Opinion
NO. 2022 CA 0399.
11-04-2022
Andrew Paul GRIFFIN v. Louisiana Attorney General Jeff LANDRY, Louisiana Department of Public Safety and Corrections, Louisiana Bureau of Criminal Identification and Information of the Office of State Police, Louisiana Sexual Predator Apprehension Team of the Department of Justice, Office of the District Attorney for the Twenty-Third Judicial District, Ascension Parish Sheriff's Office and Louisiana Office of Risk Management of the Division of Administration.
Brant M. Mayer , Baton Rouge, LA, Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellee, Andrew Paul Griffin. Andre C. Castaing , James L. Hilburn , Erica S. McLellan , Faye D. Morrison , Adrienne E. Aucoin , Emma J. DeVillier , Jeremiah J. Sams , Baton Rouge, LA, Attorneys for Defendants-Appellants, Louisiana Attorney General Jeff Landry and State of Louisiana through the Department of Public Safety and Corrections. BEFORE: THERIOT, CHUTZ, AND HESTER, JJ.
Brant M. Mayer , Baton Rouge, LA, Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellee, Andrew Paul Griffin.
Andre C. Castaing , James L. Hilburn , Erica S. McLellan , Faye D. Morrison , Adrienne E. Aucoin , Emma J. DeVillier , Jeremiah J. Sams , Baton Rouge, LA, Attorneys for Defendants-Appellants, Louisiana Attorney General Jeff Landry and State of Louisiana through the Department of Public Safety and Corrections.
BEFORE: THERIOT, CHUTZ, AND HESTER, JJ.
HESTER, J.
This matter is before us on appeal from a judgment of the trial court issuing a writ of mandamus and permanent injunction, directing the termination of plaintiff's obligation to comply with Louisiana sex offender registration and notification requirements in La. R.S. 15:540 et seq. For the following reasons, we reverse.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Plaintiff, Andrew Paul Griffin, filed a Petition for Injunctive Relief, Declaratory Relief, Mandamus Relief, and Damages against Louisiana Attorney General Jeff Landry and the Louisiana Department of Public Safety and Corrections ("DPSC") seeking to eliminate any requirement that he register as a sex offender pursuant to La. R.S. 15:540 et seq. Particularly, Mr. Griffin sought a declaratory judgment decreeing that the State is bound by a prior court ruling, which allegedly altered Mr. Griffin's reporting requirement, and sought mandamus relief directing the State to terminate his obligation to register as a sex offender and to remove his name from the Louisiana State Police Sex Offender Registry. Mr. Griffin also sought injunctive relief prohibiting the State of Louisiana from either requiring him to comply with the registration provisions of La. R.S. 15:540 et seq., and/or punishing him for noncompliance therewith. Lastly, Mr. Griffin sought monetary damages.
Mr. Griffin also named as defendants, the Louisiana Bureau of Criminal Identification and Information of the Office of State Police, the State of Louisiana through the Sexual Predator Apprehension Team of the Department of Justice, the Office of the District Attorney for the 23rd Judicial District Court through Ricky Babin, in his official capacity as District Attorney, the Ascension Parish Sheriff's Office through Bobby Webre, in his official capacity as Sheriff, and the State of Louisiana through the Office of Risk Management of the Division of Administration. However, all of these defendants were subsequently dismissed from the suit.
In 1998, Mr. Griffin was charged by Bill of Information with one count of carnal knowledge of a juvenile. On July 27, 1999, Mr. Griffin pled guilty to one count of contributing to the delinquency of a juvenile, a violation of La. R.S. 14:92(A)(7), and was sentenced to two years imprisonment, which was suspended. Mr. Griffin was placed on three years active, supervised probation and was required to register as a sex offender pursuant to the provisions of La. R.S. 15:540 et seq.
In 1999, La. R.S. 15:544(A) provided as follows:
Louisiana Revised Statutes 15:544(B) through (D) were repealed by Acts 1999, No. 594, § 2, made effective August 15, 1999 shortly after Mr. Griffin's guilty plea and requirement to register as a sex offender. Prior to the repeal, La. R.S. 15:544(B) provided that a person with the duty to register as a sex offender and give notice under La. R.S. 15:542 could petition the court to be relieved of that duty and required that the district attorney be named as a defendant, among other requirements.
A person required to register and give notice under R.S. 15:542 shall comply with the requirement for a period of ten years after the conviction, if not imprisoned during that period in a penal institution, full-time residential treatment facility, hospital, or other facility or institution pursuant to the conviction. If the person required to register and give notice is imprisoned or confined to a penal institution, full-time residential facility, hospital, or other facility or institution pursuant to the conviction, he shall comply with the registration and notice provisions for a period of ten years after release from his confinement or imprisonment. A convicted sex offender's duty to register and give notice terminates at the expiration of ten years from the date of initial registration, provided that during the ten-year period the convicted sex offender does not again become subject to this Chapter.
However, La. R.S. 15:544 was substantially amended by subsequent acts of the legislature, including Acts 2008, No. 462, § 1, made effective June 25, 2008, which provided, in pertinent part, as follows:
A. Except as provided for in Subsection B of this Section, a person required to register and provide notification pursuant to the provisions of this Chapter shall comply with the requirement for a period of fifteen years from the date of the initial registration, or the duration of the lifetime of the offender as provided in Subsection E of this Section, unless the underlying conviction is reversed, set aside or vacated. The requirement to register shall apply to an offender who is pardoned.
...
D. (1) The registration period of fifteen years established in Subsection A of this Section shall be reduced to a period of ten years if the offender maintains a clean record for the entire ten-year period of registration.
...
(3) For purposes of this Subsection, an offender maintains a "clean record" by:
(a) Not being convicted of any offense for which imprisonment for more than one year may be imposed;
(b) Not being convicted of any sex offense;
(c) Successfully completing any periods of supervised release, probation, or parole; and
(d) Successfully completing an appropriate sex offender treatment program by a registered treatment as provided in R.S. 24:936 or an appropriate sex offender treatment program certified by the Attorney General of the United States.
As acknowledged in his petition, Mr. Griffin's reporting period was extended to fifteen years through the amendment to the statute prior to the termination of his initial ten-year reporting period. However, the amendment also provided Mr. Griffin with an opportunity to reduce his fifteen-year reporting period to ten years if he maintained a "clean record" for the entire ten-year period of registration.
In State ex rel. Olivieri v. State, 2000-0172 (La. 2/21/01), 779 So.2d 735, cert. denied , 533 U.S. 936, 121 S.Ct. 2566, 150 L.Ed.2d 730, and 534 U.S. 892, 122 S.Ct. 208, 151 L.Ed.2d 148 (2001), the Louisiana Supreme Court held that retroactive application of La. R.S. 15:540 et seq., requiring registration of sex offenders and public notification, did not impose punishment and, therefore, did not violate state and federal ex post facto law, even though the failure to comply with the registration and notification requirements is a crime and the offenders must pay the cost of notification. Moreover, the restrictions imposed by La. R.S. 15:540 et seq., are civil, rather than punitive, for the protection of the public, and the period of time a sex offender is obligated to register may be extended during the time of his original registration period without violating the ex post facto clause. State v. Billiot, 2012-0174 (La. App. 1st Cir. 9/21/12), 104 So.3d 113, 117-18.
On September 23, 2008, Mr. Griffin was charged by Bill of Information with one count of "REGISTRATION OF SEX OFFENDERS, La. RS 15:542(F)(1)" in the matter entitled, State of Louisiana v. Andrew Paul Griffin, bearing Docket No. 24054 in the 23rd Judicial District Court, Parish of Ascension. The Bill of Information provided that,
ON OR ABOUT JULY 10, 2008, IN THE PARISH OF ASCENSION, ANDREW PAUL GRIFFIN committed the offense of R.S. 15:542(F)(1) REGISTRATION OF SEX OFFENDERS, by failing to register as a sex offender pursuant to La. R.S. 15:542(F)(1) contrary to the law of the State of Louisiana and against the peace and dignity of the same.
The criminal minutes from the Ascension Parish proceeding reflect that Mr. Griffin pled not guilty and later filed a Motion to Quash the Bill of Information. Reference is made to a motion to quash four times in the criminal minutes. On February 20, 2009, the trial court allowed the defense thirty days to file a motion to quash and ordered defense counsel to file a memorandum of law by April 27, 2009. At the request of the defense on April 27, 2009, the trial court continued the "MOTION TO QUASH & MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF THE LAW" until May 28, 2009. On May 28, 2009, the "MTN QUASH BILL OF INFORMATION" was continued to July 27, 2009. On July 27, 2009, the criminal minutes reflect as follows:
Accused present in open court with counsel S JONES. State represented by J BUQUOI. State introduced court minutes from July 27, 1999, Motion to Quash granted by the Court as to REGISTRATION/SEX OFFENDER.
The entirety of the transcript from the July 27, 2009 hearing before Judge Thomas J. Kliebert, Jr. contains the following:
MS. BUQUOI:
Page 29, number 47, Andrew Paul Griffin.
A. (ANDREW GRIFFIN) Present.
THE BAILIFF:
Here.
MS. BUQUOI:
Susan, what is this set for? I see that you called a witness, but I don't —
MS. JONES:
May we approach the bench, Your Honor?
THE COURT:
Mr. Chilli Russo, will you step forward, please?[]
MR. RUSSO:
Yes, Judge?
THE COURT:
Yes, sir. Will you come up here, please? I've got a little bench conference I need you on.
(WHEREUPON, THERE IS A BENCH CONFERENCE IN THIS MATTER.)
THE COURT:
All right, State of Louisiana versus Andrew Griffin.
MS. JONES:
Susan Jones on behalf of Andrew Griffin. Your Honor, we would seek to offer and introduce the minutes of the previous conviction which shows that he entered a plea of guilty on July 27, 1999,
James Chilli Russo was an agent with the Division of Probation and Parole at the time of Mr. Griffin's guilty plea in 1999 and was assigned to supervise Mr. Griffin.
and we would submit — we would ask the Court to grant our Motion to Quash, because part of the plea agreement was that he would only have to register for the determined period of time. He has done that. He has complied with it, and we would submit that the inducement for entering that plea was that the registration would not go beyond the period as stated in the law at that time. And as further proof of that, he was in fact — the condition that he register was waived, and he was not required to publish notice of the conviction in the newspaper. So that would make our argument even stronger that that seduced him.
THE COURT:
Does he have a clean record for the last ten years also?
Ms. JONES:
Yes.
THE COURT:
Ms. Buquoi?
MS. JONES:
We would call Mr. Russo if necessary to —
THE COURT:
You want to respond in any fashion?
MS. BUQUOI:
No, sir.
THE COURT:
All right, based upon all that the Court is going to grant the Motion to Quash.
A. (ANDREW GRIFFIN) Thank you.
MS. JONES:
Thank you, Your Honor.
THE COURT:
All right.
A. (ANDREW GRIFFIN) Thank you, Judge.
[THIS MATTER IS CONCLUDED.]
There appears to be no written ruling regarding the grant of the motion to quash. Based on the minute entry and the transcript from the Ascension Parish proceeding on July 27, 2009, Mr. Griffin maintained that it is clear that Judge Kliebert ruled that he was relieved from his obligation to register as a sex offender, finding that he had a "clean record" for the previous ten years.
On June 15, 2021, the trial court held a hearing on Mr. Griffin's request for a declaratory judgment, a writ of mandamus, and a permanent injunction. Both sides presented live testimony, and five joint exhibits were accepted into evidence. Relative to the matter of State of Louisiana v. Andrew Paul Griffin, bearing Docket No. 24054 in the 23rd Judicial District Court, Parish of Ascension, the Bill of Information for the charge of failing to register as a sex offender pursuant to La. R.S. 542(F)(1), the criminal minutes, and the transcript of the July 27, 2009 hearing before Judge Kliebert were jointly admitted as exhibits. The criminal minutes in the matters of State of Louisiana v. Andrew Paul Griffin, bearing Docket No. 11148 in the 23rd Judicial District Court, Parish of Ascension (involving the initial charge of carnal knowledge of a juvenile) and State of Louisiana v. Andrew Paul Griffin, bearing Docket No. 27709 in the 23rd Judicial District Court, Parish of Ascension (a subsequent proceeding involving multiple counts relative to obtaining controlled dangerous substances by fraud) were also jointly admitted.
At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court determined that Judge Kliebert's ruling ended Mr. Griffin's reporting requirement. The trial court additionally directed and ordered the Attorney General and DPSC, in the form of a writ of mandamus, to conform with the prior court's ruling and to terminate Mr. Griffin's obligation to register as a sex offender and to remove his name from the Louisiana State Police Sex Offender Registry. A permanent injunction was also issued, enjoining the Attorney General and DPSC from requiring Mr. Griffin to register beyond the ten years. The trial court further instructed the Attorney General "to share [this information] with the court of the 23rd Judicial Court ... so that it will be clear that [Mr. Griffin] has no sex offender registration requirements going forward." Finally, the trial court granted Mr. Griffin's request for attorney's fees in the amount of $2,500 and assessed costs to the Attorney General.
The trial court signed a judgment memorializing this ruling on January 24, 2022. The Attorney General and DPSC appealed the January 24, 2022 judgment, and assign the following errors:
1. The trial court erred as a matter of law when it issued a writ of mandamus, as Mr. Griffin sought a permanent injunction in the same petition, had an adequate remedy in a permanent injunction, and received a permanent injunction in the same judgment in which the trial court granted the writ of mandamus.
2. In 2009, Judge Kliebert granted Griffin's Motion to Quash a one-count Bill of Information in an Ascension Parish criminal case. The trial court legally erred when it determined Judge Kliebert's ruling in a criminal case terminated Mr. Griffin's obligation to register as a sex offender.
3. The trial court legally erred when it determined that Mr. Griffin does not have a current obligation to register as a sex offender.
4. The district court erred as a matter of law when it awarded Mr. Griffin $2,500 in attorney's fees. The award is not authorized by any statute or contract.
Respecting the Attorney General and DPSC's fourth assignment of error, counsel for Mr. Griffin forthrightly conceded in oral argument that there is no statute authorizing the award of attorney's fees in this case. See Wilson v. Two SD, LLC, 2015-0477 (La. App. 1st Cir. 12/23/15), 186 So.3d 159, 162, writ denied , 2016-0306 (La. 4/8/16), 191 So.3d 588; Sigur v. Mun. Employees' Ret. Sys. of Louisiana, 2021-0790 (La. App. 1st Cir. 3/4/22), 341 So.3d 632, 639, writ denied , 2022-00747 (La. 9/7/22), 345 So.3d 426 (Under Louisiana law, attorney fees are not permitted except where authorized by statute or by contract.). This assignment of error has merit, and we reverse the trial court's award of $2,500 in attorney's fees against the Attorney General. See Wilson, 186 So.3d at 162.
LAW AND ANALYSIS
In this matter, there is no dispute that Mr. Griffin was initially obligated to register as a sex offender in accordance with La. R.S. 15:540 et seq., for a period of ten years, which was extended to fifteen years by legislative amendment. However, the parties dispute the effect of an equivocal oral ruling made by Judge Kliebert on July 27, 2009, in the Ascension Parish proceeding.
As a necessary predicate to all other relief sought, Mr. Griffin argued that he was entitled to a judgment decreeing that the State is bound by Judge Kliebert's ruling. Mr. Griffin maintained that Judge Kliebert's ruling reduced his requirement to register as a sex offender from fifteen years to ten years pursuant to the version of La. R.S. 15:544 in effect on July 27, 2009, which provided for the reduction of the period to ten years if the offender maintained a clean record for the entire ten-year period.
The trial court agreed with Mr. Griffin's argument and, in its oral reasons, concluded as follows:
[T]he record [in the Ascension Parish proceeding] reflect[ed] that at the ten[-]year point, a hearing on the failure to register charge was conducted before Judge Kliebert [sic] on June [sic] 27, 2009, which is ten years. On that date Judge Kliebert [sic] determined that Griffin had maintained a clean record for the ten-year registration period and he quashed — what was before the court was to quash, in my estimation, was to quash the charge and the sex [offender] registration requirement.
This court affirms Judge Kliebert's [sic] finding and declares that Andrew Paul Griffin maintained a clean record for the entire ten-year period of registration and that he has been injured by the State requiring him to continue to register through April 2029.
However, the documentary evidence introduced at the hearing in this matter is unclear as to what specific relief was granted by Judge Kliebert in the Ascension Parish proceeding. The only documents memorializing the ruling of Judge Kliebert are the minutes from the Ascension Parish criminal proceedings concerning the failure to register as a sex offender and the transcript from the hearing in which Judge Kliebert made his ruling. The pleading itself, which would demonstrate the specific relief requested, was neither introduced at the hearing nor in the record in this matter. If an oral motion to quash the registration requirement was made at any point during the Ascension Parish proceeding, it is not reflected in the documents introduced into evidence in this matter. Rather, the only indications in the record of the subject matter for the motion to quash were minute entries stating "MTN QUASH BILL OF INFORMATION" and "Motion to Quash granted by the Court as to REGISTRATION/SEX OFFENDER," and the fact that the charge on the Bill of Information was "REGISTRATION OF SEX OFFENDERS."
Mr. Griffin was the only person to testify in support of his claims. Mr. Griffin was asked whether, after learning that he was required to register beyond his initial ten-year period, he applied to have his registration reduced from fifteen to ten years, and Mr. Griffin responded, "That's correct." There were no questions asked as to how, when, or before what court or agency this application was made. When asked whether it was his understanding at the conclusion of the hearing before Judge Kliebert that his "registration had indeed been quashed," Mr. Griffin responded, "That's correct." According to Mr. Griffin, he contacted Louisiana State Police multiple times to have the ruling recognized by the state, and either could not get through or was told "it wasn't done correctly." Mr. Griffin's testimony did not provide any information as to the substance of the motion to quash granted by Judge Kliebert on July 27, 2009.
In view of the entirety of the evidence presented in this matter, we find that Mr. Griffin did not carry his burden of proof of establishing entitlement to any of the relief sought, as he failed to establish what relief was granted by Judge Kliebert. To the extent that the trial court made a factual determination of what relief was granted by Judge Kliebert, we find that the trial court was manifestly erroneous. Stobart v. State through Dep't of Transp. & Dev., 617 So.2d 880, 882 (La. 1993) ("A court of appeal may not set aside a trial court's or a jury's finding of fact in the absence of `manifest error' or unless it is `clearly wrong.'"). Despite the trial court's conclusion that Judge Kliebert "determined that Griffin had maintained a clean record for the ten-year registration period," the evidence did not demonstrate that Judge Kliebert made any such determination; rather, Judge Kliebert asked Mr. Griffin's counsel, "Does he have a clean record for the last ten years also?" to which counsel responded, "Yes." In the oral ruling, Judge Kliebert stated, "based upon all that the Court is going to grant the Motion to Quash." There is no indication of what "all that" encompassed, nor was there any evidence produced in this matter to explain or support to what Judge Kliebert was referring or on what he was relying in making his ruling. There exists no reasonable factual basis in the record to support the conclusion reached by the trial court. See Id.
Additionally, and to the extent that the trial court in this matter was interpreting the decree of another court, we find that the trial court legally erred in concluding that Judge Kliebert definitively ruled that Mr. Griffin had a clean record for purposes of the applicable version of La. R.S. 15:544(D) in 2009, such that his reporting requirements under La. R.S. 15:540 et seq., ended on July 27, 2009. See Marco Outdoor Advert., Inc. v. Dep't of Transp. & Dev. By & Through Wilson, 2021-0123 (La. App. 1st Cir. 7/13/21), 329 So.3d 288, 299, writ denied, 2021-01195 (La. 11/10/21), 326 So.3d 1247 (Appellate review of questions of law is simply a review of whether the trial court was legally correct or legally incorrect.).
In finding error in the trial court's determination that Judge Kliebert's ruling dispensed with Mr. Griffin's reporting requirements, there is no basis on which to support the trial court's issuance of a writ of mandamus, permanent injunction, or other relief ordered in the January 24, 2022 judgment. Accordingly, we find merit in the Attorney General and DPSC's assignments of error and reverse the January 24, 2022 judgment of the trial court.
CONCLUSION
In light of the above, the January 24, 2022 judgment of the trial court is hereby reversed in its entirety. Cost of this appeal in the amount of $1,625.00 are assessed to plaintiff Andrew Paul Griffin.
REVERSED.
Chutz, J., concurs with dissents.
Chutz, J., concurring.
I respectfully concur in the result reached by the majority. The 23rd JDC criminal proceeding in which Mr. Griffin's motion to quash was granted was decided upon the evidence presented in that matter and concluded only the criminal case pending before the 23rd JDC at that time. By contrast, "[t]he sex offender registration and notification statutes are a civil regulatory scheme administered and maintained independent of any criminal case arising as a result of failing to comply with that scheme." See Quatrevingt v. State through Landry, 17-0884 (La. App. 1st Cir. 2/8/18), 242 So.3d 625, 639, writ denied, 18-0391 (La. 4/27/18), 239 So.3d 837. Mr. Griffin has not established in the instant civil proceeding that he is entitled pursuant to La. R.S. 15:544(D) to be released from his obligation to register as a sex offender or to the removal of his name from the Louisiana State Police Sex Offender Registry.