Opinion
No. CV 03-0825933 S
May 17, 2004
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION ON MOTION TO DISMISS COUNT TWO
Enterprise Rent-a-Car and Camrac, Inc. move to dismiss count two of this personal injury action directed to them on the ground that the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction because Enterprise Rent-a-Car and "Camrac" are not legal entities. The defendants argue that Enterprise Rent-a-Car is merely a trade name for Camrac, Inc., and, therefore, it has no legal existence. The defendants also argue that the plaintiff's complaint does not allege a cause of action against Camrac, Inc., but only against the nonexistent entity "Camrac." An additional claim is made of improper services on Camrac, Inc.
I
It is clear that in order to confer jurisdiction on the court the plaintiff must have an actual legal existence, that is he or it must be a person in law or a legal entity with legal capacity to sue. Isaac v. Mount Sinai Hospital, 3 Conn. App. 598, 600, 490 A.2d 1024, cert. denied, 196 Conn. 807, 494 A.2d 904 (1985).
This court does not have subject matter jurisdiction over the defendant Enterprise Rent-a-Car, because no action may be brought against a trade name as an entity and any such proceeding must be considered a nullity. GMA Yacht Sales v. Skagit Marine Dis., Superior Court, judicial district of Fairfield at Bridgeport, Docket No. CV 99 036 4155 (September 7, 2000, Skolnick, J.) ( 28 Conn. L. Rptr. 227).
II
The situation is different with respect to Camrac, Inc.
In Lussier v. Dept. of Transportation, 228 Conn. 343, 350, 636 A.2d 808 (1994), our Supreme Court stated: "When the correct party is designated in a way that may be inaccurate but which is still sufficient for identification purposes, the misdesignation is a misnomer. Such a misnomer does not prevent the exercise of subject matter jurisdiction if the defendant was actually served and knew he or she was the intended defendant." See also Cherry Hill Construction Co. v. Gateway Plaza, Superior Court, judicial district of Tolland at Rockville, Docket No. CV 03 0081364 (February 5, 2004, Scholl, J.) (finding incorrectly named plaintiff simply a misnomer — there being little difference between the names "Cherry Hill Construction Company, Inc." and "Cherry Hill Const., Inc."). Accordingly, we conclude that this court maintains subject matter jurisdiction over the defendant Camrac, Inc., since the name "Camrac," while inaccurate, sufficiently notified Camrac, Inc. that it was the intended party to the lawsuit.
III
However, the defendant Camrac, Inc. moves to dismiss the plaintiff's claim on the additional ground that the court lacks personal jurisdiction over it due to insufficiency of service of process. Specifically, Camrac, Inc. alleges that the plaintiff did not serve the second revised complaint pursuant to the requirements in Gen. Stat. § 52-45a, because neither a summons page, nor a return date accompanied the complaint. Proper service is essential to obtain personal jurisdiction. Kim v. Magnotta, 249 Conn. 94, 101-02, 733 A.2d 809 (1999). The plaintiff concedes in her Revised Objection to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss that service upon Camrac, Inc. was imperfect, but argues that the motion should be denied because it was untimely. Practice Book § 10-30 provides that a motion to dismiss for insufficiency of process must be made within 30 days of the filing of an appearance. An appearance for Enterprise Rent-a-Car was filed on July 7, 2003. Subsequent to the plaintiff's motion to cite in Camrac, Inc. as a defendant Camrac, Inc. filed an appearance on February 18, 2004. Thereafter, Enterprise Rent-a-Car and Camrac, Inc. filed this motion to dismiss on February 27, 2004. Since the motion to dismiss was filed within thirty days of the second appearance, it is timely. Moreover, the motion to dismiss is appropriate to address a claim of lack of personal jurisdiction. Knipple v. Viking Communications, Ltd., 236 Conn. 602, 605 (1996). It is concluded that this court does not have personal jurisdiction over Camrac, Inc.
Since the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over
Enterprise Rent-a-Car and lacks personal jurisdiction over the defendant Camrac, Inc., defendants' motion to dismiss count two is granted.
Wagner, JTR