at 817-18; Johnson v. Corr. Corp. of Am., 26 F. App'x 386, 388 (6th Cir. 2001). CCA "cannot be held liable under a theory of respondeat superior." Braswell v. Corr. Corp. of Am., 419 F. App'x 622, 627 (6th Cir. 2011). Instead, to prevail on a § 1983 claim against CCA, Grogg "must show that a policy or well-settled custom of the company was the 'moving force' behind the alleged deprivation" of his rights. Id. The complaint does not adequately allege that Grogg suffered an injury because of an unconstitutional policy or custom of CCA.
2. Claims Against Assignment to Segregation
Grogg has no valid claim against Defendants for causing him to be held in segregation. In general, an inmate does not have a liberty interest in a particular prison, housing assignment, or security classification or in freedom from segregation. Olim v. Wakinekona, 461 U.S. 238, 245 (1983); Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 224-25 (1976); Montanye v. Haymes, 427 U.S. 236, 243 (1976); Moody v. Daggett, 429 U.S. 78, 88 n.9 (1976); Newell v. Brown, 981 F.2d 880, 883 (6th Cir. 1992); Beard v. Livesay, 798 F.2d 874, 876 (6th Cir. 1986). See also Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484-87 (1995) (confinement in particular part of prison or jail does not implicate due process absent "atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life"); Guile v. Ball, 521 F. App'x 542, 544 (6th Cir. 2013); McMillan v. Fielding, 136 F. App'x 818, 820 (6th Cir. 2005) ("Ten days in lock up, the loss of package privileges, and a $4.00 fine do not constitute an atypical and significant hardship in the context of prison life." (quoting Sandin, 515 U.S. at 484)). Further, the Court has no discretion to permit or prohibit Grogg's transfer to another facility.
3. Claims Concerning Grievances
Grogg complains that nothing has been done regarding his grievances and complaints. Inmates do not have a right under the Due Process Clause to an effective grievance mechanism. Argue v. Hofmeyer, 80 F. App'x 427, 430 (6th Cir. 2003); Shehee v. Luttrell, 199 F.3d 295, 300 (6th Cir. 1999); Smith v.Corr. Corp. of Am., 19 F. App'x 318, 321 (6th Cir. 2001) (holding that prisoner "had no constitutional right to . . . disciplinary or grievance systems that met his standards"); Irvin v. Fluery, No. 2:07-cv-117, 2007 WL 5328577, at *2 (W.D. Mich. Sept. 11, 2007) ("[T]he Sixth Circuit and other circuit courts have held that there is no constitutional right to access an institutional grievance procedure.") (report and recommendation), adopted, 2007 WL 3036493 (W.D. Mich. Oct. 16, 2007); Mackey v. Carberry, No. 2:07-cv-43, 2007 WL 2479296, at *3 (W.D. Mich. Aug. 28, 2007) (report and recommendation adopted as opinion of the Court); Holloway v. Drew, No. 2:07-CV-160-MEF, 2007 WL 1175067, at *2 (M.D. Ala. Apr. 4, 2007) (report and recommendation); Robertson v. Montgomery Cnty., No. 3 06 0435, 2006 WL 1207646, at *2 (M.D. Tenn. Apr. 27, 2006) ("[S]tate law does not create a liberty interest in the grievance procedure."); Robinson v. Hastings, 2006 WL 950185, at *4.
See also 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(b) ("The failure of a State to adopt or adhere to an administrative grievance procedure shall not constitute the basis for an action under section 1997a or 1997c of this title.").
The participation of defendants in processing or denying Grogg's grievances cannot in itself constitute sufficient personal involvement to state a claim of constitutional dimension. Simpson v. Overton, 79 F. App'x. 117, 2003 WL 22435653 (6th Cir. 2003); see also Martin v. Harvey, 14 F. App'x. 307, 2001 WL 669983, at *2 (6th Cir. 2001) ("The denial of the grievance is not the same as the denial of a request to receive medical care."). Section 1983 liability may not be imposed against a defendant for "a mere failure to act" based upon information contained in a grievance. See Shehee v. Luttrell, 199 F.3d at 300; Lillard, 76 F.3d at 727-28.
Additionally, Grogg also has no cause of action against these Defendants for failing to investigate or take remedial measures to the extent they were aware of his grievances and complaints. Although failure to investigate may give rise to § 1983 supervisory liability, see Walker v. Norris, 917 F.2d 1449, 1457 (6th Cir. 1990) and Marchese v. Lucas, 758 F.2d 181, 188 (6th Cir. 1985), the reasoning in Walker and the analysis in its progeny teach that evidence of a failure to investigate can establish municipal liability only. In Dyer v. Casey, No. 94-5780, 1995 WL 712765, at *2 (6th Cir. Dec. 4, 1995), the Court stated that "the theory underlying [Marchese] is that the municipality's failure to investigate or discipline amounts to a 'ratification' of the officer's conduct."
In Walker, the Sixth Circuit distinguished Marchese because the Court "imposed the broad investigative responsibilities outlined in Marchese upon the Sheriff in his official capacity." Walker, 917 F.2d at 1457 ("The Sheriff is sued here in his official capacity and in that capacity, he had a duty to both know and act."). In 1998, the Sixth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of a claim of supervisory liability based on the "failure to investigate," stating:
Young's claim against defendants McAninch and Goff is based solely on their alleged failure to investigate defendant Ward's behavior towards Young. Although Young stated that defendants McAninch and Goff had knowledge of his allegations against defendant Ward, this is insufficient to meet the standard that they either condoned, encouraged or knowingly acquiesced in the misconduct.Young v. Ward, No. 97-3043, 1998 WL 384564, at *1 (6th Cir. June 18, 1998).
4. Claims against Pierce
Defendant Pierce is a private citizen. Grogg makes no allegations that he is employed by the state. Generally to be considered to have acted "under color of state law," the person must be a state or local government official or employee. A private party may be found to have acted under color of state law to establish the first element of this cause of action only when the party "acted together with or . . . obtained significant aid from state officials" and did so to such a degree that its actions may properly be characterized as "state action." Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 937 (1982). An individual may also be considered a state actor if he or she exercises powers traditionally reserved to a state. Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 352 (1974). The fact that Pierce is an inmate, under control of the state, does not make him an actor of the state.
5. Eighth Amendment: Cruel and Unusual Punishment
An Eighth Amendment claim consists of both objective and subjective components. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994); Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 8 (1992); Wilson, 501 U.S. at 298; Williams v. Curtin, 631 F.3d at 383; Mingus v. Butler, 591 F.3d 474, 479-80 (6th Cir. 2010). The objective component requires that the deprivation be "sufficiently serious." Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834; Hudson, 503 U.S. at 8; Wilson, 501 U.S. at 298.
To satisfy the objective component of an Eighth Amendment claim, a prisoner must show that he "is incarcerated under conditions posing a substantial risk of serious harm," Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834; see also Miller v. Calhoun Cnty., 408 F.3d 803, 812 (6th Cir. 2005), or that he has been deprived of the "'minimal civilized measure of life's necessities,'" Wilson, 501 U.S. at 298 (quoting Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981)); see also Hadix v. Johnson, 367 F.3d 513, 525 (6th Cir. 2004). The Constitution "'does not mandate comfortable prisons.'" Wilson, 501 U.S. at 298 (quoting Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 349). "[R]outine discomfort 'is part of the penalty that criminal offenders pay for their offenses against society.'" Hudson, 503 U.S. at 9 (quoting Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 347). Thus, "extreme deprivations are required to make out a conditions-of-confinement claim." Id.
In considering the types of conditions that constitute a substantial risk of serious harm, the Court evaluates not only the seriousness of the potential harm and the likelihood that the harm will actually occur, but evidence that unwilling exposure to that risk violates contemporary standards of decency, i.e., that society does not choose to tolerate the risk in its prisons. Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 36 (1993). The Supreme Court has also emphasized that prisoners can rarely establish an Eighth Amendment violation from a combination of conditions of confinement that, in themselves, do not rise to the level of a constitutional violation:
Some conditions of confinement may establish an Eighth Amendment violation "in combination" when each would not do so alone, but only when they have a mutually enforcing effect that produces the deprivation of a single, identifiable human need such as food, warmth, or exercise—for example, a low cell temperature at night combined with a failure to issue blankets. To say that some prison conditions may interact in this fashion is a far cry from saying that all prison conditions are a seamless web for Eighth Amendment purposes. Nothing as amorphous as "overall conditions" can rise to the level of cruel and unusual punishment when no specific deprivation of a single human need exists.Wilson, 501 U.S. at 304-05 (citation omitted); see also Thompson, 29 F.3d at 242 ("Eighth Amendment claims may not be based on the totality of the circumstances, but rather must identify a specific condition that violates" a particular right); Carver v. Knox Cnty., Tenn., 887 F.2d 1287, 1294 (6th Cir. 1989) (same).
To establish the subjective component of an Eighth Amendment violation, a prisoner must demonstrate that the official acted with the requisite intent, that is, that he had a "sufficiently culpable state of mind." Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834; see also Wilson, 501 U.S. at 297, 302-03. The plaintiff must show that the prison officials acted with "deliberate indifference" to a substantial risk that the prisoner would suffer serious harm. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834; Wilson, 501 U.S. at 303; Helling, 509 U.S. at 32; Woods v. Lecureux, 110 F.3d 1215, 1222 (6th Cir. 1997); Street v. Corr. Corp. of Am., 102 F.3d 810, 814 (6th Cir. 1996); Taylor v. Mich. Dep't of Corr., 69 F.3d 76, 79 (6th Cir. 1995). "[D]eliberate indifference describes a state of mind more blameworthy than negligence." Farmer, 511 U.S. at 835. Thus,
[a] prison official cannot be found liable under the Eighth Amendment for denying an inmate humane conditions of confinement unless the official knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety; the official must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference. This approach comports best with the text of the Eighth Amendment as our cases have interpreted it. The Eighth Amendment does not outlaw cruel and unusual "conditions"; it outlaws cruel and unusual "punishments." An act or omission unaccompanied by knowledge of a significant risk of harm might well be something society wishes to discourage, and if harm does result society might well wish to assure compensation. The common law reflects such concerns when it imposes tort liability on a purely objective basis. . . . But an official's failure to alleviate a significant risk that he should have perceived but did not, while no cause for commendation, cannot under our cases be condemned as the infliction of punishment.Id. at 837-38, 114 S. Ct. at 1979 (emphasis added; citations omitted); see also Garretson v. City of Madison Heights, 407 F.3d 789, 796 (6th Cir. 2005) ("If the officers failed to act in the face of an obvious risk of which they should have known but did not, then they did not violate the Fourteenth Amendment."). The subjective component must be evaluated for each defendant individually. Bishop v. Hackel, 636 F.3d 757, 767 (6th Cir. 2011); see also id. at 768 ("[W]e must focus on whether each individual Deputy had the personal involvement necessary to permit a finding of subjective knowledge.").
Grogg's complaint that various "prejudice black woman" put him in segregation, stripped him of his clothes, and turned off his water are too conclusory and without enough information to provide for sufficient allegations for an Eighth Amendment claim. Grogg does not provide that he was harmed by the actions or that the "black women" acted in a manner deliberately indifferent to Grogg's safety.
Defendant Dowin's alleged threats do not satisfy the objective component of an Eighth Amendment claim. See, e.g., Pasley v. Conerly, 345 F. App'x 981, 984 (6th Cir. 2009); Jones Bey v. Johnson, 248 F. App'x 675, 677-78 (6th Cir. 2007) (no Eighth Amendment claim for prison guard's "use of racial slurs and other derogatory language"); Miller v. Wertanen, 109 F. App'x 64, 65 (6th Cir. 2004) (a guard's verbal threat to sexually assault an inmate "was not punishment that violated [the prisoner's] constitutional rights"); Johnson v. Unknown Dellatifa, 357 F.3d 539, 546 (6th Cir. 2004) ("harassment and verbal abuse . . . do not constitute the type of infliction of pain that the Eighth Amendment prohibits"); Johnson v. Moore, 7 F. App'x 382, 384 (6th Cir. 2001) ("Allegations of verbal harassment and verbal abuse by prison officials toward an inmate do not constitute punishment within the meaning of the Eighth Amendment. Nor do allegations of verbal harassment rise to the level of unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain proscribed by the Eighth Amendment." (citation omitted)); Owens v. Johnson, No. 99-2094, 2000 WL 876766, at *2 (6th Cir. June 23, 2000) ("The occasional or sporadic use of racial slurs, although unprofessional and reprehensible, does not rise to a level of constitutional magnitude. The petty exchanges of insults between a prisoner and guard do not amount to constitutional torts." (citation omitted)); Ivey v. Wilson, 832 F.2d 950, 955 (6th Cir. 1987) (per curiam) (holding that verbal abuse or harassment does not constitute punishment under the Eighth Amendment); Miles v. Tchrozynski, No. 2:09-CV-11192, 2009 WL 960510, at *1 (E.D. Mich. Apr. 7, 2009) ("Even verbal threats by a corrections officer to assault an inmate do not violate an inmate's Eighth Amendment rights. Verbal threats and abuse made in retaliation for filing grievances are likewise not actionable." (citation omitted)). Thus, Grogg has no cause of action for threats made by Defendant Dowin.
However, for purposes of screening, Grogg has alleged a plausible claim for violation of the Eighth Amendment for excessive force against Defendant Dowin.
III. CONCLUSION
The Court DISMISSES Grogg's complaint against Defendants Perry, CCA, Burns, and Pierce for failure to state a claim on which relief can be granted, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and 1915A(b)(1). Process will be issued for Defendant Dowin on Grogg's Eighth Amendment claim for the use of excessive force.
It is ORDERED that the Clerk shall issue process for Defendant Dowin and deliver that process to the U.S. Marshal for service. Service shall be made on Defendant Dowin pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(e) and Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure 4.04(1) and (10), either by mail or personally if mail service is not effective. All costs of service shall by advanced by the United States.
It is further ORDERED that Grogg shall serve a copy of every subsequent document he files in this cause on the attorneys for Defendant Dowin or on any unrepresented Defendant. Grogg shall make a certificate of service on every document filed. Grogg shall familiarize himself with Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and this Court's Local Rules.
A copy of the Local Rules may be obtained from the Clerk. The Local Rules are also available on the Court's website at www.tnwd.courts.gov/pdf/content/LocalRules.pdf.
Grogg shall promptly notify the Clerk, in writing, of any change of address or extended absence. Failure to comply with these requirements, or any other order of the Court may result in the dismissal of this case without further notice. IT IS SO ORDERED.
s/James D. Todd
JAMES D. TODD
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE