Opinion
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT; VACATING HEARING (DOCKET NO. 13)
MAXINE M. CHESNEY, JUDGE
Before the Court is defendants' motion for summary judgment pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Plaintiff has filed opposition, to which defendants have replied. Having reviewed the papers submitted in support of and in opposition to the motion, the Court deems the motion appropriate for decision on the papers, VACATES the hearing scheduled for June 14, 2002, and rules as follows.
I. BACKGROUND
The following facts are not in dispute or are read in the light most favorable to plaintiff.
On December 28, 1999, plaintiff visited the Oakland Public Library ("the Library"). (See Odofin Decl. Ex. 4.) A librarian asked another patron, Mr. Kufu ("Kufu"), to leave the Children's Room because he was "staring at a young mother with her children." (See id.) When a guard came to escort Kufu out of the Children's Room, plaintiff had a loud confrontation with Library staff. (See id.; Wagner Decl. Ex. 1 [Grigsby Dep. at 102:10-106:13].) Plaintiff then left the Library. (See Wagner Decl. Ex. 1 [Grigsby Dep. at 107:13-20].)
On the evening of December 30, 1999, plaintiff again visited the Library. (See Saladdin Decl. Ex. 4.) Defendant Irving Peagler ("Peagler"), a security guard with the Library, spoke to plaintiff about plaintiff having walked through the Children's Room. (See Wagner Decl. Ex. 1 [Grigsby Dep. at 84:3-19, 85:11-14].) Plaintiff told Peagler to "get out of [my] face" because plaintiff did not want to talk to Peagler. (See id. [Grigsby Dep. at 84:5-8, 85:8-10].) Peagler then told plaintiff to leave the Library, and plaintiff refused because plaintiff was of the view that Peagler did not have the right to ask [plaintiff] to leave." (See id. [Grigsby Dep. at 87:9-15, 21-23].) Peagler phoned the police, who arrived, approached plaintiff, and told plaintiff he would have to leave the Library. (See id. [Grigsby Dep. at 95:8-23, 109:9-11].) Plaintiff was directed to leave the Library for the remainder of the evening. (See Odofin Decl. ¶ 8.) Plaintiff left the Library, feeling he had no choice but to leave. (See Wagner Decl. Ex. 1 [Grigsby Dep. at 110:21-111:5].) Plaintiff was not banned from the Library. (See id. [Grigsby Dep. at 179:20-25].)
According to plaintiff, Peagler told plaintiff that "somebody in the Children's Room said that [plaintiff] walked through there and they had a problem with it." (See id. [Grigsby Dep. at 86:4-9].)
II. LEGAL STANDARD
Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that a court may grant summary judgment "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law."
The Supreme Courts 1986 "trilogy" of Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986), Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986), and Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986), requires that a party seeking summary judgment show the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Once the moving party has done so, the non moving party must "go beyond the pleadings and by her own affidavits, or by the `depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,' designate `specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.'" See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324 (quoting Rule 56(c)). "When the moving party has carried its burden under Rule 56(c), its opponent must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts." Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586. "If the evidence is merely colorable, or is not significantly probative, summary judgment may be granted." Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 249-50 (citations omitted). When determining whether There is a genuine issue for trial, "inferences to be drawn from the underlying facts . . . must be viewed in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion."See Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587 (quoting United States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 655 (1962)).
III. DISCUSSION
Plaintiff brings the above-titled action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff alleges he was deprived of his Fourth Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment rights when he was directed to leave the Library on the evening of December 30, 1999. See Compl. ¶¶ 15-16.) Defendants argue they are entitled to summary judgment because plaintiff lacks evidence that his constitutional rights were violated.
Defendants further argue that the public entity defendants are entitled to summary judgment because plaintiff lacks evidence that his alleged constitutional injuries were the result of a county policy, practice or custom, and that the individual defendants are entitled to qualified immunity. In light of the Court's findings discussed infra, the Court does not reach these additional arguments.
A. Fourth Amendment (Unlawful Seizure/Arrest)
Plaintiff alleges, based on the above stated facts, that he was subjected to an "unlawful seizure" in violation of his Fourth Amendment rights. (See Compl. ¶ 15.)
"[A] person has been 'seized' within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment only if, in view of all the circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to leave." United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1984). Here, the undisputed facts establish that plaintiff was not "seized" within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment; rather, plaintiff left the Library after being directed to do so by police officers. See Dalrymple v. Reno, 164 F.Supp.2d 1364, 1372 (S.D. Fla. 2001) (holding plaintiffs who left site of demonstration after being confronted by police officers were not "seized").
Plaintiffs conclusory assertion in his opposing declaration that he was "arrested" is insufficient to create a genuine issue for trial. See Lujan v. National Wildlife Federation, 497 U.S. 871, 888 (1990) (holding party opposing summary judgment does not show "genuine issue for trial" by "replac[ing] conclusory allegations of the complaint or answer with conclusory allegations of an affidavit"); Arpin v. Santa Clara Valley Transportation Agency, 261 F.3d 912, 922 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding where defendants offered evidence plaintiff resisted arrest by stiffening arms and attempting to pull free of arresting officer, plaintiff did not create triable issue of fact by making conclusory statement that "she did not resist arrest in any way").
Accordingly, defendants are entitled to summary judgment on plaintiffs claim that defendants violated § 1983 by depriving him of his Fourth Amendment rights.
B. Fourteenth Amendment (Due Process)
Plaintiff alleges that he was deprived of his liberty interest in being able to freely use the public library to seek knowledge" when he was required to leave the Library, and that he should have been granted a "hearing to fairly deal with the issues raised by the expulsion." (See Compl. ¶ 15.)
"Procedural due process imposes constraints on governmental decisions which deprive individuals of `liberty' or `property' within the meaning of the Due Process Clause of the . . . Fourteenth Amendment." Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 332 (1976). In determining what amount of process is due before a government actor may deprive a citizen of liberty or property, courts balance three factors: "First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government's interest." See id. at 335.
"A threshold requirement to a . . . procedural due process claim is the plaintiffs showing of a liberty or property interest protected by the Constitution." Wedges/Ledges of California, Inc. v. City of Phoenix, 24 F.3d 56, 62 (9th Cir. 1994). Here, neither party cites to any authority addressing the question of a liberty interest in the context of access to a library. The Court's research indicates that one district court has considered the issue, and concluded that a suspension of all library privileges for approximately four months implicated a liberty interest protectible under the Fourteenth Amendment. See Wayfield v. Town of Tisbury, 925 F.Supp. 880, 882, 885 (D. Mass. 1996) (analogizing library privileges to a license to drive or to conduct business). Here, as noted, plaintiff was unable to access the Library on the evening of December 30, 1999 - a period of, at most, several hours. This de minimus interruption of plaintiffs otherwise unrestricted access to the Library simply does not implicate a cognizable liberty interest. See Dittman v. State of California, 191 F.3d 1020, 1029 (9th Cir. 1999) (noting liberty interest in right to choose one's field of private employment not implicated by governmental restriction causing only "brief interruption" in ability to pursue chosen occupation or profession).
Moreover, even if plaintiffs inability to access the Library on the evening in question could be characterized as a deprivation of a liberty interest, plaintiff fails to make any argument, let alone offer evidence, to show how conducting a hearing prior to expulsion would reduce the risk of an erroneous decision under the circumstances presented, nor does he discuss the Library's interest in maintaining order. See Mathews, 424 U.S. at 332. Plaintiff merely declares that defendants should have provided him "a fair hearing before a neutral arbiter." (See Grigsby Decl. ¶ 3.) Conclusory assertions in a declaration do not suffice to create a genuine issue for trial. See Lujan, 497 U.S. at 888.
Accordingly, defendants are entitled to summary judgment on plaintiffs claim that defendants violated § 1983 by depriving him of due process.
C. Fourteenth Amendment (Equal Protection)
Plaintiff alleges that the Library has a policy of allowing its security guards to "eject people like myself (an indigent African-American male) without providing a hearing . . . ." (See Compl. ¶ 15.)
"Proof of racially discriminatory intent or purpose is required to show a violation of the Equal Protection Clause." Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 265 (1977). Defendants argue plaintiff lacks evidence of such intent or purpose because plaintiff makes no showing that defendants applied their rules in a discriminatory manner.
The Library's rules provide that persons who engage in specified activities "may be excluded from the Library," and that persons not engaging in "reading, studying, or using Library materials, programs, and services" may be "asked to leave the building." (See Odofin Decl. ¶ 5, Ex. 1.) Plaintiff offers no evidence that defendants provide some Library patrons with pre-expulsion hearings, but do not provide such hearings to indigent African-Americans. Plaintiff also offers no evidence that when defendants perceive patrons to be violating Library rules, defendants only require such patrons to leave if they are indigent African-Americans. In short, plaintiff offers no evidence whatsoever concerning his equal protection claim. Indeed, plaintiffs opposing declaration does not even reference his equal protection claim.
Accordingly, defendants are entitled to summary judgment on plaintiffs claim that defendants violated § 1983 by depriving him of equal protection.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, defendants' motion for summary judgment is hereby GRANTED.
The Clerk shall close the file.
This order closes Docket No. 13.
JUDGMENT IN A CIVIL CASE
Defendants' motion for summary judgment is hereby granted.