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stating arbitration agreement's broad language provides arbitrator wide latitude to fashion relief, including issuance of preliminary injunction
Summary of this case from J. Strober Sons, LLC v. Strober Roofing, Inc.Opinion
CIVIL ACTION N0: 03-2179, SECTION: "R" (3)
December 2, 2003
ORDER AMD REASONS
Defendant Chase Manhattan Automotive Finance Corporation moves the Court to compel arbitration and to stay tins action pending arbitration. For the following reasons, the Court GRANTS defendant's motion in part and DENIES the motion in part.
I. BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL INSTORY
In September, 2000, plaintiff Todd Greene entered into a motor vehicle lease agreement with Lakeside Toyota in Metairie, Louisiana. Lakeside Toyota assigned the lease to Chase Manhattan, which financed the lease.
On December 6, 2001, the United States called Todd Greene to active military duty. Greene's orders indicated that the government expected him to serve until at least December 2002. Greene is still on active duty at this time and has no knowledge of when ins active term of service will end.
At the time the government called Greene to active duty, he and ins wife, Carla Greene, learned that ins total monthly Income would decrease by fifty percent. The Greenes therefore put their house up for sale and sought to purchase a smaller home with a lower monthly note. Todd Greene also submitted to Chase Manhattan a copy of ins order and a properly executed affidavit under the Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act, 50 U.S.C. app. § 510, et seg. The affidavit referred to the loan number associated with ins vehicle lease and invoked his right to relief under the statute.
On January 6, 2002, Greene informed Chase Manhattan of ins financial situation and asked Chase to terminate the lease. Chase Manhattan disputed Greene's right to relief under the Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act and informed him that he would be required to continue payments under the lease.
Greene alleges that throughout the spring and summer of 2002, Chase sent him "dunning letters," seeking to collect the monthly payments, threatening to sue him, and threatening to repossess the vehicle. Plaintiff also alleges that Chase reported the loan as delinquent to credit reporting agencies.
In response to Chase's allegedly threatening letters, Carla Greene voluntarily surrendered the leased vehicle. Chase sold the repossessed vehicle in December 2002, allegedly for one-half of its Blue Book value. Chase then attempted to collect costs, auction fees, reconditioning fees, and a claimed deficiency balance of $8,610.99 from the Greenes. Plaintiffs also allege that the notifications that Chase sent to credit reporting agencies ruined their credit rating and impeded their purchase of a smaller, less expensive home.
Plaintiff sued Chase in tins Court for violations of the Fair Credit Reporting Act, the Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act, and relevant state statutes, Including the Louisiana Unfair Trade Practices Act. Two months later, plaintiffs filed a second suit in tins Court, adding a claim for emotional distress. The Court consolidated the two actions.
The lease signed by Todd Greene, but not by Carla Greene, contained an "Agreement to Arbitrate Disputes." Defendant now moves the Court to compel arbitration and to stay tins action. Plaintiffs oppose tins motion.
II. DISCUSSION
A. LAW
In adjudicating a motion to compel arbitration under the Federal Arbitration Act, courts conduct a two-step inquiry. The first step is to determine whether the parties agreed to arbitrate the dispute. Webb v. investacorp, Inc., 89 F.3d 252, 258 (5th Cir. 1996). in tihs analysis, the Court must determine "whether there is a valid agreement to arbitrate between the parties" and "whether the dispute in question falls within the scope of that arbitration agreement." Id. (citing Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 626 (1985)). To determine whether the parties agreed to arbitrate the dispute, "courts generally . . . should apply ordinary state-law principles that govern the formation of contracts." Id. (citing First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 944 (1995)).
Plaintiff does not dispute defendants proposition that the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 1, et. seq., applies to tins arbitration agreement. The Court will therefore dispense with analysis of the issue.
Depending on the language of the arbitration provision, there may be an additional threshold inquiry before the Court reaches the issue of whether the particular controversy falls within the scope of the arbitration agreement. The parties may have agreed to submit the issue of arbitrability of the particular dispute to the arbitrator. The Supreme Court has stated that "[c] ourts should not assume that the parties agreed to arbitrate arbitrability unless there is `clear and unmistakable evidence that they did so.'" First Options, 514 U.S. at 944 (quoting AT T Techs. Inc. v. Communications Workers, 475 U.S. 643, 649 (1986)). First Options places the burden on the district court "to look closely at the agreement between the parties and determine whether the parties agreed to arbitrate the issue of arbitrability." F.C. Schaffer Assocs., Inc. v. Demech Contractors, Ltd., 101 F.3d 40, 42 (5th Cir. 1996). If the parties agreed to arbitrate arbitrability, tins Court need not reach a determination of whether the dispute falls within the scope of the arbitration agreement. That is for the arbitrator to decide.
When the Court decides the scope of the arbitration provision, the Court must give due consideration to the strong federal policy favoring arbitration, "and ambiguities as to the scope of the arbitration clause itself must be resolved in favor of arbitration." Volt Info. Sciences, Inc. v. Board of Trustees of Leland Stanford, Jr. Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 475-76 (1989). After the Court determines that there is a valid arbitration agreement, it must decide whether "legal constraints external to the parties1 agreement foreclose [s] the arbitration of those claims." Webb, 89 F.3d at 258 (citing Mitsubishi Motors Corp., 473 U.S. at 628).
1. Whether the parties agreed to arbitrate the dispute
a. Whether there is a valid agreement to arbitrate between the parties
The Court must first determine whether there exists a valid agreement to arbitrate. Webb, 89 F.3d at 258. The Court will apply Louisiana law to the agreement. The parties who negotiated the contract, Todd Greene and Lakeside Toyota, are Louisiana domiciliaries. The negotiations for the contract took place in Metairie, Louisiana. The motor vehicle lease agreement provides that the lease will be governed by the law of the original lessor's state. ( See Def.'s Motion to Compel Arbitration and to Stay Action Pending Arbitration, Ex. 2). The original lessor is Lakeside Toyota of Metairie, Louisiana. There is no evidence that the law of any other state applies to tins contract.
The first line of the lease provides that the lessor is the dealer. ( See Def.'s Motion to Compel Arbitration and to Stay Action Pending Arbitration, Ex. 2).
Under Louisiana law, a contract is an agreement by two or more parties in which obligations are created, modified, or extinguished. LA. Civ. CODE art. 1906. The Louisiana Civil Code requires four elements for the confection of a valid contract: (1) the parties must possess the capacity to contract; (2) the parties must freely give their mutual consent; (3) there must be a certain and lawful object for the contract; and (4) there must be lawful cause. See LA. Civ. CODE arts. 1918, 1927 1971, 1966.
Plaintiffs argue that Todd Greene did not consent to arbitrate. Plaintiffs argue that defendant has not shown, nor can it show, that Todd Greene knew of, or consented to, any arbitration agreement. Plaintiffs argue that Exhibit 2 to defendant's motion, entitled "Motor Vehicle Lease Agreement," does not demonstrate Mr. Greene's consent because it is a blank, unsigned lease agreement. Plaintiff's argument is without merit.
The Court notes that plaintiff attacks ins consent to the arbitration agreement, not to the lease agreement. Because plaintiff asserts a defense to the arbitration agreement only, the Court must decide the issue. See Primerica Life ins. Co. v. Brown, 304 F.3d 469, 472 (5th Cir. 2002).
Exhibit 1 to defendant's motion is the actual lease signed by Greene. Exhibit 1 is, however, compressed because the paper on which the lease agreement is written is too large for the letter-sized paper of defendant's motion. Exhibit 2 is no more than an enlarged version of a blank copy of the lease, photocopied by defendant to enable the Court to read the provisions. in addition, defendant submits the affidavit of Jill Silvestro, Assistant Treasurer of Chase Manhattan. in her affidavit, Silvestro swears that Exhibit 2, although blank and unsigned, is a true and correct copy of the lease signed by Todd Greene. Defendant has carried its burden in proving that the lease agreement signed by Todd Greene contained the agreement to arbitrate.
The Fifth Circuit has rejected an argument similar to the Greene's. In Cajun Electric Power Cooperative, Inc. v. Riley Stoker Corp., Cajun Power attempted to argue that even though it had signed the contract, it did not agree to the arbitration provision. 791 F.2d 353, 357 (5th Cir. 1986). The court rejected tins argument, relying on the obvious placement of the arbitration agreement in the contract. See id. Here, the terms "Agreement to Arbitrate Disputes" is on the reverse of the lease. It is in bold lettering, all capitals, and is underlined. The arbitration agreement is set off from the rest of the text by a box that surrounds it. The agreement was not hidden or buried in the agreement. Even a cursory glance at the reverse of the agreement would have revealed the boxed-off provision in bold. The Court finds that Todd Greene consented to the arbitration agreement and that a valid agreement to arbitrate existed between the parties.
b. Whether the dispute falls within the scope of the arbitration agreement
The Court finds that it need not resolve the issue of whether the dispute here falls within the scope of the arbitration agreement because the "Agreement to Arbitrate Disputes" submits the issue of arbitrability to the arbitrator. The Agreement states:
The term Dispute also Includes all tort, common law, constitutional, statutory and equitable claims arising from the transaction to which tins Lease relates or arising from our enforcement of the Lease and any question regarding whether a matter is subject to arbitration under tins Agreement to Arbitrate Disputes.
(Def.'s Motion to Compel Arbitration and to Stay Action Pending Arbitration, Ex. 2) (emphasis added). The Court finds tins language "clear and unmistakable." See First Options, 514 U.S. at 944. It is clear that the parties intended to submit "any question regarding whether a matter is subject to arbitration" under the agreement to the arbitrator. It is therefore the arbitrator's duty to decide whether the scope of Greene's claims fall within the terms of the "Agreement to Arbitrate Disputes."
2. Whether legal constraints external to the parties' agreement foreclose the arbitration oú plaintiffs' claims
Although the Court finds that the parties intended the arbitrator to decide the question of arbitrability, the Court must still determine whether "legal constraints external to the parties' agreement foreclose [s] the arbitration of those claims." Webb, 89 F.3d at 258 (citing Mitsubishi Motors Corp., 473 U.S. at 628). Specifically, tins inquiry entails "whether any federal statute or policy renders the claims nonarbitrable." R.M. Perez Assocs., Inc. v. Welsh, 960 F.2d 534, 538 (5th Cir. 1992). The presumption of enforceability of arbitration agreements "applies equally to `claim[s] founded on statutory rights,'" such as those asserted by plaintiff under the FCRA and SSCRA. Walton v. Rose Mobile Homes, LLC, 298 F.3d 470, 473 (5th Cir. 2002) (citing Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 226 (1987)). To overcome the presumption in favor of arbitration, plaintiff has a heavy burden. Plaintiff must demonstrate that "Congress intended to preclude a waiver of judicial remedies for the statutory rights at issue." Mitsubishi Motors Corp., 473 U.S. at 628. Tins Court must consider three factors in order to determine whether Congress intended to foreclose application of the Federal Arbitration Act to the statutory rights here: "(1) the statute's text; (2) its legislative history; and (3) whether there is an `an inherent conflict between arbitration and the statute's underlying purposes.'" Id. Plaintiff asserts claims under the FCRA, the SSCRA, and the LUTPA.
The Court notes that it must proceed to tins analysis even though the arbitrator will decide the issue of arbitrability. An arbitrator "cannot decide an issue if there is a limitation in positive law — statutory or, of course, contractual — upon ins power to do so." Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Consol. Rail Corp., 892 F.2d 1066, 1070 (D.D.C. 1990); see also Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler-Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 627 (1985) ("Just as it is the congressional policy . . . that requires the scope of arbitration agreements covered by [the] Act, it is the congressional intention expressed in some other statute on which the courts must rely to identify any category of claims as to which agreements to arbitrate will be held unenforceable.") (emphasis added).
Whether LUTPA forecloses the application of the FAA to the dispute here is a non-issue. The United States Supreme Court has explicitly held that the FAA preempts any state statute that may attempt to foreclose arbitration proceedings. See Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 122-23 (2001).
a. Fair Credit Reporting Act
Although the Fifth Circuit has not addressed the issue directly, several district courts have held that FCRA claims are arbitrable and that noting in the FCRA's statutory framework or legislative history precludes the application of the FAA to claims under the FCRA. See, e.g., Berkery v. Cross Cty. Bank, 256 F. Supp.2d 359 (E.D. Pa. 2003) (granting motion to compel arbitration of FCRA claims); Jacobsen v. J.K. Pontiac CMC Truck, Inc., 2001 WL 1568817, No. 01 C 4316 (N.D. Ill. 2001) (same). The Court agrees with these courts that the FCRA does not preclude arbitration of claims filed under the statute.
b. Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act
Plaintiffs seek actual damages, statutory damages, costs, and attorneys' fees under the SSCRA. Plaintiffs do not assert a cause of action under any specific provision of the SSCRA. Plaintiffs merely allege that Chase violated Todd Greene's rights under the statute. From the factual allegations of plaintiffs' complaint, the Court finds that two provisions of the SSCRA are arguably applicable: §§ 526 and 531.
Plaintiffs arguably allege that Chase violated 50 U.S.C. app. § 526 by continuing to charge Todd Greene more than the 6% interest rate allowed by the statute. Plaintiffs assert that Chase violated the SSCRA by "misrepresenting that [Todd Greene] was required to continue monthly lease payments at the same rate, because [the] 6% limitation on interest, set forth in the Relief Act `only applies to loan accounts. . . .'" Pls.' Compl., at ¶ 9. Tins section states:
No obligation or liability bearing interest at a rate in excess of 6 percent per year Incurred by a person in military service before that person's entry into that service shall, during any part of the period of military service, bear interest at a rate in excess of 6 percent per year unless, in the opinion of the court, upon application thereto by the obligee, the ability of such person in military service to pay interest upon such obligation or liability at a rate in excess of 6 percent per year is not materially affected by reason of such service, in which case the court may make such order as in its opinion may be just.
50 U.S.C. app. § 526.
In addition, plaintiffs arguably assert that defendant violated § 531. Tins section, entitled "Installment contracts for purchase of property," provides that a creditor may not exercise any right or option to rescind or terminate a lease once the debtor has entered active military duty and once he has paid the first installment of the lease. See 50 U.S.C. app. § 531(1). Section 531(2) provides that any person who violates tins provision may be fined or imprisoned. See id. § 531(2). Section 531(3) provides that the court may order a stay of such proceedings until the obligor's active term of military service ends. See id. § 531(3).
It is far from clear that these provisions even provide an implied remedy for damages, much less foreclose arbitration for such a claim. indeed, there is nothing in §§ 526 or 531 that prevents arbitration. Nor do plaintiffs cite to any case law that holds that the various statutory provisions under which plaintiffs may arguably assert their claims foreclose arbitration. Further, "[i]n every case the Supreme Court has considered involving a statutory right that does not explicitly preclude arbitration, it has upheld the application of the FAA." Walton, 298 F.3d at 474 (listing statutes under which arbitration has been upheld by the Supreme Court).
The only remedies that the relevant provisions of the Act specifically provide are criminal in nature or injunctive (i.e., in the form of a stay). See 50 U.S.C. app. § 531(2) (criminal penalties); § 531(3) (stay); id. § 590 (allowing a district court to grant a stay of enforcement of obligations and liabilities during the serviceman's military service). A private party cannot impose criminal penalties, and plaintiffs do not ask the Court to stay any specific action.
Even were the Court to find that plaintiffs seek injunctive relief under the SSCRA, arbitrators are not per se prohibited from awarding such relief. See Marsh v. First USA Bank, 103 F. Supp.2d 909, 924 (N.D. Tex. 2000) (citing Gilmer v. interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 32 (1991)). The Court must refer to the express terms of the contract to ascertain whether the arbitration agreement provides for injunctive relief. Int'l Union of Operating Eng'rs, Local 103 v. Indiana Constr. Corp., 910 F.2d 450, 454 (7th Cir. 1990).
Here, the "Agreement to Arbitrate Disputes" does not explicitly provide what type of relief may be afforded under the provision. The arbitration agreement does not provide for, nor does it prohibit, injunctive relief. When, as here, the contract is not explicit concerning the relief available, the general rule is that "the arbitrator is given wide latitude in fashioning an appropriate remedy." Int'l Dillon of Operating Eng'rs, 910 F.2d at 454. Plaintiff points to no evidence that an arbitrator may not issue an injunction here. The Court finds that the arbitrator here is given wide latitude to fashion appropriate relief, Including a stay. See id.
Plaintiff Todd Greene must therefore submit ins claims to arbitration pursuant to the arbitration agreement in the motor vehicle lease agreement.
B. CARLA GREENE'S CLAIMS
A thornier issue arises with regard to the claims of plaintiff's wife, Carla Greene. The issue here is whether a non-signatory to the lease agreement is bound by the terms of the arbitration clause in the agreement. The issue is therefore not what claims are arbitrable, but who must arbitrate. Plaintiffs assert that Carla Greene's claims are not subject to the arbitration agreement in the motor vehicle lease because she was not a signatory to the lease. Defendant argues that federal courts have held non-signatories bound to the terms of an arbitration agreement when the non-signatory is a third-party beneficiary of the contract. Alternatively, defendant argues that the doctrine of equitable estoppel requires Carla Greene to arbitrate her claims because they require reliance on the contract between Chase and Todd Greene. For the following reasons, the Court holds that Carla Greene is not bound by the terms of the arbitration agreement.
Whether a party is bound by an arbitration agreement "is generally considered an issue for the courts, not the arbitrator,`[u]nless the parties clearly and unmistakably provide otherwise.'" Bridas S.A.P.I.C. v. Govt of Turkmenistan, 345 F.3d 347, 354 (5th Cir. 2003). Under Louisiana law, "ordinary contract principles govern the question of who is bound by an arbitration agreement." Shroyer v. Foster, 814 So.2d 83, 88 (La.Ct.App. 2002). Generally, "a party cannot be required to submit to arbitration to any dispute that he has not agreed to submit." Ciaccio v. Cazayoux, 519 So.2d 799, 804 (La.Ct.App. 1988).
Defendant relies on Fleetwood Enterprises, Inc. v. Gaskamp, 280 F.3d 1069 (5th Cir. 2002), and Mississippi Fleet Card, LLC v. BilStat, Inc., 175 F. Supp.2d 894 (S.D. Miss. 2001), as support for its proposition that a non-signatory is bound by the arbitration agreement when she sues on the contract or is a third-party beneficiary of the contract.
The Court finds these two cases inapposite here. Fleetwood explicitly treated Texas law and the application of the arbitration agreement to minors. 280 F.3d at 1074. Mississippi Fleet Card applied Mississippi law to the dispute there. 175 F. Supp.2d at 902. Neither Mississippi nor Texas law is applicable here.
It is readily apparent that there is nothing within the four corners of the agreement that binds Carla Greene to the contract. Mrs. Greene did not sign the arbitration agreement, nor is she defined as a party in the agreement. See Bridas, 345 F.2d at 355. Federal courts have, however, held that under certain circumstances a nonsignatory may be bound by a written arbitration agreement. See id. "Six theories for binding [such] a nonsignatory . . . have been recognized: (a) Incorporation by reference; (b) assumption; (c) agency; (d) veil-piercing/alter ego; (e) estoppel; and (f) third-party beneficiary." See id. at 356 (citing Thompson-C.S.F., S.A. v. American Arbitration Ass'n, 64 F.3d 773 (776 (2d Cir. 1995)). Here, defendant relies on estoppel and third-party beneficiary theories.
The Court finds that Carla Greene is not a third-party beneficiary of the lease agreement between her husband and Chase. Louisiana courts have set forth explicit requirements to prove the existence of a third-party beneficiary contract:
Under Louisiana law, a contract for the benefit of a third party is referred to as a stipulation pour autrui. `in order to establish a stipulation pour autrui there must be a clear expression of intent to benefit the third party. The third party relationship must form the consideration for a condition of the contract; the benefit may not be merely Incidental to the contract. A contract, in order to constitute a stipulation pour autrui, must be' in writing and clearly manifest an intention to confer a benefit upon a third party.Lakeland Anesthesia, Inc. v. CIGNA Healthcare of La., Inc., 812 So.2d 695, 702 (La.Ct.App. 2002) (citations omitted). The lease agreement does not satisfy these requirements. Nothing in the lease expresses a clear intent to confer a benefit on Carla Greene. Defendant's first argument is without merit.
Neither is Carla Greene equitably estopped from asserting that she is not bound by the arbitration agreement. In Grigson v. Creative Artists Agency, L.L.C., the Fifth Circuit held that a signatory is estopped from avoiding arbitration with a nonsignatory when the issues the nonsignatory seeks to resolve in arbitration are intertwined with the agreement that the estopped party has signed. 210 F.3d 524, 527 (5th Cir. 2000). The Fifth Circuit, however, has also made explicitly clear that the reverse is not also true: "a signatory may not estop a nonsignatory from avoiding arbitration regardless of how closely affiliated that nonsignatory is with another signing party." Bridas, 345 F.3d at 361 (citing MAG Portfolio Consultant, MGBH v. Merlin Biomed Group, L.L.C., 268 F.3d 58, 62 (2d Cir. 2001)). Chase may not estop Carla Greene from avoiding arbitration based on how closely her claims resemble those of her husband.
In addition, "direct benefits estoppel" does not apply here. See id. at 361-62. Direct benefits estoppel applies "when a nonsignatory `knowingly exploits the agreement containing the arbitration clause.'" Id. Louisiana courts have upheld a similar rule. See, e.g., Billieson v. City of New Orleans, 2003 WL 22244963, No. 2002-CA-1993 (La.Ct.App. 2003) (upholding district court's reasoning that plaintiffs were not equitably estopped from avoiding arbitration because they did not seek to enforce of the contract containing the arbitration provision). Carla Greene is not seeking to enforce the contract. Defendant argues that Mrs. Greene asserts an interest in the vehicle and that she is reaping the benefits from the lease agreement. This argument is unpersuasive. The "direct benefits" theory is reserved for those plaintiffs who sue to enforce a contract containing an arbitration agreement and who then attempt to shrink from the arbitration clause. Tins is not the situation here.
Absent some other evidence that Carla Greene is bound by the terms of the arbitration agreement, tins Court finds that Mrs. Greene is neither a third-party beneficiary of the lease agreement, nor is she equitably estopped from avoiding arbitration. Mrs. Greene's claims are not subject to arbitration.
C. THE MOTION TO STAY
Defendant also moves, pursuant to section 3 of the FAA, to stay the action pending arbitration. Once the Court finds the dispute arbitrable, it has no choice but to stay the action in response to a motion to stay. See Midwest Mech. Contractors, Inc. v. Commonwealth Constr. Co., 801 F.2d 748, 750 (5th Cir. 1986). As the Fifth Circuit has held, Section 3 is mandatory. See Folse v. Richard Wolf Med. instruments Corp., 56 F.3d 603, 605-06 (5th Cir. 1995) (citing In re Complaint of Hornbeck Offshore (1984) Corp., 981 F.2d 752, 754 (5th Cir. 1993)).
With regard to Todd Greene's claims, tins Court has held that there is a written agreement to arbitrate between the parties and that the parties have agreed to submit the issue of arbitrability to the arbitrator. Therefore, the Court must stay ins claims pending arbitration.
As to Carla Greene's claims, generally, the mandatory stay provision of § 3 of the FAA applies only to signatories to the contract. See Adams v. Georgia Gulf Corp., 237 F.3d 538, 540 (5th Cir. 2001); see also in the Matter of Talbott Big Foot, Inc., 887 F.2d 611 (5th Cir. 1989) (holding that the mandatory stay provision of § 3 does not apply to nonsignatories to the arbitration agreement). The Fifth Circuit has, however, recognized two exceptions to tins rule. A motion to stay may be granted against nonsignatories if: (1) the issues to be litigated in district court would render the arbitration redundant and meaningless, see Harvey v. Joyce, 199 F.3d 790, 796 (5th Cir. 2000); or (2) the issues to be litigated in district court are identical to those submitted to arbitration, harming the signatory parties1 right to arbitrate, see Subway Equipment Leasing Corp. v. Forte, 169 F.3d 324, 329 (5th Cir. 1999); Reisfeld Son Import Co. v. S.A. Eteco, 530 F.2d 679, 681 (5th Cir. 1976).
Here, Carla Greene's claims are identical to those of her husband. Mrs. Greene's claims are based on the "same operative facts" as those of her husband and are "inherently inseparable" from them. Reisfeld, 530 F.2d at 681. Allowing Mrs. Greene's claims against Chase to proceed to trial at the same time that Todd Greene's claims go before an arbitrator would adversely affect Chase's right to arbitrate. Chase would have to defend itself on identical claims on two different fronts. In consideration of the federal policy favoring arbitration, tins Court stays tins proceeding with regard to both of the plaintiffs' claims.
III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS defendant's motion to compel arbitration with respect to the claims of Todd Greene. The Court DENIES defendant's motion to compel arbitration with respect to the claims of Carla Greene. The Court also GRANTS defendant's motion to stay these proceedings pending arbitration with regard to the claims of both Todd and Carla Greene.
New Orleans, Louisiana.