Opinion
Civil Action 3:23-cv-345-HTW-LGI
05-29-2024
RILEY GRIFFIN PETITIONER v. WARDEN BAYSHORE RESPONDENT
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
LAKEYSHA GREER ISAAC, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Petitioner Riley Griffin brings the instant petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. Griffin is incarcerated at the Federal Correctional Complex in Yazoo City, Mississippi (FCC-Yazoo) serving 132 months for Travel with Intent to Engage in Illicit Sexual Conduct with a Minor and Receipt and Distribution of Child Pornography. Griffin alleges that disciplinary proceedings, resulting in solitary confinement, the loss of good-conduct credit, and visitation restrictions violated his due process rights. Respondent asserts that the petition should be denied because all due process requirements were met, and sufficient evidence supports the sanctions imposed. Having considered the submissions of the parties and the applicable law, the undersigned recommends that the petition be dismissed.
On the morning of December 5, 2021, at 5:46 a.m., Griffin was informed that he had been selected to provide a urine sample for a routine drug screening. Under BOP policy, Griffin was required to provide a sufficient testing sample within two hours, and he was given eight ounces of water to complete the task. However, he was unable to provide the requisite testing sample (66cc or two ounces) within the two-hour time frame.
BOP Program Statement 6060.08, sec. 9(a). Despite his best efforts, Griffin claims his sample “fell just short of the line.”
Later that day, he received a copy of an incident report charging him with violating Disciplinary Code 103, Refusing Drug/Alcohol Test. Upon reviewing the incident report, the Unit Disciplinary Committee (“UDC”) referred the matter to the Disciplinary Hearing Officer (DHO) for a hearing, which was held on December 13, 2021. Griffin was advised of his rights to a disciplinary hearing, including the right to a staff representative and the right to present witnesses on his behalf. He declined both, however. In his defense, Griffin stated: “I deny it. I provided a sample[,] but it wasn't enough for the test.” In considering this statement, the DHO advised Griffin that the “inability to provide the proper amount of urine for the test also qualifies as refusing a drug test.” Finding the greater weight of the evidence established a Code 110 violation, the DHO sanctioned Griffin with a disallowance of 41 days of good-conduct time, 11 days of solitary confinement, and 6 months loss of visitation rights.
After exhausting his administrative remedies, Griffin filed the instant petition alleging that his due process rights were violated, and the sanctions imposed were arbitrary and capricious. As grounds for relief, he requests that his 41 days of good-conduct time be restored.
Discussion
It is well-settled that an inmate's liberty interest in his earned good time credits cannot be denied without the minimal safeguards afforded by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 94 S.Ct. 2963, 41 L.Ed.2d 935 (1974). However, prison disciplinary proceedings are not a part of a criminal prosecution, so a prisoner is not afforded the full panoply of rights in such proceedings. Id. at 566. The evidence here reflects that Griffin received all the procedural due process to which he was entitled. He was given (1) advance written notice of the charges at least 24 hours prior to the proceedings; (2) the opportunity to have assistance from a staff representative; (3) the opportunity to present documentary evidence and call witnesses in his defense; and, (4) a written statement by the factfinder of the evidence relied on and the reasons for the disciplinary action taken. Martinez v. Young, 653 Fed.Appx. 835, 836 (5th Cir. 2016) (citing Wolff, 418 U.S. at 563-70).
The gravamen of Griffin's complaint, however, is that he did not refuse to give a sample but was simply unable to produce the required amount. But under the applicable BOP regulations, a failure to provide a urine sample within a two-hour period is deemed to be a refusal unless the inmate rebuts the presumption during the disciplinary process. 28 C.F.R. § 550.31(a). BOP Program Statement 6060.08, sec. 9(a), Urine Surveillance and Narcotic Identification, specifically provides that a “urine sample is considered to be approximately a full specimen bottle,” or specifically “60 cc or two ounces” of urine. Though the record is silent on what Griffin produced, he has consistently acknowledged that his sample fell short. Smith v. Dir., No. CIV.A.9:09CV24, 2010 WL 2267224, at *2 (E.D. Tex. Apr. 12, 2010), report and recommendation adopted, No. CIV.A.9:09CV24, 2010 WL 2267241 (E.D. Tex. June 3, 2010) (rejecting petitioner's attempts to draw a distinction between “failing” to provide a specimen and “refusing” to do so).
Notably, he has asserted several reasons for his inability to produce a full specimen on administrative and habeas review including the need to have a bowel movement, a shy bladder, intimidation tactics by the attending officer, and a desire not to appear argumentative.But these reasons are not listed in the incident report and do not appear to have been offered at the disciplinary hearing. See Julick v. Snyder-Norris, No. 16-CV-107-HRW, 2016 WL 6246790, at *6 (E.D. Ky. Oct. 25, 2016), aff'd, No. 16-6652, 2017 WL 5485453 (6th Cir. Mar. 1, 2017) (evidence supporting disciplinary finding where petitioner, who had a medical condition and a reported need to have a bowel movement prior to urine flow, failed to make “clear to the DHO the particulars of his condition”); Garcia-Cortez v. Sanders, No. SACV 11-1554-CJC MAN, 2013 WL 2417973, (CD. Cal. May 31, 2013) (“Because Petitioner never mentioned his gastrointestinal issues, his asserted condition formed no part of the evidence before the DHO.”). Griffin also argues he was “not allowed to present evidence” at the disciplinary hearing, but he does not indicate what that evidence might have been. He has offered no medical documentation concerning any physical basis for his inability to provide a urine sample, or any other evidence to rebut the presumption that his sample was a Code 110 violation. As for his contention that he may have been able to provide a sample had he been allowed to have a bowel movement, BOP Program 6060.08 states: “To eliminate the possibility of diluted or altered samples, staff shall keep the inmate under direct visual supervision during this two-hour time period, or until a complete sample is finished.” Allowing such an accommodation, which is in the discretion of BOP staff, could have diluted or contaminated the sample.
Under BOP policy, “[s]taff may consider supervising indirectly an inmate who claims to be willing but unable to provide a urine sample under direct visual supervision,” by “allowing the inmate to provide the sample in a secure, dry room after a thorough search has been made of both the inmate and the room.” BOP Program Statement 6060.08. sec. 9(a). Post-hearing, Griffin advises that he did not know this was an option at that time. To the extent he argues that the BOP failed to follow its own rules and regulations, such allegations do not constitute violations of federal law cognizable under § 2241. Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 485 (1995); Davis v. Lithicum, 574 Fed.Appx. 379, 380 (5th Cir. 2014); Myers v. Klevenhagen, 97 F.3d 91, 94 (5th Cir.1996).1
Ultimately, the DHO was entitled to place greater weight on the report that Griffin was given the requisite amount of water and sufficient time. Disciplinary hearings do not require proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Due process is satisfied if there is “at least ‘some basis in fact' or a ‘modicum of evidence' to support the disciplinary conviction.'” Superintendent, Massachusetts Corr. Inst. v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 454-56, (1985). “[O]nly where there is no evidence whatsoever to support the decision of the prison officials,” will prison disciplinary hearings be overturned. Kapordelis v. Myers, 16 F.4th 1195, 1200 (5th Cir. 2021) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted) (emphasis added by Fifth Circuit). The sincerity of Griffin's arguments notwithstanding, such evidence exists here. See Lacy v. Young, 2021 WL 6498833 (S.D. W.Va. Nov. 16, 2021), report and recommendation adopted by, 2022 WL 141675 (S.D. W.Va. January 14, 2022) (“Without doubting the sincerity of Lacy's claim that he was physically unable to provide a urine sample on request, the Court lacks authority to grant Lacy relief when the disciplinary proceedings comported with due process and the DHO's decision is supported by some evidence.”); Resendez v. Washington-Adduci, No. 7:15cv01340-VEH-JEO, 2017 WL 693334 (N.D. Ala. Jan. 26, 2017), report and recommendation adopted, No. 7:15cv01340 VEH-JEO, 2017 WL 679852 (N.D. Ala. Feb. 21, 2017), at *3 (rejecting petitioner's claim that she had no “malicious intent” in failing to produce a sufficient urine sample and finding that “intent is not the relevant consideration” rather, the only consideration is whether “some evidence” supports the disciplinary conviction).
As for Griffin's contentions that his sanctions were arbitrary and capricious, he only specifically challenges the 41-day loss of good conduct time. However, all sanctions were within the range provided in the regulation. See 28 C.F.R. § 541.3(b) (setting forth appropriate punishments including up to 41 days loss of good conduct time, disciplinary segregation, and the loss or privileges, including visitation); see also Wallace v. Ebbert, 505 Fed.Appx. 124, 125 (3d Cir. 2012) (punishment within standard regulatory limits for prison infraction does not impugn due process).
It is well-settled that the authority to administer prison discipline is within the discretion of the BOP. Because the record shows that there was at least some evidence to support the relevant finding, the Court is without authority to find that Griffin's arguments, including those not expressly addressed herein, provide a basis for disturbing the DHO's finding or the sanctions imposed. Accordingly, the undersigned recommends that the instant petition be denied.
NOTICE OF RIGHT TO APPEAL/OBJECT
Under Rule 72(a)(3) of the Local Uniform Civil Rules of the United States District Courts for the Northern District of Mississippi and the Southern District of Mississippi, any party may serve and file written objections within 14 days after being served with a copy of this Report and Recommendation. Within 7 days of the service of the objection, the opposing party must either serve and file a response or notify the District Judge that he or she does not intend to respond to the objection.
The parties are notified that failure to file timely written objections to the proposed findings, conclusions, and recommendations contained within this report and recommendation, will bar that party from attacking on appeal the unobjected-to proposed factual findings and legal conclusions accepted by the district court, except upon grounds of plain error. 28 U.S.C. § 636, Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b) (as amended, effective December 1, 2009); Douglass v. United Servs. Auto. Ass'n, 79 F.3d 1415, 1428-29 (5th Cir. 1996).