Opinion
99-Civ.-5255 (WGB).
August 23, 2001
Nashira A. Green, East Orange, NJ, Plaintiff pro se
Jason Holt, Esq., Tracey L. Hackett, Esq., Corporation Counsel, Office of Corporation Counsel, East Orange, NJ, Attorneys for Defendants East Orange Police Department and Officer Charles Hinton.
Marvin L. Comick, Esq., Love Randall, Esqs., East Orange, NJ, Attorneys for Defendants East Orange Board of Education, Deloris Trimble, Laura Trimmings, Dorothy Douge, Sadie Vincent, Iris Johnson, Victoria Laugalis, Herbert Robinson, James McDaniels, and Westly Hall.
OPINION
Defendants East Orange Police Department ("EOPD") and Officer Charles Hinton ("Hinton") (collectively "Defendants") move for summary judgment pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 56. The Court has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331.
For the reasons noted herein, Defendants' motion for summary judgment is granted only with respect to Plaintiffs' claims for false arrest, false imprisonment, and malicious prosecution.
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiffs Abijahn Johnson ("Abijahn") and Armoni Johnson ("Armoni") are the minor children of Plaintiff Nashira Green (collectively "Plaintiffs"). Plaintiffs are not represented by counsel. They allege various violations of their civil rights. Because only Defendants EOPD and Hinton have moved for summary judgment, only the facts relevant to claims against them will be discussed.
Plaintiffs allege that on January 12, 1999, Defendant Westly Hall ("Hall"), a security guard at the Cicely Tyson School of Performing and Fine Arts, assaulted Armoni twice that day. (Amended Compl. at ¶ 15.) They also claim that during one of the assaults, Officer Charles Hinton ("Hinton") joined in while the school cheered on. (Id.) According to Plaintiffs, Hall and Hinton then lied about the assault and arrested the Johnson boys. (Id.) To support their version of the facts, Plaintiffs submit the witness statement of Beaulah Thompson ("Thompson"). In Thompson's statement, she alleges that she observed "Hitten" hit Abijahn and push him into the wall. Thompson also contends that Hall punched Armoni in the chest and pushed him into the wall.
Presumably, Thompson is referring to Hinton.
In contrast to Plaintiffs' version of the facts, the EOPD and Hinton contend that Armoni assaulted Hall on January 12, 1999 and that his brother, Abijahn joined in the assault. (Certification of Officer Charles Hinton ("Hinton Cert."), at ¶¶ 4-5.) Hinton claims that upon witnessing the attack, he came to the assistance of Hall and restrained Abijahn and Armoni. (Id. at ¶ 6.) According to Defendants, both children, while being restrained, stated several times that they were going to shoot Hall when they got out of jail. (Id.) They were transported to Juvenile Aid Bureau. (Id. at ¶ 7.) Hinton filed a police report regarding the incident. (See Police Report attached to Defs.' Letter Brief in Support of Summary Judgment ("Police Report")).
On January 22, 1999, Green filed a "Notice of Claim" under the New Jersey Tort Claims Act against the EOPD. Plaintiffs filed this action on November 10, 1999. Although it is difficult to ascertain from Plaintiffs' amended complaint what claims Plaintiffs are raising and against which Defendants, Plaintiffs appear to be making the following claims against the EOPD and Hinton: (1) assault and battery in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1, false arrest and imprisonment in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:13-3, criminal coercion in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:13-5, official misconduct in violation N.J.S.A. 2C:30-2, malicious prosecution, and intentional infliction of emotional distress, all as a result of the Johnsons' arrest on January 12, 1999, (Amended Compl., ¶¶ 18, 47); and (2) harassment of Plaintiffs for "five long years" by making false accusations and making warrantless entries into Green's home in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:33-4 (harassment), 2C:5-2 (conspiracy), and the Fourth Amendment. (Id. at ¶ 41.)
Additionally, Plaintiffs allege that all Defendants in this action discriminated against them, endangered the welfare of the two boys in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4, (id. at ¶ 51), and were "personally and directly involved in the misconduct and deprivation of the plaintiff's due process rights within meaning of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments" and in violation of New Jersey statute. (Id. at ¶ 50.) Finally, Plaintiffs contend that all Defendants conspired to deprive Plaintiffs of their right to "freedom of speech and exercise in violation of the 1st Amendment, and the 5th Amendment." (Id. at ¶ 53.)
Defendant EOPD and Hinton now move for summary judgment on "every remaining allegation of the Amended Complaint" against them. (Defs.' Brief in Support of Mot. for Summary Judgment, at 8 (emphasis added)). Nevertheless, Defendants failed to brief why "every" allegation against them should be dismissed. Accordingly, the Court will treat Defendants' motion as one for partial summary judgment and rule only on the claims that Defendants have briefed.
II. DISCUSSION
A. Qualified Immunity
The New Jersey Tort Claims Act, N.J.S.A. 59:1-1, et seq. governs the liability of public entities. Under N.J.S.A. 59:2-2, "[a] public entity is liable for injury proximately caused by an act or omission of a public employee within the scope of his employment in the same manner and to the same extent as a private individual under like circumstances."
Defendants, however, claim that they are entitled to qualified immunity from Plaintiffs' state constitutional and common law claims pursuant to certain provisions of the Tort Claims Act.
1. Police Department
Defendants claim that the EOPD is entitled to immunity under N.J.S.A. 59:2-3, which provides in pertinent part: "[a] public entity is not liable for an injury resulting from the exercise of judgment or discretion vested in the entity."
Immunity under N.J.S.A. 59:2-3 is, however, limited to "discretion exercised at the highest levels of government in matters of policy or planning." Tice v. Cramer, 133 N.J. 347, 366 (1993) (holding that an officer's conduct in pursuing a suspect at high speed, although comprised of decision whether to pursue, how to pursue, and whether to continue pursuit, was not a discretionary act); Costa v. Josey, 83 N.J. 49, 54-55 (1980) (concluding that with respect to public entities, "exercise of discretion" refers to "actual, high-level policymaking decisions involving the balancing of competing considerations.")
Here, Defendants cannot argue that Abijahn and Armoni's arrest was part of a high-level policymaking decision by the EOPD. Therefore, the EOPD is not entitled to immunity under N.J.S.A. 59:2-3.
To the extent, however, that Hinton is alleged to have engaged in willful misconduct, the EOPD is immune from those claims pursuant to N.J.S.A. 59:2-10, which states that a pubic entity "is not liable for the acts or omissions of a public employee constituting a crime, actual fraud, actual malice, or willful misconduct."
2. Officer Hinton
Defendants argue that Hinton is entitled to qualified immunity pursuant to N.J.S.A. 59:3-3, which states:
[a] public employee is not liable if he acts in good faith in the execution or enforcement of any law. Nothing in this section exonerates a public employee from liability for false arrest or false imprisonment.
"Under this section, immunity may be established `if the public employee can show either objective or subjective good faith.'"B.F. v. Division of Youth and Family Services, 296 N.J. Super. 372, 385 (App.Div. 1997) (citing Bombace v. City of Newark, 125 N.J. 361, 374 (1991)). "Good faith" is to be determined in relation to whether the public employee's conduct involved "crime, actual fraud, actual malice or willful misconduct" in violation of N.J.S.A. 59:3-14. Id. at 386. Actual fraud, actual malice or willful misconduct connotes the commission of a forbidden act with actual knowledge that the act is forbidden. Van Engelen v. O'Leary, 323 N.J. Super. 141, 151 (App.Div.), certif. denied, 162 N.J. 486 (1999).
Plaintiffs claim that Hinton engaged in willful misconduct when, as alleged in Thompson's statement, Hinton hit Abijahn and pushed him into the wall. Because there is a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether Hinton engaged in willful misconduct, Hinton is not entitled to qualified immunity under N.J.S.A. 59:3-3. In accordance with the express language of the statute, Hinton is also not immune from claims of liability for false arrest or false imprisonment.
B. False Arrest
"A basis for a suit for false arrest arises where the aggrieved party is arrested without legal authority, as where he is arrested pursuant to process that is void." Mesgleski v. Oraboni, 330 N.J. Super. 10, 24 (App.Div. 2000). "False arrest, or false imprisonment, is the constraint of the person without legal justification." Id. "The tort requires an arrest or detention of the person against his or her will; and lack of proper legal authority or `legal justification.'" Id. (citingBarletta v. Golden Nugget Hotel Casino, 580 F. Supp. 614, 617 (D.N.J. 1984)).
If an arrest is made based on probable cause, the existence of probable cause is a defense to a false arrest claim. Id. (citing Bauer v. Borough of Cliffside Park, 225 N.J. Super. 38, 47 (App.Div.), certif. denied, 113 N.J. 330 (1988)). Although a plaintiff need not establish the absence of probable cause, the existence of probable cause successfully defeats a claim for false arrest. Id. at 24-25.
"The probable cause needed to defend a false arrest action uses the objective standard of a reasonable and prudent person in like circumstances." Id. at 25. When the police officer "could reasonably have believed in the existence of probable cause, the issue of probable cause generally should be decided as a matter of law." Connor v. Powell, 162 N.J. 397, 409 (2000), cert. denied, 530 U.S. 1216 (2000).
Therefore, Defendants may defeat Plaintiffs' claim for false arrest upon a showing that Hinton had probable cause to arrest Abijahn and Armoni. As stated in Hinton's Certification and in the Police Report, Hinton observed Abijahn and Armoni physically assault Hall. Plaintiffs have not presented any evidence to establish a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether Hinton observed the alleged assault. Thus, the Court finds that it was objectively reasonable for Hinton, after having witnessed the assault, to have arrested the two boys.
Plaintiffs' false arrest claims cannot survive summary judgment because there was proper legal authority or legal justification for Hinton to have arrested Abijahn and Armoni.
C. False Imprisonment
Probable cause is also the threshold issue for determining the validity of a claim for false imprisonment. As stated above, false imprisonment, like false arrest, is also the constraint of the person without legal justification. Mesgleski, 330 N.J. Super. at 24.
Because probable cause formed the basis of Abijahn and Armoni's arrest, see discussion supra, Plaintiffs' claim for false imprisonment cannot, as a matter of law, survive Defendants' motion for summary judgment.
D. Malicious Prosecution
"A malicious prosecution action arising out of a criminal prosecution requires proof: (1) that the criminal action was instituted by the defendant against the plaintiff, (2) that it was actuated by malice, (3) that there was an absence of probable cause for the proceeding, and (4) that it was terminated favorably to the plaintiff." Lind v. Schmid, 67 N.J. 255, 262 (1975). "The plaintiff must establish each element. Upon failure to prove any one, the cause must fail." Id.
Giving Plaintiffs every reasonable inference, Plaintiffs cannot prove the existence of at least two of these four elements. First, Defendant Hall, rather than Defendants EOPD and Hinton, initiated the criminal proceedings against the two boys. Second, as discussed previously, probable cause existed to arrest Abijahn and Armoni. Because Plaintiffs cannot prove the existence of all four elements, the claim for malicious prosecution fails as a matter of law.
III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons noted above, Defendants' motion for summary judgment on Plaintiffs' claims for false arrest, false imprisonment, and malicious prosecution is granted.
An appropriate Order accompanies this Opinion.
ORDER
This matter having come before the Court on the motion of Defendants East Orange Police Department and Officer Charles Hinton for partial summary judgment pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 56; andThe Court having considered the submissions of the parties; and
The Court having decided this matter without oral argument pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 78; and
For the reasons set forth in the Court's Opinion filed this day; and
For good cause shown;
IT IS on this 23th day of August, 2001, hereby ORDERED that Defendants' motion for summary judgment on Plaintiffs' claims for false arrest, false imprisonment, and malicious prosecution is granted; and
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiffs' claims against Defendant East Orange Police Department and Officer Charles Hinton for false arrest, false imprisonment, and malicious prosecution are dismissed.