Opinion
June 13, 1994
Appeal from the Supreme Court, Queens County (Milano, J.).
Ordered that the judgment is affirmed, without costs or disbursements.
The Supreme Court properly granted the defendant's motion to dismiss the complaint at the conclusion of the trial as the plaintiff failed to demonstrate a "special relationship" between the decedent and the defendant municipality (see, Merced v. City of New York, 75 N.Y.2d 798, 799; Kircher v. City of Jamestown, 74 N.Y.2d 251, 255; Cuffy v. City of New York, 69 N.Y.2d 255, 260; Riss v. City of New York, 22 N.Y.2d 579, 581; Rodriguez v. City of New York, 189 A.D.2d 166, 172; Kilmetis v. New York City Tr. Auth., 181 A.D.2d 659, 660). There was no evidence at the trial that the decedent was promised protection or that the decedent requested protection from the police upon learning of a threat to her life. Thus, after the threat there was no direct contact between the decedent and the police and no reliance on promises of protection or a breach of any special duty by a refusal to give assistance (see, Wolff v. City of New York, 190 A.D.2d 732; Yearwood v. Town of Brighton, 101 A.D.2d 498, 501, affd 64 N.Y.2d 667).
The fact that the decedent's employer called the police about the threat is insufficient absent evidence that the employer received assurances from the police and those assurances were communicated to the decedent who acted in reliance thereon (see, Merced v. City of New York, 75 N.Y.2d, at 800, supra; Kircher v City of Jamestown, 74 N.Y.2d, at 254, 257-258, supra; Helman v County of Warren, 111 A.D.2d 560, affd 67 N.Y.2d 799; compare, Freidfertig Bldrs. v. Spano Plumbing Heating, 173 A.D.2d 454, 455). Rosenblatt, J.P., Miller, Lawrence and Florio, JJ., concur.