Opinion
Civil Action No. 02-616
March 26, 2003
ORDER AND REASONS
Before this Court is the defendant, the United States', Motion to Dismiss/Alternatively Motion for Summary Judgment (Rec. Doc. 20). In its motion, the Government contends that the plaintiffs' survival action and claims for wrongful death should be dismissed because, with the exception of the claim brought by Ronald Lewis, none of the plaintiffs have exhausted their administrative remedies pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2675 (a) of the Federal Tort Claims Act. For the reasons explained below, the United States' Motion to Dismiss/Alternatively Motion for Summary Judgment is DENIED. Background
On March 6, 2002 the plaintiffs, the twelve children of Charles C. Lewis, filed suit under the Federal Tort Claims Act, alleging that their father died as a result of the negligent medical treatment he received at Veterans Administration Hospital. In their complaint, the plaintiffs assert a survival action as well as wrongful death claims. According to 28 U.S.C. § 2675, before suing the United States for money damages, a claimant must first exhaust his or her remedies in the appropriate federal agency. Ronald Lewis is the only plaintiff who filed an administrative claim before bringing this action. See Defendant's Exhibit A, Claim for Damage, 12/23/00. The other plaintiffs, Beverly Lewis Green, Nathan Charles Lewis, Theron Bernard Lewis, Raphael John Lewis, Carolyn Lewis Jasmin, Rose Lewis Wilson, Wayne Leonidas Lewis, John Thaddeus Lewis, Arnold Patrick Lewis, Denise Lewis Anderson, and Kelson Raymond Lewis, have not. In its Motion to Dismiss, the United States seeks to dismiss the remaining claims brought by the other eleven children on the grounds that they have failed to exhaust their administrative remedies. The plaintiffs contend that the Government's motion should be denied because Ronald Lewis' administrative claim was sufficient to put the government on notice of the possible claims of the remaining siblings, and that the purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 2675 have been satisfied by his administrative filing.
The FTCA Claim
The United States is correct in noting that before a tort claim can be filed in federal district court, an administrative claim must first be presented to the appropriate federal agency. See 28 U.S.C. § 2675 (a); see also Saunders v. Bush, 15 F.2d 64, 65 (5th Cir. 1994). Section 2675(a) reads in pertinent part:
An action shall not be instituted upon a claim against the United States for money damages, for injury or loss of property, or personal injury or death caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any employee of the Government while acting within the scope of his office or employment, unless the claimant shall have first presented the claim to the appropriate federal agency and his claim shall have been finally denied by the agency in writing and sent by certified or registered mail.28 U.S.C. § 2675 (a). A claim is properly presented within the meaning of § 2675(a) when the agency is given 1) sufficient written notice to commence investigation, and 2) the plaintiff places a value on the claim. See Transco Leasing corp. v. United States, 896 F.2d 1435, 1442 (5th Cir. 1990).
Requiring claimants to provide the relevant agency with notice of their claims serves two congressional purposes:
First, in enacting the notice requirement, Congress sought "to ease court congestion and avoid unnecessary litigation, while making it possible for the government to expedite the fair settlement of tort claims asserted against the United States." This efficiency purpose, however accompanies a second purpose "of providing for more fair and equitable treatment of private individuals and claimants when they deal with government or are involved in litigation with their government."Id. The Instant claim
Ronald Lewis filed his administrative claim on December 23, 2000. On Standard Form 95 (an administrative claim form, hereinafter "S.F. 95"), Mr. Lewis wrote "Ronald M. Lewis" in the space labeled "Name, Address of Claimant" and indicated on the form that his claim was for wrongful death in the amount of 1.5 million dollars. On September 5, 2001, the Department of Veterans Affairs denied his tort claim stating that no negligence had occurred. It reasoned that because no autopsy had been performed "the cause of death cannot be determined with greater certainty."
Pursuant to 28 C.F.R. § 14.2 a claimant or his duly authorized agent must fill out a form called the Standard Form 95 or other written notification of an incident, accompanied by a claim for money damages in a sum certain.
This issue confronting the Court is whether Ronald Lewis' administrative claim, which listed only himself as a claimant, sufficiently put the United States on notice of the claims of Charles Lewis' other surviving children. The Court need not address the second jurisdictional requirement, the "sum certain," because it is not in dispute. Ronald Lewis indicated that the wrongful death claim was for 1.5 million dollars.
Notice
The FTCA's notice requirement can be characterized as "minimal." Eskine v. United States, 1995 WL 495903 (E.D. La.). As long as the administrative claim evinces sufficient facts to enable the Government to investigate its potential liability, and conduct settlement negotiations, the minimal notice requirement has been satisfied. Eskine v. United States, 1995 WL 495903 (E.D. La.). A claimant's failure to comply with the maze of procedural regulations set forth in the 28 C.F.R. § 14 will not bar him or her from pursuing his claim in federal court. For instance, in Eskine, the court held that the fact that wife did not file a separate administrative claim from her husband, but filed one jointly did not divest the court of jurisdiction to hear wife's claim. In another case, Lightell v. United States, 1987 WL 15954 (E.D.La.), the court held that even though the wife was not listed as a claimant on the S.F. 95 that her husband submitted, the form provided adequate notice to the Government of the wife's claim because the wife's address was on the form. See also Champagne v. United States, 573 F. Supp. 488, 90 (E.D. La. 1983) (holding that although not all of the plaintiffs signed the S.F. 95 form, because their names were listed as claimants, the government had notice of their claims); Rise v. United States, 630 F.2d 1068 (5th Cir. 1980) (holding that the plaintiff could bring additional theories of liability which were not articulated in his administrative claim because his claim had fairly apprized the Government of the facts causing injury).
The United States argues that these cases can be distinguished from the instant situation because in all of the cases the plaintiffs cite, the litigants were listed somewhere on the S.F. 95 form. For instance, in Champagne, all of the minor children were listed as claimants — the defects in the application were 1) not all of the children had signed the form and 2) the mother did not list her authority to bring a claim in their behalf as the regulations require. Likewise, in Eskine, the defect in the S.F. 95 was that one of the claimants was not listed as a claimant, however, she was mentioned elsewhere on the S.F. 95 as the claimant's spouse. In all of these cases, the Government argues. the United States at least had names and addresses of potential claimants at its disposal, and therefore it had enough information to investigate. The Government argues that Ronald Lewis' administrative claim did not adequately notify it that there were eleven potential claimants because none of the siblings were listed anywhere on the S.F. 95. In other words the administrative claim did not comply with the procedures set forth in 28 C.F.R. § 14.
The plaintiffs respond that even though the siblings were not listed on the S.F. 95, the medical records show that Charles Lewis had several children. Medical records list Theron Lewis, Carolyn Lewis Jasmin, and repeatedly reference "family." The plaintiffs argue that these references along with the fact that the amount of damages Ronald Lewis claimed (1.5 million), put the Government on notice that there may have been more than one family member who could bring a wrongful death claim. The plaintiffs rely on Locke v. United States, 351 F. Supp. 185 (D. Haw. 1972), in which the court found that minor children were entitled to bring an action even though their names were not mentioned on the S.F. 95. In Locke, the husband of the decedent filed an administrative claim for personal injury in the amount of $250,000. The Locke court reasoned that the amount was large enough to put the Government on notice that the husband was bringing a claim for more than just loss of consortium. The court noted that the Government had ample time to investigate and had no excuse for being unaware that others may have been involved in the claim.
The Court acknowledges that the Ronald Lewis' administrative claim falls short of the type of notice contemplated by Champagne, Eskine, and the other cases upon which plaintiffs rely in that the surviving siblings are not listed as claimants or otherwise on the form. However, the Court finds Transco Leasing Corp. v. United States, 896 F.2d 1435 (5th Cir. 1990) instructive because it holds that even if names of some of the existing claimants are entirely absent from the S.F. 95, this fact is not material because the Government has a procedural mechanism which allows it to request additional information from the claimant.
In Transco, a bank, the executor of the Williams estate, filed an administrative claim on behalf of the estate. The attorney for the estate signed his name in the block entitled "Name of Claimant." The name and address of Willams' widow was present on the form, but she was not listed as a claimant. The widow's daughter was not listed on the form in any capacity. Subsequently, Williams' surviving wife and daughter filed suit. The United States argued that the district court should grant its motion for summary judgment because the administrative claim did not give sufficient notice of the claims of the surviving wife and daughter. The Transco court faulted the United States for not requesting additional information as allowed under 28 C.F.R. § 14.4 (a)(3). Title 28 C.F.R. § 14.4 (a)(3) authorizes the government to request additional information from the claimant. The section reads:
(a) Death. In support of a claim based on death, the claimant may be required to submit the following evidence or information:
(3) Full names, addresses, birth dates, kinship, and marital status of the decedent's survivors, including identification of those survivors who are dependent for support upon the decedent at the time of his death.28 C.F.R. § 14.4 (a)(3); see Transco, 896 F.2d at 1442. In Transco, the court explained that the bank's failure to comply with the literal requirements of regulations promulgated pursuant to § 2672, which pertains to the administrative adjustment of claims against the United States, would not bar the claims of the surviving wife and daughter as long as (1) the agency was given sufficient written notice of the claim and (2) a value was placed on the claim. Id. The court also stated that "the regulations promulgated pursuant to § 2672 are independent of the jurisdictional notice requirements of § 2675(a). . . . The Bank's failure literally to comply with that regulation is not a sufficient ground upon which to bar the claims of the wife and daughter when the jurisdictional requirements have been met." Id. at 1443-44.
Title 28 U.S.C. § 2762 pertains to the administrative adjustment of claims. It states in pertinent part that, "[t]he head of each Federal agency or his designee, in accordance with regulations prescribed by the Attorney General, may consider. ascertain, adjust, determine, compromise, and settle any claim for money damages against the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 2672.
In this case, there is no evidence that the United States ever made a request for more information pursuant to § 14.4, as it could have. Therefore, because there was sufficient written notice given for the United States to commence and investigation and because a value was placed upon the claim, the fact that the other surviving beneficiaries were not listed on the form, will not bar their cause of action. The omission of the names of the other surviving claimants is a procedural defect which does not diminish the fact that Ronald Lewis' claim gave the Government notice of the claim and stated the amount of the claim.
Additionally, as the Court noted above, notice satisfies the first purpose of requiring an administrative filing — to ease court congestion and avoid unnecessary litigation, while making it possible for the government to expedite the fair settlement of tort claims asserted against the United States. The Court concludes that Ronald Lewis' administrative filing fairly apprized the Government of his claim and the claim of his siblings. The second purpose of the administrative claim prerequisite is to "provide for a more fair and equitable treatment of private individuals and claimants when they deal with the government or are involved in litigation with their government." See Transco Leasing Corp. v. United States, 896 F.2d 1435, 1442 (5th Cir. 1990). "The administrative claims requirements of the FTCA are meant to benefit claimants and in no way [are] designed to preclude them from their day in court." Id. at 1444. Since Ronald Lewis' claim was denied because the Veterans Affairs panel found that there was no negligence, an order from this Court requiring the other eleven children to file administrative claims would be an exercise in futility. If the remaining eleven children were to file an administrative claim, Veterans Affairs would deny relief for the same reason it denied Ronald Lewis' claim. The Supreme Court and various federal courts have held that "when the attempt to exhaust such remedies would itself be a patently futile course of action," exhaustion of administrative remedies is unnecessary. Pan-American Pharmaceuticals Inc., v. Kessler, 980 F.2d 730 (6th Cir. 1992); see also Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305 (1988); Hessbrook v. Lennon, 777 F.2d 999, 1003 (5th Cir. 1985); Hart v. United States, 914 F. Supp. 1346, 1355 (S.D. W. Va. 1996). Consequently, this Court finds that barring the siblings' claims would prevent them from having their day in court and would be inequitable.
Conclusion
Ronald Lewis substantially complied with the minimal requirements of § 2675 by filing his claim and indicating a sum certain. The amount claimed was great enough to put the United States on notice that there may be multiple claimants. At this point, the United States could have requested additional information from Ronald Lewis as to whether there were additional survivors who had potential claims under 28 C.F.R. § 14.4. The United States chose not to pursue this avenue. However, to be fair to the United States, the Court will limit the amount of damages that the plaintiffs can seek on their wrongful death claims to 1.5 million dollars, the amount that Ronald Lewis claimed on the S.F. 95. The Court limits the plaintiffs' recovery to this amount because this is the amount of which the United States received notice. Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED that the United States' Motion to Dismiss/Alternatively Motion for Summary Judgment, (Rec. Doe. 20) is DENIED.